Nuclear deterrence theory: the search for credibility
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantage...
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1990
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (viii, 230 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511551598 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511551598 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511551598 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511551598 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 online resource (viii, 230 pages) |
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| publishDate | 1990 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| spelling | Powell, Robert 1956 July 7- Verfasser aut Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility Robert Powell Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1990 1 online resource (viii, 230 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd rswk-swf Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-06399-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-37527-6 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551598 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Powell, Robert 1956 July 7- Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)7791249-4 |
| title | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility |
| title_auth | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility |
| title_exact_search | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility |
| title_full | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility Robert Powell |
| title_fullStr | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility Robert Powell |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility Robert Powell |
| title_short | Nuclear deterrence theory |
| title_sort | nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility |
| title_sub | the search for credibility |
| topic | Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare Nukleare Abschreckung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551598 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT powellrobert nucleardeterrencetheorythesearchforcredibility |