Myths and realities of executive pay:
Popular perceptions of executive compensation in the United States are now part of a full-blown mythology fueled by critics who have little direct experience with the inner workings of corporations, their boards, and the executive teams who ultimately shoulder the responsibility for business success...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2007
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Popular perceptions of executive compensation in the United States are now part of a full-blown mythology fueled by critics who have little direct experience with the inner workings of corporations, their boards, and the executive teams who ultimately shoulder the responsibility for business success or failure. This book documents the realities of executive compensation by investigating the extent to which the pay for performance model governs executive pay levels. It also assesses the relative success of this model in creating value for shareholders and robust job growth for U.S. workers and provides detailed, real-world guidance for designing and executing effective executive compensation plans. Based on extensive empirical research and decades of direct experience in the field, Myths and Realities of Executive Pay settles the debate about executive compensation and the role it plays in the broader U.S. economy |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvii, 259 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511499296 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511499296 |
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505 | 8 | |a Prologue: the compensation committee meets -- Introduction: the battle over executive compensation -- Executive compensation in the U.S. corporate model -- The goals of executive compensation -- Our approach -- The myths and realities of pay for performance -- The realities of pay for performance -- Other issues -- Case studies -- The myth of managerial power -- Academic response to Bebchuk and Fried -- The realities of managerial power -- Camouflaged compensation -- At-the-money strike prices -- Repricings and reloads -- Diversifying, hedging and timing -- Peer group data and upward bias -- Other factors in setting pay -- Fixed shares vs. constant dollar techniques -- Conflicts of interest -- External pressures: the new context for executive compensation -- Characteristics of external forces -- Cyclical reforms and unintended consequences -- The genesis of the current environment -- The regulators -- Securities and Exchange Commission -- Financial Accounting Standards Board -- | |
505 | 8 | |a Internal Revenue Service -- NYSE and NASDAQ -- Congress -- The reformers -- Institutional investor perspectives -- Concerns with lack of pay for performance -- Stock incentives -- Performance metrics -- Severance and change-in-control agreements -- The financial activists -- LBO impact -- Impact of change-in-control protection -- Hedge funds -- Media critics and public figures -- What we can learn -- End of an era: the decline of the stock option -- The 1990s: the decade of the stock option -- 2000--2002: a turning point -- The decline of the stock option -- The realities of expensing -- Perceived value -- The case for stock options -- Costs and stock prices -- Reducing the expense -- The future of long-term incentives -- Factors influencing LTI design -- Designing a LTI program -- Setting performance goals and metrics -- Basis for measurement -- Goal setting -- Determining share award sizes -- A look to the future -- | |
505 | 8 | |a Executive stock ownership: the solution to the executive compensation crisis -- Agency theory and costs -- Moral hazard -- Driving superior returns -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Stock holding requirements -- Net share retention requirements -- Other mechanisms for creating ownership -- Management stock purchase plans -- Finding the right solutions -- Director compensation in the new environment -- The evolution of director compensation -- Move away from stock options -- Activity-based compensation -- Compensating committee chairs and members -- General electric as a reference point -- Director compensation levels and mix -- Director share ownership -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Net share holding requirements -- Ownership effectiveness -- Structuring the optimal director compensation package -- The future of director compensation -- The compensation committee: creating a balance between shareholders and executives -- Legal context -- Right from wrong? -- | |
505 | 8 | |a Foundations for best practices -- Creating excellence in corporate governance -- Institutional and regulatory governance recommendations and mandates -- Consultant independence -- Setting the CEO's pay as rigorously as possible -- Case study of an internal promotion -- Creating a pay-for-performance environment -- Rule 10b5--1 plans -- preannounced purchases or sales of stock -- Best governance practices in designing annual and long-term incentives -- Aligning all employee pay to improve corporate performance -- Elements of alignment -- Untenable forms of alignment -- Performance pay solutions -- Employee stock ownership -- The role of stock options -- Moving beyond options -- Converting to restricted stock -- Adjusting stock-based incentives -- Alignment in practice -- Building better alignment -- International executive pay comparisons -- U.S. competitive advantage -- The international executive pay gap -- United Kingdom -- France -- Canada -- Asia -- In summary -- | |
505 | 8 | |a Conclusion: the future of executive compensation -- Epilogue: back in the boardroom -- Acknowledgements -- Appendix A Legal and regulatory requirement for executive compensation plans -- Nonqualified stock options -- Incentive stock options -- Stock appreciation rights -- Restricted stock units -- Restricted stock -- Appendix B Summary of the regulatory and institutional mandates and recommendations -- Calpers -- TIAA-CREF -- Fidelity -- Vanguard -- Union-sponsored funds -- Other organizations -- The Council of Institutional Investors -- Institutional Shareholder Services -- Glass, Lewis & Company -- National Association of Corporate Directors -- The conference board -- Appendix C Academic articles on pay for performance and the executive labor market -- Index -- Endnotes | |
520 | |a Popular perceptions of executive compensation in the United States are now part of a full-blown mythology fueled by critics who have little direct experience with the inner workings of corporations, their boards, and the executive teams who ultimately shoulder the responsibility for business success or failure. This book documents the realities of executive compensation by investigating the extent to which the pay for performance model governs executive pay levels. It also assesses the relative success of this model in creating value for shareholders and robust job growth for U.S. workers and provides detailed, real-world guidance for designing and executing effective executive compensation plans. Based on extensive empirical research and decades of direct experience in the field, Myths and Realities of Executive Pay settles the debate about executive compensation and the role it plays in the broader U.S. economy | ||
650 | 4 | |a Chief executive officers / Salaries, etc / United States | |
650 | 4 | |a Executive ability / United States | |
650 | 4 | |a Competition, International | |
651 | 4 | |a USA | |
700 | 1 | |a Van Putten, Steven |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Kay, Ira T. |
author_facet | Kay, Ira T. |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Kay, Ira T. |
author_variant | i t k it itk |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043929221 |
collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
contents | Prologue: the compensation committee meets -- Introduction: the battle over executive compensation -- Executive compensation in the U.S. corporate model -- The goals of executive compensation -- Our approach -- The myths and realities of pay for performance -- The realities of pay for performance -- Other issues -- Case studies -- The myth of managerial power -- Academic response to Bebchuk and Fried -- The realities of managerial power -- Camouflaged compensation -- At-the-money strike prices -- Repricings and reloads -- Diversifying, hedging and timing -- Peer group data and upward bias -- Other factors in setting pay -- Fixed shares vs. constant dollar techniques -- Conflicts of interest -- External pressures: the new context for executive compensation -- Characteristics of external forces -- Cyclical reforms and unintended consequences -- The genesis of the current environment -- The regulators -- Securities and Exchange Commission -- Financial Accounting Standards Board -- Internal Revenue Service -- NYSE and NASDAQ -- Congress -- The reformers -- Institutional investor perspectives -- Concerns with lack of pay for performance -- Stock incentives -- Performance metrics -- Severance and change-in-control agreements -- The financial activists -- LBO impact -- Impact of change-in-control protection -- Hedge funds -- Media critics and public figures -- What we can learn -- End of an era: the decline of the stock option -- The 1990s: the decade of the stock option -- 2000--2002: a turning point -- The decline of the stock option -- The realities of expensing -- Perceived value -- The case for stock options -- Costs and stock prices -- Reducing the expense -- The future of long-term incentives -- Factors influencing LTI design -- Designing a LTI program -- Setting performance goals and metrics -- Basis for measurement -- Goal setting -- Determining share award sizes -- A look to the future -- Executive stock ownership: the solution to the executive compensation crisis -- Agency theory and costs -- Moral hazard -- Driving superior returns -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Stock holding requirements -- Net share retention requirements -- Other mechanisms for creating ownership -- Management stock purchase plans -- Finding the right solutions -- Director compensation in the new environment -- The evolution of director compensation -- Move away from stock options -- Activity-based compensation -- Compensating committee chairs and members -- General electric as a reference point -- Director compensation levels and mix -- Director share ownership -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Net share holding requirements -- Ownership effectiveness -- Structuring the optimal director compensation package -- The future of director compensation -- The compensation committee: creating a balance between shareholders and executives -- Legal context -- Right from wrong? -- Foundations for best practices -- Creating excellence in corporate governance -- Institutional and regulatory governance recommendations and mandates -- Consultant independence -- Setting the CEO's pay as rigorously as possible -- Case study of an internal promotion -- Creating a pay-for-performance environment -- Rule 10b5--1 plans -- preannounced purchases or sales of stock -- Best governance practices in designing annual and long-term incentives -- Aligning all employee pay to improve corporate performance -- Elements of alignment -- Untenable forms of alignment -- Performance pay solutions -- Employee stock ownership -- The role of stock options -- Moving beyond options -- Converting to restricted stock -- Adjusting stock-based incentives -- Alignment in practice -- Building better alignment -- International executive pay comparisons -- U.S. competitive advantage -- The international executive pay gap -- United Kingdom -- France -- Canada -- Asia -- In summary -- Conclusion: the future of executive compensation -- Epilogue: back in the boardroom -- Acknowledgements -- Appendix A Legal and regulatory requirement for executive compensation plans -- Nonqualified stock options -- Incentive stock options -- Stock appreciation rights -- Restricted stock units -- Restricted stock -- Appendix B Summary of the regulatory and institutional mandates and recommendations -- Calpers -- TIAA-CREF -- Fidelity -- Vanguard -- Union-sponsored funds -- Other organizations -- The Council of Institutional Investors -- Institutional Shareholder Services -- Glass, Lewis & Company -- National Association of Corporate Directors -- The conference board -- Appendix C Academic articles on pay for performance and the executive labor market -- Index -- Endnotes |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511499296 (OCoLC)850660045 (DE-599)BVBBV043929221 |
dewey-full | 331.2/8165800973 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 331 - Labor economics |
dewey-raw | 331.2/8165800973 |
dewey-search | 331.2/8165800973 |
dewey-sort | 3331.2 108165800973 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511499296 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:53Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780511499296 |
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spelling | Kay, Ira T. Verfasser aut Myths and realities of executive pay Ira T. Kay, Steven Van Putten Myths & Realities of Executive Pay Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007 1 online resource (xvii, 259 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Prologue: the compensation committee meets -- Introduction: the battle over executive compensation -- Executive compensation in the U.S. corporate model -- The goals of executive compensation -- Our approach -- The myths and realities of pay for performance -- The realities of pay for performance -- Other issues -- Case studies -- The myth of managerial power -- Academic response to Bebchuk and Fried -- The realities of managerial power -- Camouflaged compensation -- At-the-money strike prices -- Repricings and reloads -- Diversifying, hedging and timing -- Peer group data and upward bias -- Other factors in setting pay -- Fixed shares vs. constant dollar techniques -- Conflicts of interest -- External pressures: the new context for executive compensation -- Characteristics of external forces -- Cyclical reforms and unintended consequences -- The genesis of the current environment -- The regulators -- Securities and Exchange Commission -- Financial Accounting Standards Board -- Internal Revenue Service -- NYSE and NASDAQ -- Congress -- The reformers -- Institutional investor perspectives -- Concerns with lack of pay for performance -- Stock incentives -- Performance metrics -- Severance and change-in-control agreements -- The financial activists -- LBO impact -- Impact of change-in-control protection -- Hedge funds -- Media critics and public figures -- What we can learn -- End of an era: the decline of the stock option -- The 1990s: the decade of the stock option -- 2000--2002: a turning point -- The decline of the stock option -- The realities of expensing -- Perceived value -- The case for stock options -- Costs and stock prices -- Reducing the expense -- The future of long-term incentives -- Factors influencing LTI design -- Designing a LTI program -- Setting performance goals and metrics -- Basis for measurement -- Goal setting -- Determining share award sizes -- A look to the future -- Executive stock ownership: the solution to the executive compensation crisis -- Agency theory and costs -- Moral hazard -- Driving superior returns -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Stock holding requirements -- Net share retention requirements -- Other mechanisms for creating ownership -- Management stock purchase plans -- Finding the right solutions -- Director compensation in the new environment -- The evolution of director compensation -- Move away from stock options -- Activity-based compensation -- Compensating committee chairs and members -- General electric as a reference point -- Director compensation levels and mix -- Director share ownership -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Net share holding requirements -- Ownership effectiveness -- Structuring the optimal director compensation package -- The future of director compensation -- The compensation committee: creating a balance between shareholders and executives -- Legal context -- Right from wrong? -- Foundations for best practices -- Creating excellence in corporate governance -- Institutional and regulatory governance recommendations and mandates -- Consultant independence -- Setting the CEO's pay as rigorously as possible -- Case study of an internal promotion -- Creating a pay-for-performance environment -- Rule 10b5--1 plans -- preannounced purchases or sales of stock -- Best governance practices in designing annual and long-term incentives -- Aligning all employee pay to improve corporate performance -- Elements of alignment -- Untenable forms of alignment -- Performance pay solutions -- Employee stock ownership -- The role of stock options -- Moving beyond options -- Converting to restricted stock -- Adjusting stock-based incentives -- Alignment in practice -- Building better alignment -- International executive pay comparisons -- U.S. competitive advantage -- The international executive pay gap -- United Kingdom -- France -- Canada -- Asia -- In summary -- Conclusion: the future of executive compensation -- Epilogue: back in the boardroom -- Acknowledgements -- Appendix A Legal and regulatory requirement for executive compensation plans -- Nonqualified stock options -- Incentive stock options -- Stock appreciation rights -- Restricted stock units -- Restricted stock -- Appendix B Summary of the regulatory and institutional mandates and recommendations -- Calpers -- TIAA-CREF -- Fidelity -- Vanguard -- Union-sponsored funds -- Other organizations -- The Council of Institutional Investors -- Institutional Shareholder Services -- Glass, Lewis & Company -- National Association of Corporate Directors -- The conference board -- Appendix C Academic articles on pay for performance and the executive labor market -- Index -- Endnotes Popular perceptions of executive compensation in the United States are now part of a full-blown mythology fueled by critics who have little direct experience with the inner workings of corporations, their boards, and the executive teams who ultimately shoulder the responsibility for business success or failure. This book documents the realities of executive compensation by investigating the extent to which the pay for performance model governs executive pay levels. It also assesses the relative success of this model in creating value for shareholders and robust job growth for U.S. workers and provides detailed, real-world guidance for designing and executing effective executive compensation plans. Based on extensive empirical research and decades of direct experience in the field, Myths and Realities of Executive Pay settles the debate about executive compensation and the role it plays in the broader U.S. economy Chief executive officers / Salaries, etc / United States Executive ability / United States Competition, International USA Van Putten, Steven Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-87195-2 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-56490-9 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499296 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Kay, Ira T. Myths and realities of executive pay Prologue: the compensation committee meets -- Introduction: the battle over executive compensation -- Executive compensation in the U.S. corporate model -- The goals of executive compensation -- Our approach -- The myths and realities of pay for performance -- The realities of pay for performance -- Other issues -- Case studies -- The myth of managerial power -- Academic response to Bebchuk and Fried -- The realities of managerial power -- Camouflaged compensation -- At-the-money strike prices -- Repricings and reloads -- Diversifying, hedging and timing -- Peer group data and upward bias -- Other factors in setting pay -- Fixed shares vs. constant dollar techniques -- Conflicts of interest -- External pressures: the new context for executive compensation -- Characteristics of external forces -- Cyclical reforms and unintended consequences -- The genesis of the current environment -- The regulators -- Securities and Exchange Commission -- Financial Accounting Standards Board -- Internal Revenue Service -- NYSE and NASDAQ -- Congress -- The reformers -- Institutional investor perspectives -- Concerns with lack of pay for performance -- Stock incentives -- Performance metrics -- Severance and change-in-control agreements -- The financial activists -- LBO impact -- Impact of change-in-control protection -- Hedge funds -- Media critics and public figures -- What we can learn -- End of an era: the decline of the stock option -- The 1990s: the decade of the stock option -- 2000--2002: a turning point -- The decline of the stock option -- The realities of expensing -- Perceived value -- The case for stock options -- Costs and stock prices -- Reducing the expense -- The future of long-term incentives -- Factors influencing LTI design -- Designing a LTI program -- Setting performance goals and metrics -- Basis for measurement -- Goal setting -- Determining share award sizes -- A look to the future -- Executive stock ownership: the solution to the executive compensation crisis -- Agency theory and costs -- Moral hazard -- Driving superior returns -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Stock holding requirements -- Net share retention requirements -- Other mechanisms for creating ownership -- Management stock purchase plans -- Finding the right solutions -- Director compensation in the new environment -- The evolution of director compensation -- Move away from stock options -- Activity-based compensation -- Compensating committee chairs and members -- General electric as a reference point -- Director compensation levels and mix -- Director share ownership -- Stock ownership guidelines -- Net share holding requirements -- Ownership effectiveness -- Structuring the optimal director compensation package -- The future of director compensation -- The compensation committee: creating a balance between shareholders and executives -- Legal context -- Right from wrong? -- Foundations for best practices -- Creating excellence in corporate governance -- Institutional and regulatory governance recommendations and mandates -- Consultant independence -- Setting the CEO's pay as rigorously as possible -- Case study of an internal promotion -- Creating a pay-for-performance environment -- Rule 10b5--1 plans -- preannounced purchases or sales of stock -- Best governance practices in designing annual and long-term incentives -- Aligning all employee pay to improve corporate performance -- Elements of alignment -- Untenable forms of alignment -- Performance pay solutions -- Employee stock ownership -- The role of stock options -- Moving beyond options -- Converting to restricted stock -- Adjusting stock-based incentives -- Alignment in practice -- Building better alignment -- International executive pay comparisons -- U.S. competitive advantage -- The international executive pay gap -- United Kingdom -- France -- Canada -- Asia -- In summary -- Conclusion: the future of executive compensation -- Epilogue: back in the boardroom -- Acknowledgements -- Appendix A Legal and regulatory requirement for executive compensation plans -- Nonqualified stock options -- Incentive stock options -- Stock appreciation rights -- Restricted stock units -- Restricted stock -- Appendix B Summary of the regulatory and institutional mandates and recommendations -- Calpers -- TIAA-CREF -- Fidelity -- Vanguard -- Union-sponsored funds -- Other organizations -- The Council of Institutional Investors -- Institutional Shareholder Services -- Glass, Lewis & Company -- National Association of Corporate Directors -- The conference board -- Appendix C Academic articles on pay for performance and the executive labor market -- Index -- Endnotes Chief executive officers / Salaries, etc / United States Executive ability / United States Competition, International |
title | Myths and realities of executive pay |
title_alt | Myths & Realities of Executive Pay |
title_auth | Myths and realities of executive pay |
title_exact_search | Myths and realities of executive pay |
title_full | Myths and realities of executive pay Ira T. Kay, Steven Van Putten |
title_fullStr | Myths and realities of executive pay Ira T. Kay, Steven Van Putten |
title_full_unstemmed | Myths and realities of executive pay Ira T. Kay, Steven Van Putten |
title_short | Myths and realities of executive pay |
title_sort | myths and realities of executive pay |
topic | Chief executive officers / Salaries, etc / United States Executive ability / United States Competition, International |
topic_facet | Chief executive officers / Salaries, etc / United States Executive ability / United States Competition, International USA |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499296 |
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