The craft of bureaucratic neutrality: interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety
Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bure...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2007
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (viii, 256 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511509841 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511509841 |
Staff View
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| 505 | 8 | |a Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion | |
| 520 | |a Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial hygiene / Law and legislation / United States | |
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| author | Huber, Gregory Alain 1973- |
| author_facet | Huber, Gregory Alain 1973- |
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| contents | Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511509841 (OCoLC)967420905 (DE-599)BVBBV043928926 |
| dewey-full | 363.1/10684 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 363 - Other social problems and services |
| dewey-raw | 363.1/10684 |
| dewey-search | 363.1/10684 |
| dewey-sort | 3363.1 510684 |
| dewey-tens | 360 - Social problems and services; associations |
| discipline | Soziologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511509841 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV043928926 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:52Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511509841 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 online resource (viii, 256 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| spelling | Huber, Gregory Alain 1973- Verfasser aut The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety Gregory A. Huber Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007 1 online resource (viii, 256 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers United States / Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Politik Recht Industrial safety / Law and legislation / United States Industrial hygiene / Law and legislation / United States Industrial safety / Government policy / United States Industrial hygiene / Government policy / United States Bureaucracy USA Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-87279-9 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Huber, Gregory Alain 1973- The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion United States / Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Politik Recht Industrial safety / Law and legislation / United States Industrial hygiene / Law and legislation / United States Industrial safety / Government policy / United States Industrial hygiene / Government policy / United States Bureaucracy |
| title | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety |
| title_auth | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety |
| title_exact_search | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety |
| title_full | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety Gregory A. Huber |
| title_fullStr | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety Gregory A. Huber |
| title_full_unstemmed | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety Gregory A. Huber |
| title_short | The craft of bureaucratic neutrality |
| title_sort | the craft of bureaucratic neutrality interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety |
| title_sub | interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety |
| topic | United States / Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Politik Recht Industrial safety / Law and legislation / United States Industrial hygiene / Law and legislation / United States Industrial safety / Government policy / United States Industrial hygiene / Government policy / United States Bureaucracy |
| topic_facet | United States / Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Politik Recht Industrial safety / Law and legislation / United States Industrial hygiene / Law and legislation / United States Industrial safety / Government policy / United States Industrial hygiene / Government policy / United States Bureaucracy USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841 |
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