The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II:
The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2004
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the Western position at Munich consisted in the Anglo-French opinion that the Soviet commitment to its allies - France and Czechoslovakia - was utterly unreliable. What has never been seriously studied in the Western literature is the whole spectrum of East European documentation. This book targets precisely this dimension of the problem. The Romanians were at one time prepared to admit the transfer of the Red Army across their territory. The Red Army, mobilised on a massive scale, was informed that its destination was Czechoslovakia. The Polish consul in Lodavia reported the entrance of the Red Army into the country. In the meantime, Moscow focused especially on the Polish rail network. All of these findings are new, and they contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxii, 212 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511511912 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511511912 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Ragsdale, Hugh |
author_facet | Ragsdale, Hugh |
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contents | Preface: A test case of collective security -- Introduction: The nature of the problem -- Part 1: Background of the Munich crisis. The shaky foundations of collective security: Moscow, Paris, London ; Soviet-Romanian relations I: 1934-1938 ; Soviet-Romanian relations II: summer 1938 -- Part 2: Foreground: Climax of the crisis. East awaiting west: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg ; The red army mobilizes ; Dénouement -- Part 3: Conclusion. What the red army actually did ; What the red army might feasibly have done ; Epilogue ; Assessment of soviet intentions |
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dewey-full | 940.53/112 |
dewey-hundreds | 900 - History & geography |
dewey-ones | 940 - History of Europe |
dewey-raw | 940.53/112 |
dewey-search | 940.53/112 |
dewey-sort | 3940.53 3112 |
dewey-tens | 940 - History of Europe |
discipline | Geschichte |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511511912 |
era | Geschichte 1934-1938 gnd |
era_facet | Geschichte 1934-1938 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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spelling | Ragsdale, Hugh Verfasser aut The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II Hugh Ragsdale The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, & the Coming of World War II Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2004 1 online resource (xxii, 212 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Preface: A test case of collective security -- Introduction: The nature of the problem -- Part 1: Background of the Munich crisis. The shaky foundations of collective security: Moscow, Paris, London ; Soviet-Romanian relations I: 1934-1938 ; Soviet-Romanian relations II: summer 1938 -- Part 2: Foreground: Climax of the crisis. East awaiting west: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg ; The red army mobilizes ; Dénouement -- Part 3: Conclusion. What the red army actually did ; What the red army might feasibly have done ; Epilogue ; Assessment of soviet intentions The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the Western position at Munich consisted in the Anglo-French opinion that the Soviet commitment to its allies - France and Czechoslovakia - was utterly unreliable. What has never been seriously studied in the Western literature is the whole spectrum of East European documentation. This book targets precisely this dimension of the problem. The Romanians were at one time prepared to admit the transfer of the Red Army across their territory. The Red Army, mobilised on a massive scale, was informed that its destination was Czechoslovakia. The Polish consul in Lodavia reported the entrance of the Red Army into the country. In the meantime, Moscow focused especially on the Polish rail network. All of these findings are new, and they contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject Munich Four-Power Agreement / (1938) Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1934-1938 gnd rswk-swf Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 / Diplomatic history World War, 1939-1945 / Soviet Union World War, 1939-1945 / Germany World War, 1939-1945 / Causes Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland Sowjetunion Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 g Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 u Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 s 1\p DE-604 Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Geschichte 1934-1938 z 2\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-09918-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-83030-0 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511912 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Ragsdale, Hugh The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II Preface: A test case of collective security -- Introduction: The nature of the problem -- Part 1: Background of the Munich crisis. The shaky foundations of collective security: Moscow, Paris, London ; Soviet-Romanian relations I: 1934-1938 ; Soviet-Romanian relations II: summer 1938 -- Part 2: Foreground: Climax of the crisis. East awaiting west: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg ; The red army mobilizes ; Dénouement -- Part 3: Conclusion. What the red army actually did ; What the red army might feasibly have done ; Epilogue ; Assessment of soviet intentions Munich Four-Power Agreement / (1938) Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 gnd Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 / Diplomatic history World War, 1939-1945 / Soviet Union World War, 1939-1945 / Germany World War, 1939-1945 / Causes Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4170659-6 (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4079167-1 (DE-588)4077548-3 |
title | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II |
title_alt | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, & the Coming of World War II |
title_auth | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II |
title_exact_search | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II |
title_full | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II Hugh Ragsdale |
title_fullStr | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II Hugh Ragsdale |
title_full_unstemmed | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II Hugh Ragsdale |
title_short | The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the coming of World War II |
title_sort | the soviets the munich crisis and the coming of world war ii |
topic | Munich Four-Power Agreement / (1938) Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 (DE-588)4170659-6 gnd Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 / Diplomatic history World War, 1939-1945 / Soviet Union World War, 1939-1945 / Germany World War, 1939-1945 / Causes Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
topic_facet | Munich Four-Power Agreement / (1938) Münchener Abkommen 1938 September 29 Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 / Diplomatic history World War, 1939-1945 / Soviet Union World War, 1939-1945 / Germany World War, 1939-1945 / Causes Außenpolitik Zweiter Weltkrieg Deutschland Sowjetunion |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511912 |
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