Game-theoretic models of bargaining:
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those gi...
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| Other Authors: | |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1985
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (ix, 390 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511528309 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511528309 |
Staff View
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Record in the Search Index
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| isbn | 9780511528309 |
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| spelling | Game-theoretic models of bargaining edited by Alvin E. Roth Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1985 1 online resource (ix, 390 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games Mathematisches Modell Game theory / Congresses Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)1071861417 Konferenzschrift gnd-content Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 1\p DE-604 Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s 2\p DE-604 Roth, Alvin E. 1951- edt Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-02274-3 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-26757-1 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511528309 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Game-theoretic models of bargaining Mathematisches Modell Game theory / Congresses Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139583-9 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)1071861417 |
| title | Game-theoretic models of bargaining |
| title_auth | Game-theoretic models of bargaining |
| title_exact_search | Game-theoretic models of bargaining |
| title_full | Game-theoretic models of bargaining edited by Alvin E. Roth |
| title_fullStr | Game-theoretic models of bargaining edited by Alvin E. Roth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game-theoretic models of bargaining edited by Alvin E. Roth |
| title_short | Game-theoretic models of bargaining |
| title_sort | game theoretic models of bargaining |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Game theory / Congresses Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Game theory / Congresses Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses Verhandlungstheorie Spieltheorie Konferenzschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511528309 |
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