Resource allocation mechanisms:
Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Pro...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1987
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Professor Campbell employs a formal and abstract model of a mechanism that brings into prominence the criteria by which the performance of an economy is to be judged. The mechanism approach is used to prove some fundamental theorems about the possibility of designing an economic system satisfying the criteria. It also establishes a way of thinking about economic issues that is becoming increasingly useful in special branches of economics, such as industrial organization and public finance. This book can be viewed as two different texts: one constitutes an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and the other is a treatment of welfare economics with conventional emphasis on Pareto optimality as well as providing substantial material on incentives, uncertainty, and existence of equilibrium |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiii, 183 pages) |
ISBN: | 9781139173476 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781139173476 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Campbell, Donald E. 1943- |
author_facet | Campbell, Donald E. 1943- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Campbell, Donald E. 1943- |
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dewey-full | 330/.01 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
dewey-raw | 330/.01 |
dewey-search | 330/.01 |
dewey-sort | 3330 11 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9781139173476 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV043924530 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:43Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781139173476 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029333609 |
oclc_num | 967483768 |
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owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
physical | 1 online resource (xiii, 183 pages) |
psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
publishDate | 1987 |
publishDateSearch | 1987 |
publishDateSort | 1987 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Campbell, Donald E. 1943- Verfasser aut Resource allocation mechanisms Donald E. Campbell Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1987 1 online resource (xiii, 183 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Professor Campbell employs a formal and abstract model of a mechanism that brings into prominence the criteria by which the performance of an economy is to be judged. The mechanism approach is used to prove some fundamental theorems about the possibility of designing an economic system satisfying the criteria. It also establishes a way of thinking about economic issues that is becoming increasingly useful in special branches of economics, such as industrial organization and public finance. This book can be viewed as two different texts: one constitutes an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and the other is a treatment of welfare economics with conventional emphasis on Pareto optimality as well as providing substantial material on incentives, uncertainty, and existence of equilibrium Wirtschaft Economics Resource allocation Welfare economics Equilibrium (Economics) Consumption (Economics) Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd rswk-swf Ressourcenallokation (DE-588)4129283-2 gnd rswk-swf Gleichgewichtstheorie (DE-588)4071876-1 gnd rswk-swf Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 s Gleichgewichtstheorie (DE-588)4071876-1 s 1\p DE-604 Ressourcenallokation (DE-588)4129283-2 s 2\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-26664-2 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-31990-4 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173476 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Campbell, Donald E. 1943- Resource allocation mechanisms Wirtschaft Economics Resource allocation Welfare economics Equilibrium (Economics) Consumption (Economics) Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Ressourcenallokation (DE-588)4129283-2 gnd Gleichgewichtstheorie (DE-588)4071876-1 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4066735-2 (DE-588)4129283-2 (DE-588)4071876-1 |
title | Resource allocation mechanisms |
title_auth | Resource allocation mechanisms |
title_exact_search | Resource allocation mechanisms |
title_full | Resource allocation mechanisms Donald E. Campbell |
title_fullStr | Resource allocation mechanisms Donald E. Campbell |
title_full_unstemmed | Resource allocation mechanisms Donald E. Campbell |
title_short | Resource allocation mechanisms |
title_sort | resource allocation mechanisms |
topic | Wirtschaft Economics Resource allocation Welfare economics Equilibrium (Economics) Consumption (Economics) Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Ressourcenallokation (DE-588)4129283-2 gnd Gleichgewichtstheorie (DE-588)4071876-1 gnd |
topic_facet | Wirtschaft Economics Resource allocation Welfare economics Equilibrium (Economics) Consumption (Economics) Wohlfahrtstheorie Ressourcenallokation Gleichgewichtstheorie |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173476 |
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