In this 2003 book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees i...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Schick, Frederic 1929- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003
Schlagworte:	Decision making Ambiguity Logic Logik Ambiguität Entscheidungsfindung Aufsatzsammlung
Online-Zugang:	BSB01 UBG01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	In this 2003 book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists
Beschreibung:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (ix, 154 pages)
ISBN:	9780511610219
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511610219