Competition policy: a game-theoretic perspective
This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperf...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1995
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511522055 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |
Staff View
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043923541 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161202s1995 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511522055 |c Online |9 978-0-511-52205-5 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511522055 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)967485565 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043923541 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 338.8 |2 20 | |
| 084 | |a QR 300 |0 (DE-625)142024: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Phlips, Louis |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Competition policy |b a game-theoretic perspective |c Louis Phlips |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 1995 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a 1. Preliminaries -- 2. Four are few and six are many -- 3. Cartel laws are good for business -- 4. Cartel enforcement -- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists -- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes -- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism -- 8. Collusion detection -- 9. Excess capacity and collusion -- 10. Collusion in R & D -- 11. Predation in theory -- 12. Evidence on predation -- 13. Antitrust implications | |
| 520 | |a This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cartels | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition / Europe / Case studies | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wettbewerbspolitik |0 (DE-588)4065839-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wettbewerbstheorie |0 (DE-588)4117638-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a Europa | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Europa |0 (DE-588)4015701-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4522595-3 |a Fallstudiensammlung |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Wettbewerbstheorie |0 (DE-588)4117638-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Europa |0 (DE-588)4015701-5 |D g |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Wettbewerbspolitik |0 (DE-588)4065839-9 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Wettbewerbspolitik |0 (DE-588)4065839-9 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 1 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | |8 3\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-49521-9 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-49871-5 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029332620 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 3\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804176847990161408 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Phlips, Louis |
| author_facet | Phlips, Louis |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Phlips, Louis |
| author_variant | l p lp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043923541 |
| classification_rvk | QR 300 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | 1. Preliminaries -- 2. Four are few and six are many -- 3. Cartel laws are good for business -- 4. Cartel enforcement -- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists -- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes -- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism -- 8. Collusion detection -- 9. Excess capacity and collusion -- 10. Collusion in R & D -- 11. Predation in theory -- 12. Evidence on predation -- 13. Antitrust implications |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511522055 (OCoLC)967485565 (DE-599)BVBBV043923541 |
| dewey-full | 338.8 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338.8 |
| dewey-search | 338.8 |
| dewey-sort | 3338.8 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03981nmm a2200673zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043923541</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161202s1995 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511522055</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-511-52205-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9780511522055</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511522055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)967485565</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043923541</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">338.8</subfield><subfield code="2">20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QR 300</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)142024:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Phlips, Louis</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Competition policy</subfield><subfield code="b">a game-theoretic perspective</subfield><subfield code="c">Louis Phlips</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1. Preliminaries -- 2. Four are few and six are many -- 3. Cartel laws are good for business -- 4. Cartel enforcement -- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists -- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes -- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism -- 8. Collusion detection -- 9. Excess capacity and collusion -- 10. Collusion in R & D -- 11. Predation in theory -- 12. Evidence on predation -- 13. Antitrust implications</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cartels</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competition / Europe / Case studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wettbewerbspolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4065839-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wettbewerbstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4117638-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Europa</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Europa</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015701-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4522595-3</subfield><subfield code="a">Fallstudiensammlung</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wettbewerbstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4117638-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Europa</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015701-5</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wettbewerbspolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4065839-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wettbewerbspolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4065839-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-49521-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-49871-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029332620</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Fallstudiensammlung |
| geographic | Europa Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Europa |
| id | DE-604.BV043923541 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511522055 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029332620 |
| oclc_num | 967485565 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Phlips, Louis Verfasser aut Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective Louis Phlips Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1995 1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1. Preliminaries -- 2. Four are few and six are many -- 3. Cartel laws are good for business -- 4. Cartel enforcement -- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists -- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes -- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism -- 8. Collusion detection -- 9. Excess capacity and collusion -- 10. Collusion in R & D -- 11. Predation in theory -- 12. Evidence on predation -- 13. Antitrust implications This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy Competition Cartels Game theory Competition / Europe / Case studies Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Europa Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 1\p DE-604 Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 g Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 s 2\p DE-604 3\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-49521-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-49871-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Phlips, Louis Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective 1. Preliminaries -- 2. Four are few and six are many -- 3. Cartel laws are good for business -- 4. Cartel enforcement -- 5. Information sharing among oligopolists -- 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes -- 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism -- 8. Collusion detection -- 9. Excess capacity and collusion -- 10. Collusion in R & D -- 11. Predation in theory -- 12. Evidence on predation -- 13. Antitrust implications Competition Cartels Game theory Competition / Europe / Case studies Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4065839-9 (DE-588)4117638-8 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4015701-5 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective |
| title_auth | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective |
| title_exact_search | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective |
| title_full | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective Louis Phlips |
| title_fullStr | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective Louis Phlips |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition policy a game-theoretic perspective Louis Phlips |
| title_short | Competition policy |
| title_sort | competition policy a game theoretic perspective |
| title_sub | a game-theoretic perspective |
| topic | Competition Cartels Game theory Competition / Europe / Case studies Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Competition Cartels Game theory Competition / Europe / Case studies Wettbewerbspolitik Wettbewerbstheorie Spieltheorie Europa Fallstudiensammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT phlipslouis competitionpolicyagametheoreticperspective |