Constructing international security: alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard
Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commi...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commitments is key, because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of international security order. Benson argues that sometimes the optimal commitment conditions military assistance on specific hostile actions the adversary might take. At other times, he finds, it is best to be ambiguous by leaving an ally and adversary uncertain about whether the third party will intervene. Such uncertainty transfers risk to the ally, thereby reducing the ally's motivation to behave too aggressively. The choice of security commitment depends on how well defenders can observe hostilities leading to war and on their evaluations of dispute settlements, their ally's security and the relative strength of the defender |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xiii, 207 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781139225694 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781139225694 |
Staff View
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| 520 | |a Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commitments is key, because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of international security order. Benson argues that sometimes the optimal commitment conditions military assistance on specific hostile actions the adversary might take. At other times, he finds, it is best to be ambiguous by leaving an ally and adversary uncertain about whether the third party will intervene. Such uncertainty transfers risk to the ally, thereby reducing the ally's motivation to behave too aggressively. The choice of security commitment depends on how well defenders can observe hostilities leading to war and on their evaluations of dispute settlements, their ally's security and the relative strength of the defender | ||
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| contents | Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world |
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| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Politologie Militärwissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9781139225694 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:41Z |
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| isbn | 9781139225694 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 online resource (xiii, 207 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2012 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| spelling | Benson, Brett V. 1973- Verfasser aut Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard Brett V. Benson, Vanderbilt University Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2012 1 online resource (xiii, 207 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commitments is key, because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of international security order. Benson argues that sometimes the optimal commitment conditions military assistance on specific hostile actions the adversary might take. At other times, he finds, it is best to be ambiguous by leaving an ally and adversary uncertain about whether the third party will intervene. Such uncertainty transfers risk to the ally, thereby reducing the ally's motivation to behave too aggressively. The choice of security commitment depends on how well defenders can observe hostilities leading to war and on their evaluations of dispute settlements, their ally's security and the relative strength of the defender Security, International Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd rswk-swf Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd rswk-swf Bündnis (DE-588)4069715-0 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 s Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 s Bündnis (DE-588)4069715-0 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-02724-4 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-65819-6 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225694 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Benson, Brett V. 1973- Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world Security, International Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd Bündnis (DE-588)4069715-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4116489-1 (DE-588)4322425-8 (DE-588)4072885-7 (DE-588)4069715-0 |
| title | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard |
| title_auth | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard |
| title_exact_search | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard |
| title_full | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard Brett V. Benson, Vanderbilt University |
| title_fullStr | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard Brett V. Benson, Vanderbilt University |
| title_full_unstemmed | Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard Brett V. Benson, Vanderbilt University |
| title_short | Constructing international security |
| title_sort | constructing international security alliances deterrence and moral hazard |
| title_sub | alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard |
| topic | Security, International Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd Bündnis (DE-588)4069715-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Security, International Sicherheitspolitik Moral Hazard Internationale Politik Bündnis |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225694 |
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