The sanctions paradox: economic statecraft and international relations
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the shor...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in international relations
65 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 UER01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvi, 342 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511549366 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511549366 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a 1. Introduction -- pt. I. Theory and data. 2. A model of economic coercion. 3. Plausibility probes. 4. Statistical tests -- pt. II. Economic coercion in the former Soviet Union. 5. Russian power and preferences | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 6. The extent of NIS concessions. 7. Evaluating the evidence -- pt. III. Choosing between carrots and sticks. 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula -- pt. IV. Conclusion | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations | |
| 520 | |a Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Drezner, Daniel W. 1968- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)138655057 |
| author_facet | Drezner, Daniel W. 1968- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Drezner, Daniel W. 1968- |
| author_variant | d w d dw dwd |
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| bvnumber | BV043922132 |
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| contents | 1. Introduction -- pt. I. Theory and data. 2. A model of economic coercion. 3. Plausibility probes. 4. Statistical tests -- pt. II. Economic coercion in the former Soviet Union. 5. Russian power and preferences 6. The extent of NIS concessions. 7. Evaluating the evidence -- pt. III. Choosing between carrots and sticks. 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula -- pt. IV. Conclusion 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511549366 (OCoLC)967422183 (DE-599)BVBBV043922132 |
| dewey-full | 327.1/17 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.1/17 |
| dewey-search | 327.1/17 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 217 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511549366 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:39Z |
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| isbn | 9780511549366 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Drezner, Daniel W. 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)138655057 aut The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2010 1 online resource (xvi, 342 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in international relations 65 Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1. Introduction -- pt. I. Theory and data. 2. A model of economic coercion. 3. Plausibility probes. 4. Statistical tests -- pt. II. Economic coercion in the former Soviet Union. 5. Russian power and preferences 6. The extent of NIS concessions. 7. Evaluating the evidence -- pt. III. Choosing between carrots and sticks. 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula -- pt. IV. Conclusion 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions / Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-521-64332-0 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover 0 521 64332 5 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-521-64415-0 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 0 521 64415 1 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511549366 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Drezner, Daniel W. 1968- The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations 1. Introduction -- pt. I. Theory and data. 2. A model of economic coercion. 3. Plausibility probes. 4. Statistical tests -- pt. II. Economic coercion in the former Soviet Union. 5. Russian power and preferences 6. The extent of NIS concessions. 7. Evaluating the evidence -- pt. III. Choosing between carrots and sticks. 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula -- pt. IV. Conclusion 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions / Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4190074-1 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_auth | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_exact_search | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_full | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_fullStr | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_full_unstemmed | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_short | The sanctions paradox |
| title_sort | the sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_sub | economic statecraft and international relations |
| topic | Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions / Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions / Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion Fallstudiensammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511549366 |
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