Perfect deterrence:
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2000
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in international relations
72 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511491788 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043921599 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161202s2000 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511491788 |c Online |9 978-0-511-49178-8 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511491788 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)704410921 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043921599 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 355.02/17 |2 21 | |
| 084 | |a MK 3600 |0 (DE-625)123050: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Zagare, Frank C. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Perfect deterrence |c Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 2000 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in international relations |v 72 | |
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory | |
| 520 | |a An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Abschreckung |0 (DE-588)4000230-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Abschreckung |0 (DE-588)4000230-5 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kilgour, D. Marc |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-78174-9 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-78713-0 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330682 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176843907006464 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_facet | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_variant | f c z fc fcz |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043921599 |
| classification_rvk | MK 3600 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511491788 (OCoLC)704410921 (DE-599)BVBBV043921599 |
| dewey-full | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
| dewey-raw | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-search | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.02 217 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Politologie Militärwissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03274nmm a2200493zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043921599</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161202s2000 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511491788</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-511-49178-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9780511491788</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511491788</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)704410921</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043921599</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">355.02/17</subfield><subfield code="2">21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MK 3600</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)123050:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zagare, Frank C.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Perfect deterrence</subfield><subfield code="c">Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cambridge studies in international relations</subfield><subfield code="v">72</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deterrence (Strategy)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Abschreckung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000230-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Abschreckung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000230-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kilgour, D. Marc</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-78174-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-78713-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330682</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043921599 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511491788 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330682 |
| oclc_num | 704410921 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publishDateSearch | 2000 |
| publishDateSort | 2000 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in international relations |
| spelling | Zagare, Frank C. Verfasser aut Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in international relations 72 Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s 1\p DE-604 Kilgour, D. Marc Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-78174-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-78713-0 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Zagare, Frank C. Perfect deterrence Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4000230-5 |
| title | Perfect deterrence |
| title_auth | Perfect deterrence |
| title_exact_search | Perfect deterrence |
| title_full | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_fullStr | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_full_unstemmed | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_short | Perfect deterrence |
| title_sort | perfect deterrence |
| topic | Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zagarefrankc perfectdeterrence AT kilgourdmarc perfectdeterrence |