Assertion and conditionals:

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning c...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Appiah, Anthony (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1985
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy
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Zusammenfassung:This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses
Beschreibung:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:1 online resource (xiii, 265 pages)
ISBN:9780511895975
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511895975