Fiscal governance in Europe:

This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the de...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hallerberg, Mark (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2009
Series:Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-12
DE-473
Volltext
Summary:This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union
Item Description:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Physical Description:1 online resource (x, 230 pages)
ISBN:9780511759505
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511759505

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Get full text