Equilibrium and rationality: game theory revised by decision rules

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outc...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Weirich, Paul 1946- (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998
Series:Cambridge studies in probability, induction and decision theory
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Online Access:BSB01
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Summary:This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists
Item Description:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Physical Description:1 online resource (xii, 235 pages)
ISBN:9780511663727
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511663727

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