Moral disagreement:
Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2006
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in philosophy
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | DE-12 DE-473 Volltext |
| Summary: | Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvii, 141 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511570599 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511570599 |
Staff View
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Record in the Search Index
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| author_facet | Tersman, Folke |
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| contents | Realism and irrealism -- The case for radical moral disagreement -- Explaining and predicting disagreement -- The argument from inaccessibility -- The argument from ambiguity -- Attributing moral judgments |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511570599 (OCoLC)967401922 (DE-599)BVBBV043921225 |
| dewey-full | 170/.42 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
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| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511570599 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043921225 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:15:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511570599 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 online resource (xvii, 141 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2006 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
| spelling | Tersman, Folke Verfasser aut Moral disagreement Folke Tersman Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006 1 online resource (xvii, 141 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Realism and irrealism -- The case for radical moral disagreement -- Explaining and predicting disagreement -- The argument from inaccessibility -- The argument from ambiguity -- Attributing moral judgments Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker Ethics Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-11555-1 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-85338-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tersman, Folke Moral disagreement Realism and irrealism -- The case for radical moral disagreement -- Explaining and predicting disagreement -- The argument from inaccessibility -- The argument from ambiguity -- Attributing moral judgments Ethics Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4015602-3 |
| title | Moral disagreement |
| title_auth | Moral disagreement |
| title_exact_search | Moral disagreement |
| title_full | Moral disagreement Folke Tersman |
| title_fullStr | Moral disagreement Folke Tersman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral disagreement Folke Tersman |
| title_short | Moral disagreement |
| title_sort | moral disagreement |
| topic | Ethics Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ethics Ethik |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599 |
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