Putting trust in the US budget: federal trust funds and the politics of commitment
In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author in...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2000
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Theories of institutional design
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511490842 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511490842 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping | |
| 520 | |a In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Patashnik, Eric M. |
| author_facet | Patashnik, Eric M. |
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| contents | Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511490842 (OCoLC)704411112 (DE-599)BVBBV043921113 |
| dewey-full | 336.73 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 336 - Public finance |
| dewey-raw | 336.73 |
| dewey-search | 336.73 |
| dewey-sort | 3336.73 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511490842 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043921113 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
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| isbn | 9780511490842 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Patashnik, Eric M. Verfasser aut Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment Eric M. Patashnik Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 1 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Theories of institutional design Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development Soziale Sicherheit Pension trusts / United States Social security / United States Infrastructure (Economics) / United States / Finance Budget / United States USA Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-77174-0 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-77748-3 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490842 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Patashnik, Eric M. Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping Soziale Sicherheit Pension trusts / United States Social security / United States Infrastructure (Economics) / United States / Finance Budget / United States |
| title | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment |
| title_auth | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment |
| title_exact_search | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment |
| title_full | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment Eric M. Patashnik |
| title_fullStr | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment Eric M. Patashnik |
| title_full_unstemmed | Putting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment Eric M. Patashnik |
| title_short | Putting trust in the US budget |
| title_sort | putting trust in the us budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment |
| title_sub | federal trust funds and the politics of commitment |
| topic | Soziale Sicherheit Pension trusts / United States Social security / United States Infrastructure (Economics) / United States / Finance Budget / United States |
| topic_facet | Soziale Sicherheit Pension trusts / United States Social security / United States Infrastructure (Economics) / United States / Finance Budget / United States USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490842 |
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