Putting skeptics in their place: the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry
This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the ana...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2000
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in philosophy
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 264 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511527418 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511527418 |
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| contents | The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry Skepticism about the World: Part One Skepticism about the World: Part Two Skepticism about the World: Part Three The Argument from an Infinite Regress of Reasons Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact Agent Reliabilism Agent Reliabilism and the Relevant Sense of "Relevant Possibility" Moral and Religious Epistemology |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511527418 (OCoLC)971457218 (DE-599)BVBBV043920691 |
| dewey-full | 149/.73 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 149 - Other philosophical systems and doctrines |
| dewey-raw | 149/.73 |
| dewey-search | 149/.73 |
| dewey-sort | 3149 273 |
| dewey-tens | 140 - Specific philosophical schools |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511527418 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043920691 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:36Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511527418 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Greco, John Verfasser aut Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry John Greco Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 1 online resource (xvi, 264 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1 The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry 2 Skepticism about the World: Part One constructions 3 Skepticism about the World: Part Two smissive Responses 4 Skepticism about the World: Part Three alism, Realism, and Representationalism 5 The Argument from an Infinite Regress of Reasons 6 Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact 7 Agent Reliabilism 8 Agent Reliabilism and the Relevant Sense of "Relevant Possibility" 9 Moral and Religious Epistemology This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended Skepticism Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-04553-7 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-77263-1 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527418 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Greco, John Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry Skepticism about the World: Part One Skepticism about the World: Part Two Skepticism about the World: Part Three The Argument from an Infinite Regress of Reasons Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact Agent Reliabilism Agent Reliabilism and the Relevant Sense of "Relevant Possibility" Moral and Religious Epistemology Skepticism Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4055225-1 |
| title | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry |
| title_alt | The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry Skepticism about the World: Part One Skepticism about the World: Part Two Skepticism about the World: Part Three The Argument from an Infinite Regress of Reasons Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact Agent Reliabilism Agent Reliabilism and the Relevant Sense of "Relevant Possibility" Moral and Religious Epistemology |
| title_auth | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry |
| title_exact_search | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry |
| title_full | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry John Greco |
| title_fullStr | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry John Greco |
| title_full_unstemmed | Putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry John Greco |
| title_short | Putting skeptics in their place |
| title_sort | putting skeptics in their place the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry |
| title_sub | the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry |
| topic | Skepticism Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Skepticism Skeptizismus |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527418 |
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