Preferences and well-being:

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Olsaretti, Serena (Editor), Arneson, Richard J. (Editor)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006
Series:Royal Institute of Philosophy supplements
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Online Access:BSB01
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Summary:Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being
Item Description:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Physical Description:1 online resource (v, 279 pages)
ISBN:9780511599743
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511599743

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