Deliberate discretion: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy
The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to m...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2002
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Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xv, 284 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511804915 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511804915 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Huber, John D. |
author_facet | Huber, John D. |
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author_sort | Huber, John D. |
author_variant | j d h jd jdh |
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dewey-search | 320/.6 |
dewey-sort | 3320 16 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511804915 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780511804915 |
language | English |
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spelling | Huber, John D. Verfasser aut Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2002 1 online resource (xv, 284 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in comparative politics Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process Politik Recht Separation of powers Political planning Bureaucracy Law / Political aspects Comparative government Politische Planung (DE-588)4115587-7 gnd rswk-swf Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd rswk-swf Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd rswk-swf Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 s Politische Planung (DE-588)4115587-7 s Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 s 1\p DE-604 Shipan, Charles R. 1961- Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-52070-6 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-81744-8 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804915 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Huber, John D. Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy Politik Recht Separation of powers Political planning Bureaucracy Law / Political aspects Comparative government Politische Planung (DE-588)4115587-7 gnd Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4115587-7 (DE-588)4187735-4 (DE-588)4008822-4 |
title | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy |
title_auth | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy |
title_exact_search | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy |
title_full | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan |
title_fullStr | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan |
title_full_unstemmed | Deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan |
title_short | Deliberate discretion |
title_sort | deliberate discretion the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy |
title_sub | the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy |
topic | Politik Recht Separation of powers Political planning Bureaucracy Law / Political aspects Comparative government Politische Planung (DE-588)4115587-7 gnd Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Politik Recht Separation of powers Political planning Bureaucracy Law / Political aspects Comparative government Politische Planung Vergleichende Regierungslehre Bürokratie |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804915 |
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