Sensations: a defense of type materialism
This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1991
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in philosophy
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (ix, 253 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781139173827 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781139173827 |
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| author | Hill, Christopher S. |
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| dewey-full | 128/.3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
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| dewey-search | 128/.3 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 13 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9781139173827 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
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| isbn | 9781139173827 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Hill, Christopher S. Verfasser aut Sensations a defense of type materialism Christopher S. Hill Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991 1 online resource (ix, 253 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists Senses and sensation Knowledge, Theory of Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-39423-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-39737-7 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173827 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hill, Christopher S. Sensations a defense of type materialism Senses and sensation Knowledge, Theory of Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4064317-7 |
| title | Sensations a defense of type materialism |
| title_auth | Sensations a defense of type materialism |
| title_exact_search | Sensations a defense of type materialism |
| title_full | Sensations a defense of type materialism Christopher S. Hill |
| title_fullStr | Sensations a defense of type materialism Christopher S. Hill |
| title_full_unstemmed | Sensations a defense of type materialism Christopher S. Hill |
| title_short | Sensations |
| title_sort | sensations a defense of type materialism |
| title_sub | a defense of type materialism |
| topic | Senses and sensation Knowledge, Theory of Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Senses and sensation Knowledge, Theory of Erkenntnistheorie Wahrnehmung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173827 |
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