From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind
This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an ori...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2016
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Feb 2016) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiv, 270 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781316092873 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781316092873 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Titel: From the knowledge argument to mental substance
Autor: Robinson, Howard
Jahr: 2016
Contents
Preface page xi
Acknowledgements xiii
Part I The power of the knowledge argument 1
1 Introducing the knowledge argument 3
1.1 Setting the context 3
1.2 Smart, Armstrong and topic neutrality 4
1.3 Problems with the topic neutral analysis 8
1.4 The knowledge argument, informally stated 12
1.5 KA and its close relatives 14
1.6 KA formally stated 16
1.7 Possible objections 19
2 Dennett s denial of Mary s ignorance 22
2.1 Mary and the blue banana: an argument or a challenge? 22
2.2 Swamp Mary and RoboMary: how Mary could have pulled it off 26
2.3 A coup de grace: is MBB even relevant? 28
2.4 Dennett s behaviourism and the dubious relevance of Mary s
scientific knowledge 29
2.5 The tension between structural and functional criteria for the identity
of mental states 34
2.6 Conclusion: the shape of Dennett s failure 35
3 The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies 36
3.1 Introductory remarks 36
3.2 The abilities hypothesis: what is it a theory about? 36
3.3 Stalnaker and Lewis on the knowledge argument and phenomenal
information 44
3.4 What would a truly physicalist AH need to say? 46
3.5 A general argument against analytic behaviourism and functionalism 48
3.6 Kirk, zombies, epiphenomenalism and physicalism 52
4 Why Frank should not have jilted Mary: the inadequacy of
representationalism as a strategy against KA 57
4.1 How Jackson has changed his opinion 57
4.2 Pure representationalism and experience 60
vii
viii
Contents
4.3 What is representationalism? 61
4.4 The plausibility of (2) 65
4.5 Physicalism and (3) and (4) 66
4.6 The physicalist need for (5) 67
4.7 Standard physicalist accounts of representation 70
4.8 Jackson s use of representationalism 70
4.9 Conclusion of the argument 71
5 The phenomenal concept strategy: more enigma
than argument 73
5.1 Trying to understand the phenomenal concept strategy 73
5.2 Phenomenal concepts, dualism and physicalism 75
5.3 Why I have difficulty understanding the PCS 77
5.4 The problem facing PCS 78
5.5 Taking option (a): phenomenal concepts are what present brain
states as experiences 79
5.6 Phenomenal qualities, transparency and our conception of the
physical world 83
5.7 Options (b) and (c): identity is given but PCS explains away the
mystery 85
5.8 Option (d): the topic neutral approach 89
5.9 A more general objection to PCS as a whole 89
5.10 Papineau and the Leibniz Law problem 91
5.11 Conclusion 92
6 Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism
without physicalism 93
6.1 Donald Davidson and non-reduction 93
6.2 The two senses of non-reductive 93
6.3 Confusing the two senses 94
6.4 Davidson s theory, naively and sophisticatedly understood 97
6.5 Anomolousness and normativity 101
6.6 Naturalism without physicalism ...? (i) McDowell 104
6.7 Naturalism without physicalism ...? (ii) Price and Rorty 107
6.8 The root of the problem 109
6.9 Conclusion 111
7 Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism 112
7.1 The mysterian option 112
7.2 The appeal to ignorance 115
7.3 A general objection to the hidden property approach 117
7.4 Russell and neutral monism 118
7.5 How qualities might be thought of as complementing the scientific
conception of matter 119
7.6 Explicit panpsychism 126
7.7 Conclusion 130
Contents
ix
8 Conclusion: the real power of the KA - qualia, qualities
and our conception of the physical world 133
8.1 The initial predicament 133
8.2 Extending the scope of the KA 134
8.3 How all objections to the KA miss the point 138
8.4 A direct realist response 141
8.5 Empiricism and physicalism 141
Part II Why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism 145
9 Reductionism and the status of the special sciences 147
9.1 What is reduction? The nature of the problem 147
9.2 Different theories of reduction 148
9.3 Non-reductive conceptions 154
9.4 The limitations of type (3) reduction and the opening to dualism 156
10 Vagueness, realism, language and thought 160
10.1 Introduction 160
10.2 The problem of vagueness 160
10.3 Possible solutions 162
10.4 The alternative picture of language 165
10.5 Vagueness 170
10.6 Sorites 173
10.7 The resultant nature of language 175
11 Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism
and realism 177
11.1 Introduction 177
11.2 Conceptualist and realist existence claims 178
11.3 How to decide the issue 180
11.4 Causal efficacy and existence: (a) defending common sense 181
11.5 Causal efficacy and existence: (b) the reality and power of
structures 183
11.6 Causal efficacy and existence: (c) explanatory force and realism 186
11.7 Human perspectives, Newtonian science and conceptualism 190
11.8 General advantages of CI 190
11.9 Conceptualism and the mind 191
11.10 Conclusion 193
12 Why there are (probably) no physical individuals 194
12.1 Vagueness and individuality 194
12.2 The ineliminability of vagueness in counterfactual identity:
the prima facie case 195
12.3 Is vagueness in identity possible? 196
12.4 Denials of vagueness: Wiggins s treatment of vagueness in identities 197
12.5 Denials of vagueness: Salmon and haecceitas 198
12.6 Denials of vagueness: fixed leeway and no leeway 201
X
Contents
12.7 Lockean common sense: rigour for atoms, convention
for complexes 204
12.8 Conclusion 205
13 Dennett and the human perspective 210
13.1 Introduction 210
13.2 Why the human perspective is unavoidable 210
13.3 Dennett s instrumentalism 212
13.4 Discussion of (10) 214
13.5 Realism and real patterns 216
13.6 Social realism 219
Part III Arguments for mental substance 221
14 Some current arguments for substance dualism 223
14.1 E. J. Lowe s argument for non-Cartesian substance dualism 223
14.2 Swinburne s substance dualism 226
14.3 John Foster s argument for Cartesianism 231
1 ^ An argument for the existence of mental substance 233
15.1 Why mental substance ? 233
15.2 Minds and counterfactuals of origin 234
15.3 Individuality and consciousness 239
15.4 An objection: that this argument shows something about our
concepts but not about reality 242
15.5 Making sense of the substantial self...? 244
16 Plotinus, Locke and Hume on the unity of individual
substances 248
16.1 Introduction 248
16.2 Locke, Aristotle and the organic theory 249
16.3 Plotinus s ascent to the One 252
16.4 From Platonism to neo-Platonism on the nature of forms, via
Aristotle and Frege 254
16.5 Other reasons for thinking Unity is self-predicating 256
16.6 Conventionalism and transcendentalism 258
16.7 Overall conclusion 259
Bibliography
Index
260
268
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| spelling | Robinson, Howard Verfasser aut From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind Howard Robinson Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2016 1 online resource (xiv, 270 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Feb 2016) This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Materialism Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-08726-2 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-45548-1 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316092873 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029327043&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Robinson, Howard From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Materialism |
| title | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind |
| title_auth | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind |
| title_exact_search | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind |
| title_full | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind Howard Robinson |
| title_fullStr | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind Howard Robinson |
| title_full_unstemmed | From the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind Howard Robinson |
| title_short | From the knowledge argument to mental substance |
| title_sort | from the knowledge argument to mental substance resurrecting the mind |
| title_sub | resurrecting the mind |
| topic | Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Materialism |
| topic_facet | Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Materialism |
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