UK merger control:
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | Undetermined |
| Published: |
Oxford ; Portland, Oregon
Hart Publishing
2016
|
| Edition: | Second edition |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | lxix, 829 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9781509904907 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a UK merger control |c Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a United Kingdom merger control |
| 250 | |a Second edition | ||
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| 300 | |a lxix, 829 Seiten | ||
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CONTENTS
THE AUTHORS
V
AUTHOR'S PREFACE VII
TABLE OF CASES XXIX
TABLE OF DECISIONS XXXV
TABLE OF LEGISLATION XLIX
1. OVERVIEW OF THE UK MERGER CONTROL REGIME 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.2 THE FAIR TRADING ACT: 1973 TO 2003 2
1.2.1 ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES 3
1.2.2 JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS 4
1.2.3 THE OFT'S PHASE I INVESTIGATION 4
1.2.4 THE CC'S PHASE II INVESTIGATION 5
1.2.5 THE PUBLIC INTEREST TEST 5
1.3 THE ENTERPRISE ACT: 2003 TO 2014 6
1.3.1 THE 1999 CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 6
(A) THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMPETITION BASED TEST 7
(B) INDEPENDENT COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 8
(C) PUBLIC INTEREST CASES 8
(D) SPECIAL MERGER REGIMES 9
(E) PRE-NOTIFICATION OF MERGERS 9
(F) JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS 10
1.3.2 THE 2000 CONSULTATION RESPONSE 10
(A) THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMPETITION BASED TEST 11
(B) REMOVING MINISTERS FROM THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 12
(C) INDEPENDENT COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 12
(D) PUBLIC INTEREST CASES 12
(E) PROCESS AND TIMETABLES 13
(F) JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS 13
1.3.3 THE ENTERPRISE ACT 14
1.3.4 THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 15
1.3.5 THE COMPETITION COMMISSION 16
1.4 THE ENTERPRISE ACT: 2014 TO DATE 16
1.4.1 THE 2011 CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 16
1.4.2 OPTIONS FOR REFORM 18
(A) STRENGTHENING THE VOLUNTARY REGIME 18
(B) MANDATORY NOTIFICATION 19
(C) JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS 21
(D) SMALL MERGER EXEMPTION 21
(E) STREAMLINING THE MERGER REGIME 22
CONTENTS
(F) MERGER FEES 23
(G) STATUTORY OBJECTIVE 24
(H) CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 25
(I) INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 25
(J) DECISION MAKING 25
1.5 THE RESPONSE OF THE CONSULTATION 26
1.5.1 THE RETENTION OF A VOLUNTARY REGIME 26
1.5.2 JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS 28
1.5.3 STATUTORY TIME LIMITS AND INFORMATION-GATHERING POWERS 28
1.5.4 EARLY CONSIDERATION OF REMEDIES AND SUSPENSION OF PHASE II 29
1.6 AMENDMENTS TO THE ENTERPRISE ACT 29
1.7 THE CMA MERGER GUIDELINES 31
1.8 THE MERGER REGULATION 32
1.9 THE CMA 33
1.10 THE SECRETARY OF STATE 34
1.11 THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL 35
1.12 SECTORAL REGULATORS 36
2. ENTERPRISES CEASING TO BE DISTINCT 38
2.1 INTRODUCTION 38
2.2 RELEVANT MERGER SITUATIONS 39
2.3 THE DEFINITION OF AN ENTERPRISE 40
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 40
2.3.2 THE ACQUISITION OF PHYSICAL ASSETS 41
2.3.3 THE ACQUISITION OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 44
2.3.4 THE ACQUISITION OF A NON-TRADING BUSINESS 45
2.3.5 OUTSOURCING OR MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 47
2.3.6 THE ACQUISITION OF COMPONENTS OF AN ENTERPRISE FROM
DIFFERENT PARTIES 49
2.3.7 THE TREATMENT OF LEASES 50
2.3.8 THE FORMATION OF JOINT VENTURES 52
2.3.9 CONSIDERATION 54
2.4 THE CONCEPT OF CEASING TO BE DISTINCT 54
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 54
2.4.2 DE JURE CONTROL 55
2.4.3 DE FACTO CONTROL 56
(A) ABILITY TO EXERCISE MORE THAN 50% OF VOTING SHARES 56
(B) ABILITY TO INFLUENCE A MAJORITY OF VOTES 56
(C) CMA DISCRETION TO TREAT DE FACTO CONTROL AS
A CONTROLLING INTEREST 57
2.4.4 MATERIAL INFLUENCE 57
(A) SHAREHOLDINGS EXCEEDING 25% 58
(B) SHAREHOLDINGS BETWEEN 15% AND 25% 60
(C) PLUS FACTORS 64
(D) SHAREHOLDINGS BELOW 15% 69
(E) INSUFFICIENT CONTROL 71
2.5 TIME LIMITS AND PRIOR NOTICE 72
2.5.1 THE FOUR-MONTH TIMING RULE 72
2.5.2 THE STARTING POINT FOR THE FOUR-MONTH PERIOD 73
CONTENTS XI
2.5.3 FACTS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MUST BE READILY ASCERTAINABLE 73
2.5.4 EXTENSION OF THE FOUR-MONTH PERIOD 74
2.5.5 RYANAIR/AER LINGUS 75
2.6 SUCCESSIVE TRANSACTIONS 77
2.6.1 AGGREGATING TRANSACTIONS WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD 77
2.6.2 THE TIME AT WHICH ENTERPRISES CEASE TO BE DISTINCT 78
2.6.3 OPTIONS 78
2.6.4 ONLY MERGERS BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES MAY BE AGGREGATED 78
2.7 OBTAINING CONTROL BY STAGES 79
2.7.1 CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF CONTROL 79
2.7.2 ACQUISITIONS OF CONTROL WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD 80
2.7.3 AGGREGATION OF ANTICIPATED MERGERS 80
2.8 TEMPORARY MERGER SITUATIONS 80
2.9 ASSOCIATED PERSONS 81
3. THE SHARE OF SUPPLY AND TURNOVER TESTS 85
3.1 INTRODUCTION 85
3.2 THE SHARE OF SUPPLY TEST 86
3.2.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 86
(A) A SHARE OF SUPPLY OR ACQUISITION 86
(B) AN INCREMENT IS NECESSARY 86
(C) NOT A MARKET SHARE TEST 86
(D) CALCULATION OF THE SHARE OF SUPPLY 87
(E) CMA ANALYSIS 87
(F) TIMING OF THE CM A'S ASSESSMENT 87
3.2.2 THE SUPPLY OF GOODS OR SERVICES 88
(A) HORIZONTAL MARKETS 88
(B) VERTICAL MARKETS 90
(C) MERCHANT AND CAPTIVE SUPPLY 91
(D) JOINT VENTURES 91
3.2.3 A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE UK 92
(A) THE MEANING OF "SUBSTANTIAL PART" 92
(B) NON-CONTIGUOUS REFERENCE AREAS 96
(C) GEOGRAPHICAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE REFERENCE AREA
AND THE AREA OF POTENTIAL SUBSTANTIVE CONCERN 98
3.2.4 GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION OF SUPPLY 99
3.3 THE TURNOVER TEST 100
3.3.1 ENTERPRISES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TURNOVER CALCULATION 100
(A) TRANSACTIONS WHERE AT LEAST ONE PARTY REMAINS
UNDER THE SAME OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 101
(B) TRANSACTIONS WHERE NONE OF THE PARTIES REMAINS
UNDER THE SAME OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 101
3.3.2 THE CALCULATION OF TURNOVER 102
(A) ORDINARY ACTIVITIES 102
(B) THE RELEVANT TIME-PERIOD 102
(C) ADJUSTMENTS TO TURNOVER IN THE PRECEDING BUSINESS YEAR 102
(D) GROUP TURNOVER 103
(E) ACQUISITION OF PART OF A COMPANY 103
XII CONTENTS
(0 EXCLUSION OF INTRA-GROUP SALES 104
(G) INCLUSION OF AID 104
(H) GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF TURNOVER 104
(I) SUCCESSIVE TRANSACTIONS 105
(J) TREATMENT OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES 106
3.3.3 RULES FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS 106
(A) CREDIT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 106
(B) INSURANCE UNDERTAKINGS 106
4. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MERGER REGULATION 107
4.1 INTRODUCTION 108
4.2 CONCENTRATIONS WITH AN EU DIMENSION 110
4.2.1 CONCENTRATION 110
4.2.2 EU DIMENSION 110
4.3 THE COMMISSION'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES 112
4.3.1 OVERVIEW 112
4.3.2 MORE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY 112
4.3.3 ONE-STOP SHOP 112
4.3.4 LEGAL CERTAINTY 113
4.4 REFERRALS FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE CMA 113
4.4.1 PRE-NOTIFICATION REFERRAL REQUESTS UNDER ARTICLE 4(4) 113
(A) GENERAL PRINCIPLES 113
(B) LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 114
(C) ADDITIONAL FACTORS 115
(D) MULTIPLE REFERRAL REQUESTS 118
(E) PARTIAL REFERRAL REQUESTS 119
(F) FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE CMA 119
(G) ELIGIBLE TRANSACTIONS AND ACTION BEFORE FILING FORM RS 120
(H) FORMRS 120
(I) CMA CONSIDERATION OF AN ARTICLE 4(4) REQUEST 120
(J) COMMISSION DECISION ON REFERRAL 121
(K) CMA PROCEDURE FOLLOWING A REFERRAL BACK 121
(1) TIMING IMPLICATIONS 122
(M) DECISIONAL PRACTICE 123
(N) REVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 4(4) REFERRAL MECHANISM 124
(O) 2014 WHITE PAPER 126
4.4.2 POST-NOTIFICATION REFERRAL REQUESTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 126
(A) GENERAL PRINCIPLES 126
(B) LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 127
(C) PARTIAL REFERRALS 130
(D) PROCEDURE AND TIMING 130
(E) DECISIONAL PRACTICE 132
(F) REVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 9 REFERRAL MECHANISM 134
4.5 REFERRALS FROM THE CMA TO THE COMMISSION 135
4.5.1 PRE-NOTIFICATION REQUESTS UNDER ARTICLE 4(5) 135
(A) GENERAL PRINCIPLES 135
(B) LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 135
(C) PROCEDURE AND TIM ING 135
CONTENTS XIII
(D) THE UK VETO 136
(E) REVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 4(5) REFERRAL MECHANISM 137
(F) 2014 WHITE PAPER 138
4.5.2 POST-NOTIFICATION REQUESTS UNDER ARTICLE 22 139
(A) GENERAL PRINCIPLES 139
(B) LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 139
(C) OTHER FACTORS 140
(D) PROCEDURE AND TIMING 140
(E) DECISIONAL PRACTICE 141
(0 REVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 22 REFERRAL MECHANISM 144
(G) 2014 WHITE PAPER 144
4.6 PROTECTION OF LEGITMATE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 145
4.6.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 145
4.6.2 PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 145
4.7 ARTICLE 346 TFEU 148
5. PUBLIC INTEREST MERGERS 149
5.1 INTRODUCTION 149
5.2 PUBLIC INTEREST GROUNDS 150
5.2.1 PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 150
5.2.2 NATIONAL SECURITY 152
5.2.3 NEWSPAPER PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 157
(A) MEDIA MERGER GUIDANCE 157
(B) ACCURATE PRESENTATION OF NEWS 158
(C) FREE EXPRESSION OF OPINION 159
(D) PLURALITY OF VIEWS 160
(E) POLICY ON INTERVENTION 161
5.2.4 MEDIA AND BROADCASTING PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 163
(A) DEFINITION OF A MEDIA ENTERPRISE 164
(B) CONSIDERATION OF A PURCHASER'S TRACK RECORD 164
(C) ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA PUBIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 164
(D) PLURALITY OF PERSONS WITH CONTROL OF MEDIA ENTERPRISES 165
(E) RANGE OF BROADCASTING 169
(F) COMMITMENTS TO THE BROADCASTING STANDARDS OBJECTIVES 169
5.2.5 MAINTAINING THE STABILITY OF THE UK FINANCIAL SYSTEM 171
5.3 PUBLIC INTEREST MERGERS 172
5.3.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 172
5.3.2 PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTION NOTICE 173
5.3.3 PHASE I INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 174
5.3.4 REPORT BY OFCOM 176
5.3.5 DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON REFERENCE 176
5.3.6 PHASE II INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 177
5.3.7 FINAL DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 179
5.3.8 ENFORCEMENT 180
5.4 SPECIAL PUBLIC INTEREST MERGERS 181
5.4.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 181
5.4.2 PROCEDURE 182
5.4.3 PHASE I INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 182
XIV CONTENTS
5.4.4 DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON REFERENCE 182
5.4.5 PHASE II INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 183
5.4.6 FINAL DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 183
5.5 EUROPEAN MERGERS AND THE PROTECTION OF
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS 183
5.5.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 183
5.5.2 PHASE I INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 184
5.5.3 DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON REFERENCE 185
5.5.4 PHASE II INVESTIGATION AND REPORT 185
5.5.5 FINAL DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 186
6. THE PHASE 1 PROCESS 187
6.1 INTRODUCTION 188
6.2 MERGERS INTELLIGENCE 189
6.2.1 THE STATUTORY DUTY TO MONITOR UK MERGERS 189
6.2.2 MERGERS INTELLIGENCE TEAM 189
6.2.3 COMPLAINTS 191
6.3 ENQUIRY LETTERS 192
6.4 THE DECISION TO NOTIFY A MERGER 193
6.4.1 TRANSACTIONS RAISING NO COMPETITION CONCERNS 193
6.4.2 TRANSACTIONS RAISING POTENTIAL COMPETITION CONCERNS 193
(A) INITIAL ENFORCEMENT ORDERS 194
(B) PHASE II REFERRAL 194
(C) REDUCED PERIOD FOR A PHASE I REVIEW 194
6.5 INFORMAL ADVICE 195
6.5.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 195
6.5.2 APPLICATIONS FOR INFORMAL ADVICE 197
6.5.3 TIMETABLE 197
6.6 PRE-NOTIFICATION CONTRACT 198
6.6.1 THE PURPOSE OF PRE-NOTIFICATION CONTACT 198
6.6.2 THE PRE-NOTIFICATION PROCESS 198
6.6.3 THE BENEFITS OF PRE-NOTIFICATION CONTACT 199
6.7 NOTIFICATION OF MERGERS 201
6.7.1 MERGERS MUST NOT BE CONFIDENTIAL 201
6.7.2 GOOD FAITH INTENTION TO PROCEED 202
6.7.3 CONTENT AND COMPLETENESS 202
6.7.4 TIMING 204
6.7.5 OWN-INITIATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 204
6.7.6 FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION 204
6.7.7 CONFIDENTIALITY 205
6.7.8 FAST TRACK REFERENCE CASES 205
6.8 INITIAL ENFORCEMENT ORDERS 207
6.8.1 PURPOSE 207
6.8.2 TIMING 208
6.8.3 ANTICIPATED MERGERS 208
(A) INTERIM ORDERS TO PREVENT PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION 208
(B) INTERIM ORDERS PREVENTING COMPLETION 209
6.8.4 COMPLETED MERGERS 210
CONTENTS XV
6.8.5 DEROGATIONS 213
6.8.6 COMPLIANCE UPDATES 214
6.8.7 PUBLICATION 215
6.8.8 MONITORING TRUSTEES AND HOLD SEPARATE MANAGERS 215
6.8.9 UNWINDING ORDER 217
6.9 THE CMA'S INFORMATION-GATHERING POWERS 218
6.10 DISCUSSIONS WITH MERGING PARTIES AND
THIRD PARTIES 220
6.11 THE PHASE I PROCESS 221
6.11.1 THE INITIAL STAGES 221
(A) EARLY INVESTIGATION 221
(B) INTERNAL STATE OF PLAY MEETING 222
(C) EXTERNAL STATE OF PLAY CALL 222
6.11.2 NON-CRM CASES 223
6.11.3 CRM CASES 223
(A) ISSUES LETTER 223
(B) ISSUES MEETING 224
(C) CASE REVIEW MEETING 225
(D) DECISION MEETING 225
(E) DRAFT DECISION 226
(F) PUBLICATION OF DECISIONS 226
6.12 FILING FEES 226
6.13 TAKEOVER CODE 228
6.13.1 RELEVANCE OF THE TAKEOVER CODE TO UK MERGERS 229
6.13.2 CONDITIONS TO AN OFFER 229
6.13.3 TIMING IMPLICATIONS 230
(A) RULE 2.4 ANNOUNCEMENTS 230
(B) RULE 2.7 ANNOUNCEMENTS 230
6.14 ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 230
6.14.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-ASSESSMENT 231
6.14.2 CMA ASSESSMENT 231
7. THE DUTY TO REFER AND EXCEPTIONS 234
7.1 INTRODUCTION 234
7.1.1 STATUTORY DISCRETIONARY EXCEPTIONS 235
7.1.2 NO DISCRETION TO REFER 235
7.2 THE CMA'S STANDARD OF PROOF 236
7.2.1 THE OFT'S ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF ITS
STANDARD OF PROOF 236
7.2.2 ISOFT/TOREX 237
7.2.3 IBA HEALTH V. OFT 238
7.2.4 OFTV. IBA HEALTH 241
7.2.5 THE AMENDED REFERENCE THRESHOLD 243
7.3 EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY TO REFER 243
7.4 MARKETS OF INSUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE 244
7.4.1 2003 SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE 245
7.4.2 2007 DE MINIMIS GUIDANCE 246
XVI CONTENTS
(A) INCREASE IN THE THRESHOLD 246
(B) CALCULATION OF THE MARKET SIZE 246
(C) MERGERS LIKELY TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
ON COMPETITION 247
(D) THE THREE KEY VARIABLES 247
(E) INTRODUCTION OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH VARIABLES 248
7.4.3 THE EXCEPTION AND REMEDIES GUIDANCE 248
(A) INTRODUCTION 248
(B) APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTION 249
(C) ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 250
(D) SIZE OF THE MARKETS 250
(E) STRENGTH OF THE CMA'S CONCERNS 253
(F) MAGNITUDE OF THE COMPETITION LOST 254
(G) DURABILITY 256
(H) REPLICABIIITY 257
(I) CONSIDERATION OF THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS 257
7.4.4 AVAILABILITY OF UNDERTAKINGS IN LIEU 258
7.5 RELEVANT CUSTOMER BENEFITS 261
7.5.1 INTRODUCTION 261
7.5.2 RELEVANT CUSTOMER BENEFITS VERSUS MERGER-SPECIFIC
EFFICIENCIES 261
7.5.3 RELEVANT CUSTOMER BENEFITS AND UNDERTAKINGS 263
7.5.4 EVIDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS 263
7.5.5 RELEVANT CUSTOMER BENEFITS IN HOSPITAL MERGERS 264
7.5.6 THE AUTHORITIES'DECISIONAL PRACTICE 264
7.6 MERGERS INSUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED OR
UNLIKELY TO PROCEED 267
7.7 NO DUTY TO REFER 268
8. THE PHASE II PROCESS 270
8.1 INTRODUCTION 270
8.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE 271
8.3 CANCELLATION OR VARIATION OF REFERENCES 272
8.4 STATUTORY QUESTIONS 272
8.5 STANDARD OF PROOF 273
8.6 TIME LIMITS 273
8.7 APPOINTMENT OF AN INQUIRY GROUP 275
8.8 MERGER INQUIRY CASE TEAM 276
8.9 SUSPENSION OF A REFERENCE 277
8.10 TIMETABLE 277
8.11 OPENING LETTER 278
8.12 INTERIM UNDERTAKINGS AND ORDERS 279
8.12.1 STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 279
8.12.2 INTERIM MEASURES 280
8.12.3 INTERIM ORDERS 281
8.12.4 APPOINTMENT OF A MONITORING TRUSTEE OR
HOLD-SEPARATE MANAGER 282
8.13 INFORMATION GATHERING 284
CONTENTS XVII
8.13.1 INITIAL SUBMISSION 284
8.13.2 ECONOMIC SUBMISSIONS 285
8.13.3 SURVEYS 285
8.13.4 QUESTIONNAIRES 286
8.13.5 THIRD PARTY SUBMISSIONS 287
8.13.6 INFORMATION-GATHERING POWERS 288
8.13.7 THIRD PARTY HEARINGS 289
8.13.8 SURVEYS AND CONSULTANTS 289
8.13.9 SITE VISITS 290
8.14 ISSUES STATEMENT 291
8.15 WORKING PAPERS 291
8.16 ANNOTATED ISSUES STATEMENT 292
8.17 SHARING TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 292
8.18 PUT-BACK 293
8.19 MAIN PARTY HEARINGS 293
8.20 PROVISIONAL FINDINGS 295
8.21 NOTICE OF POSSIBLE REMEDIES 297
8.22 RESPONSE HEARINGS 298
8.23 REMEDIES WORKING PAPER 298
8.24 FINAL REPORTS 299
8.25 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 299
8.25.1 CORE DOCUMENTS 299
8.25.2 EVIDENCE AND ANNOUNCEMENTS 300
8.25.3 CONFIDENTIALITY 300
9. THE COUNTERFACTUAL 303
9.1 INTRODUCTION 303
9.2 THE COUNTERFACTUAL 304
9.2.1 THE PHASE I APPROACH 304
9.2.2 THE PHASE II APPROACH 305
9.3 THE RELEVANT TIME-PERIOD FOR ASSESSING
THE COUNTERFACTUAL 306
9.3.1 FUTURE EVENTS 307
9.3.2 PAST BEHAVIOUR 308
9.3.3 A TWO-PART COUNTERFACTUAL 311
9.3.4 VIOLATIONS OF COMPETITION LAW 312
9.4 THE FAILING FIRM COUNTERFACTUAL 313
9.4.1 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 315
9.4.2 THE PHASE I APPROACH 315
9.4.3 THE PHASE II APPROACH 316
9.4.4 LIMB ONE: EXIT OF THE TARGET FIRM 316
9.4.5 LIMB TWO: ALTERNATIVE PURCHASERS 320
9.4.6 LIMB THREE: EXIT OF THE TARGET AS A LESS
ANTI-COMPETITIVE OUTCOME 326
9.4.7 EXIT UNINFLUENCED BY THE MERGER 328
9.4.8 FAILING DIVISION COUNTERFACTUAL 330
9.4.9 THE PHASE I DECISIONAL PRACTICE 331
9.4.10 THE PHASE II DECISIONAL PRACTICE 338
XVIII CONTENTS
9.5 STRATEGIC EXIT 342
9.6 SCENARIOS SHORT OF EXIT 344
9.6.1 THE TARGET AS A WEAKENED COMPETITIVE FORCE 344
9.6.2 STATE RESCUE 346
9.7 MARKET ENTRY OR EXPANSION 348
9.8 EXIT OF A COMPETITOR 351
9.9 COMPETING BIDS 352
9.9.1 THE PHASE 1 APPROACH 352
9.9.2 THE PHASE II APPROACH 353
9.10 PARALLEL TRANSACTIONS 354
9.10.1 THE PHASE I APPROACH 354
9.10.2 THE PHASE II APPROACH 356
9.11 RAIL FRANCHISE BIDS 357
10. MARKET DEFINITION 359
10.1 INTRODUCTION 359
10.2 THE HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST 361
10.2.1 USE OF THE HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST 363
10.2.2 A SSNIP TEST ALGORITHM 364
10.2.3 NARROW VERSUS WIDE MARKETS AND THE CHOICE OF SSNIP 365
10.3 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION:
DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION 367
10.3.1 PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 369
10.3.2 PRICING EVIDENCE 370
(A) ABSOLUTE PRICE LEVELS 370
(B) PRICE CORRELATION 371
(C) STATIONARITY TESTS 374
(D) OWN-PRICE AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES 371
(E) CUSTOMER MARKETS, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND PRICE SENSITIVITY 376
10.3.3 SWITCHING COSTS 378
10.3.4 CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS 379
10.3.5 EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS AND DIVERSION RATIOS 383
10.4 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: SUPPLY-SIDE
SUBSTITUTION 385
10.5 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 388
10.5.1 HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST 388
10.5.2 FACTORS CONSIDERED IN GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 389
10.5.3 SENSITIVITY OF SHARE DATA TO THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
DEFINITION EMPLOYED 391
(A) UK-WIDE VERSUS WIDER THAN NATIONAL 391
(B) UK-WIDE VERSUS REGIONAL OR LOCAL 392
10.5.4 POINT-TO-POINT TRANSPORT FLOWS 393
10.5.5 CHAINS OF SUBSTITUTION 394
10.5.6 IMPORT AND TRADE FLOWS 396
10.5.7 REGIONAL MARKETS 397
CONTENTS XIX
10.5.8 LOCAL MARKETS 399
(A) MERGERS INVOLVING NATIONAL CHAINS OF LOCAL STORES 399
(B) THE CMA'S STANDARD APPROACH TO LOCAL MARKET
DEFINITION WHERE CUSTOMER DATA ARE AVAILABLE 401
(C) THE CMA'S APPROACH WHERE CUSTOMER DATA ARE
NOT AVAILABLE 403
10.6 OTHER ISSUES IN PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION 405
10.6.1 COMPETITIVE VERSUS PREVAILING LEVEL SSNIP TESTS 405
10.6.2 INDIRECT DEMAND-SIDE CONSTRAINTS 407
10.6.3 PRODUCT BUNDLES 410
(A) AFTERMARKETS 410
(B) 'ONE-SHOP' PURCHASING 411
(C) OTHER EXAMPLES 412
10.6.4 TWO-SIDED MARKETS 413
10.6.5 ASYMMETRIC CONSTRAINTS 414
10.6.6 INNOVATION AND PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLES 416
10.6.7 INTERNET SALES 417
10.6.8 BRANDED AND OWN-LABEL PRODUCTS 420
11. CONCENTRATION MEASURES AND SCREENS 425
11.1 INTRODUCTION 425
11.2 MARKET SHARES 426
11.2.1 THE 40% SHARE SCREEN FOR UNILATERAL EFFECTS,
UNDIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 427
11.2.2 MERGERS RESULTING IN SMALL INCREMENTS 429
11.2.3 CALCULATING MARKET SHARES 430
11.2.4 INTERPRETING MARKET SHARES 434
11.3 THE
C
SIGNIFICANT COMPETITOR' SET AND
'FASCIA COUNTS' 436
11.3.1 FASCIA COUNTS 437
11.3.2 MERGERS OF LARGE FULL-RANGE RETAILERS OR
4
SUPERSTORES' 438
11.3.3 SELECTED OTHER CASES 442
11.3.4 THE 5 TO 4 SCREEN FOR MULTIPLE-OVERLAP RETAIL
(AND OTHERS) CASES 445
(A) RETAIL CASES 445
(B) NON-RETAIL CASES 447
11.3.5 EXAMPLES OF FASCIA AND MARKET SHARE SCREENS 448
(A) PHASE I DEMAND- AND SUPPLY-CENTRED
4
4 TO 3'
FASCIA COUNTS 448
(B) PHASE I STORE COUNT SHARE AND INCREMENT 448
(C) PHASE I SCREENS IN PHARMACIES 449
(D) PHASE I SCREEN, 40% MARKET SHARE THRESHOLD,
10% INCREMENT 450
(E) PHASE I '4 TO 3' SCREEN APPLIED ONLY TO TARGET STORES,
SUPPLEMENTED BY FURTHER DISTANCE SCREENS 450
(F) PHASE I '4 TO 3' SCREEN PLUS DIVERSION RATIOS 451
XX CONTENTS
(G) PHASE II '4 TO 3' AND '3 TO 2' SCREENS BASED ON PRIOR
ECONOMETRICS ASSESSMENT (NON-RETAIL) 451
(H) PHASE II '5 TO 4', '4 TO 3' AND RELATED MARKET SHARE
SCREENS (NON-RETAIL) 452
11.3.6 EXAMPLES OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS 453
11.4 OTHER CONCENTRATION MEASURES AND SCREENS 456
11.4.1 HHIS 456
11.4.2 CONCENTRATION RATIOS 457
11.4.3 THE 30% SCREEN FOR NON-HORIZONTAL THEORIES 457
12, UNILATERAL EFFECTS 459
12.1 INTRODUCTION 461
12.2 UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN RETAIL MARKETS 463
12.2.1 UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN THE SETTING OF TEXTBOOK
MODELS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 463
(A) THE BERTRAND MODEL 463
(B) PRE-MERGER EQUILIBRIUM 464
(C) POST-MERGER EQUILIBRIUM 464
(D) UPWARD PRICING PRESSURE 465
(E) ILLUSTRATIVE PRICE RISES AND GUPPIS 466
(F) OTHER MODELS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 467
(G) DYNAMIC RESPONSES IGNORED BY STATIC MODELS OF PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION 468
12.2.2 THE MERGER ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES 469
12.2.3 CLOSENESSOF SUBSTITUTION AND RELATED THEORIES OF HARM 470
(A) WHAT IS A CLOSE SUBSTITUTE? 471
(B) DIVERSION RATIOS AND OTHER MEASURES OF 'CLOSENESS' 471
(C) MARKET SHARES AND SITE COUNTS AS A BENCHMARK
FOR CLOSENESS 473
(D) THEORIES OF HARM IN RELATION TO 'CLOSEST' AND
'CLOSE ENOUGH'COMPETITORS 475
(E) THEORIES OF HARM WITH ASYMMETRIC SUBSTITUTION PATTERNS 480
(0 THEORIES OF HARM WITH CUMULATIVE CONSTRAINTS 481
(G) THEORIES OF HARM WITH STORE ACQUISITIONS THAT DO
NOT REMOVE A COMPETITOR 481
(H) DIVERSION RATIO SCREENS 482
12.2.4 VARIABLE MARGINS 483
(A) INTRODUCTION 483
(B) THE LERNER CONDITION 483
(C) CALCULATION AND USE OF MARGIN DATA 484
(D) MARGIN SCREENS 485
12.2.5 SPECIFIC PRICE PRESSURE INDICES AND TESTS 485
(A) GROSS UPWARD PRICING PRESSURE INDEX 486
(B) ILLUSTRATIVE PRICE RISES WITH SYMMETRIC DEMAND 490
(C) UPWARD PRICING PRESSURE 494
(D) COMPARING INTERVENTION THRESHOLDS WITH
GUPPI AND IPRS 495
CONTENTS XXI
(E) PRICE PRESSURE TEST THRESHOLDS IN PRACTICE 497
(F) MEASUREMENT ERROR: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND
APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO PLACE ON PRICE PRESSURE TESTS 500
12.2.6 INTERACTING NATIONAL AND LOCAL THEORIES OF HARM IN
RETAIL CASES WITH LOCAL OVERLAPS 503
(A) INTRODUCTION 503
(B) REDUCTION IN NATIONALLY SET PQRS 504
(C) CESSATION OF NATIONAL PQRS SETTING, GIVING RISE TO
ADVERSE LOCAL PQRS EFFECTS 505
(D) STORE CLOSURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 506
(E) NATIONAL CONCERNS IN PURE GYM/THE GYM 507
(F) NATIONAL (AND OTHER) EFFECTS MITIGATING LOCAL
PQRS CONCERNS 508
12.3 SUPPLIER MERGERS IN INTERMEDIATE AND
UNDIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 509
12.3.1 INTRODUCTION 509
12.3.2 THE THEORY OF UNDIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS AND
QUANTITY COMPETITION 510
(A) THE OUTPUT REDUCTION THEORY OF HARM 510
(B) THE COURNOT MODEL - COMPETITION IN QUANTITIES WITH
UNDIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 511
(C) ILLUSTRATIVE PRICE RISES IN A COURNOT SETTING 513
(D) BERTRAND EDGEWORTH MODELS OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINT 513
12.3.3 DECISIONAL PRACTICE WITH UNDIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKETS 514
(A) THEORIES OF HARM BASED ON CLOSENESS OF COMPETITION 515
(B) THEORIES OF HARM BASED ON SPARE CAPACITY 515
(C) THEORIES OF HARM RELATING TO SWITCHING COSTS 517
12.3.4 MARKETS WITH BIDDING PROCESSES AND AUCTIONS 518
(A) FIRMS WITH IDENTICAL PRODUCTS BUT DIFFERENT COSTS 520
(B) AUCTIONS, COMPETITIVE TENDERS AND UNCERTAINTY 521
(C) PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 523
12.3.5 NEGOTIATED PRICES 524
12.4 MERGERS IN PROCUREMENT MARKETS 526
12.4.1 COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF BUYER MERGERS 527
(A) MERGER ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES 527
(B) DEFINITIONS OF BUYER POWER 527
(C) BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL EFFECTS OF BUYER MERGERS 529
(D) 'WATERBED EFFECTS', RAISING RIVALS COSTS AND RELATED
THEORIES OF HARM 530
12.4.2 THE AUTHORITIES'DECISIONAL PRACTICE 531
(A) TRAVIS PERKINS/BSS 531
(B) STONEGATE/DEANS 532
(C) WATERSTONE 'S/OTTAKAR 'S 534
(D) NIKE/UMBRO 534
(E) GRAPHIC/BENSON 535
(0 MUELLER/DAIRY CREST 535
(G) RANK/GALA 536
XXII CONTENTS
12.5 THE ELIMINATION OF A POTENTIAL ENTRANT 536
12.5.1 INTRODUCTION 536
12.5.2 THE AUTHORITIES'DECISIONAL PRACTICE 538
12.6 UNILATERAL EFFECTS WITH MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS 542
12.6.1 THE ECONOMICS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS 542
12.6.2 THE AUTHORITIES'DECISIONAL PRACTICE 543
(A) SKY/ITV 543
(B) RYANAIR/AER LINGUS 544
12.7 CLOSENESS OF SUBSTITUTION: EMPIRICAL
TECHNIQUES AND TESTS 551
12.7.1 CUSTOMER SURVEY EVIDENCE 551
(A) SURVEY STRUCTURE 551
(B) TYPES OF SURVEYS, REPRESENTATIVENESS AND
CHOICE OF LOCATIONS 551
(C) ELICITING DIVERSION RATIOS VIA A SINGLE STORE
CLOSURE QUESTION 554
(D) ELICITING DIVERSION RATIOS VIA HYPOTHETICAL
PRICE RISE QUESTIONS 555
(E) REBASING DIVERSION RATIOS TO EXCLUDE WITHIN
PORTFOLIO SWITCHING 556
(F) MARGIN FOR ERROR 557
(G) EXTRAPOLATION OF DIVERSION RATIOS FROM SURVEYS 558
(H) SELECTED ISSUES IN CONSUMER SURVEY DESIGN 558
(I) STATED PREFERENCES VERSUS ACTUAL SWITCHING EVIDENCE 561
(J) SUGGESTED BEST PRACTICE FOR SUBMISSIONS OF
TECHNICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FROM PARTIES 562
12.7.2 A SELECTIVE NOTE ON EMPIRICAL TECHNIQUES 563
(A) OWN AND CROSS PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 563
(B) A SIMPLE DEMAND SYSTEM 564
(C) THE ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM 565
(D) LOGIT FORM OF DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS 566
(E) REDUCED FORM MODELS 568
(F) MERGER SIMULATION 568
(G) BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 569
12.7.3 EVENT ANALYSIS 572
(A) PROMOTIONS 572
(B) ENTRY/EXIT 573
(C) TEMPORARY PRODUCTION OUTAGE 574
12.7.4 PRICE AND MARGIN CONCENTRATION STUDIES 574
(A) INTRODUCTION 574
(B) EXAMPLES OF PCA USED BY THE AUTHORITIES 576
(C) MARGIN CONCENTRATION 577
(D) THE COMMENTARY ON RETAIL MERGERS 579
(E) COMPARING RANGE AND SERVICE QUALITY IN OVERLAP
AND NON-OVERLAP AREAS 579
12.7.5 BIDDING AND WIN/LOSS ANALYSIS 580
(A) TENDER PROCESSES 581
(B) ECONOMETRIC TESTS 582
(C) DECISIONAL PRACTICE 582
CONTENTS XXIII
12.7.6
INFERENCES ON COMPETITION AMONGST MANUFACTURERS
DRAWN FROM RETAIL LEVEL DATA
(A) DERIVED WHOLESALER DEMAND AND WHOLESALER PASS-THROUGH
(B) A BARGAINING CONTEXT
(C) DECISIONAL PRACTICE
13. COORDINATED EFFECTS
13.1 INTRODUCTION
13.2 THE ECONOMICS OF COORDINATION
13.2.1
13.2.2
THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION - OUTLINE OF THE BASIC MODEL
THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION - KEY CONCEPTS
(A) EXPLICIT VERSUS TACIT COLLUSION
(B) THE ECONOMIC DEFINITION OF COLLUSION IS NOT THE SAME
AS THE LEGAL DEFINITION
(C) HOW DO FIRMS DETERMINE THE COLLUSIVE PRICE?
(D) HOW DO FIRMS CHOOSE A PUNISHMENT MECHANISM?
(E) EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION DOES NOT MAKE
COLLUSION INEVITABLE
13.3 THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR COORDINATION
13.3.1
13.3.2
13.3.3
13.3.4
ALIGNMENT
(A) NUMBER OF COMPETITORS
(B) DEGREE OF COMPLEXITY IN THE MARKET
(C) STRUCTURAL LINKS
(D) TERMS OF COORDINATION
INTERNAL STABILITY
(A) FACTORS RELEVANT TO INTERNAL SUSTAINABILITY
(B) NUMBER OF COMPETITORS
(C) TRANSPARENCY
(D) PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES
(E) SYMMETRY OF MARKET SHARES AND COST STRUCTURES
(F) PRIOR EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION
EXTERNAL STABILITY
EFFECT OF A MERGER ON THE SCOPE FOR COORDINATION
(A) TYPES OF COORDINATED EFFECTS
(B) HOW MIGHT A MERGER MAKE COLLUSION MORE
SUSTAINABLE OR MORE HARMFUL?
13.4 THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE
13.4.1
13.4.2
13.4.3
DS SMITH/LINPAC
(A) MERGER OVERVIEW
(B) OFT DECISION
(C) CC DECISION
WIENERBERGER/BAGGERIDGE
(A) MERGER OVERVIEW
(B) OFT DECISION
(C) CC DECISION
ANGLO AMERICAN/LAFARGE
(A) MERGER OVERVIEW
(B) OFT DECISION
(C) CC DECISION
583
584
585
587
589
589
590
591
593
593
593
594
594
595
596
597
597
598
599
599
600
600
601
602
606
609
611
612
613
613
619
623
623
623
623
624
625
625
625
627
630
630
631
635
XXIV CONTENTS
14. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
INTRODUCTION
VERTICAL MERGERS
14.2.1 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
14.2.2 INPUT FORECLOSURE
(A) INTRODUCTION
(B) THE ECONOMICS OF INPUT FORECLOSURE
(C) TOTAL INPUT FORECLOSURE
(D) PARTIAL INPUT FORECLOSURE
(E) ABILITY, INCENTIVE, EFFECT
(F) COUNTERVAILING CONSTRAINTS TO INPUT FORECLOSURE
(G) ASSESSING AN INPUT FORECLOSURE STRATEGY AS AN
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
14.2.3 CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE
(A) INTRODUCTION
(B) MERGER ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES
(C) FORECLOSURE STRATEGIES
(D) ABILITY TO FORECLOSE CUSTOMERS
(E) INCENTIVE TO FORECLOSE CUSTOMERS
(F) EFFECT ON COMPETITION
14.2.4 THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE
(A) BT/EE
(B) ANGLO AMERICAN/LAFARGE
(C) THOMAS COOK/CGUMIDLANDS
(D) TICKETMASTER/LIVE NATION
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
14.3.1 INTRODUCTION
14.3.2 MERGER ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES
14.3.3 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
14.3.4 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE TYING AND BUNDLING
(A) DEFINITIONS OF TYING AND BUNDLING
(B) EXAMPLES OF THEORIES OF HARM
(C) EFFICIENCIES
14.3.5 ANTI-COMPETITIVE PORTFOLIO EFFECTS
14.3.6 THE AUTHORITIES' DECISIONAL PRACTICE
DIAGONAL MERGERS
15. COUNTERVAILING CONSTRAINTS
15.1
15.2
15.3
INTRODUCTION
MARKET ENTRY AND EXPANSION
15.2.1 TYPES OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY/EXPANSION
15.2.2 TIMELINESS OF ENTRY/EXPANSION
15.2.3 LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY/EXPANSION
15.2.4 SUFFICIENCY OF ENTRY /EXPANSION
15.2.5 EVIDENCE ON ENTRY/EXPANSION
15.2.6 THE AUTHORITIES' DECISIONAL PRACTICE
BUYER POWER
15.3.1 EVIDENCE ON BUYER POWER
639
639
640
641
641
641
642
643
645
645
651
651
652
652
653
653
654
656
657
658
658
661
663
665
668
688
688
669
669
669
670
671
672
674
680
682
682
683
684
685
686
687
689
691
695
696
CONTENTS XXV
15.4
15.3.2 SUPPLIER MERGERS WITH A SINGLE PURCHASER
15.3.3 BUYER POWER AND THE DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION
EFFICIENCIES
15.4.1 SUPPLY-SIDE EFFICIENCIES
(A) COST REDUCTIONS
(B) REMOVAL OF DOUBLE MARGINALISATION
(C) INVESTMENT PLANNING
(D) PRODUCT REPOSITIONING
(E) ACCESS TO SCARE RESOURCES AND COMPLEMENTARY INPUTS
15.4.2 DEMAND-SIDE EFFICIENCIES
(A) COURNOT EFFECTS
(B) NETWORK EFFECTS
(C) 'ONE-STOP' SHOPPING
15.4.3 EVIDENCING EFFICIENCIES AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF
15.4.4 THE AUTHORITIES' DECISIONAL PRACTICE
15.4.5 CUMULATIVE CONSTRAINTS
16. UNDERTAKINGS IN LIEU OF REFERENCE
16.1
16.2
16.3
16.4
16.5
16.6
16.7
16.8
16.9
16.10
16.11
16.12
16.13
INTRODUCTION
THE CMA'S STATUTORY DUTY
UIL OFFERS
THE UIL DECISION
MODIFICATIONS TO AN EXISTING OFFER
THE ASSESSMENT PERIOD FOR UIL OFFERS
UPFRONT BUYER CASES
16.7.1 INTRODUCTION
16.7.2 ADVANTAGES
16.7.3 PROCESS
16.7.4 APPLICATION TO PART OF A REMEDIES PACKAGE
NON-UPFRONT BUYER CASES
' FIX-IT-FIRST' UNDERTAKINGS
UNDERTAKINGS TEMPLATE
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNDERTAKINGS
16.11.1 UNDERTAKINGS MUST BE CLEAR-CUT
16.11.2 UNDERTAKINGS MUST COMPREHENSIVELY REMOVE ALL
COMPETITION CONCERNS
16.11.3 UNDERTAKINGS MUST BE PROPORTIONATE
16.11.4 UNDERTAKINGS MUST USUALLY BE STRUCTURAL
16.11.5 UNDERTAKINGS MUST NOT REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT
ADDITIONAL MONITORING
16.11.6 UNDERTAKINGS MUST NOT RAISE COMPETITION CONCERNS
16.11.7 DIVESTMENTS MUST BE MADE TO A SUITABLE PURCHASER
'QUASI-STRUCTURAL
7
REMEDIES
BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES
699
699
700
701
701
702
703
703
703
704
704
704
705
705
706
709
711
711
713
713
715
716
716
717
717
717
719
721
721
722
723
727
727
728
729
730
732
732
733
735
738
XXVI CONTENTS
17. PHASE II REMEDIES 742
17.1 INTRODUCTION 742
17.2 REMEDIES PROCESS 744
17.2.1 INTRODUCTION 744
17.2.2 NOTICE OF POSSIBLE REMEDIES 744
17.23 DRAFT UNDERTAKINGS AND MODIFICATIONS 745
17.2.4 ACCEPTANCE OF FINAL UNDERTAKINGS 745
17.2.5 DIVESTMENT PERIOD 746
17,2.6 DIVESTMENT TRUSTEE 746
17.2.7 MONITORING TRUSTEE 746
17.2.8 UPFRONT BUYERS 747
17.2.9 ORDERS 748
17.2.10 INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 748
17.3 FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING REMEDIES 748
17.3.1 INTRODUCTION 748
17.3.2 REMEDIAL OPTIONS 749
17.3.3 EFFECTIVENESS 749
17.3.4 COSTS 750
17.3.5 PROPORTIONALITY 750
17.3.6 RELEVANT CUSTOMER BENEFITS 751
17.4 STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: PROHIBITION 751
17.4.1 INTRODUCTION 751
17.4.2 DECISIONAL PRACTICE 752
17.5 STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: DIVESTMENTS 754
17.5.1 INTRODUCTION 754
17.5.2 DIVESTMENT RISKS 754
17.5.3 IDENTIFYING A DIVESTMENT PACKAGE 755
17.5.4 DIVESTMENT OF AN EXISTING BUSINESS 755
17.5.5 THE AUTHORITIES' DECISIONAL PRACTICE 756
17.6 QUASI-STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND SPONSORED ENTRY 759
17.6.1 IP REMEDIES 759
17.6.2 SPONSORED ENTRY 760
17.7 BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES 761
17.7.1 INTRODUCTION 761
17.7.2 RISKS RELATED TO BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES 761
17.7.3 TYPES OF BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES 762
17.7.4 ENABLING MEASURES 762
17.7.5 CONTROLLING MEASURES 763
17.7.6 THE AUTHORITIES' DECISIONAL PRACTICE 763
17.8 MIXED STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES 767
18. JUDICIAL REVIEW 770
18.1 INTRODUCTION 770
18.2 APPEALABLE DECISIONS BEFORE THE CAT 772
18.2.1 SECTION 120 772
18.2.2 THE MEANING OF "DECISION" 773
18.2.3 DECISIONS PRECEDING A FINAL DECISION 773
CONTENTS XXVII
18.3 THE RESIDUAL SCOPE FOR APPEALS BEFORE
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 775
18.4 STANDING TO APPEAL 777
18.4.1 A "PERSON AGGRIEVED" BEFORE THE CAT 777
18.4.2 "SUFFICIENT INTEREST" BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 778
18.5 TIME LIMITS FOR APPEAL 780
18.5.1 CAT PROCEEDINGS 780
18.5.2 ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 781
18.6 BASIC GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 782
18.6.1 JUDICIAL REVIEW GENERALLY 782
(A) BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GROUNDS 782
(B) THE CAT'S RECENT ARTICULATION OF THE
DETAILED PRINCIPLES 783
18.6.2 GROUND #1: ILLEGALITY/ERROR OF LAW 785
18.6.3 GROUND #2: IRRATIONALITY/UNREASONABLENESS 788
18.6.4 GROUND #3: PROPORTIONALITY 789
18.6.5 GROUND #4: PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS 791
18.7 SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF REVIEW 791
18.7.1 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 791
18.7.2 ABILITY TO ADDUCE NEW EVIDENCE 794
(A) THE POSITION GENERALLY 794
(B) NEW CAT RULES AND GUIDANCE 795
18.7.3 INTENSITY OF REVIEW: THE FORMAL LEGAL POSITION 795
18.7.4 INTENSITY OF REVIEW: ASSESSMENT OF THE CAT'S PRACTICE 797
18.8 POWERS OF THE COURTS FOLLOWING
A SUCCESSFUL APPEAL 799
18.8.1 POWERS OF THE CAT 799
18.8.2 POWERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 799
18.9 SELECTED PROCEDURAL ISSUES 800
800
800
802
802
802
803
804
804
804
805
805
806
806
806
807
INDEX 809
18.9.1
18.9.2
18.9.3
CAT PROCEEDINGS
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(0
(G)
(H)
(I)
(J)
NOTICE OF APPEAL
AMENDING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
WITHDRAWAL OF AN APPEAL
DEFENCE
INTERVENTIONS
INTERIM RELIEF
CASE MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTIONS
EVIDENCE AND DISCLOSURE
CONFIDENTIALITY
COSTS
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
FURTHER APPEALS
(A)
(B)
APPEAL FROM CAT JUDGMENTS
APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGMENTS |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Parker, Jonathan A. Majumdar, Adrian |
| author_GND | (DE-588)129580589 (DE-588)1107048281 |
| author_facet | Parker, Jonathan A. Majumdar, Adrian |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Parker, Jonathan A. |
| author_variant | j a p ja jap a m am |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043694473 |
| classification_rvk | PU 4376 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)967870016 (DE-599)BVBBV043694473 |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | Second edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV043694473 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-04-15T12:08:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781509904907 |
| language | Undetermined |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029107056 |
| oclc_num | 967870016 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | lxix, 829 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Hart Publishing |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Parker, Jonathan A. (DE-588)129580589 aut UK merger control Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar United Kingdom merger control Second edition Oxford ; Portland, Oregon Hart Publishing 2016 lxix, 829 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Majumdar, Adrian (DE-588)1107048281 aut SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029107056&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Parker, Jonathan A. Majumdar, Adrian UK merger control |
| title | UK merger control |
| title_alt | United Kingdom merger control |
| title_auth | UK merger control |
| title_exact_search | UK merger control |
| title_full | UK merger control Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar |
| title_fullStr | UK merger control Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar |
| title_full_unstemmed | UK merger control Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar |
| title_short | UK merger control |
| title_sort | uk merger control |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029107056&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT parkerjonathana ukmergercontrol AT majumdaradrian ukmergercontrol AT parkerjonathana unitedkingdommergercontrol AT majumdaradrian unitedkingdommergercontrol |