The regulation of international trade: Volume 2 The WTO agreements on trade of goods
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England
MIT Press
[2016]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXXVI, 849 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780262029995 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The regulation of international trade |n Volume 2 |p The WTO agreements on trade of goods |c Petros C. Mavroidis |
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| adam_text | Contents
Preface xxxv
Introduction 1
1 Annex 1A Agreements Dealing with Customs Procedures
1.1 Clearing Goods through Customs 5
1.2 ILA 5
1.2.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 5
1.2.2 Automatic Licensing 8
1.2.2.1 Definition 8
1.2.2.2 The Rationale for Antomaticity 8
1.2.2.3 Conditions for Lawful Imposition 9
1.2.2.4 Approval Granted in All Cases 9
1.2.2.5 General Provisions 12
1.2.2.6 Presumption of Existence of Restrictive Effects 13
1.2.3 Nonautomatic Licensing 14
1.2.3.1 Definition 14
1.2.3.2 The Rationale for Nonautomatic Licensing 15
1.2.3.3 Conditions for Lawful Imposition 16
1.2.3.4 Disciplines Specific to Nonautomatic Licensing 17
1.2.4 Administration of Tariff Quotas 18
1.2.5 Transparency 19
1.2.5.1 Notification Requirements 19
1.2.5.2 The Record 20
1.2.6 Export Licensing 20
1.2.7 Special and Differential Treatment 23
1.2.8 Reservations 23
1.2.9
1.2.10
1.2.11
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2
1.3.3
1.3.4
1.3.5
1.3.6
1.3.7
1.3.8
1.3.9
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2
1.4.3
1.4.4
Exceptions 23
Institutions 23
Relationship with Article XI of GATT 23
CVA 24
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 24
Transaction Value (Actual Price) 27
1.3.2.1 The Primacy of Transaction Value 27
1.3.2.2 A rm s Length 28
1.3.2.3 Verifying the Truth and Accuracy of Information Received
Deviating from the Transaction Value 30
1.3.3.1 Hierarchy among the Statutory Methods 30
1.3.3.2 FalIback Method: Limited Discretion 32
1.3.3.3 Right of Appeal 34
Treatment of Confidential Information 34
Cooperation across WTO Members 34
Special and Differential Treatment 35
Exceptions 35
Reservations 35
Institutions 35
The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) 36
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 36
Déjà Vu All Over Again? 36
1.4.2.1 is PSI an NTB? 37
1.4.2.2 It Is Basically Companies We Are After 38
The Ambit of the Agreement 39
1.4.3.1 What Is a PSI Entity? 39
1.4.3.2 What Do PSI Entities Do? 39
Obligations Imposed on User Members 40
1.4.4.1 The Site of Inspection 40
1.4.4.2 Nondiscrimination 41
1.4.4.3 Contractual and International Standards 41
1.4.4.4 Transparency 41
1.4.4.5 BC1 41
1.4.4.6 Conflict of Interest 41
1.4.4.7 Timely Inspection 42
Price Verification 42
1.4.4.8
1.4.5
1.4.6
1.4.7
1.4.8
1.4.9
1.4.10
1.5
1.5.1
1.5.2
1.5.3
1.5.4
1.5.5
1.5.6
1.5.7
1.5.8
1.5.9
1.6
2
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
Obligations Imposed on Exporter Members 42
Resolution of Disputes 42
1.4.6.1 Appeals Procedures 42
1.4.6.2 The Independent Entity 42
Special and Differential Treatment 44
Exceptions 44
Institutions 45
PSI Inspection and Trade Facilitation 45
Trade Facilitation 46
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 46
The Negotiating Process 48
The Evolution of Definition 49
For the Benefit of ... 51
Cutting Red Tape in Customs 51
1.5.5.1 Transparency 52
1.5.5.2 Substantive Improvements in Customs Administration 52
1.5.5.3 Procedural Improvements in Customs Administration 55
Special and Differential Treatment 58
1.5.6.1 Categories of Commitments 58
1.5.6.2 Implementation: Sine Die (Until the Greek
Kalends)? 59
1.5.6.3 Early Warning 61
Institutions 61
Entry into Force 62
Where Does the Red Tape End? 62
Concluding Remarks 64
Antidumping 67
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 67
The Legal Discipline 67
The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 67
Discussion 72
2.1.3.1 Nego dating His to ry 72
2.1.3.2 Economic Theory 73
2.1.3.3 Contingent Protection 73
2.1.3.4 Injury to Competitors 73
2.1.3.5 Combating Dumping Only through Antidumping 73
2.1.3.6 No Double Cotint 74
2.2 The Relationship with GATT 75
2.3 Calculating the Dumping Margin 75
2.3.1 NV Must Exceed EP 75
2.3.2 NV Can Be a Market Price 75
2.3.3 NV When Market Price Is Discounted 76
2.3.3.1 Ordinary Course of Trade 76
2.3.3.2 Low Volume of Sales 77
2.3.3.3 Particular Market Situation 77
2.3.4 Calculating NV when Market Price Is Discounted 77
2.3.4.1 Third-Country Sales 78
2.3.4.2 Constructed Price 78
2.3.5 Export Price (EP) 81
2.3.5.1 EP Can Be a Market Price 81
2.3.5.2 EP when Market Price Is Discounted 81
2.3.6 The Duty to Perform Fair Comparison between NV and EP 82
2.3.6.1 Prices Must Be at the Same Level of Trade 83
2.3.6.2 Due Allowances Can Be Made 84
2.3.6.3 Statutory Methodologies to Decide on the Dumping Margin 85
2.3.6.4 Zeroing: Dead and Loving It 87
2.3.7 Calculating the Amount of Dumping Margin 88
2.3.7.1 Dumping Margin Must Not Exceed the Statutory De Minimis Level
2.3.7.2 Calculating Duties for Individual Exporters 89
2.3. 7.3 Sampling Exporters 90
2.3.7.4 New Shipments 91
2.3.7.5 Unknown Exporters 91
2.3.7.6 Single Entity/Collapsing 91
2.3.8 Calculating Dumping Margins for NMEs 92
2.3.8.1 Defining NMEs 93
2.3.8.2 The Rationale for Including Separate Calculation for NMEs 93
2.3.8.3 Third-Country Sales, Constructed Prices 93
2.3.8.4 The Case of China 93
2.4 Injury Analysis 94
2.4.1 Injury Must Be “Material” 94
2.4.1.1 Quantity Effects 95
2.4.1.2 Price Effects 96
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5
2.4.6
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.6.5
2.6.6
2.6.7
Injury to Competitors 99
2.4.2.1 Like Product 99
2.4.2.2 Major Proportion 101
Statutory Indicators of Injury 102
Cumulating Injury from Various Sources 104
Sampling in Injury Analysis 105
Threat of Injury 105
2.4.6.1 Factors of Threat of Injury 105
2.4.6.2 Reasoned and Adequate Explanation 107
2.4.6.3 The Special Care Obligation 107
2.4.6.4 The Standard of Review: Clear and Present Danger 107
The Causality Requirement 108
Causal Relationship between Dumping and Injury 109
Implications for Data Gathering 110
Genuine and Substantial Relationship 110
Imposing Antidumping Duties 111
The Decision to Impose Duties 111
Public Interest Clause 111
The Various Forms of Impositions 113
2.6.3.1 Provisional Duties 113
2.6.3.2 Definitive Duties 113
2.6.3.3 Variable Antidumping Duties 113
2.6.3.4 Price Undertakings 114
The Level of Permissible Imposition 115
2.6.4.1 Duties Cannot Exceed the Dumping Margin 115
2.6.4.2 Lesser Duty Rule 115
Duties Imposed Prospectively, Retrospectively 115
2.6.5.1 Prospective Assessment 115
2.6.5.2 Retrospective Assessment 115
Retroactive Application of Duties 116
Who Are Duties Imposed Against? 117
2.6.7.1 Known Exporters 118
2.6.7.2 Sampled Exporters 118
2.6.7.3 Nonsampled Exporters 118
2.6.7.4 New Shipments 119
2.6. 7.5 Unknown Exporters 120
2.6.8 Refunding AD Duties 122
2.7 Administrative Review of AD Duties 123
2.7.1 The Function and Rationale for Administrative Reviews 123
2.7.2 The Ambit of Review 124
2.7.3 Ex Officio and Upon Request Reviews 125
2.7.4 Reasonable Period of Time 125
2.7.5 Standard of Review 127
2.8 Sunset Reviews 128
2.8.1 Duties Will Lapse in Five Years, Absent Review 128
2.8.2 The Ambit of Sunset Review 129
2.8.3 The Standard of Sunset Review 129
2.8.3.1 Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Injuiy 129
2.8.3.2 Positive Evidence 130
2.8.3.3 Irrelevance of Standards Applied in the Original Investigation 132
2.8.3.4 Zeroing in Sunset: Illegal as Well 134
2.8.4 Ex Officio and Upon Request Reviews 135
2.8.5 Due Process 136
2.8.6 Sunset Practice 137
2.8.7 Administrative and Sunset Reviews: The Overlap 137
2.9 Duties Can Be Imposed Only Following Investigation 138
2.9.1 Conducting Investigation Is a Legal Requirement 138
2.9.2 Who Can Request Investigation? 138
2.9.2.1 Ex Officio 138
2.9.2.2 Upon Request 138
2.9.3 Standing Requirements 138
2.9.3.1 The Rationale for Standing Requirements 138
2.9.3.2 Statutory Thresholds 139
2.9.4 The Content of Requests 141
2.9.5 The Decision to Initiate Investigation 142
2.9.5.1 The Duty to Examine Supplied Information 143
2.9.5.2 I As Retain Discretion to Initiate 143
2.9.6 Rights and Duties of Investigating Authorities during
Investigation 146
2.9.6.1 The Right to Request Information through Questionnaires 146
2.9.7
2.9.8
2.9.9
2.10
2.11
2.11.1
2.9.6.2 The Right to Conduct On-the-Spot Verification 147
2.9.63 The Right to Draw Inferences 148
2.9.6.4 The Duty to Observe Due Process 148
2.9.6.5 The Duty to Protect Confidential Information 149
2.9.6.6 The Duty to Respect Transparency 151
The Rights and Duties of Interested Parties 152
2.9.7.1 The Right to Access the File 153
2.9.7.2 The Right to Be Heard 153
2.9.7.3 The Duty to Cooperate 154
Balancing Rights and Duties: Recourse to BIA 154
2.9.8.1 The Rationale for This Provision 154
2.9.8.2 When Is Recourse to BIA Appropriate? 155
2.9.8.3 Refusing Access to Necessary Information 157
2.9.8.4 Failure to Provide Necessary Information within a Reasonable Period
of Time 159
2.9.8.5 Significant Impediment of Investigation 159
2.9.8.6 Special Circumspection 160
The Length of the Period of Investigation 161
2.9.9.1 The Function of POI 161
2.9.9.2 Recommendation on Length of POl 161
2.9.9.3 POI Ends before Initiation of Investigation 163
2.9.9.4 Recent Data Should Be Used 163
2.9.9.5 Shorter Periods Can Be Lawful 164
2.9.9.6 Cherry Picking Is Not Permissible 164
2.9.9.7 Overlap between Dumping and Injury POI 166
Special and Differential Treatment 166
2.10.1 What Are Constructive Remedies? 166
2.10.2 Constructive Remedies Must Be Explored 166
The Standard of Review by WTO Adjudicating Bodies 167
One or Two Standards of Review? 167
2.1L2 De Novo Review Is Not Total Deference 169
2.11.2.1 Panels Cannot Use New Evidence 169
2.11.2.2 Absence of a Reasoned and Adequate Explanation 171
2.11.3 Permissible Interpretations 172
2.11.4 Investigating Authorities: Honest Brokers or Active Investigators
2A2 Remedies against Illegally Imposed AB Buttes 174
2«13 Institutional Issues 175
2.14
2.14.1
2.14.2
2.14.3
2.14.4
2.15
3
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.2
3.3
3.3.1
Is Dumping Unfair? 175
The Origins of Modem Antidumping 176
Price Discrimination in Domestic Antitmst Statutes 178
In Defense of AD 180
2.14.3.1 Price Discrimination 180
2.14.3.2 Predatory Dumping 181
2.14.3.3 Strategic Dump ing 181
2.14.3.4 Leveling the Playing Field 182
2.14.3.5 AD as Safeguard 182
AD and ... More Problems 183
2.14.4.1 A Procartel Instrument 183
2.14.4.2 AD Wars 184
Concluding Remarks 184
Subsidies 185
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 185
The Legal Discipline 185
The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 185
Discussion 186
3.1.3.1 Negotiating Subsidies in GATT/WTO 186
3.1.3.2 Subsidies in the Realm of Economic Theory 191
3.1.3.3 From Economic Theory to WTO Practice 193
3.1.3.4 A ction against Subsidies 195
The Relationship with GATT 196
Defining a Subsidy 200
Financial Contribution by Government 202
3.3.1.1 Contribution by Government (or Public Body) 203
3.3.1.2 Government Acts Through a Private Agent 207
3.3.1.3 Direct Transfer of Funds by Government 210
3.3.1.4 Revenue Otherwise Due to Government Is Foregone 210
3.3.1.5 The Special Case of Double Taxation 213
3.3.1.6 Provision of Goods or Services by Government 213
3.3.1.7 Any Fol.rm of Income or Price Support 215
Benefit to the Recipient 216
3.3.2.1 The Identity of the Recipient 217
3.3.2.2 ‘Private Investor ” Test: Benefit That Market Does Not Yield 218
3.3.2.3 Cost of Production: An Appropriate Benchmark to Discern Benefit?
223
3.3.3 Pass Through of Benefits to New Owners 224
3.3.3.1 The Issue 224
33.3.2 A Typology of Pass Through 225
3.333 The Test (in Full Mutation) 227
3.3.3.4 Extinction of Subsidies Bestowed 229
333.5 Extraction of Subsidies Bestowed 231
333.6 Change of Corporate Identity 232
3.33.7 Critique 232
3.3.4 Calculating the Amount of Benefit 233
33.4.1 Why Calculate Subsidies in Terms of Benefit Granted? 233
33.4.2 The Guidance Provided in Article 14 of SCM 233
33.4.3 Does Article 14 of SCM Reflect an Exhaustive List? 234
33.4.4 Allocation of Benefits over Time 238
33.4.5 Allocation of Benefit over Productive Assets 239
3.3.5 Specificity 240
3.3.5.1 De Jure Specificity 242
33.5.2 De Facto Specificity 243
3.3.53 Regional Subsidies 248
33.5.4 Positive Evidence 248
3.4 Three Categories of Subsidies 248
3.4.1 Classifying Subsidies: Actionable, Nonactionable, Prohibited 248
3.4.2 Legal Consequences of Classification 248
3.5 Actionable Subsidies 249
3.5.1 Three Forms of Adverse Effect: Injury, Nullification or Impairment, and
Serious Prejudice 249
3.5.2 Injury 250
3.5.3 Nullification and Impairment 250
3.5.4 Serious Prejudice 251
3.5.4.1 Quantity Effects 252
3.5.4.2 Price Effects 254
3.5.43 The Causality Requirement 259
3.5.5 Remedies 261
3,6 Nonactionable Subsidies 262
3.6.1 The Statutory Criteria 262
3.6.2 The Limits of Nonactionability 262
3.6.3 The Origins of Nonactionable Subsidies 263
3.6.4
3.6.5
3.6.6
3.6.7
3.7
3.7.1
3.7.2
3.7.3
3.8
3.8.1
3.8.2
3.8.3
Back to the Future 264
They Did Not Overstay Their Welcome 265
Lo and Behold: Stimulus Packages 266
Are Nonactionable Subsidies Legally Irrelevant? 267
Prohibited Subsidies 267
Export Subsidies 268
3.7.1.1 The Changing Attitude toward Export Subsidies 268
3. 7.1.2 De Jure Export Subsidies 270
3.7.1.3 De Facto Export Subsidies 270
3.7.1.4 The Evidentiary Standard 271
3. 7.1.5 Permanent Group of Experts (PGE) 272
Local Content 272
3.7.2.1 Local Content and Production Subsidies 273
3.7.2.2 Local Content in the GATT, and the SCM Agreement 273
Remedies against Prohibited Subsidies 274
3.7.3.1 The Process 274
3. 7.3.2 “Appropriate” Countermeasures 274
3.7.3.3 Benefit, Injury, and the Missing Incentives 277
CVDs: Substantive Requirements 278
CVDs, if Subsidies Cause Injury 278
Calculating the Amount of Benefit That Subsidies Have
Conferred 279
3.8.2.1 The Rule: CVDs Cannot Exceed the Amount of Subsidy Granted 279
3.8.2.2 Calculating the Amount of Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit Granted 279
3.8.2.3 Investigated Exporters 279
3.8.2.4 Noninvestigated Exporters 280
Injury Analysis 280
3.8.3.1 Statutory Indicators of Injury 280
3.8.3.2 Injury to Competitors (Like Product Analysis) 281
3.8.3.3 Quantity Effects 284
3.8.3.4 Price Effects 285
3.8.3.5 Cumulating Various Sources of Injury 285
3.8.3.6 Injury Based on Positive Evidence 286
3.8.3.7 Threat of Injury 286
3.8.3.8 Public Interest Clauses 288
3.8.4
3.8.5
3.8.6
3.8.7
3.8.8
3.9
3.9.1
3.9.2
3.9.3
3.9.4
3.9.5
3.9.6
The Causality Requirement 288
3.8.4.1 Nonattribution 290
3.8.4.2 Temporal Correlation between Imports and Injury 290
3.8.4.3 Controlling for Factors Not Mentioned in the Agreement 291
The Types of CVDs 291
3.8.5.1 Provisional CVDs 292
3.8.5.2 Definitive CVDs 292
3.8.5.3 Price Undertakings 292
Imposition and Collection of Definitive CVDs 293
3.8.6.1 CVDs up to the Amount of Benefit Conferred 293
3.8.6.2 Lesser Duty Rule 293
3.8.6.3 Retroactive Application of Duties 293
Duties Imposed Prospectively, Retrospectively 294
No Double Counting: CVDs or Countermeasures 295
CVDs: Procedural Requirements 295
Duties Can Be Imposed Only Following an
Investigation 295
Initiating an Investigation 296
3.9.2.1 Ex Officio 296
3.9.2.2 Investigation upon Request 296
Standing Requirements (Locus Standi) 296
3.9.3.1 The Rationale for Standing Requirements 296
3.9.3.2 The Statutory’Thresholds 296
The Content of the Request 296
The Decision to Initiate an Investigation 296
3.9.5.1 I As Must Examine the Accuracy of Supplied Information 296
3.9.5.2 Consultation with the Exporting WTO Member 297
3.9.5.3 IAs Retain Discretion 297
The Rights and Duties of IAs 298
3.9.6.1 The Right to Seek Information through Questionnaires 298
3.9.6.2 The Right to Conduct On-the-Spot Verifications 298
3.9.6.3 The Right to Draw Inferences 298
3.9.6.4 The Obligation to Observe Due Process 298
3.9.6.5 The Obligation to Protect Confidential Information 300
3.9.6.6 The Obligation to Ensure Transparency 301
3.9.7
3.9.8
3.9.9
3.10
3.10.1
3.10.2
3.10.3
3.10.4
3.11
3.11.1
3.11.2
3.11.3
3.11.4
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.14.1
3.14.2
3.15
Rights and Obligations of Interested Parties 301
3.9.7.1 The Right to Access the File 301
3.9.7.2 The Duty to Cooperate 301
Balancing Rights and Duties: Recourse to BIA 301
3.9.8.1 The Rationale for Recourse to BIA 302
3.9.8.2 Duty to Include Requested Information in the Questionnaire 303
3.9.8.3 Refusal to Supply Necessary Information 303
3.9.8.4 Significant Impediment of Investigation 303
The POI 304
3.9.9.1 The Length of the Investigation Process 304
3.9.9.2 The Function of POI 304
Administrative Reviews 305
The Function and Rationale for Administrative Reviews 305
The Ambit of Review 305
Initiating Reviews 306
3.10.3.1 Ex Officio 306
3.10.3.2 Review upon Request 306
Standard of Review 307
3.10.4.1 Standard of Initiation 307
3.10.4.2 Irrelevance of de Minimis Standards Applicable to Original Investigations 307
Sunset Reviews 307
Duties Will Lapse in Five Years Absent Review 307
The Ambit of Review 307
Initiating Reviews 308
3.11.3.1 Ex Officio 308
3.11.3.2 Review upon Request 308
The Standard of Review 308
3.11.4.1 Continuation or Recurrence of Injuty 308
3.11.4.2 Positive Evidence 3 08
3.11.4.3 Irrelevance of Standards Applied to the Original Investigation 309
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 309
The Standard of Review Applied by WTO Adjudicating Bodies 310
Fisheries Subsidies 310
The Issue 310
The Negotiation 311
Institutional Issues 311
3.16 Concluding Remarks 311
4 Safeguards 313
4.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 313
4.1.1 The Legal Discipline 313
4.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 313
4.1.3 Discussion 315
4.1.3.1 HOiy Safeguards ? 315
4.1.3.2 Costs Associated with the Imposition of Safeguards 317
4.1.3.3 Safeguards, Antidumping, and Countetwailing 318
4.2 The Legal Relationship with GATT 318
4.3 The Road to the SG Agreement 322
4.3.1 The Original Safeguard Clause 322
4.3.2 Practice Evolves Contra Legem: VERs 323
4.3.2.1 Why VERs? 323
4.3.2.2 VERs and GATT 324
4.3.3 US Safeguard Practice 325
4.3.4 Onto the Agreement on Safeguards 325
4.4 The Right to Safeguard Action 327
4.4.1 Unforeseen Developments 329
4.4.1.1 The Rationale 329
4.4.1.2 The (Lack of) Definition 331
4.4.1.3 Unforeseen When? 333
4.4.1.4 Procedural Requirements 333
4.4.2 Increased Quantities of Imports 335
4.4.2.1 Recent, Sudden, Sharp, Significant Increase: Trends Matter 335
4.4.2.2 Recent, Sudden, Sharp, Significant Increase: No Injury Analysis
4.4.3 Injury to Competitors (Like Product Analysis) 340
4.4.3.1 Injury Must Be “Serious ” 340
4.4.3.2 Statutory Factors Indicating Injury 340
4.4.3.3 Other Factors 341
4.4.3.4 Domestic Industty Producing the ‘Like” Product 342
4.4.4 Threat of Injury 345
4.4.4.1 Forward-Looking Evaluation 345
4.4.4.2 Standard of Review 345
4.4.4.3 Injury and Threat of Injury Based on the Same Facts 346
339
4.4.5
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.3
4.5.4
4.5.5
4.5.6
4.5.7
4.6
4.6.1
4.6.2
4.6.3
4.6.4
4.6.5
The Causality Requirement 346
4.4.5.1 Genuine and Substantial Relationship 347
4.4.5.2 The Obligation to Review All Relevant Facts 349
4.4.5.3 Nonattribution (Separation) 350
4.4.5.4 Postseparation 354
4.4.5.5 Evaluation in Light of Alternative Explanations 354
4.4.5.6 Failure to Meet the Causal Requirement 356
Applying Safeguards 356
Types of Safeguards 356
4.5.1.1 Provisional Safeguards 356
4.5.1.2 Definitive Safeguards 356
Safeguards to the Extent Necessary 356
The Duration of Safeguards: Dynamic Use Constraint 357
The Obligation to Compensate 358
4.5.4.1 Affected Parties, Substantial Interest 358
4.5.4.2 Substantially Equivalent Level of Concessions 359
4.5.4.3 No Duty to Compensate during the First Three Years 359
Safeguarding against Whom? 360
4.5.5.1 Safeguards Must Be Nondiscriminatory 360
4.5.5.2 Quota Modulation 360
4.5.5.3 VERs 361
Who Imposes Safeguards? 361
4.5.6.1 Individual WTO Members 361
4.5.6.2 Individual WTO Members, Members of a PTA 362
4.5.6.3 PTAs in the Name of a Constituent 363
4.5.6.4 PTAs Imposing Safeguards as a Single Unit 363
The Form of Safeguards 363
Procedural Requirements 363
Safeguards Can Be Imposed Only Following an
Investigation 363
Initiating an Investigation 364
The Request to Initiate 364
Standing Requirements {Locus Standi) 364
The Rights and Duties of I As 364
4.6.5.1 The Right to Seek Information 364
4.6.5.2 The Duty to Observe Due Process 365
365
4.6.5.3 The Duty to Protect Confidential Information
4.6.5.4 The Duty to Observe Transparency 365
4.6.6 The Rights and Duties of Interested Parties 367
4.6.6.1 The Right to Access the File 367
4.6.6.2 The Duty to Cooperate 368
4.6.7 Consultations 368
4.6.8 The Length and Period of Investigation 368
4.7 Special Safeguard Regime with Respect to China 368
4.7.1 Four Types of Safeguards 368
4.7.2 Transitional Safeguard 369
4.7.3 Safeguarding against Safeguards 372
4.7.4 Textiles Safeguard 372
4.8 Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 373
4.9 Standard of Review 373
4.1Ö Institutions 374
4.11 Concluding Remarks 374
5 Technical Barriers to Trade 377
5.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 377
5.1.1 The Legal Discipline 377
5.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 377
5.1.3 Discussion 380
5.1.3.1 Why Standardize? 380
5.1.3.2 Standard Setting in the EU and US 380
5.1.3.3 The Cost of Divergent Standards 382
5.1.3.4 International Cooperation to Reduce Costs 385
5.2 The Relationship with GATT 387
5.3 Coverage 388
5.3.1 Instruments Covered 388
5.3.2 Private Standards 389
5.3.2.1 Private Standards Proliferate 391
5.3.3 The Origins of Private Standards 393
5.3.4 Certification 393
5.3.5 One International Standard? One Test? One Certificate 394
5.3.6 The Relevance of the TBT Agreement on Private Standards 396
5.3.6.1 GATT and Private Practices 396
5.3.6.2 The TBT Agreement and Private Practices 397
5.3.6.3 TBT Committee Practice 398
5.3.6.4 A Very Preliminary Conclusion 398
5.4 International Standards 399
5.4.1 The Primacy of International Standards 399
5.4.2 Defining International Standards 399
5.4.2.1 Statutory (Lack of) Definition 399
5.4.2.2 The International Standardizing Community 400
5.4.2.3 Practice 401
5.4.3 Litigating International Standards 406
5.4.3.1 Observing International Standards 406
5.4.3.2 Deviating from International Standards 406
5.5 Technical Regulations 410
5.5.1 Defining Technical Regulations 410
5.5.1.1 Document 411
5.5.1.2 Identifiable Group of Products 411
5.5.1.3 Product Characteristics and PPMs 412
5.5.1.4 Mandatory Compliance 413
5.5.1.5 Coverage of “Technical Regulation” Revisited 416
5.5.1.6 Return to the Good Old Days (Recommended) 416
5.5.2 Legitimate Objective 417
5.5.3 Necessity 419
5.5.3.1 Intervene When Necessary and Adopt Necessary Measures Only 419
5.5.3.2 Measures Based on International Standards Are Presumed Necessary
5.5.3.3 Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) 421
5.5.3.4 Necessity and Appropriateness 421
5.5.3.5 Necessity and the Relative Importance of the Objective Sought 421
5.5.3.6 Necessity and Consistency 422
5.5.3.7 Burden of Proof 423
5.5.4 Nondiscrimination 423
5.5.4.1 Like Products 424
5.5.4.2 Less Favorable Treatment (LFT) 427
5.5.5 Performance Requirements 428
5.5.6 Transparency 428
5.5.6.1 Reasonable Internal between Adoption and Entry into Force 429
5.5.6.2 Enquiry Points 430
420
5.5.7
5.6
5.6.1
5.6.2
5.6.3
5.7
5.7.1
5.7.2
5.7.3
5.7.4
5.8
5.9
5.9.1
5.9.2
5.10
5.10.1
5.10.2
6
6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
Recognition 430
Standards 431
Defining Standards 431
Standard-Setting Bodies 432
Code of Good Practice 433
Conformity Assessment 433
Defining Conformity Assessment 433
The Ambit of Conformity Assessment 434
5.7.2.1 Assessing Products 434
5. 7.2.2 Assessing Procedures 436
International Standards 437
Unilateral Conformity Assessment 438
5.7.4.1 Nondiscrimination 438
5.7.4.2 Necessity 438
5.7.4.3 Confidentiality 439
5.7.4.4 Transparency 439
5. 7.4.5 Local and Nongovernmental Bodies 439
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 439
Institutional Issues 441
The TBT Committee 441
5.9.1.1 Reviewing the Operation of the TBT Agreement 441
5.9.1.2 Promoting Transparency 443
5.9.1.3 Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) 443
Technical Expert Groups 444
Concluding Remarks 444
The Challenges Posed by the TBT Agreement 445
A Test for Addressing Complaints under the TBT Agreement 447
5.10.2.1 Errors Galore 447
5.10.2.2 GATT and TBT Are Not Like Products 449
5.10.2.3 TBT Is More Like Article XX and Less Like Article ill of GATT 451
5.10.2.4 Why Sequence Matters 452
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 455
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 455
The Legal Discipline 455
The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 455
6.1.3
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.4
6.4.1
6.4.2
6.4.3
6.4.4
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
6.5.3
6.5.4
Discussion 457
6.1.3.1 Link to Agriculture 45 7
6.1.3.2 Science, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Ignorance 458
6.1.3.3 Proxies to Detect Unlawful Behavior 459
The Relationship with GATT and the Other Annex 1A Agreements 460
The Relationship with GATT 460
The Relationship with the TBT Agreement 460
The Relationship with the AG Agreement 460
Coverage 461
SPS Measures 461
Private Standards 463
6.3.2.1 The Relevance of the SPS Agreement to Private Standards 463
6.3.2.2 SPS Committee Practice 463
International Standards 466
Defining International Standards 466
Measures That Conform to International Standards 468
Measures Based on International Standards 468
Measures Deviating from International Standards 469
Unilateral Measures Must Be Based on Science 471
Risk Assessment Based on Scientific Principles 471
6.5.1.1 Risk Must Be Identifiable 4 72
6.5.1.2 Two Types of Risk Assessment 473
6.5.1.3 The Content of Risk Assessment 474
6.5.1.4 The Methodology for Risk Assessment 4 75
6.5.1.5 Minority Scientific Opinions Suffice 476
6.5.1.6 Science, Not Junk Science 476
6.5.1.7 Is There a Procedural Requirement to Demonstrate Risk Assessment? 477
6.5.1.8 The Standard of Review 4 78
ALOP 478
6.5.2.1 Definition 4 78
6.5.2.2 Wide Discretion to Define ALOP 478
6.5.2.3 Expressing the ALOP 479
Recognition 482
Conformity Assessment 483
6.6 Measures Based on Precaution 483
6.6.1 Defining Precaution 483
6.6.2 The Legal Test for Consistency with Article 5.7 of SPS 484
6.6.3 Precaution and Science 484
6.6.4 Precaution, Nondiscrimination, Necessity, and Consistency 486
6.6.5 Is Precaution a “Carte Blanche”? 487
6.7 Measures Must Be Applied in a Nondiscriminatory Way 488
6.7.1 The Relationship between Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of SPS 488
6.7.2 Where Identical or Similar Conditions Prevail 489
6.7.3 Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination 489
6.7.4 Disguised Restriction of Trade 490
6.7.5 Geographic Scope of SPS Measures 490
6.7.6 Burden of Proof 492
6.8 Measures Must Be Necessary 492
6.8.1 Burden of Proof 493
6.8.1.1 GATT, TBT/SPS: Same Principle, Different Application 493
6.8.1.2 Practice 494
6.8.2 Judicial Review: Limited to Means; No Discussion of Ends 494
6.8.3 The Relationship between Articles 5.6 and 2.2 of SPS 495
6.9 Consistency 495
6.9.1 The Test for Compliance with the Consistency Requirement 496
6.9.2 The Guidelines on Consistency 497
6.10 Special and Differential Treatment 500
6.10.1 Parallel with the TBT Agreement 500
6.10.2 Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) 500
6.11 Transparency 501
6.12 Standard of Review 502
6.13 Institutional Issues 502
6.13.1 The SPS Committee 502
6.13.2 Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) 503
6.13.3
The Treatment of Expertise by Panels 504
6.13.3.1 Panels Have Discretion to Invite Experts 504
6.13.3.2 The Ambit of Supplied Expertise 504
6.13.3.3 Selecting Court-Appointed Experts 505
6.13.3.4 Self-Disclosure Obligations 505
6.13.3.5 Due Process 506
6.13.3.6 Legal Value of Opinions Expressed by Court-Appointed Experts 507
6.14 Concluding Remarks 510
7 Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 513
7.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 513
7.1.1 The Legal Discipline 513
7.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 513
7.1.3 Discussion 514
7.1.3.1 Local Content, Export Performance 514
7.1.3.2 Negotiating TRIMs 515
7.2 The Relationship with GATT and the Other Annex 1A Agreements
7.2.1 The Relationship with GATT 517
7.2.2 The Relationship with the Other Annex 1A Agreements 518
7.3 Trade and Investment 520
7.3.1 From ITO to GATT 520
7.3.2 The GATT Regime 520
7.3.3 The WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment 521
7.3.3.1 Chronicle of a Death Foretold 521
7.3.3.2 Developing Countries Are Skeptical 521
7.3.3.3 Developed Countries Do Not Speak with One Voice 522
7.3.3.4 End Game: Drop It 523
7.3.4 Attempts outside the WTO: The MAI 523
7.3.4.1 An Ambitious Project 523
7.3.4.2 Content 524
7.3.4.3 Failure Explained: No Taxation without Representation 524
7.3.4.4 A Glimmer of Hope 526
7.3.5 Investment Protection in BITs and PTAs 526
7.4 The TRIMs Agreement 527
7.4.1 Measures Coming under the Purview of TRIMs 527
7.4.1.1 Measures Coming under the Purview of Article III of GATT 528
7.4.1.2 Measures Coming under the Purview of Article XI of GATT 528
7.4.2 The Obligations Assumed 529
7.4.2.1 Thou Shalt Not ... 529
7.4.2.2 Thou Shalt Not ... in the Foreseeable Future 529
7.4.2.3 Transparency 530
7.4.3 De Facto TRIMs? 531
7.4.4 Special and Differential Treatment 531
7.5 Institutions 532
7.6 Review of the Agreement 532
7.7 Concluding Remarks 532
8 Agreement on Agriculture 535
8.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 535
8.1.1 The Legal Discipline 535
8.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 535
8.1.3 Discussion 536
8.1.3.1 Farm Markets Are Volatile 536
8.1.3.2 The Political Economy of Farm Protection in the North 537
8.1.3.3 Farm Trade and Developing Countries 537
8.2 The Relationship with GATT and the Other Annex 1A Agreements
8.2.1 The Relationship with GATT 538
8.2.2 The Relationship between the AG and the SCM Agreements 540
8.2.3 The Relationship between the AG and the SG Agreements 544
8.3 The Road to the AG Agreement 544
8.3.1 The GATT Approach 544
8.3.2 The US Waiver (1955) 546
8.3.3 The CAP 546
8.3.3.1 Self-Sufficiency for Europe 547
8.3.3.2 Challenging the Consistency of CAP with the GATT Rules 547
8.3.3.3 Reforming the CAP 550
8.3.4 The Uruguay-Round Negotiation 552
8.3.5 The Doha-Round Negotiation 555
8.3.6 The AG Agreement in a Nutshell 555
8.3.6.1 Border Measures (Market Access) 556
8.3.6.2 Domestic Support 556
8.3.6.3 Export Subsidies 558
8.4
8.5
8.5.1
8.5.2
8.5.3
8.5.4
8.6
8.6.1
8.6.2
8.6.3
8.6.4
8.7
8.7.1
8.7.2
8.7.3
8.7.4
8.7.5
Product Coverage and Schedules of Concessions 558
Border Measures 560
Goods Protected by Tariffs 561
Goods Protected by Other Measures: Tariffication 562
8.5.2.1 The Indicative List of Items to Tariffy 564
8.5.2.2 Similar Border Measures 566
Tariff Bindings Must Be Respected 567
Exceptions 568
8.5.4.1 Special Safeguard Mechanism 568
8.5.4.2 Special Treatment 569
8.5.4.3 Predom inan t Staple 570
Domestic Support 570
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) 572
Payments Excluded from the Calculation of AMS 573
8.6.2.1 Development Subsidies 573
8.6.2.2 De minimis Payments 573
8.6.2.3 Direct Payments for Production-Limiting Programs (Blue Box) 574
8.6.2.4 Green Box 574
Calculating the AMS 579
Equivalent Measurement of Support (EMS) 582
Export Subsidies 583
Defining Export Subsidies 583
Commitments on Export Subsidies 586
8.7.2.} Commitments on Budgetary Outlays 586
8.7.2.2 Commitments on Quantities 587
8.7.2.3 Scheduled Goods 587
8.7.2.4 Unscheduled Goods 587
Anticircumvention 587
8.7.3.1 Export Credits 588
8.7.3.2 Excess Exports 588
8.7.3.3 Food Aid 589
8.7.3.4 Standard of Review 591
Export Competition 591
Export Subsidies Revisited 591
8.8
8.8.1
8.8.2
8.9
8.10
8.10.1
8.10.2
8.10.3
8.10.4
8.11
8.11.1
8.11.2
8.11.3
8.11.4
8.11.5
8.12
8.13
8.14
9
9.1
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.2
9.3
9.3.1
9.3.2
Minimum Access Requirements 592
Minimum Access Opportunities 592
Current Access Opportunities 593
Due Restraint (Peace Clause) 593
Public Stockholding for Food-Security Purposes 594
India in Bali 594
India Was Serious 595
What Prompted This Action? 596
Food Crises at Large 597
Special and Differential Treatment 598
Implementation Period for Developing Countries 598
Export Restrictions and Prohibitions 598
Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 599
Remaining Provisions 600
The Cotton Initiative 600
8.11.5.1 What Is the Initiative All About? 600
8.11.5.2 The Measures Envisaged 601
8.11.5.3 The Situation Now (Far from Xanadu) 602
Transparency 602
Institutional Issues 603
Concluding Remarks 603
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 607
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 607
The Legal Discipline 607
The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 607
Discussion 608
9.1.3.1 Estimating the Welfare Implications of MFA 608
9.1.3.2 From Manchester to Delhi: Changing Production Patterns 608
The Relationship with GATT 609
The Road to the ATC 609
Before the MFA 609
Why the MFA? 609
9.3.3 The MFA Regime 610
9.3.4 MFA and GATT 611
9.4 ATC 612
9.4.1 The Objective Sought 612
9.4.2 Product Coverage 613
9.4.3 Notification of Restrictions 613
9.4.4 Progressive Integration 613
9.4.5 Special Transitional Safeguard Mechanism 614
9.4.5.1 Conditions for Lawful Imposition 614
9.4.5.2 The Rationale 614
9.4.5.3 Injmy, Threat of Injury 615
9.4.5.4 Domestic Industry Producing the Like Product 616
9.4.5.5 Attribution to a Source of Supply 617
9.4.5.6 The Requirement to Hold Consultations 617
9.4.5.7 Retroactive Application 618
9.4.6 Administering Restrictions during the Transitional Period 618
9.4.7 Anticircumvention 618
9.4.8 Institutions 618
9.5 Concluding Remarks 619
10 Government Procurement 621
10.1 The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 621
10.1.1 The Legal Discipline 621
10.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 621
10.1.3 Discussion 622
10.1.3.1 Gains from Liberalization 622
10.1.3.2 Why Plurilateral? 622
10.1.3.3 “Revised” GPA 622
10.1.3.4 UNCITRAL Model Law 623
10.1.3.5 Procurement by WTO Members That Have Not Joined the GPA 624
10.2 The Relationship with GATT 624
10.3 Government Procurement: A Multifaceted Instrument 626
10.3.1 Procurement and Industrial Policy 626
10.3.1.1 A Worldwide Phenomenon 626
10.3.1.2 Buy American 627
10.3.2 Procurement and Competition Policy 629
10.3.3 Procurement and the Fight against Corruption 630
10.4 The Scope of the GPA 631
10.4.1 Plurilateral Agreement 631
10.4.2 Membership 631
10.4.2.1 Acceding to the GPA 631
10.4.2.2 Current Membership 631
10.4.3 Entities Covered 631
10.4.4 Measures Covered 632
10.4.5 Modification of Commitments 634
10.4.5.1 The Meaning of Modification ” 634
10.4.5.2 Procedure 634
10.4.6 Exemptions from Coverage 636
10.5 The Obligations Assumed 636
10.5.1 Nondiscrimination 636
10.5.2 Reciprocity 637
10.5.3 Government Procurement in PTAs 637
10.5.4 Electronic Procurement 639
10.5.5 Rules of Origin 639
10.5.6 Offsets 639
10.5.7 Technical Specifications 640
10.5.8 Exceptions 640
10.6 Procurement Methods 641
10.6.1 Common Elements to All Methods 642
10.6.1.1 Conditions for Participation 643
10.6.1.2 Supplier Registration System 643
10.6.1.3 Dead1 ines 644
10.6.1.4 Notice of Intended Procurement 644
10.6.2 Umbrella Categories Included in the GPA 645
10.6.2.1 Open Tendering 645
10.6.2.2 Selective Tendering 646
10.6.2.3 Limited Tendering 646
10.6.3
Variations Not Included in the GPA 647
10.6.3.1 Competitive Procedures with Negotiation and/or Competitive Dialogue 647
10.6.3.2 Restrictive Procedures 648
10.6.3.3 EOT or BOOT 648
10.6.4 Awarding the Contract 649
10.7 Transparency 649
10.7.1 Ex Ante 650
10.7.2 ExPost 651
10.7.3 Transparency, Every Step of the Way 651
10.8 Special and Differential Treatment 652
10.8.1 A Carrot to Increase Participation 653
10.8.2 Substantive Law 654
10.9 Enforcing the GPA 654
10.9.1 Trondheim: Who Lost What? 655
10.9.2 The Challenge Procedures 656
10.9.3 First Review by the Procuring Entity: What For? 658
10.9.4 Dispute Adjudication 658
10.10 The Work Programmes 659
10.11 Institutional Issues 660
10.12 Concluding Remarks 660
11 The Civil Aviation Agreement 663
11.1 The Legal Discipline and its Rationale 663
11.1.1 The Legal Discipline 663
11.1.2 The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 663
11.1.3 Discussion 664
11.1.3.1 Industrial Policy and Effects on Trade 664
11.1.3.2 Duopolies 664
11.1.3.3 US-EU 1992 Agreement on Civil Aviation 665
11.1.3.4 Who Is Hurting JYJjo? 667
11.2 The Relationship with the GATT and Annex 1A Agreements 667
The Relationship with the GATT 667
11.2.1
11.2.2
11.2.3
11.3
11.4
11.4.1
11.4.2
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.7.1
11.7.2
11.7.3
11.8
11.9
12
12.1
12.1.1
12.1.2
12.1.3
12.2
12.2.1
12.2.2
The Relationship with the SCM Agreement 668
The Relationship with the TBT Agreement 668
Membership 668
Product Coverage 668
The Original Regime 668
The Protocol Amending the CA Agreement 669
Elimination of Customs Duties 669
Disciplines on Subsidies 670
Other Obligations 670
Quantitative Restrictions 670
Import Licensing 670
Procurement 670
Institutions 671
Concluding Remarks 671
Transparency 673
The Legal Discipline and Its Rationale 673
The Legal Discipline 673
The Rationale for the Legal Discipline 674
Discussion 674
12.1.3.1 Transparency, a Commodity 674
12.1.3.2 Beyond Trade Concerns 675
12.1.3.3 What Influences Transparency? 676
12.1.3.4 Transparency and Enforcement of Obligations 677
12.1.3.5 The Record of Transparency in the WTO 678
Article X of GATT 678
Laws and Other Acts of General Application 678
12.2.1.1 Defining Laws of General Application 678
12.2.1.2 The Rationale: Due Process 680
12.2.1.3 Prompt Publication 680
A Halt to (Unpleasant) Surprises 681
12.2.2.1 Advance in a Rate of Duly 681
12.2.2.2 New or More Burdensome Requirement 682
12.2.3 Uniform, Reasonable, and Impartial Administration of Laws 682
12.2.3.1 Three Distinct Obligations 682
12.2.3.2 Minimum Standards 682
12.2.3.3 Laws and Their Clarifications Are Covered 683
12.2.3.4 Uniform 683
12.2.3.5 Reasonable 686
12.2.3.6 Impartial 68 7
12.2.4 The Obligation to Maintain Independent Tribunals 688
12.2.5 Standard of Review 689
12.3 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 692
12.3.1 The Objectives 692
12.3.2 The Record 693
12.3.3 Is the TPRM Really Useful? 693
12.4 Into the Great Wide Open: Transparency Unlimited 694
12.4.1 Transparency Obligations in the WTO 694
12.4.2 Three Generations of Transparency Provisions 695
12.4.3 The WTO: International Watchdog? 696
12.4.3.1 The March toward Transparency 697
12.4.3.2 Crisis-Related Reports and Beyond 699
12.4.3.3 Ball in the Geneva Camp 699
Notes 701
References 795
Index 827
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Mavroidis, Petros C. 1959- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128796472 |
| author_facet | Mavroidis, Petros C. 1959- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Mavroidis, Petros C. 1959- |
| author_variant | p c m pc pcm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043550313 |
| classification_rvk | QM 230 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)951782351 (DE-599)BVBBV043550313 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV043550313 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:28:37Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262029995 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028965592 |
| oclc_num | 951782351 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-739 DE-12 DE-2070s DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-739 DE-12 DE-2070s DE-M382 |
| physical | XXXVI, 849 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Mavroidis, Petros C. 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)128796472 aut The regulation of international trade Volume 2 The WTO agreements on trade of goods Petros C. Mavroidis Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England MIT Press [2016] XXXVI, 849 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Außenhandelsrecht (DE-588)4137393-5 gnd rswk-swf Internationales Handelsrecht (DE-588)4027429-9 gnd rswk-swf Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4027461-5 gnd rswk-swf Internationales Handelsrecht (DE-588)4027429-9 s Außenhandelsrecht (DE-588)4137393-5 s Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4027461-5 s DE-604 (DE-604)BV043435137 2 Digitalisierung UB Passau - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028965592&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Mavroidis, Petros C. 1959- The regulation of international trade Außenhandelsrecht (DE-588)4137393-5 gnd Internationales Handelsrecht (DE-588)4027429-9 gnd Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4027461-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4137393-5 (DE-588)4027429-9 (DE-588)4027461-5 |
| title | The regulation of international trade |
| title_auth | The regulation of international trade |
| title_exact_search | The regulation of international trade |
| title_full | The regulation of international trade Volume 2 The WTO agreements on trade of goods Petros C. Mavroidis |
| title_fullStr | The regulation of international trade Volume 2 The WTO agreements on trade of goods Petros C. Mavroidis |
| title_full_unstemmed | The regulation of international trade Volume 2 The WTO agreements on trade of goods Petros C. Mavroidis |
| title_short | The regulation of international trade |
| title_sort | the regulation of international trade the wto agreements on trade of goods |
| topic | Außenhandelsrecht (DE-588)4137393-5 gnd Internationales Handelsrecht (DE-588)4027429-9 gnd Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4027461-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenhandelsrecht Internationales Handelsrecht Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028965592&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV043435137 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mavroidispetrosc theregulationofinternationaltradevolume2 |