Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo: profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri
Държавна сигурност - предимство по наследство професионални биографии на водещи офицери
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Bulgarian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sofija
Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo
2016
Sofia Ciela 2016 |
| Ausgabe: | Părvo izdanie |
| Schriftenreihe: | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Abstract Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | 958 Seiten, 16 ungezählte Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9789542819370 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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STATE SECURITY-ADVANTAGE
BY INHERITANCE
Professional biographies of the senior officers
(Summary)
At the end of every modem dictatorship, one of the main issues facing the new
government is what should be the fate of the secret police of the old regime. One ap-
proach requires that it should be completely dismantled, its employees dismissed and
possibly prosecuted, and its collaborators exposed. The second approach involves a
structural reorganisation, with some of the staff retained in the hope of winning their
loyalty in the name of stability. The first route was taken by East Germany (1989),
which became a successful model thanks to the unification of Germany. In Greece
(1974), Spain (1975) and most countries in Eastern Europe (1989), the second route
was preferred, that of the “historic compromise”. There is a third approach, that of
“continuity”, in which only the most prominent representatives of the repressive
apparatus are compelled to leave their jobs, while the services themselves remain
virtually intact, which guarantees them new prospects, and often opens the way for
a new dictatorship. This was the route chosen by the Soviet Union/Russia after the
August 1991 coup and by Egypt after the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
Bulgaria has taken the path of the “historic compromise”, but also melded it
with the third option, “continuity”. In early 1990, after nearly two months of fruit-
less debates and disputes about how to conduct “deep cuts and a comprehensive
reorganisation of the Ministry of Interior”, the Gordian Knot was cut on January 5
1990, when the Sixth Department of State Security, the one that had been in charge
of “combating ideological subversion” and that was the most compromised of all,
was shut down. In the coming months, other State Security structures were closed
and restructured, into counterintelligence, intelligence and security services. In the
process of this restructuring, 40 per cent of the employees of the former depart-
ments were pensioned off or dismissed. But the agency apparatus of these services
remained undisclosed after the initial energy about opening the files produced no
result, meaning that their archives remained closed during the ensuing 17 years.
941
The most prominent and long-standing managers of the system were retired or
laid off, but with minor exceptions, were not prosecuted. They got the opportunity to
enjoy a peaceful old age, with above-average pensions, just as their salaries had been
higher than the average in the years of their active careers. There was no bar to them
writing their memoirs and pretending to having been “guardians of national security”
in the difficult times of the Cold War, a time when the sovereignty of the country
and “national security” were expressions that had been drained of meaning. All of
this means that in spite of the partial layoffs and reorganisations, the secret services
of old managed to preserve their institutional culture, connections and networks.
This makes them not only generators of instability, but also has resulted in the
overwhelming belief that there is a close link between the staff and agents of State
Security, on the one hand, and, on the other, what political scientist Venelin Ganev
has termed the “predatory elite”֊ an economic elite formed of uncertain provenance,
parasitic on current state resources. For a large part of society, there is no doubt
that the Bulgarian transition was a laboratory creation, devised and designed by the
former State Security.
The documentation made available so far provides no evidence to support this
conspiracy theory. Yet a reading of State Security documents from the late 1980s
raises nagging doubts, because it becomes apparent that far from all was committed
to writing. State Security’s life after State Security has been lived concealed from
public view, and sometimes it is difficult to find a paper trail along which to track
covert networks.
Which raises the question of the institutional culture bequeathed by State Secu-
rity. What is this culture and how was it formed? What were the criteria for joining
the system and what were the principles of advancement in the hierarchy? How valid
are the claims of former officers that they were, however invisible, the social elite?
What motivated those employees, who did they obey and of whom were they afraid?
One of the possible sources from which to find the answers to these questions
are the personal files of those State Security officers commonly referred to as “re-
cruiters”. These administrative files are the primary historical source used for the
writing of this research, which presents the biographies of 47 of the system’s senior
officers. Based on these, this book tries to reconstruct the institutional culture and to
trace the evolution of State Security in the communist era and the transition years.
It may be said that State Security personnel belong to two generations. What
they had in common was ideological fidelity to the Communist Party, but they dif-
fered in how they proved their ideological fidelity, which affected their motivation
as well as their career prospects.
Party members in military uniforms
The guiding principle to which to the work of all branches of State Security and
its employees was subject was ideological fidelity. Employees of the State Security
were “the organ of the Politburo,” its “eyes, ears, tongs”, the “drawn sw ord of the
942
dictatorship of the proletariat” as the first party leader, Vulko Chervenkov, described
them in the early 1950s. But how to check and to prove that ideological fidelity?
Immediately after 1944 this ideological fidelity in State Security was guaran-
teed by the appointment of proven party cadres who had participated in the so-called
“resistance movement”, which in Bulgaria during World War 2 was significantly
weaker than in other Balkan countries. The first employees had received their “bap-
tism of fire” in real combat situations, and they had a clear idea of the “enemy”. For
them, their work in State Security was a continuation of the conspiracy and romance
of their youth. But the internal party purges in the late 1940s and early 1950s also
affected almost all heads of State Security, who were dismissed, and many of them
subjected to repression. The result was that in the early 1950s, State Security was
seized by paranoia and a sense of conspiracy, which in turn meant that a heavy
bureaucratic system had to be created, ensuring continuous assessment, monitoring
and guaranteeing of the ideological fidelity of its officers.
The purges exalted ideological fidelity from an imperative that was declared
into a loyalty that had to be constantly tested and proven. The main instrument for
doing so were the “special checks” that explored in detail the background of each
candidate or already appointed operative. Other means are the characteristics, com-
piled by the Party organisations, which were mandatory for the employee to have
in order to advance upward.
The third instrument was the constant interflow between the top leadership of
State Security and party and state office-bearers. The appointment of high leadership
positions of the State Security always had to be approved by the relevant depart-
ment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. And the people who were
appointed often came from the party nomenklatura or retained the possibility of a
party career after release from State Security, but while also preserving the privileges
of the officers of the system. This applied not only to interior ministers, who were
always party, not professional appointments. Nor was it limited to deputy ministers
— as in the cases of Mircho Spasov and Grigor Shopov, who throughout their terms
at the interior ministry retained the opportunity for a party career. It also applied to
much of the so-called “professional managers” of the system, which essentially were
partisan appointments and could at any stage of their career return to purely party
work. For example, Boris Manov, the first Chief of the Sixth Division for combating
dissidents, in 1968 returned to party work, heading the party structures in Sofia and
then in Pemik. Or Anton Musakov, the last head of the same Sixth Division, who
before joining State Security worked for more than 10 years in the structure of the
Komsomol, the party youth organisation.
All this gave officers of State Security the status of “payroll party workers
in military uniforms, equipped with the means of physical repression” in the apt
expression of German researcher Jens Giesecke.
943
The First Generation: ‘Active participants in the
establishment of people’s power’
What was the profile of the first generation of officials of the communist State
Security who survived the purges of the early 1950s or were appointed immediately
after them? The vast majority were young people bom in the 1920s, mainly in vil-
lages, which they then left to continue their secondary education in a nearby town,
where they found a “progressive environment”. Going by the biographical summaries
compiled by Interior Ministry placement officers, such people had the advantage of
coming from “poor peasant” or “average peasant” families. Employees of “working
class” origin were the exception rather than the mie.
In the second half of the 1930s or the early 1940s, these representatives of the
first generation had become members of the youth organisation of the Communist
Party and “gathered support for partisans and political prisoners” or at least provided
support to the communist resistance. An advantage towards appointment was if they
had repressed by the old regime, as cases of detention, beatings, incarceration or time
in apolitical prison camp were carefully documented. This type of CV, however, could
also create enormous difficulties for the job applicant or already serving employee,
for any such event in the past was given detailed consideration in the special checks,
as the full range of views about such “failures” were gathered and those who were
suspected of “provocations” or betrayal became victims of purges and dismissals.
Especially detailed special checks were carried out in the early and mid 1950s,
just after the first purge of State Security. But even after these drastic special checks,
there were staff who remained on the payroll in spite of there being cloudy areas
in their pasts. These employees continued to be periodically subjected to new such
inspections, sometimes up to four or five during the span of their careers, again
without a firm conclusion being reached, but sometimes they were penalised by
removal from the staff of State Security. A typical case is that of Kiril Velichkov,
head of the Fourth Economic Directorate in the 1980s, who was subjected to several
checks because of the “priestly origin” of his wife, whose father had been a cleric.
When he was appointed, this is recognised as a negligible detail, but when in 1965
he was proposed for promotion, the Ministry’s placement officers stated their op-
position, not by calling his qualifications into question, but on the grounds that his
colleagues were aware of the origin of his wife, and the department had other staff
with “wider party and operational experience”.
In the ranks of the first generation of employees of State Security, partisans were
no exception, although they rather were assigned careers at the central and local party
leaderships. Insofar as there were partisans or veteran communists in State Security,
they occupied leadership positions in the ministry or in different departments — this
was the case with longtime deputy minister Mircho Spasov, minister Angel Tsanev
as well as the heads of various departments, Stoyan Savov, Boris Manov, Dimitar
Gmbchev, Nanka Serkedzhieva, Peter Chergilanov, Petar Stoyanov and others. But the
944
relationship between the partisans from one detachment or between the partisans and
their “aides” was a very strong factor in explaining the rise or the appointment of an
operative. This type of relationship between parents played a big role in the appoint-
ment of the second generation of employees and can explain their career development.
The next asset in a biography of an employee of the first generation was if they
could demonstrate “active participation in the establishment of people’s power” on
September 9 1944, whether at central or local level. Employees customarily used that
euphemism in their CVs as an introduction, and then went on to explain what form
this activity took, most often having been in the “cleansing” of a village or town of
“enemy” or “fascist” elements (“bastards”), the murders of army officers and others.
After taking part in the “establishment” of the new government, ordinarily
the representatives of the first generation returned to their places of birth, as at that
time almost all had completed secondary education or completed it immediately
afterwards. If up to then they had not been members of the Bulgarian Communist
Party, they entered the ranks of the party after September 9 1944 or by the end of
the 1940s. Very few' of them tried to continue their education by attending univer-
sity, although a few had completed higher education before joining State Security.
After that some of them went to serve in th e army, others in local party commit-
tees. From there, at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, they joined State Security,
which had just been cleared of all “suspicious elements”. If they succeeded in getting
through the special checks, by the mid-1950s they already occupied leading positions
in the system, in which they remained until the end of communism.
In sum, the first generation of operatives were people almost entirely of rural
origin who moved in the course of their education to a nearby town. They had high
school education, some active years in the resistance and had received their “baptism
of fire” in the establishment of “people’s power” or in the pursuit of “enemies of the
people” among officers in the army.
From biographies of this kind emerge the first principle of appointment to and
working for State Security - the requirement of political loyalty, of which the sole
proof is the appropriate background and biography before and around September 9
1944. But this principle implies a lack of specialised training needed to work in special
services, which led to the introduction of the second principle, which remained in
full force until the end of communism ֊ that education and training should follow
and not precede the appointment. Only after occupying a position in State Security
because of verified and proven political loyalty, employees were sent to acquire or
improve their skills. This could be training at a special school in Moscow, courses
at the Interior Ministry school or a course for senior party cadres, but any decision
about such training had to follow an appointment to a post. Even when it came to
the reassignment of an employee from one directorate to another in the system, even
only after taking up the new post, was he sent to the school for training.
As to joining State Security, whether as the first or second generation, there was
never a competition or at least an entry exam for candidates to verify their qualifica-
945
tions. Furthermore, it was a matter of a vacancy being sought for a person, not of a
person being sought for a vacancy. There is not one case (at least in the personnel
files examined) in which it can be seen that the assignment has happened because
specific qualifications were sought for a position. If this happened at all, it certainly
was limited to the Investigative Department where there continued to be a preference
for staff who were law graduates, and at the technical division of State Security.
The Second Generation: ‘Preference for children of active
fighters and for former and current employees of the
Committee for State Security”
Both principles of appointment explained above also applied in full to the
second generation of employees. But unlike the first, the proof of the ideological
loyalty of the second generation was in having politically active parents (family
members), and the recruitment of new employees was by recommendation (in other
words ֊ patronage), and this recommendation most often was a matter of acquaint-
ance between parents from years of resistance or just old rural connections. It was
possible for the recommendation to come from both the party leadership and the
heads of the system of State Security.
This made State Security into a closed-shop officer corps, to which only selected
members of the communist elite had access. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was normal
to have working in State Security the children of the first generation of staff (as was
the case of the two sons of Deputy Minister Grigor Shopov and the son of Deputy
Minister Stoyan Savov). It was permitted for two brothers to be employed in the
same department, even in the most prestigious intelligence department. And given
the checks into the pasts (origins) of prospective wives of these young employees,
they often married employees of the Ministry of Interior.
The system appointing politically loyal cadres of the second generation had
official sanction. In conditions for admission to the Higher School of Interior it was
stated that “under equal conditions, preference is given children of active fighters
against fascism and capitalism and current and former employees of the Committee
for State Security.”
The profile of the second generation of employees was people bom in the
1930s and 1940s, who entered the system at the end of the 1960s and 1970s. Upon
their appointment, both their and their parents ’ past was subj ected to careful scrutiny,
but even if negative or questionable aspects were found, these could be ignored or
“adjusted” according to the level from which the recommendation came.
A significant difference between them and the first generation was that the
majority of the second generation had a university education, without however this
becoming a prerequisite for appointment to State Security by the time of the end of
communism. Education also had no relation to the position to which the employee
was appointed. This applied to both intelligence and counterintelligence. Brigo
946
Asparuhov (chief of intelligence in the early 1990s), who knew German from high
school, was appointed to work at the Greek directorate and after studying Greek for
years, was sent for a term abroad in Greece as intelligence officer in the Bulgarian
embassy even though he had not succeeded especially well in the tests.
The second generation of employees was certainly better educated than the first,
but their motivation was significantly weaker. If among the representatives of the
first generation there indeed could be found those who were highly motivated, both
by ideological and purely career motives, then among the second generation, such
“idealists” were almost non-existent. After two purges and the pressure of failure,
however, the first generation built a heavy bureaucratic structure, which focused on
the prevention of errors, not on success at work. Employees of the second generation
came into this already built solid bureaucratic structure, but before performing their
tasks they were not required to undergo any test in which to prove their abilities. The
indisputable advantage was their origin and the past of their parents, at the expense
of which the issue of abilities and qualities remained in the background.
For the second generation the principle also remained valid that qualifica-
tions come after appointment. The decision on transferring an employee from one
department to another was based on his biography, while the question of whether
he has any knowledge of the specifics of the new activity was of no significance.
Such radical changes (especially when it comes to transfer from any of the regional
structures of State Security to the more prestigious head office) were due again either
to someone’s recommendation or to personal contacts created over the years between
the employee and his future boss. The only objective criterion that was taken into
account in career development was seniority. But this was inevitable as time served
was the basis for promotion to the higher military rank and the title itself was one of
the conditions (although not mandatory) to climb to higher levels in the hierarchy.
By the end of communism, State Security was led almost exclusively by rep-
resentatives of the first generation, while in some cases representatives of the second
generation managed to reach deputy management positions. The dominance of the
first generation created stability in the system (especially in terms of party leader-
ship), but caused internal tension by being a disincentive to younger employees to
work. In the whole period from the mid-1950s no more than four or five directorate
heads were changed in the various directorates (the most common change was the
leadership of Intelligence). Especially remarkable is the stagnation in the system
after Dimitar Stoyanov was appointed Interior Minister in 1973, remaining in this
post until 1988. During his term, changes in leadership of the major directorates were
mostly because of the deaths of some of the directors and not because of a desire
or ability to update the system. So after the initial dynamism that was characteristic
of the rapid career development of the first generation, for almost two decades, the
system was practically completely “blocked” at the top, and the career outlook for
the second generation employees extended to becoming a head of department and
in rare cases to deputy head of a directorate.
947
Along with the “grey” officers who imperceptibly did their jobs and avoided
failures while waiting for time served to bring them a higher rank and position, the
system was constructed so as to encourage the emergence of what may be called
career “meteors” that were able to benefit from the circumstances for their personal
gain. The lack of criteria for career advancement allowed individual employees to
climb the ranks thanks to their personal acquaintances and the provision of services
of all kinds, and the names of some of them became publicly known even in the years
of communism. Although some of them have been prosecuted for malfeasance in
office, it is these “career meteors” that became the role models from which recruits
to State Security should learn.
Statistics on education, training and party affiliation
Proof of these principles of recruitment to and staff development in State Se-
curity is to be found in the statistics on their education, training and party affiliation.
For example, in 1951, immediately after the Stalinist purges, the staff comple-
ment of State Security consisted of 5433 employees, of which 4181 were active. A
total of2991 were members of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 410 were candidate
BCP members, 762 were members of the Komsomol. There were only 18 non-party
people. A total of 102 had tertiary education, 142 incomplete tertiary education, and
all the rest had varying degrees of secondary education, along with those who had
primary education, 197 people.
Despite the trend towards professionalization of the services in the coming
years, it remained incomplete by the end of communism, as educational qualifica-
tion as a criterion always yielded to ideological fidelity as evidenced by member-
ship of the BCR Of a total of 7000-7200 officers working for State Security in the
1972-1978 period, the non-party (ie officers who were not members of the BCP or
communist youth organisation the Komsomol) constituted a small minority, their
number dropping from 153 people in 1972 to 92 people in 1978. Statistics for 1972
show that in the entire system of State Security there was one who was a member
of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union1, who by 1974 either had been fired or
changed his party affiliation, because from 1974 to 1978 there was not one single
member of BANU among the State Security officer corps.
However, by the end of the 1970s, the trend towards professionalization had
produced some results, because at that time the number of officers with higher
education by then exceeded the number of dropouts from higher education. But this
achievement was possible thanks to employees who have graduated from the school of
the Ministry of Interior. This figure saw significant growth. In 1972, only six officers
attended higher education at the school, by 1974 the number rose to 135, and in 1978
1 Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) was intended to represent the country’s
peasantry. A wing became part of the Fatherland Front as, ultimately, a junior partner of
the Bulgarian Communist Party.
948
had reached 475. There are more detailed data on the educational levels in 1969 and
1970. At that time, in no directorate (even in the most prestigious and specialized)
did the percentage of officers with higher education exceed 60 per cent. The highest
percentages of university graduates was in the First Chief Directorate (Intelligence),
55 per cent, and in the Investigation department, 58 per cent. Thirty-nine per cent of
those in the Second Chief Directorate (Counterintelligence), 13 per cent in Military
Counterintelligence, 33 per cent in the Fourth Technical Directorate, just 11 per cent in
the Fifth Directorate for Safety and Security, and 36 per cent in the Sixth Directorate.
There was some growth in the number of staff who could speak foreign lan-
guages, but they still remained a small fraction of the total officer corps. Data for
1978 show that 2027 officers were fluent in a foreign language (including Russian)
while 5263 could not speak any language other than Bulgarian. The statistics for
1970 were similar. Even in the two directorates entrusted to work with foreign intel-
ligence and counterintelligence, the percentage of foreign languages was relatively
low. In intelligence, only 44 per cent of all officers were fluent in at least one foreign
language, again the highest percentage among all departments, while in counterintel-
ligence the figure dropped to 39 per cent. In other directorates, the rate was lower
still, such as in the Fifth Directorate (Safety and Security) in 1970, of 1018 officers,
all of five were fluent in a foreign language.
However, officers of the State Security were the best paid civil servants. A
complex system of payments was developed at the Interior Ministry, with all officers
receiving a salary for their posts and a second one on the basis of their military rank.
This made up a basic salary, topped up with supplementary allowances for seniority,
knowledge of foreign languages, the rank of “active fighters” (if designated as such),
working with agents, and other things. Both State Security officers and People’s
Militia officers were employed in the Interior Ministry, but State Security people
got salaries about 30 per cent higher than militia appointed to equivalent posts with
similar titles. A middle manager in State Security (a department head with the rank
of colonel) got a salary between three and four times the average salary for the year
in the country. For example, in 1972 the salary of a deputy head of department with
the rank of lieutenant-colonel amounted to 408 leva, when the average salary in the
country was 130.92 leva. Employees of State Security got a number of other social
benefits, as well as privileges at retirement.
Giving priority to ideological fidelity at the expense of qualifications inevita-
bly had an impact on the quality of the work. This is especially true for intelligence
operating in a hostile environment, whose officers are exposed to the greatest temp-
tations. It follows that appointment to this directorate was the most difficult and the
requirement for ideological loyalty the highest. Despite the insistence of former staff
that Bulgarian intelligence pulled off brilliant achievements during the Cold War,
the available data provides no evidence for these claims.
For example, in 1977 the station in New York (which used as a cover mainly
the Bulgarian representation to the UN) consisted of eight operatives who managed
949
a total of 12 agents, and their activities were very highly appreciated by headquar-
ters in Sofia. The situation in Bulgaria’s neighboring countries was more onerous
֊ in 1968 the station in Athens reported that the list of agents included nine Greek
nationals, of which proper contact was maintained with five, and with the others
connection was lost. Meanwhile the station consisted of 11 people, including six
operatives and support staff (radio, driver and security). Significantly, the resident
in Athens at this time was Stoyan Savov, who in later years would become chief of
intelligence and deputy minister, and whose portfolio was indeed intelligence. In
1971 the station in Frankfurt, which used as cover the commercial representation
of Bulgaria, consisted of eight operatives and agents, managing only three foreign
nationals and 26 secret collaborators - Bulgarian citizens. In a full year, the sta-
tion reported that it had recruited four Bulgarian citizens temporarily residing in
the city as new secret collaborators, and not one new agent. Indeed State Security
headquarters reported that work on establishing contacts with local citizens was
“unsatisfactory”, but at the expense of the resident, Vladimir Todorov, who went
on to become deputy head of the directorate, but in the late 1980s also was the last
chief of the First Chief Directorate.
Of the personnel case files studied, it can be concluded that the first of the
intelligence chiefs to certainly have been able to speak a foreign language headed
that office only at the end of the 1970s. The language skills of all their predecessors
was reported as unsatisfactory. The poor language skills and lack of education among
managers and staff from the first generation of officers from the First Directorate
naturally led Intelligence to focus on “enemy emigration” — which in turn can explain
why Bulgarian intelligence gained a sad notoriety namely for murders and attacks
against representatives of Bulgarian emigration, such as the murder of dissident
writer Georgi Markov in 1978, the attempt to murder journalist and former intel-
ligence officer Vladimir Kostov in the same year and the liquidation of Bulgarian
emigrant Boris Arsov in 1974.
This uncertainty made recruiters put more emphasis on attracting secret col-
laborators — Bulgarian citizens trafficked abroad and through which officers of the
First Chief Directorate tried to develop their activities. In particular this related to
specialized structures such as scientific and technical or cultural and historical in-
telligence. As a result of this trend, in the 1970s Intelligence began to actively and
intensively recruit secret collaborators from among the representatives of scientific,
technical and humanitarian intelligentsia and thus, in turn, creating one of the net-
works that would have a real impact during the transition period.
The bottom line is that the only real success of Bulgarian intelligence was in the
early 1950s, at time when several young and motivated recruiters joined the service,
who quickly learnt foreign languages and who had real recruits in France and Eng-
land, the most famous of which was the recruitment of the future defence minister of
France (from 1981 to 1985), Charles Hemu, carried out by Raiko Nikolov in 1953.
950
The antithesis of meritocracy, and administrative
arbitrariness
How in this context can the principles of career development in State Security
be summarised? The effectiveness of any modem state institution depends on the
extent to which it is able to take advantage of the meritocratic principle, that career
growth is due to education, results and success, and that creates a role model, fol-
lowed by new generations of employees in the system.
From this perspective, the main feature of State Security is a nature that is
the antithesis of meritocracy. Advancement upwards in this institution was based
on two fonnál criteria — origin and length of sendee. Both principles were fixtures,
that could not be affected by education, quality or performance of the employee. The
principle of the development of State Security was not even non-meritocratic but was
openly anti-meritocratic as the results of an employee’s work not only do not assist
his development, but also rather hinders him because of the inevitable mistakes that
accompany it. Of all the heads of departments at the end of communism, the only
ones who could be said to have taken leadership positions thanks to demonstrated
performance were the heads of the economic directorate Kiril Velichkov and of
technical management Iliya Lingorski.
All of this presupposes another important question — if employees of State
Security were so badly motivated and of doubtful education, and managerial posi-
tions in the system were occupied by those who were far from the most capable,
how was this anti-meritocratic system able to “protect” the security of the regime
for four decades? Of course, the stability of the regime was due to numerous factors,
among which external ones that cannot be ignored, but it partly has to be credited
to State Security.
The answer lies in the institutionalized arbitrariness with which State Security
operated, or in other words, its right to apply administrative measures. Just as the first
repressions at the end of 1944 and 1945 were largely arbitrary, just so the repression
(albeit softer) in the late years of communism also was arbitrary. With a judicial
system that was firmly under outside control and with a lack of any institutional cor-
rective on the work of the secret services, this administrative arbitrariness becomes
crucial for understanding the impact of State Security on society. State Security is
everywhere and nowhere. There is no principle on the basis of which one can assume
on whom, when and why State Security would direct their attention or where there
is, it is “the lottery principle,” according to the apt expression of Assen Ignatov.
The power of State Security was based on an arbitrary mode of action, com-
bined with its large administrative powers and the lack of any control over them.
It chose its objects without any apparent principle and then had the opportunity to
apply to them administrative measures such as deprivation of citizenship, dismissal
from work, a transfer to a less promising and prestigious position.
951
The activities and decisions of State Security were not subject to appeal. The
anonymous and unprincipled danger of a person becoming a subject of State Security
was all the reason to feel monitored, without the system really being able to monitor
everyone. A totalitarian system cannot be truly totalitarian, but it has the ambition
to strive to be totalitarian. If the Communist Party is the “vanguard of the working
class”, the employees of State Security can legitimately claim to be “the vanguard”
of this vanguard. But neither education nor training and even less their “successes”
give them reason to claim the status of an elite in society — neither during the com-
munist era, nor after it.
State Security, Postmortem
So far no documents have been found proving that State Security had been
prepared for the transition. Rather the opposite. But unlike East Germany and the
Soviet Union, where in the late 1980s there was a decrease in the activity of, re-
spectively, the Stasi and the KGB, in Bulgaria in this period the process was the
opposite — increasing the state and the influence of State Security in an attempt to
deal with the new “threats” that accompanied “Glasnost and Perestroika”. The most
vivid expression of this process was the party leadership’s initiation in the second
half of the 1980s of the first massive repressive campaign in nearly 30 years, the
implementation of which was entrusted to State Security, the campaign against
Bulgarian Turks, known as the “Revival Process”. Unlike other countries in Eastern
Europe, in Bulgaria the activity of repressive authorities immediately before the end
of the regime increased rather than decreased.
This is part of the explanation for the influence that the system continued to
maintain in the transition years. The life-after-death of State Security was prolonged
because of the second generation of its employees being given leadership positions
in the new security organs in the first months after November 10 1989. Although
by 1989 having gained no small amount of professional experience, they had been
selected namely on the basis of their “good” origins (by the standards of communism)
and were the fruit of that anti-meritocratic system of career development that had
been created by the first-generation employees. If among the first generation there
were still “idealists” (in the sense of believe in ideological correctness employees)
to be found, the second generation was dominated completely and almost without
exception by bureaucrats whose main purpose was not to make a mistake, and to
hold on to their posts, salaries and benefits from any potential contact that could help
them to rise to a higher office. Even though some were dissatisfied with the system
of career advancement and sincerely wanted reforms, they remained bound by the
same family ties and the system of patronage that had built up in State Security over
decades. The opportunity of an unexpected career leap that these staff got after the
collapse of communism appeared at a time when the old control system based on
party loyalty was no longer working. So they got the right (or freedom) to choose
to whom to “donate” their loyalty - to the Party, in which their relatives, patrons or
952
mentors were, to the State which so far for them had been an abstraction, or just to
use positions of power in their own self-interest.
It follows that the second generation of employees who remained to work
in the system bore with them the old institutional culture of State Security into its
successors. And to this day it remains unclear according to what criteria staff are
appointed to the State Agency for National Security or the National Intelligence
Service. There is no information about whether this happens in any competitive way,
in which candidates are required to prove their abilities and qualifications, however
brilliant they look on paper. The lack of clear criteria for selection means the pres-
ervation of the old methods of recruitment of staff based on family acquaintances,
recommendations and patronage. And this leads to the presence of the same clan
structure, typical of the period of State Security, the semantic difference being that
instead of clans, they began to be called “circles”.
The other difference, however, is more essential. Due to the specifics of the
totalitarian state and its secret sendees, State Security did not generate public scandals
and the leakage of classified information into the public domain was unthinkable.
In contrast, Bulgarian special services in the democratic era have been constantly at
the centre of scandals because of leaks of classified information and illegal use of
surveillance equipment. Deprived of the main power that they had in the communist
years, the right of extrajudicial repression and administrative arbitrariness, they have
become “information” services, whose main task is to feed the state government
with information that cannot be acquired otherwise. The result is a continuing prac-
tice of manipulation using business information, including by a organising a black
market in discrediting people, by which disinformation is fed to society through the
media. In other words, the latter-day services of necessity conjure up conspiracies,
because their only source of power is to provide conspiratorial explanations of what
is happening in society.
Outside the current security services, the other areas where State Security is
continuing its life-after-death are the private sector and the public administration.
As a result of cutbacks carried out in 1990-1991, about 30 to 40 per cent of
staff of State Security subsidiaries were fired and had to look for a new career.
An interesting illustration of how those dismissed from State Security operate in
practice is contained in a statement by an officer of Fourth Directorate (Economic),
who was working undercover at a state-owned company. At a meeting on January
20 1990, the proposal was for as many officers as possible to be sent undercover
in state companies and institutions, and for the service to continue to pay only the
difference between the salary received by the undercover operative and the money
allocated to them as operatives. Intuitively he alludes to the role that could be played
by officers of the economic directorate after its closure, by continuing to work in
various state structures.
Those State Security officials who were dismissed from it but remained em-
ployed by state companies or institutions actually received lower wages, but at the
953
same time were exempted from the control of the management of the service, and
from the party tutelage, without losing their contacts (they did not need even to
inform their agents that they no longer worked for the security services). In short,
the “dismissed” officer got an overt blow to his personal well-being and sense of
informal status and influence, but at the same time had much greater freedom of
action, including not only to present his “civilian/experf ’ biography, but also to hold
on to his networks of agents and connections with former colleagues. This system of
dependencies could not be dismantled without the declassification of the archives of
State Security, but at that time the momentum towards opening them had dissipated.
Other structures through which State Security continues its life after death are
the numerous companies set up after the mid-1960s to control “underground tran-
sit” - smuggling rings for weapons, excise goods and illegal drugs. It is difficult to
estimate how many of those working for these companies were State Security, but
by 1989 an impressively large group of officers had been integrated into the existing
legal business structures, which however wrere involved in cross-border criminal
activity. The smuggling that had been carried out before 1989 at the behest of the
State opened the way for a coalescence between “agents” and organised crime in
the early years of transition. The culmination of cross-border crime was at the time
of the economic embargo against the former Yugoslavia.
Because they lacked their own financial resources, officials dismissed from
State Security offered specific skills, personal connections in the country and abroad
and a pool of information, as well as private companies that emerged after 1990,
some of them operating on the edge of the law. Some former officers engaged in
partnership with former business managers from the communist nomenklatura that
were in the best position to start a business in the private sector. Others were involved
in the creation of security companies, which entered the territory controlled initially
by criminal structures, often including themselves in organised criminal activity.
The governing bodies of the banks that collapsed in 1996 also have been shown by
an investigation by the Dossier Commission to have included quite a few staff and
part-time employees of State Security.
At the beginning of 1990, with the removal of party control and with the old
party leaders having departed from the stage, rising stars called “experts” or “tech-
nocrats” emerged in the public administration. These were employees who had been
at the lower levels of the state administration who had occupied executive positions
for decades but who had never hoped that they could fight the party nomenklatura.
Against a background of initiative having been lost by the democratic opposition
and the severing of the relationship between party and state, these “experts” became
the main holders of information about the status of different social sectors for which
up to then they had been responsible. No small number of them were collaborators
with State Security.
The most striking proof of this is the example of the disclosure in late 2010 and
early 2011 of the identities of State Security employees at the Ministry of Foreign
954
Affairs, when it became clear that approximately 60 per cent of Bulgarian ambas-
sadors were State Security officers or secret collaborators in the past. Unlike other
administrative structures, which in the two decades of transition largely succeeded
in addressing the issue of the change of generations, the Foreign Ministry remained
“preserved”, hidden behind the requirement that diplomacy should be reserved for
“career diplomats”, that is, for “experts” and “professionals”. In this sense, the state
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011 can be described as a scale model of the
entire Bulgarian administration and much of the state companies in the early 1990s,
when the lack of political control paved the way for the success of the “technocrats.”
This outlines the networks created in the early years of the transition that al-
lowed State Security to live on post mortem. These are the networks of “experts”
in the administration that remain connected to their superior officers, laid off from
State Security, but remaining employed in firms that had been set up in the years
of communism, or who started their own businesses thanks to their contacts. The
continued absence of political will for the declassification of the archives of State
Security and the frequent claims that the country should be run by “experts” rather
than politicians suggest the existence of just such hidden connections.
It would be exaggerated and incorrect to see in the preservation of such net-
works the conspiratorial intent of the leadership of State Security or the Bulgarian
Communist Party. Rather, it was a process that naturally developed, made possible
by the situation in the country — the survival of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (as
BCP was renamed in 1990) as a key player in the Bulgarian transition guaranteed
the existence and reproduction of these networks, as it does not allow the opening of
files that can destroy them. It can be concluded that those who profited the most from
the first period of transition in Bulgaria were precisely those “experts/technocrats”
that largely overlapped with secret collaborators of State Security and its undercover
officers in various departments. Often they were connected with the second tier of
the former Communist Party (the new faces of the BSP), around which, of course,
they allied with multiple random people, close to the first two groups through kin-
ship or domestic ties.
But the most striking legacy of State Security in the years of transition is in the
spreading of its institutional culture through these netw orks. During communism,
State Security was an anti-meritocratic and closed system throughout the country,
where there could be no illusions that a person’s career is due only or mainly to his
professional qualities. This is the institutional culture which was jealously guarded
and promoted by officers of the State Security who remained in the newly formed
security sector, as well as by their dismissed colleagues and their agents in the
departments and companies where they were employed after 1989, as this is their
main resource of influence.
So State Security continues to live postmortem to this day. Through its anti-
meritocratic and institutional spirit, the predatory elite of the country during the
transition was formed.
955
БЛАГОДАРНОСТ
Този проект се осъществи трудно и бавно, като изследването, анализът
и подготовката на книгата отнеха приблизително четири години. Това прави
още по-голяма благодарността ни към хората, които повярваха в смисъла на
начинанието и подкрепиха неговата реализация. В най-голяма степен това
се отнася за Института за изследване на близкото минало, който предложи
идеята и осигури първоначалното финансиране благодарение на д-р Георги
Лазаров, български емигрант в САЩ и основател на Фондация „Свети Георги
Победоносец“.
Впоследствие проектът беше подкрепен и от Софийското бюро на Фонда-
ция „Конрад Аденауер“, на чийто ръководител д-р Марко Арнд и сътрудници в
лицето особено на г-жа Марга Билева дължим специална благодарност. Фонда-
цията последователно подкрепя проекти, свързани с историята на комунизма в
България и ние се радваме, че в настоящото изследване те видяха възможност
за задълбочаването на познанието за този период.
След като първият вариант на текста беше готов, основните акценти в него
и детайлите в отделните биографии бяха обсъдени с други изследователи, които
дадоха своите бележки и мнения. Благодарност дължим на Георги Михайлов,
автор на интернет-страницата www.desehistory.bg, който изчете написаното и
ни предостави някои от снимките, публикувани в настоящата книга. Ръкописът
беше обсъден в Института за изследване на близкото минало и сме задължени
за критиките и поощренията, изказани от проф. Ивайло Знеполски, проф. Иван
Еленков, доц. Михаил Груев, доц. Даниела Колева, доц. Даниел Вачков, доц.
Мартин Иванов. Специална благодарност дължим на проф. Георги Димитров
за подробните му бележки по уводната студия. Възстановяването на някои
детайли от историческото развитие на структурата на Държавна сигурност,
особено за ранния комунистически период от нейното съществуване, стана
възможно благодарение на подкрепата на Христо Христов, както и на Рада
Смедовска-Тонева от Фондация „Риск Монитор“. Основните тези, изложени
в уводната студия бяха обсъдени и с проф. Евелина Келбечева и д-р Емилия
Занкина.
957
Изследването нямаше да бъде възможно без събирането на архивния ма-
териал, за което дължим специална благодарност на членовете и служителите
от Комисията по досиетата, чието отговорно отношение към документите на
Държавна сигурност прави възможно не само настоящото, но и много други
изследвания за комунистическото минало.
Далеч не на последно място благодарност дължим на Димитрина Чернева
и Тони Николов, които изчетоха и дадоха своите бележки по последния вариант
на уводната студия. Благодарни сме на редактора на книгата Мая Халачева и
на художника Веселин Праматаров, както и на Димитър Димов от Института
за изследване на близкото минало, който положи всички усилия времето от
завършването на ръкописа до неговото издаване да бъде възможно най-кратко.
В заключение дължим благодарност за подкрепата и на своите семейства
и особено на Весела Чернева, в разговор с която се яви и основната теза на тази
книга — за антимеритократичния характер на Държавна сигурност и нейните
видими и невидими наследници.
И така, усилията по подготовката и издаването на това изследване вече са
в миналото, днес то е в ръцете на читателите, на чиято добронамерена оценка
разчитаме.
958
СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
На кого служи Държавна сигурност?.9
РЪКОВОДНИТЕ КАДРИ НА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ:
„ОЧИТЕ И УШИТЕ НА ПАРТИЯТА64
I. АВАНГАРД НА АВАНГАРДА.28
II. ПОДБОР И КАРИЕРНО РАЗВИТИЕ.40
1. Първото поколение: „активни участници в установяването
на народната власт“ . 42
2. Второто поколение: „предимство имат синовете на
активни борци и на бивши и настоящи служители на КДС“ . 52
3. Статистически данни: партийна принадлежност, социален
произход, образование, заплати. 59
4. Основни характеристики: антимеритократизъм и
административен произвол. 65
III. СТРУКТУРА И ДЕЙНОСТ.72
1. Организация на работата на Държавна сигурност. 72
2. Разузнаване. 76
3. Вътрешна сигурност и Управление за безопасност и охрана . 94
4. Регионални структури . 124
5. Следствие, Картотека и архив, Школа „Георги Димитров“ . 127
РЪКОВОДНИ КАДРИ: ПРОФЕСИОНАЛНИ БИОГРАФИИ
Димо Дичев Новаков (1902-1982), началник на отдел
„Държавна сигурност“. 141
Мирчо Спасов Христов (1911-1993), заместник-министър
на вътрешните работи. 148
Ангел Минев Цанев (1912-2003), министър на вътрешните работи . 172
Георги Цанков Веселинов (1913-1990), министър на вътрешните работи. 183
5
Ангел Стоянов Кацаров (1942-2008), началник на Разузнавателно
управление при КСВ, началник на Служба „Военна информация“. 759
Бриго (Бригадир) Христофоров Аспарухов (1945), служител на
Първо главно управление, директор на Националната
разузнавателна служба.764
Пандали Димитров Бозаджиев (1945), заместник-началник на
направление „Терор“ при Шесто управление, първи
заместник-началник на Национална служба за охрана . 778
Димитър Христов Иванов (1951), началник на 06 отдел на Шесто
управление.788
Чавдар Антонов Чернев (1951), служител на Софийско градско
управление на МВР по ДС, директор на Столичната дирекция
на вътрешните работи. 811
Иван Иванов Драшков (1956), служител на Второ главно управление,
директор на Национална служба „Сигурност“, заместник-председател
на Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“ . 825
Петко Гаврилов Сертов (1956), служител на Второ главно управление,
Централна служба за борба с организираната престъпност, председател
на Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“ . 864
ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ POSTMORTEM.887
1. Държавна сигурност и нейните наследници.892
2. Държавна сигурност и обществото:
възходът на технократите.902
3. Наследството на Държавна сигурност.906
ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ.909
Съкращения .927
Източници и библиография. 933
State Security - advantage by inheritance. Professional biographies
of the senior officers (Summary).*. 941
Благодарност. 957
8 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Dermendžieva, Marija 1965- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)136557562 (DE-588)101905896X |
| author_facet | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Dermendžieva, Marija 1965- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- |
| author_variant | m m mm m d md |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043323994 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)954207175 (DE-599)BVBBV043323994 |
| edition | Părvo izdanie |
| era | Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte |
| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4006804-3 Biografie gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Biografie |
| geographic | Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Bulgarien |
| id | DE-604.BV043323994 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:11:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789542819370 |
| language | Bulgarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028744347 |
| oclc_num | 954207175 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 958 Seiten, 16 ungezählte Seiten Illustrationen |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo Ciela |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno |
| spelling | 880-01 Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)136557562 aut 880-04 Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri Momčil Metodiev, Marija Dermendžieva 880-03 Părvo izdanie 880-05 Sofija Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo 2016 880-06 Sofia Ciela 2016 958 Seiten, 16 ungezählte Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno Text bulgarisch Kyrillische Schrift Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Berühmte Persönlichkeit (DE-588)4191412-0 gnd rswk-swf Führungsoffizier (DE-588)1023706040 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4006804-3 Biografie gnd-content Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 g Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Berühmte Persönlichkeit (DE-588)4191412-0 s Führungsoffizier (DE-588)1023706040 s Geschichte z DE-604 880-02 Dermendžieva, Marija 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)101905896X aut Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028744347&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028744347&sequence=000002&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 100-01/(N Методиев, Момчил ut 700-02/(N Дерменджиева, Мария ut 250-03/(N Първо издание 245-04/(N Държавна сигурност - предимство по наследство професионални биографии на водещи офицери Момчил Методиев, Мария Дерменджиева 264-05/(N София Сиела 2016 264-06/(N София Институт за изследване на близкото минало 2016 |
| spellingShingle | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Dermendžieva, Marija 1965- Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri Berühmte Persönlichkeit (DE-588)4191412-0 gnd Führungsoffizier (DE-588)1023706040 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4191412-0 (DE-588)1023706040 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4008866-2 (DE-588)4006804-3 |
| title | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri |
| title_auth | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri |
| title_exact_search | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri |
| title_full | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri Momčil Metodiev, Marija Dermendžieva |
| title_fullStr | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri Momčil Metodiev, Marija Dermendžieva |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri Momčil Metodiev, Marija Dermendžieva |
| title_short | Dăržavna sigurnost - predimstvo po nasledstvo |
| title_sort | darzavna sigurnost predimstvo po nasledstvo profesionalni biografii na vodesti oficeri |
| title_sub | profesionalni biografii na vodešti oficeri |
| topic | Berühmte Persönlichkeit (DE-588)4191412-0 gnd Führungsoffizier (DE-588)1023706040 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Berühmte Persönlichkeit Führungsoffizier Geheimdienst Bulgarien Biografie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028744347&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028744347&sequence=000002&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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