The conflict over Kosovo: why Milosevic decided to settle when he did
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
Rand
©2001
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| Schriftenreihe: | Online Rand research documents
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | At head of title: Project Air Force. - "Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.". - Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002 Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155) Introduction -- He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule -- He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover -- Concluding Observations This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 155 pages) |
| ISBN: | 0585425388 0833030035 0833032380 9780585425382 9780833030030 9780833032386 |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155) | ||
| 500 | |a Introduction -- He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule -- He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover -- Concluding Observations | ||
| 500 | |a This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
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| discipline | Geschichte |
| era | Since 1998 fast Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Since 1998 Geschichte |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043121888 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:18:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0585425388 0833030035 0833032380 9780585425382 9780833030030 9780833032386 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Hosmer, Stephen T. Verfasser aut The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Santa Monica, CA Rand ©2001 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 155 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Online Rand research documents At head of title: Project Air Force. - "Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.". - Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002 Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155) Introduction -- He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule -- He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover -- Concluding Observations This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations Milošević, Slobodan / (1941-2006) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / ((1941- ...) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan / 1941-2006 fast Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd rswk-swf Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram Since 1998 fast Geschichte gnd rswk-swf HISTORY / General bisacsh Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd rswk-swf Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 p Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 s Geschichte z 1\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=63506 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hosmer, Stephen T. The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Milošević, Slobodan / (1941-2006) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / ((1941- ...) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan / 1941-2006 fast Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram HISTORY / General bisacsh Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)119112108 (DE-588)4547508-8 |
| title | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_alt | Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_auth | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_exact_search | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_full | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_fullStr | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_full_unstemmed | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_short | The conflict over Kosovo |
| title_sort | the conflict over kosovo why milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_sub | why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| topic | Milošević, Slobodan / (1941-2006) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / ((1941- ...) ram Milosevic, Slobodan / 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan / 1941-2006 fast Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram HISTORY / General bisacsh Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Milošević, Slobodan / (1941-2006) Milosevic, Slobodan / ((1941- ...) Milosevic, Slobodan / 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan / 1941-2006 Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord HISTORY / General Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) Kosovo-Krieg |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=63506 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hosmerstephent theconflictoverkosovowhymilosevicdecidedtosettlewhenhedid AT hosmerstephent whymilosevicdecidedtosettlewhenhedid |