Robust mechanism design: the role of private information and higher order beliefs
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bergemann, Dirk (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Singapore World Scientific Pub. ©2012
Series:World Scientific series in economic theory v. 2
Subjects:
Online Access:FAW01
FAW02
FLA01
Volltext
Item Description:Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Foreword -- Introduction -- Robust mechanism design -- Ex post implementation -- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms -- Robust implementation in general mechanisms -- The role of the common prior in robust implementation -- An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty -- Robust virtual implementation -- Multidimensional private value auctions -- The robustness of robust implementation -- Rationalizable implementation -- Pricing without priors
This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 452 pages)
ISBN:9789814374583
9789814374590
981437458X
9814374598

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