Deterrence by diplomacy:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
[2005]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Item Description: | Description based on print version record |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (x, 164 pages) illustrations |
| ISBN: | 0691116997 0691134006 1400849446 9780691116990 9780691134000 9781400849444 |
Staff View
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Sartori, Anne E. |d 1966- |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Deterrence by diplomacy |c Anne E. Sartori |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, N.J. |b Princeton University Press |c [2005] | |
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| 500 | |a Description based on print version record | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate -- The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950 -- A reputational theory of diplomacy -- Evidence that honesty matters -- Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy -- The broader importance of reputations for honesty -- Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium -- Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare -- Appendix C : Implications of the theory -- Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy | |
| 505 | 8 | |a "Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic." | |
| 505 | 8 | |a "Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important." | |
| 505 | 8 | |a "Deterrence by Diplomacy departs from traditional deterrence theory also in its implications about how states can increase the credibility of their threats. Traditional theory suggests that by fighting over small issues states can show resolve to fight over large ones. This book, which develops its arguments about effective diplomacy through a game-theoretic argument and tests the resulting implications using statistical analyses, points to an alternative road to credibility: states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing when they do not consider the issues important enough to be worth a fight - in other words, by not crying "wolf.""--BOOK JACKET. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Diplomatieke betrekkingen |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Afschrikking (polemologie) |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Diplomatie | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Dissuasion (Stratégie) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Diplomatie |2 swd | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Abschreckung |2 swd | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Afschrikking (polemologie) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Diplomatieke betrekkingen | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Diplomacy |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Diplomacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) | |
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804175383061331968 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Sartori, Anne E. 1966- |
| author_facet | Sartori, Anne E. 1966- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Sartori, Anne E. 1966- |
| author_variant | a e s ae aes |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043028431 |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate -- The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950 -- A reputational theory of diplomacy -- Evidence that honesty matters -- Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy -- The broader importance of reputations for honesty -- Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium -- Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare -- Appendix C : Implications of the theory -- Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy "Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic." "Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important." "Deterrence by Diplomacy departs from traditional deterrence theory also in its implications about how states can increase the credibility of their threats. Traditional theory suggests that by fighting over small issues states can show resolve to fight over large ones. This book, which develops its arguments about effective diplomacy through a game-theoretic argument and tests the resulting implications using statistical analyses, points to an alternative road to credibility: states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing when they do not consider the issues important enough to be worth a fight - in other words, by not crying "wolf.""--BOOK JACKET. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)861200196 (DE-599)BVBBV043028431 |
| dewey-full | 327.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.2 |
| dewey-search | 327.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.2 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043028431 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:15:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0691116997 0691134006 1400849446 9780691116990 9780691134000 9781400849444 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028453084 |
| oclc_num | 861200196 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
| owner_facet | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
| physical | 1 online resource (x, 164 pages) illustrations |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA ZDB-4-EBA FAW_PDA_EBA |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Sartori, Anne E. 1966- Verfasser aut Deterrence by diplomacy Anne E. Sartori Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press [2005] © 2005 1 online resource (x, 164 pages) illustrations txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on print version record How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate -- The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950 -- A reputational theory of diplomacy -- Evidence that honesty matters -- Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy -- The broader importance of reputations for honesty -- Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium -- Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare -- Appendix C : Implications of the theory -- Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy "Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic." "Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important." "Deterrence by Diplomacy departs from traditional deterrence theory also in its implications about how states can increase the credibility of their threats. Traditional theory suggests that by fighting over small issues states can show resolve to fight over large ones. This book, which develops its arguments about effective diplomacy through a game-theoretic argument and tests the resulting implications using statistical analyses, points to an alternative road to credibility: states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing when they do not consider the issues important enough to be worth a fight - in other words, by not crying "wolf.""--BOOK JACKET. Diplomatieke betrekkingen gtt Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Diplomatie Dissuasion (Stratégie) Diplomatie swd Abschreckung swd Afschrikking (polemologie) Diplomatieke betrekkingen Deterrence (Strategy) fast Diplomacy fast POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy bisacsh Diplomacy Deterrence (Strategy) Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd rswk-swf Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd rswk-swf Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 s Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 s Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 s Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 s 1\p DE-604 Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s 2\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Sartori, Anne E , 1966-. Deterrence by diplomacy http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=644656 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Sartori, Anne E. 1966- Deterrence by diplomacy How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate -- The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950 -- A reputational theory of diplomacy -- Evidence that honesty matters -- Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy -- The broader importance of reputations for honesty -- Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium -- Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare -- Appendix C : Implications of the theory -- Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy "Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic." "Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important." "Deterrence by Diplomacy departs from traditional deterrence theory also in its implications about how states can increase the credibility of their threats. Traditional theory suggests that by fighting over small issues states can show resolve to fight over large ones. This book, which develops its arguments about effective diplomacy through a game-theoretic argument and tests the resulting implications using statistical analyses, points to an alternative road to credibility: states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing when they do not consider the issues important enough to be worth a fight - in other words, by not crying "wolf.""--BOOK JACKET. Diplomatieke betrekkingen gtt Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Diplomatie Dissuasion (Stratégie) Diplomatie swd Abschreckung swd Afschrikking (polemologie) Diplomatieke betrekkingen Deterrence (Strategy) fast Diplomacy fast POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy bisacsh Diplomacy Deterrence (Strategy) Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4012402-2 (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4072885-7 (DE-588)4150704-6 (DE-588)4013585-8 |
| title | Deterrence by diplomacy |
| title_auth | Deterrence by diplomacy |
| title_exact_search | Deterrence by diplomacy |
| title_full | Deterrence by diplomacy Anne E. Sartori |
| title_fullStr | Deterrence by diplomacy Anne E. Sartori |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deterrence by diplomacy Anne E. Sartori |
| title_short | Deterrence by diplomacy |
| title_sort | deterrence by diplomacy |
| topic | Diplomatieke betrekkingen gtt Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Diplomatie Dissuasion (Stratégie) Diplomatie swd Abschreckung swd Afschrikking (polemologie) Diplomatieke betrekkingen Deterrence (Strategy) fast Diplomacy fast POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy bisacsh Diplomacy Deterrence (Strategy) Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd Effizienz (DE-588)4013585-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Diplomatieke betrekkingen Afschrikking (polemologie) Diplomatie Dissuasion (Stratégie) Abschreckung Deterrence (Strategy) Diplomacy POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy Internationale Politik Drohung Effizienz |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=644656 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sartoriannee deterrencebydiplomacy |