Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy:
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Washington, D.C.]
International Monetary Fund
©2013
|
| Series: | IMF working paper
WP/13/37 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Item Description: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 11, 2013). - "Prepared by Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori"--Page 2 of pdf. - "Research Department"--Page 2 of pdf. - "February 2013"--Page 2 of pdf "In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty. The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO"--Abstract Includes bibliographical references Cover; Contents; I. The Model; A. Investors and Brokers; B. The SROs; C. The Timing; D. The Broker-Investor Contract: General Results; II. The Race to the Bottom; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker Problem; C. The SRO Problem and the Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution; III. Fraud and Market Participation; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker's misconduct; C. The SRO Problem and Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution under Incomplete Contracts; Tables; 1. Monopoly vs. Competition; IV. Extension: Sophisticated Investor; A. Homogenous Sophisticated investors; V. Conclusions A. Appendix 1B. Appendix 2; 1. The SROs' Problem; 2. Naive vs Sophisticated; Figures |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (31 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781475583700 1475583702 |
Staff View
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| 500 | |a "In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty. The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO"--Abstract | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Cover; Contents; I. The Model; A. Investors and Brokers; B. The SROs; C. The Timing; D. The Broker-Investor Contract: General Results; II. The Race to the Bottom; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker Problem; C. The SRO Problem and the Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution; III. Fraud and Market Participation; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker's misconduct; C. The SRO Problem and Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution under Incomplete Contracts; Tables; 1. Monopoly vs. Competition; IV. Extension: Sophisticated Investor; A. Homogenous Sophisticated investors; V. Conclusions | ||
| 500 | |a A. Appendix 1B. Appendix 2; 1. The SROs' Problem; 2. Naive vs Sophisticated; Figures | ||
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:13:51Z |
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| language | English |
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| publisher | International Monetary Fund |
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| spelling | Caglio, Cecilia Verfasser aut Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori [Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund ©2013 1 Online-Ressource (31 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF working paper WP/13/37 Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 11, 2013). - "Prepared by Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori"--Page 2 of pdf. - "Research Department"--Page 2 of pdf. - "February 2013"--Page 2 of pdf "In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty. The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO"--Abstract Includes bibliographical references Cover; Contents; I. The Model; A. Investors and Brokers; B. The SROs; C. The Timing; D. The Broker-Investor Contract: General Results; II. The Race to the Bottom; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker Problem; C. The SRO Problem and the Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution; III. Fraud and Market Participation; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker's misconduct; C. The SRO Problem and Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution under Incomplete Contracts; Tables; 1. Monopoly vs. Competition; IV. Extension: Sophisticated Investor; A. Homogenous Sophisticated investors; V. Conclusions A. Appendix 1B. Appendix 2; 1. The SROs' Problem; 2. Naive vs Sophisticated; Figures BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Investments & Securities / General bisacsh Stock exchanges / Econometric models fast Stock exchanges / Management fast Wirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Stock exchanges Econometric models Stock exchanges Management Pescatori, Andrea Sonstige oth International Monetary Fund Research Department Sonstige oth http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=548054 Aggregator Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Caglio, Cecilia Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Investments & Securities / General bisacsh Stock exchanges / Econometric models fast Stock exchanges / Management fast Wirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Stock exchanges Econometric models Stock exchanges Management |
| title | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy |
| title_auth | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy |
| title_exact_search | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy |
| title_full | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori |
| title_fullStr | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori |
| title_short | Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy |
| title_sort | competition among exchanges and enforcement policy |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Investments & Securities / General bisacsh Stock exchanges / Econometric models fast Stock exchanges / Management fast Wirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Stock exchanges Econometric models Stock exchanges Management |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Investments & Securities / General Stock exchanges / Econometric models Stock exchanges / Management Wirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Stock exchanges Econometric models Stock exchanges Management |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=548054 |
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