Common value auctions and the winner's curse - Kagel, John H., (John Henry) (Princeton University Press, 2002)
Includes bibliographical references and index
Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- - First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" - John H. Kagel [and others] -- - Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- - Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad -- - Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study - John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin -- - Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions - Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard -- - Common value auctions with insider information - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- - Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? - Colin Campbell, Dan Levin -- - Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation - Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel -- - Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations - Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel -- - Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions - John H. Kagel -- - Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis - Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- - Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse - Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su