Size matters: "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed to explain this stylized fact, most of them focussing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows that ove...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
CESifo
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper
5154 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed to explain this stylized fact, most of them focussing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows that overinvestments are not necessarily the (negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers, but instead might be a second-best optimal response if the scope of court-enforceable contracts is limited. In such an environment a firm has to rely on relational contracts in order to manage the agency relationship with its workforce. The paper shows that investments into physical productive assets enhance the enforceability of relational contracts and hence investments optimally are "too high". |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (34 S.) graph. Darst. |
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| 520 | 1 | |a The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed to explain this stylized fact, most of them focussing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows that overinvestments are not necessarily the (negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers, but instead might be a second-best optimal response if the scope of court-enforceable contracts is limited. In such an environment a firm has to rely on relational contracts in order to manage the agency relationship with its workforce. The paper shows that investments into physical productive assets enhance the enforceability of relational contracts and hence investments optimally are "too high". | |
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| spelling | Englmaier, Florian 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)1043469893 aut Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting Florian Englmaier ; Matthias Fahn München CESifo 2015 1 Online-Ressource (34 S.) graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier CESifo working paper 5154 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed to explain this stylized fact, most of them focussing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows that overinvestments are not necessarily the (negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers, but instead might be a second-best optimal response if the scope of court-enforceable contracts is limited. In such an environment a firm has to rely on relational contracts in order to manage the agency relationship with its workforce. The paper shows that investments into physical productive assets enhance the enforceability of relational contracts and hence investments optimally are "too high". Fahn, Matthias Verfasser (DE-588)1018905995 aut CESifo working paper 5154 : Category 12, Empirical and theoretical methods (DE-604)BV014083264 5154 https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5154.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Englmaier, Florian 1974- Fahn, Matthias Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting CESifo working paper |
| title | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting |
| title_auth | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting |
| title_exact_search | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting |
| title_full | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting Florian Englmaier ; Matthias Fahn |
| title_fullStr | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting Florian Englmaier ; Matthias Fahn |
| title_full_unstemmed | Size matters "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting Florian Englmaier ; Matthias Fahn |
| title_short | Size matters |
| title_sort | size matters over investments in a relational contracting setting |
| title_sub | "Over" investments in a relational contracting setting |
| url | https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5154.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV014083264 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT englmaierflorian sizemattersoverinvestmentsinarelationalcontractingsetting AT fahnmatthias sizemattersoverinvestmentsinarelationalcontractingsetting |