Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects - Thamm, Christian (Peter Lang GmbH, 2013)
Includes bibliographical references
This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany
Cover; Preface; Acknowledgements; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; List of Symbols; I. Introduction; I.1. Preface; I.2. Definition of Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance; I.3. Theoretical Framework; I.4. Research on Shareholder Activism in Germany; I.5. Research on Shareholder Activism in the U.S.; I.6. Development of Hypotheses; I.7. Remarks on the Collection of Data; I.8. Presentation of Studies and Contribution to Literature; I.8.1. First study: Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review
I.8.2. Second Study: Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German AufsichtsratI. 8.3. Third Study: Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; II. Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review; Abstract; II. 1. Introduction; II. 2. Literature Overview; II. 3. Data Collection; II. 4. Descriptive Statistics: Target Firm, Stake Size and Activist Shareholders; II. 5. Shareholder Activism and its Effects; II. 6. Summary of Results; III. Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German Aufsichtsrat; Abstract; III. 1. Introduction
III. 2. Three Cases of Shareholder ActivismIII. 3. Literature Background, Corporate Governance Framework and Research Hypotheses; III. 4. Data and Methodology; III. 5. Results; III. 5.1. Announcement Effects; III. 5.2. NewBET Analysis; III. 5.3. Determinants of Abnormal Returns; III. 6. Conclusion; IV. Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; Abstract; IV. 1. Introduction; IV. 2. German Supervisory Board and U.S. Board of Directors; IV. 3. Transaction Partners; IV. 4. Investment by Cevian Capital and Takeover by Terex Corporation