Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
[1988]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation that they create, and the nature of the candidates--centrist or extremist--whom they advantage. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of historical elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives.Alternative procedures abound: the single-vote plurality method, ubiquitous in the United States, Canada, and Britain; runoff, used in certain primaries; the Borda count, based on rank scores submitted by each voter; approval voting, which permits each voter to support several candidates equally; and the Hare system of successive eliminations, to name a few. This work concludes that single-vote plurality is most often at odds with the majoritarian principle of Condorcet. Those methods most likely to choose the Condorcet candidate under sincere voting are generally the most vulnerable to manipulation. Approval voting and the Hare and runoff methods emerge from the analyses as the most reliable.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (176p.) |
| ISBN: | 9781400859504 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400859504 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV042523729 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20210426 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 150423s1988 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781400859504 |9 978-1-4008-5950-4 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1515/9781400859504 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)801245810 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV042523729 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-859 |a DE-860 |a DE-473 |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-739 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1043 |a DE-858 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 328/.3347 |2 23 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Merrill, Samuel |d 1939- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)170205185 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic |c Samuel Merrill |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, N.J. |b Princeton University Press |c [1988] | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (176p.) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation that they create, and the nature of the candidates--centrist or extremist--whom they advantage. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of historical elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives.Alternative procedures abound: the single-vote plurality method, ubiquitous in the United States, Canada, and Britain; runoff, used in certain primaries; the Borda count, based on rank scores submitted by each voter; approval voting, which permits each voter to support several candidates equally; and the Hare system of successive eliminations, to name a few. This work concludes that single-vote plurality is most often at odds with the majoritarian principle of Condorcet. Those methods most likely to choose the Condorcet candidate under sincere voting are generally the most vulnerable to manipulation. Approval voting and the Hare and runoff methods emerge from the analyses as the most reliable.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 | ||
| 546 | |a In English | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Voting / Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politische Wissenschaft | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Theorie |0 (DE-588)4059787-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wahlsystem |0 (DE-588)4139210-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kandidatenaufstellung |0 (DE-588)4163188-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Wahlsystem |0 (DE-588)4139210-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Theorie |0 (DE-588)4059787-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Kandidatenaufstellung |0 (DE-588)4163188-2 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Wahlsystem |0 (DE-588)4139210-3 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504 |x Verlag |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-23-DGG | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027958068 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FAB01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FAW01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FAW_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FCO01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FCO_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FHA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FHA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FKE01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FKE_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l FLA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FLA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l UBG01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UBG_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy |l UPA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UPA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804153277788454912 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Merrill, Samuel 1939- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170205185 |
| author_facet | Merrill, Samuel 1939- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Merrill, Samuel 1939- |
| author_variant | s m sm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042523729 |
| collection | ZDB-23-DGG |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)801245810 (DE-599)BVBBV042523729 |
| dewey-full | 328/.3347 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 328 - The legislative process |
| dewey-raw | 328/.3347 |
| dewey-search | 328/.3347 |
| dewey-sort | 3328 43347 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1515/9781400859504 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04839nmm a2200637zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV042523729</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210426 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">150423s1988 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781400859504</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4008-5950-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1515/9781400859504</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)801245810</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV042523729</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">328/.3347</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Merrill, Samuel</subfield><subfield code="d">1939-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170205185</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic</subfield><subfield code="c">Samuel Merrill</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Princeton, N.J.</subfield><subfield code="b">Princeton University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[1988]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (176p.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation that they create, and the nature of the candidates--centrist or extremist--whom they advantage. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of historical elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives.Alternative procedures abound: the single-vote plurality method, ubiquitous in the United States, Canada, and Britain; runoff, used in certain primaries; the Borda count, based on rank scores submitted by each voter; approval voting, which permits each voter to support several candidates equally; and the Hare system of successive eliminations, to name a few. This work concludes that single-vote plurality is most often at odds with the majoritarian principle of Condorcet. Those methods most likely to choose the Condorcet candidate under sincere voting are generally the most vulnerable to manipulation. Approval voting and the Hare and runoff methods emerge from the analyses as the most reliable.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In English</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Politik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Voting / Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Politische Wissenschaft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4059787-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wahlsystem</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139210-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kandidatenaufstellung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4163188-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wahlsystem</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139210-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4059787-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Kandidatenaufstellung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4163188-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wahlsystem</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139210-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027958068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FAB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FAW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FAW_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FCO01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FCO_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FHA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FHA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FKE01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FKE_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">FLA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FLA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">UPA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UPA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV042523729 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:24:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400859504 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027958068 |
| oclc_num | 801245810 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-Aug4 DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| owner_facet | DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-Aug4 DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (176p.) |
| psigel | ZDB-23-DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAW_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FCO_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FHA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FKE_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FLA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UBG_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UPA_PDA_DGG |
| publishDate | 1988 |
| publishDateSearch | 1988 |
| publishDateSort | 1988 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Merrill, Samuel 1939- Verfasser (DE-588)170205185 aut Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Samuel Merrill Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press [1988] 1 Online-Ressource (176p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation that they create, and the nature of the candidates--centrist or extremist--whom they advantage. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of historical elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives.Alternative procedures abound: the single-vote plurality method, ubiquitous in the United States, Canada, and Britain; runoff, used in certain primaries; the Borda count, based on rank scores submitted by each voter; approval voting, which permits each voter to support several candidates equally; and the Hare system of successive eliminations, to name a few. This work concludes that single-vote plurality is most often at odds with the majoritarian principle of Condorcet. Those methods most likely to choose the Condorcet candidate under sincere voting are generally the most vulnerable to manipulation. Approval voting and the Hare and runoff methods emerge from the analyses as the most reliable.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 In English Politik Voting / Mathematical models Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch bisacsh Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd rswk-swf Kandidatenaufstellung (DE-588)4163188-2 gnd rswk-swf Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s 1\p DE-604 Kandidatenaufstellung (DE-588)4163188-2 s 2\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Merrill, Samuel 1939- Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Politik Voting / Mathematical models Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch bisacsh Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd Kandidatenaufstellung (DE-588)4163188-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4139210-3 (DE-588)4163188-2 |
| title | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic |
| title_auth | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic |
| title_exact_search | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic |
| title_full | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Samuel Merrill |
| title_fullStr | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Samuel Merrill |
| title_full_unstemmed | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Samuel Merrill |
| title_short | Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic |
| title_sort | making multicandidate elections more democratic |
| topic | Politik Voting / Mathematical models Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch bisacsh Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd Kandidatenaufstellung (DE-588)4163188-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politik Voting / Mathematical models Political science / Decision making / Mathematical models Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Theorie Wahlsystem Kandidatenaufstellung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400859504 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT merrillsamuel makingmulticandidateelectionsmoredemocratic |