From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin
WZB
2013
|
| Series: | Discussion paper
|
| Online Access: | Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787 |
| Summary: | We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (71 S.) graph. Darst. |
Staff View
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV042393666 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20150309 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 150305s2013 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)915583612 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV749492635 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-188 | ||
| 088 | |a SP II 2013 205 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Chen, Yan |d 1964- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)171354311 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance |b theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |c Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten |
| 264 | 1 | |a Berlin |b WZB |c 2013 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (71 S.) |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Discussion paper | |
| 520 | 8 | |a We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kesten, Onur |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-205.pdf |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | |u http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787 |x Langzeitarchivierung | |
| 912 | |a ebook | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027829499 | ||
Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804153044358660096 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Chen, Yan 1964- Kesten, Onur |
| author_GND | (DE-588)171354311 |
| author_facet | Chen, Yan 1964- Kesten, Onur |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Chen, Yan 1964- |
| author_variant | y c yc o k ok |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042393666 |
| collection | ebook |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)915583612 (DE-599)GBV749492635 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02036nmm a2200325 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV042393666</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20150309 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">150305s2013 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)915583612</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV749492635</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="088" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SP II 2013 205</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chen, Yan</subfield><subfield code="d">1964-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)171354311</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance</subfield><subfield code="b">theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms</subfield><subfield code="c">Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Berlin</subfield><subfield code="b">WZB</subfield><subfield code="c">2013</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (71 S.)</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Discussion paper</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kesten, Onur</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-205.pdf</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787</subfield><subfield code="x">Langzeitarchivierung</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebook</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027829499</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV042393666 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:20:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027829499 |
| oclc_num | 915583612 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-188 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (71 S.) graph. Darst. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | WZB |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Discussion paper |
| spelling | Chen, Yan 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)171354311 aut From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten Berlin WZB 2013 1 Online-Ressource (71 S.) graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. Kesten, Onur Verfasser aut http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-205.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787 Langzeitarchivierung |
| spellingShingle | Chen, Yan 1964- Kesten, Onur From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| title | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| title_auth | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| title_exact_search | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| title_full | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten |
| title_fullStr | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten |
| title_full_unstemmed | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Yan Chen ; Onur Kesten |
| title_short | From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance |
| title_sort | from boston to chinese parallel to deferred acceptance theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| title_sub | theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms |
| url | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-205.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chenyan frombostontochineseparalleltodeferredacceptancetheoryandexperimentsonafamilyofschoolchoicemechanisms AT kestenonur frombostontochineseparalleltodeferredacceptancetheoryandexperimentsonafamilyofschoolchoicemechanisms |