Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal?:
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hess, Markus Patrick (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin De Gruyter 2010
Series:Epistemische Studien 17
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-706
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Item Description:Description based upon print version of record
Main description: This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (165 S.)
ISBN:9783110329384
9783110329551
9783110329568
DOI:10.1515/9783110329551

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