E-Physicalism: A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo J. (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin De Gruyter 2012
Series:Phenomenology & Mind 14
Subjects:
Online Access:DE-706
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Item Description:Description based upon print version of record
Main description: This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels "e-physicalism". Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the "explanatory gap" is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the "zombie argument" and the "supervenience argument" within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the "knowledge argument"
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (216 S.)
ISBN:9783110324990
9783110325560
9783110325577
DOI:10.1515/9783110325560

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