Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
Harvard University Press
[2013]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Tanney challenges not only the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for fifty years, but metaphysical-empirical approaches to the mind in general. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge advocates a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in "thick" descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (384p.) |
| ISBN: | 9780674067837 |
| DOI: | 10.4159/harvard.9780674067837 |
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| spelling | Tanney, Julia Verfasser aut Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge Julia Tanney Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press [2013] 1 Online-Ressource (384p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Tanney challenges not only the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for fifty years, but metaphysical-empirical approaches to the mind in general. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge advocates a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in "thick" descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home In English PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Essays bisacsh Philosophie Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 s Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s 2\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674067837 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tanney, Julia Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Essays bisacsh Philosophie Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
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| title | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_auth | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_exact_search | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_full | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge Julia Tanney |
| title_fullStr | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge Julia Tanney |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge Julia Tanney |
| title_short | Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge |
| title_sort | rules reason and self knowledge |
| topic | PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / Essays bisacsh Philosophie Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body PHILOSOPHY / Essays Philosophie Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Kognitionswissenschaft Philosophy of Mind Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674067837 |
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