The logical must: Wittgenstein on logic
"The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigati...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford Univ. Press
2014
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | "The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigation of the world with ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from there to empirical generalizations, then to deliberate experimentation, and eventually to theory formation and confirmation. She takes this same approach to logical truth, locating its ground in simple worldly structures and our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive machinery, tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect those structures where they occur. In his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle".. |
Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
Beschreibung: | X, 135 S. |
ISBN: | 9780199391752 |
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520 | |a "The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigation of the world with ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from there to empirical generalizations, then to deliberate experimentation, and eventually to theory formation and confirmation. She takes this same approach to logical truth, locating its ground in simple worldly structures and our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive machinery, tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect those structures where they occur. In his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle".. | ||
600 | 1 | 4 | |a Wittgenstein, Ludwig, |d 1889-1951 |
600 | 1 | 4 | |a Kant, Immanuel, |d 1724-1804 |
600 | 1 | 7 | |a Wittgenstein, Ludwig |d 1889-1951 |0 (DE-588)118634313 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 4 | |a Logic | |
650 | 4 | |a Naturalism | |
650 | 4 | |a PHILOSOPHY / Logic | |
650 | 4 | |a PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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---|---|
adam_text | THELOGICALMUST
Wittgenstein on Logic
Penelope Maddy
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Introduction 1
1 Kant on Logic 5
2 Naturalizing Kant on Logic 15
3 The Tractatus 37
4 Naturalizing the Tractatus 49
5 Rule-Following and Logic 63
6 But Isn t Logic Special?! 81
7 Naturalizing the Logical Must 101
Conclusion 123
References 127
Index 133
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Maddy, Penelope 1950- |
author_GND | (DE-588)172245389 |
author_facet | Maddy, Penelope 1950- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Maddy, Penelope 1950- |
author_variant | p m pm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV042114361 |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-label | B3376 |
callnumber-raw | B3376.W564 |
callnumber-search | B3376.W564 |
callnumber-sort | B 43376 W564 |
callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
classification_rvk | CI 5017 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)896748957 (DE-599)BVBBV042114361 |
dewey-full | 160.92 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 160 - Philosophical logic |
dewey-raw | 160.92 |
dewey-search | 160.92 |
dewey-sort | 3160.92 |
dewey-tens | 160 - Philosophical logic |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV042114361 |
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indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:13:04Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780199391752 |
language | English |
lccn | 014003096 |
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physical | X, 135 S. |
publishDate | 2014 |
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publishDateSort | 2014 |
publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
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spelling | Maddy, Penelope 1950- Verfasser (DE-588)172245389 aut The logical must Wittgenstein on logic Penelope Maddy New York Oxford Univ. Press 2014 X, 135 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index "The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigation of the world with ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from there to empirical generalizations, then to deliberate experimentation, and eventually to theory formation and confirmation. She takes this same approach to logical truth, locating its ground in simple worldly structures and our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive machinery, tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect those structures where they occur. In his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle".. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 (DE-588)118634313 gnd rswk-swf PHILOSOPHY / Logic bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Logic Naturalism PHILOSOPHY / Logic PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd rswk-swf Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 (DE-588)118634313 p Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 s DE-604 HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027554732&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Maddy, Penelope 1950- The logical must Wittgenstein on logic Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 (DE-588)118634313 gnd PHILOSOPHY / Logic bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Logic Naturalism PHILOSOPHY / Logic PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)118634313 (DE-588)4036202-4 |
title | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic |
title_auth | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic |
title_exact_search | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic |
title_full | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic Penelope Maddy |
title_fullStr | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic Penelope Maddy |
title_full_unstemmed | The logical must Wittgenstein on logic Penelope Maddy |
title_short | The logical must |
title_sort | the logical must wittgenstein on logic |
title_sub | Wittgenstein on logic |
topic | Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 (DE-588)118634313 gnd PHILOSOPHY / Logic bisacsh PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Logic Naturalism PHILOSOPHY / Logic PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 PHILOSOPHY / Logic PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern Logic Naturalism Logik |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027554732&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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