Saddam Hussein's nuclear vision an atomic shield and sword for conquest - Cigar, Norman L. 1948- (Marine Corps Univ. Press, 2011)
"June 2011."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-87)
Introduction. The terms of reference -- Saddam Hussein's nuclear vision. The historical database -- Nuclear weapons and the threat environment -- Saddam and Iraq's enemies -- Iran -- Israel -- Did the Osirak airstrike trigger the military nuclear program? -- The United States as a threat? -- Nuclear weapons as a legitimizing vehicle -- Reaching the domestic audience -- Iraq's military -- The Ba'ath Party -- Iraq's scientists -- Iraq's public and students -- Nuclear weapons and the defense of the Arab nation -- Nuclear weapons and modernity -- To hide or reveal? -- Were there any skeptics? -- Iraqi perspectives on nuclear deterrence -- Contrasting western academic frameworks -- What is nuclear deterrence : the Iraqi view -- Would deterrence of Saddam have worked? -- Saddam's brinksmanship -- Deterring the United States -- Saddam's attempts at deterrence -- A more aggressive Iraqi perspective : "offensive deterrence" -- Offensive deterrence and changing the status quo --
Wielding political clout through offensive deterrence -- Changing the balance of power -- The potential impact of aggressive deterrence -- Nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool -- The linkage between deterrence and warfighting -- Iraq's concept of nuclear war -- Iraq doctrine -- Doomsday weapons or warfighting tool? -- Saddam's mirror imaging of adversaries -- The combat use of nuclear weapons : how likely? -- Saddam as decision maker -- Saddam's calculus -- The size of the arsenal : how much is enough? -- Goals and possibilities -- Numerical parity does not matter : Iraq's assessment of other cases -- Delivery and credibility -- A maturing of Iraq's perspective? -- Maturation and the superpowers -- Iraqi thinking : a different trajectory? Preparing to be a nuclear power -- Waiting for nuclear weapons : Iraq's window of vulnerability -- Creating a nuclear-free zone -- Interim WMD : binary chemical weapons -- No substitute for nuclear weapons --
Would Saddam have revived the nuclear program? -- Conclusions. Avoiding mirror-imaging : leadership matters -- Nuclear deterrence may be uncertain and unstable -- Nuclear warfighting may be an option --Even smaller nuclear arsenals can be destabilizing -- Modifying the threat environment can help