Vreme netrpeljivih: politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Published: |
Beograd
Zavod za Udžbenike
2012
|
| Edition: | 1. izd. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Abstract Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Physical Description: | 936 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9788617177797 |
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Record in the Search Index
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| adam_text | SUMMARY
О
ur intention
has been to examine the funda¬
mental political phenomena in European his¬
tory between the World Wars as they appeared in the largest states.
This limited goal was set up for one reason only: the cultivation of po¬
litical life on the whole Continent (i.e. taking the small states into ac¬
count as well) was exceeding our present possibilities and powers.
It was further necessary to limit our goal from the very beginning,
QOO
because we do not examine this political phenomenon in its narrow
and isolated meaning, but rather see it connected with the general
economic, social and cultural state of affairs. Since we were deal¬
ing with an exceptionally rich period of history and since our book
could not be any longer than it already was, we have limited our¬
selves only to the most characteristic traits. Our point of view is that
the realm of artistic creation was most prominent among the non-
political areas of social life (taken in its narrower sense, of course),
contrary to goals best embodied in fascism and
nazism
that every¬
thing, man and society, should fall under the strict control of political
authority. For that reason, we have devoted special attention to artis¬
tic movements. On the other hand, we were obliged to neglect the
connections that existed between the metropolis and their colonies,
although they were of great importance for the contemporary life,
not only in Great Britain, but also in France and Italy
τ:
lhe
period
between the two World Wars was
heterogeneous and teeming with occurrenc¬
es, events, personalities, processes and facts, but nevertheless,
it appears that it belonged predominantly to authoritarian nation¬
alism. This phenomenon, personified by Adolf Hitler and
Benito
Mussolini, came into existence and prospered between
1919
and
1939,
only to be brought down in the period between
1939
and
1945.
Although its significance was fleeting and it did not survive
a mere quarter of a century, it had a great influence in the two dec¬
ades between the Wars. It imposed itself upon the scene, display¬
ing aggressive advances and intolerant attitudes, and appeared
to have expansionist tendencies. The perpetrators of this move¬
ment had promised the world in word and deed an authoritarian
state that knew how to rule both individuals and society. However,
precisely this was the reason that it aroused powerful resistance.
Both its activity and the resistance it provoked were the reason 833
it found itself pushed, so to speak, at the heart of the historical
movements of the Europe of that time. Of course, the main ques¬
tion of the whole contemporary history arises from the communist
activity and the formation of the socialist states, but the authoritar¬
ian nationalism had a central role during the
1920s
and
1930s
by
sheer force of its aggression,
ecause
of the prominent presence of authori¬
tarian nationalism in the political history of
Europe of that time, our book deals predominantly with this as¬
pect. However, we were inclined to think that things would be
oversimplified and even incomplete, and that the picture would
be erroneous if the parliamentary and socialist antithesis were not
depicted in detail, if we did not see this phenomenon as a part of
the whole spectrum of political phenomena. That is why we have
в
elaborated meticulously the other two political models in order to
adequately discuss other fundamental, new movements in ideol¬
ogy and political theory. Taking into the account the fact that the
fascist displayed ultimate intolerance towards all nations both in
domestic and foreign politics, we presume that the term the in¬
tolerant ones would be descriptive and characteristic enough to
be applied to them. Hence, the name of this book. The title The
Ћте
of the Intolerant Ones is meant to show our view that, as the
historical phenomenon, this authoritarian movement was central
to the political life of the old Continent in the course of those two
and a half decades. However, this does not mean either that it was
the only phenomenon, or that it was essentially a historical phe¬
nomenon that would have a lasting importance. The intolerant
ones were only those who were the most conspicuous and the
most vociferous between
1919
and
1939.
834
Ţ
The true boundary that divides the 19th from
1
1
the 20th century, or rather, separates these two
historical periods, consists of a string of important events between
1912-1920,
i.e. from the First Balkan War to the drawing up of the
peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states. There
are three basic mainstays: the First World War, the Russian and
German revolutions and the peace conference, but we believe that
the most important of all was the Russian revolution of
1917.
The
seizing of the power by the Bolsheviks in November of
1917
ush¬
ered the age of socialism, but it also clearly put on the agenda the
basic political question of the contemporary world
-
the relation
between the capitalism and socialism. The period that followed
had all the characteristics of a separate historical era which distin¬
guished itself clearly from the previous periods:
1)
four empires
had gone under, three of them (the Russian, the
Habsburg
and the
Ottoman)
had lasted for several centuries, while the fourth, the Ger¬
man, although only a few decades long, had managed to attain a
great influence;
2)
the first socialist state in history had emerged in
Europe;
3)
the question of socialism and capitalism had become
central and, in contrast with the 19th century was transformed into
an international one, the one that indisputably marked the begin¬
ning of a new era;
4)
socialism became the political, economic,
social and administrative reality of an actual state, i.e. it ceased to
be only a powerful socio-political revolutionary movement of the
opposition;
5)
the First World War brought about such unforeseen
pressure on the psychology of contemporary man that it was re¬
flected to a great, or even more, to a crucial degree in notions of
political ideals, in the general outlook on man and life, in the way
the arts were understood and even in actual works of art;
6)
inde¬
pendently of all this, the role of the state had inevitably increased,
which was reflected in the strengthening of its authority in internal
and foreign politics;
7)
in Europe, a new system of international
relations had grown up, in which Great Britain and France played
the major role during the first period, while in the following period,
the Italians and the Germans became equally powerful, but as
their competitors; at the same time, the Soviet Republic was con¬
tinually gaining strength, achieved acceptance into the interna¬
tional community and cleared the path towards becoming a great
power in European and world politics; simultaneously with these
processes, the shadow of the power of the USA had started to
loom discretely, but nevertheless more and more perceptibly over
Europe;
8)
a few totalitarian states with fascist and national-social¬
ist ideologies were formed and developed at that time, which was
something that represented a special peculiarity of the whole pe¬
riod;
9)
the sciences had brought about numerous exciting new
results in the first half of the 19th century, only now the goals of
research in the world began in greater extent to serve the nar¬
rowest political interests, and in the Second World War they were
to become an exceptionally important weapon in the bitter battle
of opponents;
10)
the arts, more self-conscious than ever before,
made an effort to create their own world consisting exclusively of
forms and colours. The Second World War closed this period; it
was basically its outcome. During the armed conflict from
1939
to
1945,
the historic unravelling of a series of particular contradic¬
tions took place, the contradictions that had accumulated in the
1920s
and
1930s
and were especially prominent in international
relations. That meant, on one hand, the final destruction of the two
most important national-socialist authoritarian states in Germany
and Italy, and on the other hand, the final acceptance of the Soviet
Union, both as a member of the international community enjoying
equal rights and as a great power.
It appears that the basic question of Euro¬
pean history in the 20th century, and particu¬
larly of the period between
1919
and
1939,
was predominantly of
a political character, in the narrow sense of the word. The man¬
kind had organized gigantic productive forces, accumulated a
huge quantity of knowledge and created an enormous material
wealth. The man had qualified himself to successfully solve the
problems of his living conditions, changing or even enriching his
natural surroundings as he pleased, he had learned, or simply
accepted that everyone was entitled to his own religious beliefs,
but he had obviously not solved the problem of government, a
recurring problem with particular regard to the relations between
politics and humanity. Moreover, it seemed as if all the relevant
experience from the previous centuries had been destroyed and,
II
all of a sudden, the man was forced to twirl around in a whirlpool
of questions regarding the state that he wished or should create,
incessantly trying to establish a new relation between people and
official power. In this manner the story that the pages of our book
tell of history resembles a very special continuation of a dispute
once begun by Socrates and the people of Piraeus in Plato s Re¬
public. The 20s and the 30s of this century showed how distant
the mankind was from Aristotle s state which is the best of all for
those who are able to live according to their own will , but also
how relevant the philosopher s desire to invent or create such a
state had become. At the same time, the apparent problem, of
which even the wise Aristotle had not been aware, was posed
when he contradicted himself by saying that such a state should
be aspired to, although he had declared previously that, neverthe¬
less, it was more important than the individual ; and to what ex¬
tent the need for harmonizing humanitarianism with the general
good was lost from sight in the 20s and the 30s, a need pointed
out by the thoughtful and experienced Raphael Hythloday in the
course of the dispute at the Archbishop of Canterbury s table, in
More s
Utopia,
lhe
twenties started in the spirit of the final
twilight of monarchism and the dawn of mass
revolutionary movements, but also with the notion of the neces¬
sity of creating an alliance with other states and the aspiration
towards a general and lasting peace. However, their later devel¬
opment took a completely different turn. Instead of extended free¬
dom, new tyrannies arose with the intention to ensure the future for
themselves, to establish themselves. Different ideologies clashed
with the same force with which different religions once had bat¬
tled one another. People became too easily willing to arrest and
τ:
III
kill everyone who dared to have different political opinion. Pris¬
ons, the invention of earlier centuries, became too crowded, and
concentration camps
-
the tragic and disgraceful discovery of the
period between the two wars
-
began to shoot up. The intoler¬
ant ones imposed their behaviour on the history of that time and
the spectre of despotism managed to cast its shadow over the
Continent. At the same time, death started to take its toll in great
numbers, and, in the end, the world was lost in the great coma of
war, One would rarely find now the house of Polemarchus, where
Socrates so wisely, learnedly and patiently held his discussions
about the state. Dialogue was mostly replaced by violence, and in
those rare occasions when the dialogue even was initiated, it was
merely an embittered ideological clash of the deaf.
After these crucial years, the political face
of Europe looked completely different than
838
it had been before the summer of
1914.
These changes were to a
certain degree the result of decisions made at the front, but mostly
they were the fruit of huge internal movements within several states,
particularly in the empires, which triggered those extremely pow¬
erful events that found its expression in social and national revolu¬
tions that took place between
1917
and
1919,
or in a few cases, in
violent internal political or armed conflicts. The greatest political
changes occurred mostly in those countries where the afore men¬
tioned processes had taken place, the breaking up of states and the
retreat to new borders, as well as the changes in the form of gov¬
ernment. In one specific case, in Russia, there were even changes
in social structure, leading to the fall of the dynasty that had reigned
for many centuries and to the ascent to power of the downtrodden
and persecuted movements which had, up to that moment, lived
only in the hearts of the people, far from the power of the state.
R
:
egarding the form of social structure, repub-
.lics were spreading all over Europe in the
years between
1917
and
1932.
In all new, independent states of
North-Western and Central Europe (Finland, Estonia,
Letonia,
Lithuania, Poland Czechoslovakia and Ireland), republican form
of government was adopted, while Germany, Austria and Turkey
replaced their constitutional monarchies with republican ones.
France, Switzerland and Portugal had already become republics
before the First World War. Spain became republic in
1911,
but
after that, returned to being a monarchy and did not re-establish
republic until
1931.
In compliance with socialist ideas, the Soviet
Union became republic as a result of the Revolution of
1917.
The
dwarf state of San Marino was also a republic. In Hungary, the re¬
public was voted in November
1918,
but as the socialist revolution
had failed, the country received a special kind of regency rule.
Greece was also a republic for a short period of time. In the 30s,
there were fifteen republics in Europe, i.e. almost half of all the
existing states, but if we choose to exclude the dwarf states, then
there was an equal number of republics and monarchies. Three
of the five Great Powers (France, Germany, and the Soviet Union)
were republics. The Republic of Czechoslovakia, which was a
state of a medium size, was one of the leading European states in
economy. It is obvious that the situation had radically changed from
the end of the 19th century when France was the only state with a
republican government. Moreover, the rulers in the monarchies of
Western Europe and Scandinavia were no longer in the position to
be the uncontrolled managers of politics and even less the mas¬
ters of their people. The management of the state was transferred
to the government which, as stated in constitutions, was accounta¬
ble to parliament, political life was led by political parties, the laws
regulated the rights and the duties of citizens and the monarchs
remained only as the incarnation of the state. The king of Italy had
to yield all his real power to the dictator from the masses. Only the
monarchs in South-Eastern Europe continued to rule with greater
authority, and the Yugoslav king even decided to resort to personal
dictatorship at the beginning of
1929.
In Greece, however, the roy¬
als were always in the shadow of the military forces.
rjlhere were three other facts that determined
-L the political picture of Europe. Firstly, the
political, economic and demographic centre of the first socialist
country was situated on this continent, so that the eastern border
of Scandinavia, Central and South-Eastern Europe was also the
border between the capitalist world and socialism. Secondly, the
states in the capitalist world, regardless of their form or structure,
could be divided into two groups: those with a parliamentary de-
mocracy
and those having one of the forms of dictatorship charac¬
teristic for the world
ofthat
time. The only countries that had a full
parliamentary democracy were Great Britain, France, the three
countries that formed Benelux, Czechoslovakia and the Scandina¬
vian monarchies, while Italy had one only until
1922,
Germany un¬
til
1933
and Spain as well till the end of the Civil War of
1939.
The
difference in power between the victorious and defeated states in
the First World War was somehow never overcome.
During the period between the two wars,
we can discern three particular, distinct
and powerful phenomena. They were manifested through three
political convictions, which not only were very different, but also
in total opposition to one another. It is easily noticeable that each
of these convictions has its own basic concept by which it deter¬
mines itself and on the basis of which it defines negatively the
IV
a:
other two, which are always looked upon as hostile. According
to one of them, the basic concept was the constitution, and the
followers of other convictions were labeled as the enemies of the
constitution , according to the second, the basic concept was the
class, so the other political factors were the class enemy , the
third conviction placed the nation in the centre and all the oth¬
ers outside its borders were called the enemies of the nation .
The first conviction had found its own type of political system in a
parliamentary state, the second in a dictatorship of the proletariat,
and the third one in a totalitarian regime. This raises the debate
around three mutually different and opposing political forms: lib¬
eralism, communism and authoritarian nationalism.
11
three convictions invoked the people and
.stated they were carrying out their real inter¬
ests and speaking trustworthily in their name. By declaring this,
they showed their historical and political origins, since they sprung 841
from the phenomena that arose in the century following the great
French Revolution, their roots were in bourgeois democracy, so¬
cialism and nationalism. However, the meaning of the word peo¬
ple was different in each of them. The first one understood the
word people as all social classes, except for the born aristocrats,
in the second, the people were basically the exploited classes,
while the third meant all those that belonged to the same race.
In the years between
1917
and
1939,
the word
revolution was very frequently used, but it
had completely different connotations. The only meaning they all
had in common was to denote every attempt or aspiration to bring
down the existing political conditions, no matter in what name that
total turn of events was desired or what was planned as their re¬
placement, Naturally, they primarily had in mind the mass move-
v
ments
of political rebellion that had followed each other in quick
succession in many places between
1917
and
1920.
Anyhow,
various historical phenomena were encompassed by this word.
Therefore, all the movements for the creation of new nation states
among the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, movements
along the border areas of Russia and those in the eastern parts
of the German Empire were called revolutions. What is more,
this name was used for the type of the political rebellion aimed to
build authoritarian nation states and at the same time to prevent
the communists and socialists from acquiring power. It also in¬
cluded the tendency to destroy the accomplishments of democra¬
cy and the spirit of freedom (both those that had existed for a long
time and those that were born in recent years), which were the
tendencies of the political right wing, the extreme nationalists and
the agents of military plans gathered in fascist organisations. Last
842
of all
,
the word revolution was used to denote the rebellion that
had sprung from the Marxist political theory of the class struggle,
which did not only strive to completely destroy the political sys¬
tem, but also to radically transform society by cutting off capitalist
production and thus annihilate the bourgeois society.
I hose who were followers of each of these three
concepts were clearly aware that they were
the representatives and agents of revolution, and that fact filled
them with pride. They saw in that fact the source of their rights
and drew the historical meaning of their influence, on the basis of
that they represented the men of today and tomorrow. The leaders
of all three concepts often pointed this out publicly, explicitly and
unambiguously, mainly motivated by the desire to show that they
did not have respect for the status quo and were aiming to change
it or to bring it down. However, there was a definite and substantial
τ:
difference in the revolutionary nature of these movements, which
meant that in the end there were no real similarities between them
at all; they were actually politically completely separate. Their
revolutionary character had lost its momentum first through the
creation of independent nation states, for the second, through the
creation of a powerful authoritarian state of national unity and for
the third, through the changes the society underwent, so that so¬
cialist relations should be able to evolve and pave the road to the
communist future. The first concept showed itself in the guise of
national politicians and intellectuals who had their connections in
the cabinets of the ministers of the Great Powers during the war.
The representatives of the second concept were half-educated
leaders of the dominant nationalist movement, who were covered
with brightly coloured flags and accompanied by the sound of fan¬
fares and drums, aligned in formations according to military mod¬
els. The third concept was represented by the Marxist tribunes of
the poor, first and foremost the working class, as well as the theo¬
reticians who pleaded for the violent revolution, which had to pave
the way to the age of the classless society. The first spoke of their
revolutionary nature more rarely than the representatives of the
other two concepts; the second emphasized it mainly when they
directly or indirectly wished to threaten their political adversaries
or when they wanted to argue in favor of their violent methods; the
third saw in revolution an ideal worthwhile of any sacrifice, which
had to be cherished as a real life value and ensured the creation of
a future devoid of exploitation and the segregation of society into
upper and lower classes.
or the movement that aimed for the creation
of independent nation states, the revolution
meant the creation of liberty for the national life of the people. The
F
movement for the building of socialism understood the revolution
as the creation of social liberties, based on the annihilation of all
class division. Both these movements regarded revolution as the
way or the means to create freedom, although the word was used
with quite different connotations. The movement for the building
of nation state power did not take into account the concept of free¬
dom at all, because it strived to construct an authoritarian gov¬
ernment. However, the problem of freedom is not exhausted with
this at all. Formation of independent nation states, which meant
acquisition of freedom in the sense of the liberation from the rule
of another nation, did not entail extension of political and social
freedom to the population in general. In the best case, what re¬
mained were the constitutional rights and political liberties that
had been more or less circumscribed by the social structure and
the distribution of power among various political factors. On the
other hand, the victory of the socialist revolution in the sense of the
taking over of the power was regarded as the mere first stage in
the development of the revolutionary dictatorship, a period neces¬
sary to carry out a thorough transformation of the whole society.
s a
result of the strongly-felt, widespread and
.variously motivated dissatisfaction among
the masses, which was fueled by the exhausting warfare, all the
mentioned historical phenomena grew into active rebellion in the
period between
1917
and
1920.
When the war broke out, govern¬
ments managed to uphold firm control of their people, but as time
passed, the longer shortages, hunger, disease, destruction and
death raged, the greater was dissatisfaction of the masses, and
the more decisively it was turned against political systems and
their leaders, only to finally erupt into disobedience, rebellion and
social revolution.
Ν;
ational liberation movements accounted for
significant changes in the political map of
Europe; authoritarian nationalism imposed its dynamics after a
certain delay and acquired a central place in the world history
of that time, while communism brought first communist state into
being. National movements resulted in the creation of a series of
new states which were developed on the territories of the former
empires. They were of small or medium size, predominantly par¬
liamentary in their political systems and liberal in their actions.
Authoritarian nationalism had resulted in mass right-wing move¬
ments and two powerful states, extremely active and ambitious in
foreign policy, aggressive and expansionist, and through them it
displayed its intention to suddenly and violently cut through his¬
torical development and radically change the political map, politi¬
cal ideas and behaviour, constitutions and even the man himself.
Communist movement emphasized the request for a complete 8 5
break-off with history by its changes of society, economy politics
an even the man himself. It proclaimed itself as the future power
and created the first socialist state that had vast territory and a
huge population
-
the Soviet Union.
lhe
majority of the socialist rebellions, among
them and above all the communist movement,
represented revolution in a deeper sense of the word, simply be¬
cause of the extent of the desired changes, because of the depth
of the committed actions, because of the firmness of the conviction
of their followers and because of the decisiveness which they dis¬
played. Their purpose was not only to change the political situation
but also to establish completely new social relations. Compared
to all other revolutionary movements, they were the ones that most
stirred up the poor masses, and, what is extremely important, in-
τ:
spired them to believe that they had right to break away from the cir¬
cumstances that reduced them to the mere lower classes of society,
and thus to free themselves from poverty. Characteristic for these
movements is their far-fetching vision of history to come, for they had
a vision of a new society that had to be built in the future and were
also firm in their belief that they were the expression of historical le¬
gitimacy. With all this, they gave meaning to chaos that arose when
the masses in their natural element began to destroy the status quo.
They also aspired to transform not only the man s environment, but
the man himself. The revolutions of previous centuries also shared
some of the great ideals, the dream of humane society, of utter hap¬
piness of human beings, but in that respect, great changes were
now taking place, because Marxist political theory had rationalized
the ancient Utopian dreams and transformed them into political ac¬
tion, and afterwards into the technique of political work At the same
040
time, the realization of this dream was facing quite a few obstacles,
although it was rationalized and a fact of historic reality, there arose
a large, if not an enormous difference between the pure ideal and
its application in practice. The beginning of the period between the
wars confronted Europe with its last bourgeois democratic revo¬
lution which took place in Russia from March to November
1917.
All previous bourgeois revolutions had influenced to a greater or a
lesser extent further development of the capitalist economy and the
strengthening of the bourgeoisie as a social class, but also the birth
of parliamentarianism and liberal constitutionalism in its developed
or undeveloped form. However, the bourgeois revolution in Russia
was not able to open up similar prospects, although it is easy to as¬
sume that it could, but it finally
-
and in spite of the role of the mon¬
archists in the Civil War of
1918-1920 -
managed to overthrow the
autocracy and nobility from their leading position. In March
1917,
the revolution in Russia seemed to be weak at its very beginning,
but it had deeper roots in Russian history. However, it was indirectly
of a great importance, because it had cleared the way for the com¬
munists to come to power, even without the desire of the political
groups that led the revolution. This implied the fact that the liberal-
democratic revolution, in which the social democrats had a promi¬
nent role, was not deeply influential in itself, but merely preceded
the socialist revolution led by the communists. This implied fact
showed that a new historical epoch had come, that political move¬
ments, whose revolutionary nature exceeded the socialism of the
second half of the twentieth century, had come to play a decisive
role on the stage of history. Anyhow, the bourgeois-democratic con¬
stitutions continued to spread throughout Europe in the first years of
the post-war period, for the national revolutions had initially brought
changes to the imperial regimes in more or less developed forms
of parliamentary and multi-party systems
.
New republics had been
born, or in other cases, new monarchies had accepted
-
at least
verbally, although often not completely in reality
-
the responsibility
of the government to the parliament.
lhe
socialist Marxists entered the
1917-1919
revolution mainly as a united, although not a
compact movement, but in the course of those years, they were
broken into two distinct and even bitterly opposed basic wings.
When the revolutions started to spring up in Russia, Austria, Hun¬
gary, Germany and Slovakia, it appeared that that the socialists of
different orientations
-
in spite of all their differences, which even
at that time were considerable
-
presented a united front; however,
very quickly it became obvious that there were important differ¬
ences between their programmes, tactics and strategy in the cre¬
ation of socialism, and what was even more significant, that these
τ:
I
disagreements could in no way be overcome. Inside the social
democracies
ofthat
period, two completely separate and mutual¬
ly conflicting movements became obvious: social democrats and
communists. The latter were more radical in the way they spoke
about revolutionary acts in their political struggle to create a state
dictatorship of the proletariat, and they really carried on other de¬
cisive phases if the social revolution.
η
the spring of
1919,
four socialist republics,
states with communist governments were
founded in Europe: Russia, Hungary, Slovakia and Bavaria, with
the exception of the first country, where the state was in fact a
federation of soviet republics. Of all four of them, Russia was the
only one that had retained communes, in all the other countries
they were crushed by military action of other political forces that
belonged to the same nation or by neighbouring countries. As
to the social democrats, they came to power in Hungary, Austria
and Germany. In Austria and Germany, they managed to remain
a significant and influential political force; they also had an ex¬
tremely important role in the creation of parliamentary democratic
regimes. Hungarian government, however, was facing problems
in its foreign policy, so it resigned its power to a coalition of the ex¬
treme left, led by communists. With socialist democrats in power,
Austria and Germany remained bourgeois societies, with capital¬
ist economies and liberal parliamentary political systems. With
communists in power, the Soviet Union became a socialist coun¬
try with the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political system.
The First World War was waged between
the armies that consisted of millions of peo¬
ple, and with the utmost strain of all the forces of the belligerent
peoples and states, The ideological and psychological basis for the
VI
withstanding of this strain was found in the consciousness and the
feeling of belonging to the same nation, as well as in a human bond
between the men in war who fought for their state. In other words,
the important factor in keeping up the fighting morals of the troops
and their exertion to the final limits was the conviction that that the
war was being carried on in the interests of the nation, and that their
struggle had its own deeper meaning. Admittedly, the allied char¬
acter of this war did not allow for the extreme enkindling of that ter¬
rible hatred between the warring nations based on sheer national
narrow-mindedness, a kind of hatred that was present during the
Franco-Prussian War of
1870-1871,
when national consciousness of
the two nations clashed on the battlefield. But anyway, national ha¬
tred was a factor that played an enormous role and egged on even
more reminders of the reciprocal animosity in the past. The goals of
all the governments involved in the First World War were also con¬
sistent with their grasp of their national interests . Regarded as a
whole, the
1914-1918
war was a clash of nations and was motivated
by the protection of the rights and interests of the nations involved
in it, The national consciousness manifested itself as the conscious¬
ness of selfishness and the cause of great and destructive conflicts.
Anyhow, the War ended in the spirit of new ascendancy of inter¬
nationalism and the spreading of faith in linking of the nations by
mutual interests of cooperation, peace and prosperity. Under these
new ideas nations had right to an independent life, but were un¬
der obligation to respect and help one another and to cooperate in
the creating of a community of nations and a world where the great
and strong would not dominate.
ι
rom
1917,
several new states were created,
which gave new confirmation to the national
idea in Europe and marked the continuation of the process that
F
had strongly characterized the second half of the 19th century.
This process unfolded simultaneously with the disintegration of
the great multinational states. A mere cornerstone was left of the
Habsburg
monarchy the only large state that remained was on
the territory of the Russian Empire, but it was reconstituted on a
socialist and federative basis. The Ottoman Empire had lost the
non-IUrkish countries in Europe back in
1912
and in Africa and
Asia in
1918,
However, the new states were not purely national.
Many people from other nations were incorporated in some
middle-sized states: Romania had a large number of Germans,
Hungarians, Serbs and others; the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes tried to constitute itself on the basis of the core Yugoslav
nationalities of its inhabitants, but it had, within its borders, large
ethnic groups of Germans, Albanians, Hungarians and Romani¬
ans. Czechoslovakia depended on the kinship of the two Slav na-
üons
whose names it bore, even though it also had considerable
amount of minorities, among them the strongest by far were the
Germans; Poland had a large group of Belarusians.
ÎŢIhe
period of awakening and formation of Eu-
J- ropean nationalism encompassed seven or
eight decades between the beginning of the nineties of the 18th
century and the beginning of the fifties of the
1
9th century, but sev¬
eral new sovereign states were founded on national basis in the
second half of the 19th century, Italy, Germany, Greece, Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro were founded in this period, and Hungary
and Bulgaria were conceived as well, The nation states of France,
Holland, Spain and Portugal had existed earlier. In Denmark, the
population of Iceland demanded independence, in Sweden, the
Norwegians did the same, In Great Britain, the consciousness of
British unity existed parallel with the consciousness of the English,
τ:
Scots and Welsh as separate national entities, while the Irish per¬
sisted in their struggle for an independent state. In spite of having
several official languages, the population of Switzerland regarded
themselves as one nation, but among the Belgians the very differ¬
ence in language meant that its citizens were divided into Flem¬
ings and Walloons, in spite of their joint Belgian consciousness.
Starting from the second half of the 19th century, the unsolved
national problem was a trial for many young European peoples,
particularly for the Poles and the Irish. At the beginning of the 20th
century, new independent nation states of Norway Bulgaria and
Albania were created, Finally, as we have already seen, after the
end of the First World War, a circle of nation states was formed
around the Baltic, in Central and South-Eastem Europe.
lhe
basis of all national movements was the re¬
quest for liberation from foreign rule and the
right to independent organization of the nation s own political, eco¬
nomic and cultural life. At first, this was followed by the idea of the
brotherhood of free nations, but the reality of the second half of the
nineteenth century, particularly the epoch of imperialism, brought
a different development. The nations showed that they wanted not
only to ensure their freedom and the conditions for cultural and
economic development, but to gain power at the expense of oth¬
ers as well, and thus they strived to conquer and subjugate other
peoples and nations. The First World War was partly caused pre¬
cisely by this desire. And it is very important to point out that this
war had ended in the spirit of condemnation of those ambitions,
even though this did not mean at all at all that they were eradicated
for good. As for the Peace Conference of
1919-20,
it allowed for
great violations of the national principle, but nevertheless, it cre¬
ated one of the basic national political maps of Europe. Anyway, it
was quickly perceived that the control of extreme national selfish¬
ness and greed was only temporary, and soon the thesis of higher
nations who had the right to rule over others emerged discreetly at
the end of the war, particularly passionately in Italy and Germany.
All nationalism in its extremes tends to show passion for its own
country, but it must be noted that not all have deduced from that
the far-reaching rights to conquer and exploit others. However,
once it happened, it was followed by two separate phenomena:
one was shutting of that nation for cultural ideas and values of oth¬
er nations, the other, the aspiration towards a pure nation which
was often converted into hatred and persecution of members of
other nations, most often it was directed towards those who were
mixed among them, for they were previously branded as inferior
and even accused of depraving the race of the higher nation .
In the years between the two wars, this kind of
extremism manifested itself very clearly in many
nations, admittedly, sometimes in a more prominent, sometimes
in a more discreet manner, but it reached frightening proportions
among the Germans and, soon afterwards, the Italians, Since the
nation state was proclaimed as the ideal, its power was under¬
stood as the quality not only to be desired, but to be praised as
the greatest value. Here lies the ideological source of national au¬
thoritarianism and totalitarianism as a kind of modern version of
despotism. Contrary to the early 19th century belief that national¬
ism would bring harmony to the peoples, the contemporary pe¬
riod saw aspirations of the nations to extend their domination even
over continents, as well as the ambition to wipe out other nations
and peoples. But since these extremes did not dominate in the
majority of nations, even though it seemed so, Europe found itself
divided between those states where the authoritarian nationalism
I
had taken over and those where it had been denounced. In the
countries where nationalism had received totalitarian characteris¬
tics, it managed to obliterate the rational premises on which its ap¬
pearance and romantic enthusiasm had been based for decades,
and turned into one of the irrational ideologies of the twentieth
century. It is important to notice that in authoritarian nationalism
a dynamic centre had been created from which one of the his¬
torical movements emerged, and which, precisely for this reason,
aimed at itself other sources of historical dynamics in the years
1919-1945.
η
reality, nationalism was thus divided into two
separate currents. One of them remained aimed
at and, to all intents and purposes, in harmony with its sources, for
it started off from the right of nations to be free, and from their
rational, non-violent inclusion in the community of international
political, economic and cultural relations. The future was seen in
a community of nations who would participate with equal rights in
international life, strive to overcome problems peacefully, contrib¬
ute to world culture and play their part in world economics. The
technical possibilities of uniting the world by all means of trans¬
port, by the exchange of goods and cultural achievements would
no more be obstructed by disintegration of political constitutions,
to which the principle of nationalism had also been contributed,
This ideal model did not deny at all the separate interests of na¬
tions, or even their right to egoism, but it condemned the satis¬
faction of ambitions and desires by violent means and started off
from the conviction that all oppositions could always be brought to
harmony in a rational manner. The other current denied the value
of original nationalism in the name of the basic logic of the nation¬
al idea
-
the priority of one s own interests. So, instead of brother-
F
hood among men or the community of nations, they came up with
a division into higher and lower , as well as the proclamation of
the right to hegemony conquest and exploitation, or the cultural,
even the biological destruction of other peoples by the chosen .
Instead of the gradual and natural cultural, economic and political
intelligence of the world, plans were laid for the foundation of a gi¬
gantic state under the rule of a certain power, in this case, the state
of the higher nation. The first current viewed the experience of
the First World War as a stimulus for more clearly expressed na¬
tionalism; the second current, as an impulse for the development
of the most irreconcilable national egoism possible.
ι
rom
its very beginning, nationalism represent¬
ed a historical fact that had an impact on the
unification and linking, and at the same time on the division and
dispersal of human groups, political events and historical move-
ments,
and now, on their basis, a modern and contemporary feel¬
ing of belonging and differences was created in a single act. The
result of its historical emergence was the creation of correspond¬
ing political goals and of a multitude of new states; and vice versa:
it was also the force that would increase or develop multi-national
political ambitions, organizations and states. It was the integrat¬
ing factor for members of the same national group or for the citi¬
zens inside a certain state, and less often inside a geographical
area. Up to around second half of the nineteenth century it aspired
to enable better and firmer linking of the nations who, conscious
of their interests, would voluntarily enter mutual relations of coop¬
eration. But the period that started with the First World War strong¬
ly emphasised the opposite, actually the disintegrating of those
ambitions of nationalism that had been evident earlier. In so far as
those ambitions included conquest, nationalism appeared again
О
to be a new aspiration towards integration, this time by force and
subjugation. In reality, however, that kind of integration resulted in
conflicts, and was not realised, but its attempts were merely proof
that nationalism of this kind represented a disuniting factor. The
unification which was aimed at in this way was based on force, su¬
periority and domination over others and this very thing became a
source of resistance, most often on a national basis.
ince
the birth of nationalism, its very principle
was completely opposed to monarchism, for
it denied the ruler s right to govern their nations just because
they had inherited or acquired them; in that respect it was found¬
ed on the principle of national sovereignty, which was cited as
older, more powerful and moral than the legitimate rights of the
crown. In this sense, it acted powerfully in the first half of the
20th century and was transformed into a moral source of rights
for the separation of nations from empires, but also for the limita¬
tion of the monarch s rule over his subjects. New nation states
had created parliamentary regimes on the principle of national
sovereignty, which meant diminishing of the monarch s power or
proclamation of republics, Authoritarian nationalism claimed the
right to absolute rule just on the basis that a national movement
had been proclaimed, or rather a movement which essentially
fought for the best interests of the nation, In consistence with
this, it stripped rulers of their rights, as it declared that they did
not serve the real interests of their nation
-
interests that could
only be represented by the nationalist authoritarian movement.
In Italy, the Fascists reduced the King and his Court into institu¬
tions without power, without any great political significance; in
Germany, the national socialists sent partisans of monarchy to
concentration camps.
VII.
The split in social democracy, which be-
, ι
came evident in the course of the revolu¬
tions of
1917-1919,
meant that the real, deep and irreconcilable
separation in their
programmes
would be recorded by new names
.
To unambiguously show the special and revolutionary nature of its
aspirations, the Marxist Left found the most expressive title in the
names communism and communist . This title had been some¬
what tested during the second half of the 19th century, and could
also point out its link to the source of the revolutionary tradition and
to several basic Marxist theses. In the
1
9th century the communist
idea existed in the framework of socialist ideology and the work¬
ers1 revolutionary movement, the word communism denoted the
classless society which was an ideal to aspire to, and the word
communist the avant-garde rebellious movement, neverthe¬
less, socialism , socialists and social democracy remained
856
dominant concepts
.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks broadened the con¬
cept of communism and converted it into a political doctrine and
a powerful movement. They also defined it separately, opposing
it to social democracy. Thus, one of the most significant political
and ideological concepts of the contemporary period was finally
formed. At the same time, The Communist Manifesto, the famous
text written by Marx and
Engels
in February
1848,
became again
extremely current, but in a new way.
lhe
split in the socialist movementin
1917-1919
meant that Marx s theses were made effective
after the special and radical nature of communism had been lost
from sight in the second half of the nineteenth century. The left
wing, the radical stream, the defender of the dictatorship of the
proletariat as the first and most important goal the revolution had
to fulfill
-
called themselves communists. The Social democrats
τ:
D:
and communists became opposed as political forces striving for
different programmes. The communists were the most militant
force of the former united movement, but by their resolute proc¬
lamation of division, the long open question of the unity of the So¬
cialist and Socialist-Marxist front was settled. That was how the
most significant revolutionary socialist movement of the inter-war
years took shape.
|Uring the period of
1917-1919
and in the
course of the whole twenty-year period be¬
tween the World Wars, communism presented itself as an extraor¬
dinarily active movement that was also characterized by a devel¬
oped self-consciousness. The belief that our world is anchored
in history and that every period has a social class that initiates a
movement
-
i.e. a change to an even more developed society is a
quite renowned component of this self-consciousness. The com-
munists, since they were the avant-garde of the working class that
presses ahead the transformation in the modern and contempo¬
rary epoch, have an extremely important mission to fulfill, not only
for the contemporary period, but for the whole of history, since
they, by their activities, open up the future of man s freedom, the
time of liberation from social inequalities, exploitation and per¬
secution. This self-consciousness was essentially based on the
belief that history is relevant, that it has a goal towards which it
moves and that the communists are the political force that em¬
bodies the movement with such an aim
-
i.e. that it represents in
itself the progress of history. The starting point was the point of
view that the contemporary moment of history was recognized by
Marx and that this recognition comprised the thesis that capital¬
ist society and the conditions under which it functioned were the
objective historical soil from which the proletariat had to grow into
F
a
revolutionary class, out of sheer necessity. The communists as
the political leaders of the proletariat had to be conscious of their
role and to be willing to make self-sacrifice in their activities, in
order to lead the revolution, create a revolutionary state and steer
it wisely until they can complete the necessary transformation of
society into a communist one.
rom
that moment, the socialist revolution was
inseparably linked with the communists, for
they had become its only real upholders. The Soviet Union be¬
came the stronghold of the communist movement and also the
seat of The Communist International. Very quickly, communism
manifested itself in all European countries and many non-Euro¬
pean ones and was at the same time embodied in a rigorously
disciplined international revolutionary organization with many
branches. It was prohibited and persecuted in a great number of
states, so it became the most significant illegal movement of the
20s and 30s of the twentieth century. The basis of the programme
was the desire to realize the socialist idea in a revolutionary man¬
ner, therefore a powerful ideology that firmly incorporated the
people of many nations and gave meaning to their self-sacrifice
and to their aspiration for the disciplined carrying out of orders
from the centres of leadership was at stake. Respecting the car¬
rying out of the socialist revolution as their first and foremost task,
the communists represented the most resolute, the most irrecon¬
cilable, the best organized and most deeply convinced political
force aimed at changing social relations in the world of that time.
Here we did not take into account the fact that in some countries
they had the possibility of legal activity, while in Ranee they were
even active inside the constitutional order, At the same time, they
have initiated a quite individual, comprehensive vision of a future
τ:
with an entirely different history from the one people lived through
at the time. Although we must keep in mind the achievement of
social democracy, nevertheless, it may be said that in commu¬
nism, for the first time in history, which in any case recognizes the
numerous elements of the movements of the poor, we can see a
development of a well-organized, ideologically deeply conscious
political group, able to fight and eager to struggle through revolu¬
tionary methods for the nghts of the lower classes.
lhe
phenomenon and the presence of com¬
munists on the historical scene re-opened
in a new way the question posed and most faithfully elaborated
through all the revolutions in the New Age of national sovereignty.
In the bourgeois revolutions the principle of national sovereignty
was understood as the rule of the entire people, and the social
democracy aspired to faithfully turn that into reality between
1917
and
1919.
The communists wanted to give this principle a different
meaning, i.e. to connote the possibility of the proletariat to attain
power and the possibility of all the lower social classes to live in
a truly humane way. Here, they included those who had hardly or
not at all realized their political rights (although those had admit¬
tedly been recognized in many aspects), who had been socially
despised, economically exploited and essentially deprived of the
possibility to worry about anything else except to earn a bare liv¬
ing; the classes who had been oppressed, deprived of their rights
and exploited, as the communists stated, citing Marx. Such rights
of the poor and the oppressed are related to the conviction that
the proletariat has that very historical mission to destroy the class
society and that, to be able to achieve this goal, it must establish
its dictatorship. The theory was essentially formulated in this way:
not all the classes in a society constitute the people, it is only the
exploited and the poor who have the mission to carry out the trans¬
formation of a society by political action. This is the way in which
national sovereignty meant, in fact, the rule of the working class.
The communists were the politically most conscious part of the
proletariat, their avant-garde, and therefore, the power that had to
take over and reform the apparatus of state and the entire public
life with the goal of revolutionary transformation.
IŢIhe
ideology of democracy, which was born
1
simultaneously with the bourgeois revolutions
and particularly the great French Revolution, achieved its culmi¬
nation with this theory, and, at the same time, as it always happens
in history, posed new political and moral problems. One of the es¬
sential problems was that, at that historical turning point and at the
time of the revolutionary transformation, the right of the proletariat
to the dictatorship brought along the rejection of equal rights to all
other until then upper classes. On the other hand, since the whole
political life was concentrated in the hands of the communists,
the question was raised of how to control the possibility that the
Party comes to power, or even only a group of leaders, instead of
a government made up of the exploited and the poor
-
the peo¬
ple in that narrower sense of the word. Historically established
after
1918,
as a movement aspiring to freedom and cherishing the
theory of man s freedom, communism was put under the pressure
of showing itself to be such in reality.
The rejection of the monarch, his gov¬
ernment and the sanctity of his person
had sprung
írom
the principle and the desire that the representa¬
tives of the people should obtain the highest positions and the
most responsible duties, but in spite of the fact that they got the
hold of the helm of the state, they should always remain the people
VIII
of the environment from which they originated. According to the
theory of the liberal 19th century, the republic should have repre¬
sented the highest form of democracy, However, the foundation of
republics revealed that the leaders of the mass movements and
the very representatives of the people who took over the govern¬
ment, were the ones who, whether we like it or not, broke their
connections with the social environment to which they had be¬
longed until that time. It is correct to say that the elective mecha¬
nism of the parliamentary states was the sign that the separation
was not complete, although it was undeniably great. A special
class of professional politicians and political experts emerged,
The first ones lived by politics; in the second, the second might
have had other sources of income (from the land, or the industry,
or the freelance professions), but the people concerned became
indispensable as authonty on certain kinds of questions
,
One way
or another, it meant that the government became reserved only for
one circle of people.
owever, there were other, completely differ-
.ent
phenomena as well, In stark opposition
to the optimism of the nineteenth century, in many cases after the
First World War people who rose to power from lower classes,
concentrated inconceivable power in their hands and ruled com¬
pletely autocrats, even as tyrants. Between
1919
and
1939
indi¬
viduals reigned in many states on the historical scene. History
had entered the period which was given the special stamp of the
leaders .
ccording to Carlyle s opinion, history in gen-
■eral, the history of what people have achieved
in this world, is the history of great individuals who have worked
on the earth, Those great individuals were leaders of men, they
H:
a;
were their protectors, and, in the wider sense of that word, the
creators of all that the general mass of people aspired to do or
to achieve; everything that we see created in the world is in fact
the final material result, the practical realization and embodiment
of thoughts which have shone in great individuals, sent into the
world; the spirit of all world history, it may justly be declared, is
the history of those people . This was the opinion, developed ide¬
ologically and by propaganda, that permeated the mythology of
the leader . Anyhow, apart from in this opening premise, it would
be difficult to find personalities who would be further from the el¬
evated pondering over history than this contemplative Briton in
his instrumental myth of the leader of the thirties of this century.
To repeat the words of
E. Cassirer
,
the ideas expressed in those
lectures contain dangerous explosive , but nothing else. The hero
of whom Carlyle was speaking might have been divine; he could
have been a religious prophet, a poet, a priest, a story-teller or a
king. The hero of the inter-war years, the leader , was a politician
of unknown origin which the authoritarian movement had raised to
the power of a tyrant. Carlyle s hero was naively imagined as the
creator of good for people, but, in fact, he was first and foremost
a ruler who tyrannically served and protected any kind of narrow
interest, whether it was of national or social nature.
lhe
myth of the future leader was anticipated
more in the painting depicting Napoleon
at The Great S. Bernard Pass, painted by Jacques Louis David
in
1801-1802,
than in the book On Heroes. The young man, im¬
mersed in thoughts, sitting on the back of a white horse, as beauti¬
ful as the sun itself, radiates his personality, and points at the way
which should be taken. No, this is not Hector, husband and father,
who will stop saddened before his loved ones with a premonition
τ:
of the evil outcome of the decisive
batüe;
it is not Achilles, who be¬
comes angered because of the removal of his mistress and cries
bitterly after the death of a friend; no, it is not even Siegfried, the
knight who defeats the dragon and outstanding warriors. The he¬
roes of classical mythology are more men than he is, although,
in spite of this paradox, they are more like gods than he is. The
hero of the German epic, again too much the mythical hero, is not
enough of a man. But that is even less one of the heroes of the first
five of Carlyle s lectures, it is not even Carlyle s Napoleon, nor is
it Cromwell. This hero had never been a philosopher, elevated
above the world and human goodness; the man in question is a
man of ordinary appearance and origin, but also an exceptional
one, for the myth praises him as the wisest, and in every way the
most able. The myth insists on this message: he is a man, but as
immediately follows
-
a man whose like does not exist, for nobody
oco
else can match up to him. He is the only one who knows the se¬
cret of political decision, and because of that way his index finger
points out in the air, he must simply be followed. Yes, he is the
political leader and as such a prophet, philosopher, ruler, and
even divinity, in a certain meaning of the word.
lhe
leader was generally a man from the
masses who had risen to power either by vir¬
tue of his
ments
in the totalitarian movement or by his skillful ma¬
noeuvres among the leading activists
ofthat
movement, and then
extended his rule, removing all other competitors (who were usu¬
ally his former advisors), as well as almost all more independent
personalities. When a certain leader would reach the height of his
power, he would become the only noticeable, dominant figure in
the regime, he would be glorified as the incarnation of his party
and moreover, he would be transformed into an almost omnipo-
τ:
tent ruler of the state. In fact, he would be the only person who,
by his own will and in the light of his own comprehension, knowl¬
edge and assessments, would create the policy of the movement
and determine the politics of the state. He would always have a
very characteristic desire to shine, particularly in foreign policy.
He would also proclaim himself as the only real interpreter of the
will of the people and perform the myth of the heroic warrior for
the the good of the nation and the people.
lhe
phenomenon of the leader was linked to
a particular type of political, social and ideo¬
logical situation. In political sense, every leader was an absolute
ruler, elevated above all responsibility, a person who really soared
above whatever and whosever rights. Neither representative bod¬
ies, constitutions or laws, nor party statutes, local autonomy, the
personal merits of his advisors, humane considerations, nor even,
in the case of Italy, monarchical jurisdiction would seriously re¬
strain his power. Ideologically, it would be explained in two ways:
by his historical mission and by his aptitude for that particular to¬
talitarian movement.
lhe
leader firmly held the complete appara¬
tus of the state in his hands, and at the same
time he pretended to despise all forms of community life and im¬
posed himself on every personality. In order to achieve that, he
created a strong organization of his supporters, those who (wheth¬
er they were ideologically convinced or not)
,
were accustomed to
discipline, or those who unscrupulously aspired to attain a high
position in life, and that constituted practically all his weapons.
Besides the political organization, some leaders created their
own illegitimate armed forces, usually a body of assault squads
,
as well as a police force with almost unlimited powers. By skillful
mi
11
I
and synchronised handling of the actions of the party, the appara¬
tus of state, the police and the armed forces, and the exploitation
of ideology, they would ensure that the masses would follow them,
and, indeed, that no other behaviour than the one they desired
was deemed possible.
η
sociological sense, the leaders were always
closely linked to the strengthening and expan¬
sion of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was unassailably and
surely constituted as a ruling group, provided it was a part of the
leader s movement and the leader s state , if both its exterior
and activities were put in the service of the leader . On the other
hand, the leaders themselves would generally find the support
for their unlimited rule in the bureaucracy, because most of them
would empower the bureaucracy when they were at the zenith of
their power, and when the government faced a crisis, the bureauc¬
racy remained the basic force on which they could rely. But, the 865
bureaucracy was, and sensed that it was, or, in other words, it was
conscious of being completely dependent on the leader , there¬
fore, fear reigned among its ranks, especially at the top. Aware
of the significance the apparatus of the state had for his rule, the
leader would punish every act of disobedience, often harshly.
However, from the ranks of the bureaucracy rose favourites ,
people who were in the special good graces with the leader, and
as such, exerted an exceptional influence or even power.
η
ideological sense, the leader was some
kind of prophet of political faith . His writings
and his word were taken as the ultimate political truth, the only
real wisdom, the revelation of the path that it was necessary to
take. The fact that the leader himself made about-turns , even
completely opposing moves, or made contradictory declarations
г
Ρ
did not harm his reputation, because the people simply had to be
believe in him, for he was untouchable in everyway, and therefore
even had the right to act in a contradictory manner. He was con¬
sidered the source and confluence of the government and simul¬
taneously the voice of political truth. On the other hand, he himself
became an object of ideology. His fellow citizens had the view of
the world which was formed primarily through the conviction that
the leader was the best, the most capable, the most righteous,
visionary, meritorious and, in short, unique in his brilliance.
olitically speaking, the leaders were insepa¬
rably linked to the authoritarian and totalitar¬
ian movements and phenomena. They were the expression of au¬
thoritarianism, but also its heroes; the personification of totalitari¬
anism, but also its chief builders. On the other hand, they turned
out to be practically indestructible by political means. Opposition
866
and competitors were always crushed. Even attempts at assas¬
sination were not successful. And, on the contrary, they always
did what they wanted, easily crushed all authority that got in their
way, destroyed opposition, sent their opponents, whether famous
or unknown, to prison or labour camps, even took lives as they
pleased, using any of the forces which were at their disposal,
Dogmatism of ideology was also one of the
, ι
most obvious characteristics
ofthat
time. It
is true that dogmatic systems were not universal, i.e. they encom¬
passed only certain geographic regions and existed in limited pe¬
riods: in the end, they differed among themselves, but they were
felt in any case, because they emerged in important countries,
and they obtained important roles in the history of those days. The
fact was that they were well-developed and powerful, but hetero¬
geneous, and far from ecumenical universality; they took a hold of
DC
several large states and threatened to expand even further, and in
those countries where they prevailed, they progressively stifled,
lulled to sleep and destroyed people s thoughts about politics,
even about society and mankind. Since non-dogmatic thought
also simultaneously existed on the Continent, there arose a strug¬
gle between dogmatism and active thinking, or live thinking so
to speak.
The growth, the toughness, the deep-rooted-
ness and success of the dogmatic systems of
the 20s and 30s raises the question whether the man had not come
to the end
ofthat
state of the soul which was founded in the Renais¬
sance and later elaborated into scientific and technological ration¬
alism. Or, in other words, whether there were not some signs that
a new period of the empire of the dogma was arriving, something
essentially quite similar to what the people of the Middle Ages
were familiar with. True, this idea eliminates the assessment of
some truly exceptional results in science and the vigorous devel¬
opment of technology. However, we are all the more confused by
the question where the frequency, the broadness, and the power
of the dogmas came from. What kind of rebellion against the rea¬
son was this? What social and spiritual factors influenced this?
Where was all this leading to? In accordance with the substance
of the soul of the
1
9th century, Marx had portrayed the time when
the world would indeed become wise, in which man, on the basis
of the known history, would determine his future. In the 20th centu¬
ry, however, many, and not infrequently those who regarded them¬
selves Marx s successors, would have the people believe only in
their revelations
,
even more than in real scientific discoveries. In
accordance with his political theory which began from the known
history and the knowledge of history, Marx anticipated a future in
Rec
hć
which man would be free. All the variants of dogmatism of the 20th
century began from the denial of the knowledge of history and in
themselves became an important view of man in bondage.
ι
egardless of differences in content which may
lave
existed between the variants of the dog¬
matism of the 20s and the 30s of the twentieth century, they shared
a mutual feature. That feature consisted in the strict way in which
its attitudes were communicated as though they were a priori giv¬
en and eternally true. In all variants there was also present the
characteristic wish to be the unique and thorough interpretation of
those phenomena, of all areas of life and of the world as a whole.
However, seen through the mirror of dogmatism, the world be¬
came simplified to an eventually intolerable degree.
ince
they presented in advance a system of
uniquely valid values, the dogmatic
ideólo
-
868
gies stifled the stimulus for research; by proclaiming their view¬
points as the ultimate truth they crushed the desire for discovery.
They excluded all scepticism, denied curiosity and, by doing
that, they destroyed the precious psychological urge to search
for truth, for different points of view and for knowledge. Because
the attitudes of the dogmatic systems tended to be absolute, they
became petrified not only in content, but in form as well. That is
how they were formulated in a relatively few words, and through
sentences full of
clichés.
They have resulted in a language which
was deprived of the richness of the vocabulary, highly regulated
and impoverished.
rnhe opinion offered by the dogmatic ideolo-
X gies was essentially unhistorical. They did
not allow for the dilemma which imposed by reality. There was
only one possible way of raising questions and always only one
τ:
answer had to be given. They completely neglected the chang¬
ing of events through time (the dialectic), refused to recognize the
possibility of distinction in earlier times was not recognized, they
strived to project the present-day understanding onto the social
past of man, they denied the existence of ambiguity, and so forth.
In reality, people had to accept the political viewpoints and the
interpretations of those in power; independent rational judgement
was made impossible by the means of the ideological powers
or under the pressure of the party and the organs of violence the
state had at its disposal.
lhe
consequences of such lulled thinking
were far-reaching. To begin with, the non-
inteilectualism appears, because people who had accepted the
dogmatic systems thought they had to be strictly applied, i.e. with¬
out any individual consideration or understanding, and so they
were left without opinions
,
without mental experience of the world.
ΟΌΌ
Then, human impoverishment was reflected in the fact that man
was considered to exist only in harmony with the narrow schemes
which did not at all allow him to see life clearly. This had resulted
in verbalism, which, to be precise, was closely linked to all the
above mentioned consequences. Questions were answered, and,
what is more, interpretations of the world were given automati¬
cally, devoid of all understanding and consideration, not to men¬
tion research, in accordance only with the prevalent dogma. As a
consequence, words without content and indeed without feeling
were used out of necessity. Because there was only one possible
truth and for several reasons, it was very opportune to support
it, to be infallible was an object of aspiration, and this meant a
literal repetition of what was acceptable. In this way, the attitudes
of the dogmatic systems were expressed through stiff linguistic
τ:
expressions, and a number of words could be decisively used
as a screen, because their use and repetition it could enable one
to become ideologically correct . That is how such words were
used, mainly because they were thought to be the most useful.
Since there were only a limited number of right words, and the
richness of the world was much more complex, there had to come
to confusion in meaning, which, in its turn, led to confusion in lan¬
guage. A frequent consequence was also cynicism
-
the convic¬
tion that words expressed one thing and acts another, that ideals
are mere declarations and expedience reality.
lhe
destruction of the mind resulted in appear¬
ance of deplorable human personalities, mere
automatons in the service of ideology or cynics who were ready
to abuse ideals and ideas; it also gave birth to the collective mass
psychology of submissiveness to authoritarian rule and created
fertile ground for totalitarian politics.
In the course of the years between the wars
,i the arts
-
at least what has remained of it
to this day to represent that time
-
built a humane and freedom-
loving antithesis to the movements of those who were politically
intolerant. The artists turned away and sought their goal more and
more within themselves, showing a desire for independence and
freedom to the extent that they did not wish to reproduce the world
of visible objects any more, but to create only their own world of
beauty and forms. However, in those countries where politics was
irreconcilably narrow and exclusive, the artists came under its at¬
tacks; they perished, emigrated, spent their days in terror of the
police or were sent to concentration camps. Nevertheless, they
survived the crises or continued somewhere else their free and
self-conscious search for new forms, expressions and beauty.
X.
в
Whenever possible, the artists would raise their voices against all
that was inhuman at that time. On the other hand, the most power¬
ful political movements
ofthat
period aspired to create some kind
of art of their own, but all that was achieved according to the plans
or even under orders of the political authority remained mere slo¬
gans, uninspired
clichés,
cold, sometimes monumental poses,
kitsch, works devoid of artistic power.
ut,
it had to come to a great transformation in
art, which had come about on its own, based
on the creation of completely new views and aspirations. In this
revolution (for this was indeed a real revolution), fine arts blos¬
somed. The turning point occurred somewhere in the first dec¬
ade of the 20th century, in the years between
1905
and
1910,
i.e.
between the autumn salon of the Fauvists, and Wassily Kandin-
sky s first abstract painting. Anyway, when the First World War
broke out, fine arts had already moved in new directions, which
represented anything but the continuation of the tendencies lead¬
ing indirectly from the Renaissance to Impressionism. The arts
had already adopted a new approach; Kandinsky, Picasso,
Klee,
Braque,
Chagall, Matisse, Degas,
Brâncuşi,
Bocconi,
Léger,
Маске
etc. had already opened new paths and created their first
significant paintings and sculptures. Suddenly, an army of young
and middle-aged artists followed in theirs footsteps. According
to Herbert Read, the most revolutionary work of art in the history
of the modern movement was Pablo Picasso s painting
Les
De¬
moiselles
d Avignon,
from
1907.
Before the war broke out, circles
of artists had surfaced to light and formed new programmes, the
most famous of all being the Munich school under the name of
Der Blaue Reiter,
Kandinsky,
Маске,
Marc,
Юее
and Jawlensky
were evidently the most important of all those who brought new
views
in the arts to the favoured capital of the Wittelsbachs.
Der
Blaue Reiter
Almanach
(The Blue Rider Almanac), which came
out in
1911,
became a resounding collection of the new interpreta¬
tion and new works. The very same year, this group opened the
first exhibition of contemporary trends and when they organized
an exhibition of graphics in
1912,
the circle of artists who had the
same persuasion turned out to be extremely wide, On that occa¬
sion the artists of different nations and schools
-
Braque, Picasso,
Malevich, Larionov,
Αφ
and the others also exhibited their works.
The first theoretical explanations of the new inspirations appeared
in the works of Worringer: Abstraction and Contents
(1908),
and
The Problem of Gothic Form
(1912),
Kandinsky s Concerning the
Spiritual in Art
(1912),
then The Green Sound, Reverberations
and Turnings
(1913),
then Apollinaire s Cubist Painters
(1913).
Certain towns became powerful and well-known centres for the
new quests and desires, primarily Munich and Pans and several
other cities, among which Dresden, Moscow and Berlin occupy
an important place. At the same time, the new art proved to be
international in the full sense of the word, in form, in its self-eval¬
uation and in regard to the people who carried it on. Paris and
Munich became the resorts for artists of various nations who felt
like compatriots and the citizens of a universal republic of art.
That was how it happened that the abstract painting was born in
Munich under the auspices of a Russian
-
Kandinsky, and that the
group called
Der Blaue Reiter was
formed by two Germans, two
Russians and a Swiss.
Ihat
tone, so violently begun, of the new un¬
derstanding of fine arts continued during the
inter-war period, like a river whose waters rise the further it flows
away from its source; it became more powerful, wider, it branched
τ:
off in many directions. After an exceptionally strong beginning,
the self-confidence of the new inspiration became even stronger.
Everything consistently turned to its own world, disregarding eve¬
rything except its own inner stimuli, showing no consideration for
its own tradition, for the existing forms in nature, for society or
industry, for ideological requirements or political reasons, or for
anybody else s reasoning and aims, but artist s own. New aspira¬
tions really reigned in the field of artistic creativity, and some other
concepts gained an even more significant place, and eventually
a great support of a political authority. The character of contem¬
porary art has also continued to become universal, refusing to ac¬
cept borders of any kind between peoples and states. It is evident
that their ambitions were literally endless. The artists wanted to
use their works as a means to bring down all limitations which en¬
chained them, to examine the inner secrets of nature, to transform
scientific inventions into an artistic result, to create a new visual Oi0
world, to experiment endlessly, led by their inner needs and feel¬
ings, to go beyond habits, traditions, the ideologies of convention,
even the senses, the mind, and moreover, the feelings themselves.
The visible world looked humble compared to the new world of
forms and colours which were handcrafted by the artist-creator.
Man had succeeded to exceed his fate through art, as
A. Malraux
once noted.
Prevela Nevena Ašković
Садржај
Предговор
12
Увод
16
ПРВИ ДЕО: НОВА ЕВРОПА
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ
KOJE JE
ОТВАРАЛА
ДИПЛОМАТИЈА
28
Тајна
дипломатка:
визија
Европе
прекројених
граница
30
Јавна дипломатија: идеологија
и
међународна
политика
37
Конференција
мира
48
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
ПОЛИТИЧКЕ ОСНОВЕ
¿9
Нова политичка карта
60
Крај
монархизма
76
Револуције
87
ГЛАВА
ТРЕЋА
-
ОБЛИЦИ
ПОЛИТИЧКОГ
ПЕЈЗАЖА
95
Националисти
97
Комунисти
104
„Вође
111
Уништено
мишљење
117
ДРУГИ ДЕО:
РЕВОЛУЦИЈЕ СОЦИЈАЛИСТА
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
РЕВОЛУЦИЈА
У
РУСИЈИ
124
„Доле
цар
126
Лењин
132
Јулски немири
139
Десница напада
145
Велики октобар
150
Диктатура
пролетариата
159
Уставотворна скупштина
171
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
РЕВОЛУЦИ
JA
У
НЕМАЧКОЈ
181
Побуна
183
Република
190
За државу
Већа
201
Обрачун
210
Република
већа
у Минхену
219
ТРЕЋИ
ДЕО: ТРИ ПОЛИТИЧКА
УЗОРА
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
ПАРЛАМЕНТАРИЗАМ
238
Велика
Британија
239
Продор лабуриста и генерални
штрајк
241
Уравнотеженост политичког живота
252
Деценија искушења
257
Француска
264
Трећа
република
265
Деценија
битке за франак
271
Народни фронт
278
Немачка
287
Вајмарска
република
288
Из
једне
кризе у другу
294
Од
стабилности
до
краха
300
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
АУТОРИТАРНИ НАЦИОНАЛИЗАМ
304
Фашизам
306
Околности и услови
појаве
фашизма
307
Борбени снопови
317
Политичке снаге
330
Наступање
341
Марш на Рим
349
Лагана смрт парламентаризма
362
Диктатура
373
Корпоративна држава
385
Националсоцијализам
394
За расистичку државу
395
Пораз и
престројавање
409
Преузимање
власти
420
Крај Вајмарске републике
436
Расистичка држава немачког народа
448
ГЛАВА
ТРЕЋА
-
КОМУНИЗАМ
463
Совјетски Савез
467
Грађански рат
469
Преокрет на
бојишту
479
Победа
487
У потрази за привредним обрасцем
497
Савез
Совјетских Социјалистичких
Република
506
Раскол
516
Социјализам
у
¡едној земљи
526
Стаљинизам
534
Интернационала
547
Трећа
интернационала
548
Четврта интернационала
553
ЧЕТВРТИ ДЕО: МИР И
PAT
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
ВЕРСАЈСКИ
ПОРЕДАК И РЕВИЗИОНИЗАМ
560
Подручја сукоба
561
Европски троуглови
565
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
ТРАГАЊЕ
ЗА МИ РОМ
574
Совјетско
и немачко
питање
576
Општи савез држава и
идеја
мира
588
ГЛАВА
ТРЕЋА
-
ЗА НОВА ЦАРСТВА
598
Немачка наступа
600
Концерт
четири
силе
610
Предвечерје рата
621
ПЕТИ ДЕО:
ИСКАЗИВАЊА
ПОЛИТИЧКОГ
И УМЕТНИЧКОГ ДУХА
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
ПОЛИТИЧКА МИСАО
632
Република
већа
633
Дра¡н
и мир и
„животни
простор
646
Националистичка ауторитарна
теорија
662
Ауторитарна
национална држава
672
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
УМЕТНОСТИ У ПОТРАЗИ ЗА СЛОБОДОМ
687
Самосвест
689
Богьшевички захтев и
стаљинско
решенье
709
Пред
стварношћу међуратног раздобља
719
ГЛАВА
ТРЕЋА
-
РАСИСТИЧКА
КУЛТУРА НЕМАЧКОГ
НАРОДА
726
Културна
воља покрета
и
Рајха
728
Немачка, а не дегенерисана уметност
739
ШЕСТИ ДЕО:
ЉУДИ ИСТОРИЈЕ
ГЛАВА ПРВА
-
ДРЖАВНИЦИ
754
Три
генерације
756
Неимар државе
револуције
763
Човек
који
¡e
хтео да забрани рат
767
Миротворац
који
je
радио за Немачку
772
Хазардер
идеје
мира
776
Фанатик као
херој
779
Заточеник британске
традиције
785
Утемељивач
фашизма
790
Револуционар
који
je
злоупотребио идеале
794
ГЛАВА ДРУГА
-
СТВАРАОЦИ У
КУЛТУРИ
И АУТОРИТАРИЗАМ
798
XepojCKO
живљење
живота
801
Право на
свој
живот
806
Подршка и отпор
808
Лична
надмоћност
ствараоца
814
У име
слободе стваралаштва
818
Између
покорности и
стварања
821
ГЛАВА
ТРЕЋА
-
САВРЕМЕНИЦИ
О
МЕЂУРАТНОЈ ЕВРОПИ
824
Summary
832
Регистар личних
имена
874
Белешка
о изворима и
историографији
889
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Mitrović, Andrej 1937-2013 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)132016141 |
| author_facet | Mitrović, Andrej 1937-2013 |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Mitrović, Andrej 1937-2013 |
| author_variant | a m am |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV041244092 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | D720 |
| callnumber-raw | D720 |
| callnumber-search | D720 |
| callnumber-sort | D 3720 |
| callnumber-subject | D - General History |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)891115582 (DE-599)BVBBV041244092 |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1919-1939 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1919-1939 |
| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4006804-3 Biografie gnd-content (DE-588)4056995-0 Statistik gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Biografie Statistik |
| geographic | Europa Europe History 1918-1945 Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Europa Europe History 1918-1945 |
| id | DE-604.BV041244092 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:43:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788617177797 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-026218237 |
| oclc_num | 891115582 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 936 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | Zavod za Udžbenike |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Mitrović, Andrej 1937-2013 Verfasser (DE-588)132016141 aut Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 Andrej Mitrović. Urednik Jelena Davidivić Kolarov 1. izd. Beograd Zavod za Udžbenike 2012 936 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1919-1939 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte Großmacht (DE-588)4125218-4 gnd rswk-swf Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Europa Europe History 1918-1945 Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4006804-3 Biografie gnd-content (DE-588)4056995-0 Statistik gnd-content Europa (DE-588)4015701-5 g Großmacht (DE-588)4125218-4 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s Geschichte 1919-1939 z DE-604 Davidović Kolarov, Jelena Sonstige oth Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026218237&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026218237&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Mitrović, Andrej 1937-2013 Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 Geschichte Großmacht (DE-588)4125218-4 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4125218-4 (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4015701-5 (DE-588)4006804-3 (DE-588)4056995-0 |
| title | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 |
| title_auth | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 |
| title_exact_search | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 |
| title_full | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 Andrej Mitrović. Urednik Jelena Davidivić Kolarov |
| title_fullStr | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 Andrej Mitrović. Urednik Jelena Davidivić Kolarov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Vreme netrpeljivih politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 Andrej Mitrović. Urednik Jelena Davidivić Kolarov |
| title_short | Vreme netrpeljivih |
| title_sort | vreme netrpeljivih politicka istorija velikih drzava evrope 1919 1939 |
| title_sub | politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919 - 1939 |
| topic | Geschichte Großmacht (DE-588)4125218-4 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Geschichte Großmacht Politik Europa Europe History 1918-1945 Biografie Statistik |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026218237&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=026218237&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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