Ustaše na Jadranu: uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | Croatian |
| Published: |
Zagreb
Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest
2012
|
| Series: | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica
Monografije i studije ; 56 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Item Description: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The Ustashas on the Adriatic |
| Physical Description: | 864 S. Ill., Kt. |
| ISBN: | 9789537840112 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Ustaše na Jadranu |b uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije |c Nikica Barić |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a The Ustashas on the Adriatic |
| 264 | 1 | |a Zagreb |b Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest |c 2012 | |
| 300 | |a 864 S. |b Ill., Kt. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije |v 56 | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The Ustashas on the Adriatic | ||
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1812550900339703808 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Sadržaj
SADRŽAJ
Predgovor
. 9
I. Uspostava vlasti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Dalmaciji u travnju
1941.
godine
13
П.
Osvrt na Rimske ugovore iz svibnja
1941.
i stanje nakon njihova potpisivanja.
37
III. Slom "hinbenog saveznika"
. 65
IV.
Ustroj uprave NDH u priključenim jadranskim krajevima
. 95
Ministarstvo za oslobođene krajeve
. 95
Glavarstvo građanske uprave za područje oslobođene Dalmacije i velikih župa
Bribir-Sidraga i Cetina sa sjedištem u Splitu
. 98
Zapovjedništva obalnih odsjeka "Lika" i "Neretva"
. 104
Velike župe u Dalmaciji
. 111
Velika župa Bribir u Šibeniku
. 111
Velika župa Cetina u Splitu
. 116
Velika župa Dubrava u Dubrovniku
. 119
Velika župa Sidraga i Ravni kotari u Zadru
. 124
Još neki podaci i razmatranja
о
upravi NDH u priključenim dijelovima
Dalmacije
. 142
Ustaški pokret u priključenim dijelovima Dalmacije
. 149
V.
Odnos NDH prema Sušaku, Rijeci i Istri
. 161
Razvoj stanja na terenu
. 177
Pokušaji NDH da proširi svoj utjecaj na području Operativnog područja
Jadransko primorje
. 180
Hrvatske oružane snage i druge hrvatske postrojbe u Operativnom području
Jadransko primorje
. 188
VI.
Oružane i redarstvene snage NDH u priključenoj Dalmaciji
. 201
Uspostava posade Hrvatskih oružanih snaga u Splitu
. 205
Djelovanje postrojbi Prometnih zdrugova Ustaške vojnice
. 209
Odnos ministra
Ede
Bułata
prema vojnim pitanjima u priključenoj Dalmaciji
. 212
Osnivanje
VII.
ustaškog stajaćeg zdruga u Drnišu
. 216
Zapovjedništvo područja Velebit-Dinara (Zaveldi)
. 219
Teškoće u djelovanju
VII.
ustaškog stajaćeg zdruga
. 233
"Amerikanski polusdrug"
. 236
Domobranske postrojbe
. 242
Ratna mornarica NDH
. 247
Ustaše na Jadranu
Redarstvena tijela NDH u priključenoj Dalmaciji
. 270
Sedma oružnička pukovnija u Splitu
. 277
Represivne mjere vlasti NDH u priključenoj Dalmaciji
. 283
Istražna i sudska djelatnost Zapovjedništva područja Velebit-Dinara
. 291
Neuspjeh vlasti NDH u suzbijanju komunističke mreže u Splitu
. 300
VII.
Njemačka vojska u Dalmaciji
. 311
Držanje njemačke vojske na području Šibenika i Zadra
. 315
Držanje njemačke vojske na području Sinja i Splita
. 320
"Konačno rješenje židovskog pitanja" u Splitu
. 332
Držanje njemačke vojske na području Makarske, Metkovića i poluotoka Pelješca
337
Držanje njemačke vojske na području Dubrovnika
. 342
"Nerazumljivi i strašni zločin"
-
slučaj Donjeg Dolca i sela Cetinske krajine,
ožujak
1944.
godine
. 346
Odgovornost četnika za stradanje stanovnika Donjeg Dolca i sela
Cetinske krajine?
. 353
"Nota Sambugnach"
. 358
Akcija ministra
Ede
Bułata.
363
Još neka razmatranja
о
stradanju Donjeg Dolca i sela Cetinske krajine
. 378
Nj emačka
voj
ska
uhićuj
e,
deportira i evakuira
stanovní
štvo u Dalmacij i
. 383
Njemačka vojska evakuira stanovništvo
s
dalmatinskih otoka
. 392
Reakcija vlasti NDH na njemačku evakuaciju otoka
. 397
Nijemci nastavljaju
s
evakuacijom u Dalmaciji
. 401
Skrb vlasti NDH za evakuirano stanovništvo
. 409
Političke i promidžbene posljedice evakuacije dalmatinskih otoka
. 414
Njemačko korištenje prisilnog rada u Dalmaciji
. 416
Njemačke deportacije stanovnika Dalmacije u logor u Zemunu i u
Njemački
Reich. 424
"Minski rat"
. 430
Postrojba
Konrad
. 438
Zaključak
о
odnosima vlasti NDH i njemačke vojske u Dalmaciji
. 445
VIII.
Odnosi NDH
s
Talijanskom Socijalnom Republikom
. 453
Pitanje repatrijacije hrvatskih i talijanskih državljana
. 472
IX.
Četnici u sjevernoj Dalmaciji
. 487
Djelovanje Davida Sinčića kao velikog župana i ustaškog stožernika u Kninu
. 504
Hrvatsko-njemačka neslaganja oko "četničkog pitanja"
. 511
Odnos Hrvatskih oružanih snaga i hrvatskih vlasti u Dalmaciji prema četnicima
527
О
opsegu i vrsti nasilja između Hrvata (ustaša) i Srba (Četnika)
. 545
Još neke sastavnice odnosa NDH prema pravoslavnom stanovništvu u Dalmaciji
563
Dinarska četnička divizija napušta Dalmaciju
. 569
Sadržaj
7
X.
Gospodarske, prometne i socijalne prilike u Dalmaciji iz perspektive
vlasti NDH
. 575
Prometne veze
-
"bosanska pruga"
. 584
Prometna veza preko Bihaća
. 587
Željeznički i automobilski promet u Dalmaciji
. 592
Pomorski promet
. 597
Poštanski, brzojavni i telefonski promet
. 602
Problem prehrane stanovništva u Dalmaciji
. 606
Problem prehrane
-
primjer Splita, Šibenika i Dubrovnika
. 611
Promidžbena i politička važnost prehrambenih prilika
. 622
XI.
"Raspoloženje naroda obzirom na vanjske i unutarnje prilike i događaje".
641
"Hrvatska je mati
-
a nema matere, koja svome sinu ne bi oprostila zablude"
. 641
Odnos njemačke vojske prema partizanskim zarobljenicima i prebjezima
. 666
Promidžba NDH u priključenim dijelovima Dalmacije
. 672
Raspoloženje stanovništva u Velikoj župi Bribir
. 702
Raspoloženje stanovništva u Velikoj župi Cetina
. 705
Raspoloženje stanovništva u Velikoj župi Dubrava
. 713
Raspoloženje stanovništva u Velikoj župi Sidraga i Ravni kotari
. 714
Preživjeti rat
. 716
Komunisti/partizani u Dalmaciji
. 719
Komunističko-partizansko nasilje i represivne mjere
. 721
Još neka razmatranja
о
komunistima/partizanima u Dalmaciji
. 732
XII.
"naša su dosadanja nastojanja u ovim krajevima dovedena u pitanje"
-
povlačenje uprave NDH iz Dalmacije
. 741
"Partizanske titovke hodaju veselo po ulicama"
. 758
Edo Bulat
i Bruno Nardelli nakon Drugog svjetskog rata
. 767
Zaključak
. 779
Summary
. 789
Kazalo osoba
. 799
Kazalo autora
. 811
Kazalo zemljopisnih pojmova
. 815
Izvori i literatura
. 827
Popis slikovnih priloga i zemljovida
. 855
Popis kratica
. 863
Summary
789
Summary
THE USTASHAS ON THE ADRIATIC:
THE AUTHORITY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF
CROATIA IN ADRIATIC CROATIA AFTER THE FALL OF THE
KINGDOM OF ITALY
The Independent State of Croatia
(Nezavisna Država Hrvatska,
NDH) was proclaimed
by the Croatian nationalist Ustasha movement on April
10, 1941
during the Axis attack on
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. At that moment, the head of this movement, Ante
Pavelić,
had
the bulk of his hard-core supporters in Italy, who gave him refugee there during the previous
years. Germany and Italy recognized the NDH, but the Italians also wanted to secure new
territorial gains on the eastern Adriatic. The Italian army occupied the Croatian coastal area
and dismantled the local NDH administration. After that, negotiations began between Italians
and NDH representatives, but the position of Croatian side in these negotiations was weak.
On May
18, 1941
Pavelić
and Mussolini signed Rome Agreements. Already after
1918
Italy
gained
Istria,
Fiume
and the islands of
Cres
and
Lošinj
in the northern Adriatic. In
Dalmaţia
it also gained the coastal town of
Zara
and the island of
Lastovo.
The rest of the eastern
Adriatic coast became part of the new Yugoslav state. According to Rome Agreements
of May
1941
Italy gained the town of
Sušak
in the northern Adriatic and the areas in its
vicinity, the coastal area in northern and central
Dalmaţia
including the towns Split and
Šibenik,
as well as a majority of Dalmatian islands. Such a solution was a serious blow for
newly proclaimed NDH and badly tarnished the reputation of Ustasha movement among the
Croatian population.
After World War II, in the new Yugoslav state governed by Communists, the Rome
Agreements were interpreted as clear evidence that the Ustasha movement committed treason
because it "sold" historic and ethnic Croatian territories on the Adriatic to the Italians. Later,
a formal alliance between the Kingdom of Italy and the NDH was also seen as evidence
of the quisling character of the NDH and its ruling Ustasha regime. After the collapse of
Socialist Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of Croatia, the confrontation with
memories and interpretations of World War II still exist. In current discussions, critics of the
NDH always emphasize that it was a puppet state with a quisling regime that committed
mass crimes against parts of its population. They also point out that Ustasha movement "sold
out" Croatian territories at the Adriatic to Mussolini's Fascist regime.
However, it is often forgotten that, by signing the Rome Agreements,
Pavelić
succeeded
in rejecting even greater Italian territorial demands toward NDH, as well as other demands.
It is logical to ask why the Ustasha movement, which sought to establish an independent
Croatian state, allied itself with Kingdom of Italy, which had imperialistic aspirations toward
Croatian eastern Adriatic. In the international circumstances that existed in Europe between
790
Ustaše na Jadranu
the two World Wars, the Ustashas could not find support from any other European power. It
is also mentioned less frequently in the Croatian historiography, and especially in the wider
public, that after the capitulation of Kingdom of Italy in early September of
1943,
the NDH
regained most of the territories that it had lost in Rome Agreements.
This book examines the establishment and activities of the NDH administration in the
areas that were under Italian rule from
1941,
particularly in
Dalmaţia. NDH
authority in
Dalmaţia
existed until late
1944,
when the German army withdrew from that area, which
opened the way for Tito's Yugoslav Partisans to gain control of it. Using a large amount
of mostly previously unexamined archival documents of the NDH authorities this book
attempts to depict one period of NDH's existence in a specific part of its territory.
After the capitulation of Italy, the NDH leadership also sought to extend its borders over
the territories that were gained by Italy after World War I. The NDH attempted to gain
Fiume
and parts of, or the entire territory, of
Istria.
It also made efforts to establish its authority
in town of
Zara
in northern
Dalmaţia,
where the Italian administration loyal to Mussolini
managed to retain authority even after the capitulation of Italy. The NDH also wanted to
establish its rule in the Bay of
Kotor
in the southern Adriatic because it was part of the
Austrian province of
Dalmaţia
before
1918
and also because a sizeable number of the local
population were Croats. The key factor in the eventual realization of these goals of the NDH
was the German Reich. Berlin supported the NDH in reclaiming the areas lost by the Rome
Agreements, but it did not satisfy NDH demands for areas that were part of Italy before
World War II, nor for the Bay of
Kotor.
The
Sušak
area, annexed by Italians in
1941,
formally
remained part of Mussolini's Italian Social Republic. In reality, the Germans established a
new Operation area Adriatic Littoral that included
Sušak,
Fiume,
Istria
and some other north¬
eastern Italian provinces. The NDH still hoped that after the war the Germans would agree
to the further extension of the NDH border in the Adriatic area. Obviously, the precondition
for this was a final German victory.
After the Italian capitulation, the NDH declared the Rome Agreements to be null
and void and the areas formally annexed by Italy were declared to be "liberated areas".
A new Ministry for liberated areas was founded in Zagreb and its duty was to establish
NDH authority in the areas previously annexed by Italians. The Minister for liberated areas
was
Edo Bulat.
Before the war
Bulat
was a lawyer in Split and member of illegal Ustasha
organization. The Ministry for liberated areas had two main representatives in those areas,
each of which had the title of "head of civilian administration".
Oskar Turína
was head
of civilian administration with a formal seat in
Sušak-Rijeka
and he was responsible for
the northern Adriatic area. Bruno Nardelli was head of civilian administration in Split and
he was responsible for the establishment of NDH authority in formally annexed parts of
Dalmaţia.
After the capitulation of Italy the territorial and administrative division of NDH
was changed. Some of the existing great counties
{velike župe)
were expanded in order to
include areas previously annexed by Italians. For example, after the Rome Agreements the
Great County of
Cetina
had a seat in
Omiš.
After the capitulation of Italy it moved its seat to
Split. Some new great counties were also established. The Great County of Sidraga-Ravni
kotari
was established in northern
Dalmaţia
and its seat was formally located in
Zara.
In
1944,
the NDH authorities also established the Great county of
Raša
that encompassed the
whole of
Istria.
Yet in reality the Great County of
Raša
never existed; its formal establishment
demonstrated the attempt of the NDH authorities to enlarge its territories in
Istria
after the
anticipated victory in the war.
Summary
791
The Ministry for liberated areas and its heads of civilian administration were active until
May of
1944
when they were abolished. This was in connection with the demands of the
German army to establish emergency law and military administration in the Croatian coastal
belt, as a measure to counter the possible American and British invasion of the eastern
Adriatic. The NDH authorities agreed to this German demand and established two new
military commands in the coastal areas. These new commands were known as commands of
the coastal sections
"Lika"
and
"Neretva".
Each of these commands encompassed several
great counties in the coastal area. The NDH commanders of these coastal sections, generals
Ivan
Tomašević
and
Vilko
Begić,
represented the supreme NDH civilian and military
authority in their section, but they were at the same time subordinated to commanders of
German army corps deployed in the coastal area.
The NDH had two internal military and political enemies
-
the Communist-led Partisans
and the Serb Chetniks. Both of these movements were also active in
Dalmaţia.
For this
reason it was imperative for NDH to establish the presence of its armed forces in the formerly
annexed areas. The NDH armed forces were divided into the regular army (Croatian Home
Guards) and the Ustasha militia. The problem was that the Italian army, during its presence
in NDH from
1941
to
1943,
had greatly reduced the presence of Home Guards and Ustasha
militia in the coastal area. The Italians did this in order to weaken any possibility for NDH to
threaten areas annexed by Rome Agreements. Because of this, on the eve of capitulation of
Italy, only a number of weak Croatian Home Guards and Ustasha militia were present in the
NDH coastal area, which bordered the annexed areas. After the fall of Italy, NDH military
authorities took measures to deploy its units and commands in the formerly annexed areas,
but they were only partially successful. A new Ustasha brigade was established in northern
Dalmaţia.
A garrison of Croatian troops was deployed in Split and a much weaker garrison
was also established in
Šibenik.
The German army established its garrisons on the Dalmatian
islands, but no Home Guards or Ustasha militia troops were deployed at these islands.
In early
1944,
the Croatian armed forces established a new Command for Northern
Dalmaţia,
which was soon renamed the Command of Velebit-Dinara area. Its commander
was Ustasha colonel Vjekoslav Servatzy. The aim of this new command was to strengthen
the military presence of NDH in northern and central
Dalmaţia.
Servatzy conducted a census
of able-bodied men in order to mobilise them into the Croatian armed forces. Servatzy
was partially successful in his mission. But after the introduction of emergency law and
military administration in the Croatian coastal belt in May of
1944
Servatzy's command was
abolished and he returned to Zagreb. For the remaining period of the NDH administration in
Dalmaţia
its armed forces remained weak and they were, as in other parts of NDH, under the
operational command of the German army.
According to the Rome Agreements, the NDH was not allowed to possess naval forces
in those parts of Adriatic coast that remained under its rule. After the Italian capitulation
this limitation ceased to exit and the NDH gained the opportunity to develop its navy. This
was achieved but only with sizable difficulties, and the NDH navy remained inferior to the
German navy whose forces were deployed along the eastern Adriatic coast.
After the capitulation of Italy the Croatian authorities also established 7th Gendarmerie
Regiment whose headquarters was located in Split. Its subordinated gendarmerie commands
and stations were responsible for the formerly annexed areas of northern and central
Dalmaţia
and its gendarmes were also deployed to Dalmatian islands.
792
Ustaše na Jadranu
The military weakness of the NDH in the former annexed areas of
Dalmaţia
brought
many problems to its authorities. It made them dependent on German army whose units,
in an attempt to suppress the Partisans, applied various repressive measures against the
Croatian civilian population. In northern
Dalmaţia
the German army also used Serb Chetniks
to combat the Partisans. All of this weakened the image of the NDH authorities in the eyes
of the Croatian population in
Dalmaţia.
The guerrilla activities of the Yugoslav Partisans and the bombing by American and
British air forces gravely affected the communications between
Dalmaţia
and other parts of
NDH. Because of this, the NDH authorities had great difficulties in supplying the coastal
area with the adequate amounts of foodstuffs. The lack of food was particularly visible in the
Dalmatian coastal towns and islands whose population was subjected to many hardships and
even starvation. This book describes in detail all land and sea routes of communication used
during that period to supply
Dalmaţia,
as well as other problems dealing with the distribution
of foodstuffs in
Dalmaţia.
For the NDH authorities, food supplies for the former annexed
areas were also a very important tool for winning the hearts and minds of population in
Dalmaţia,
many of whom supported the Partisans. However, due to the previously described
difficulties, the NDH authorities were not able to secure regular and adequate supplies of
food for
Dalmaţia.
The difficulties that the NDH authorities encountered in the former annexed areas not
only arose from the unfavourable circumstances that existed after the fall of Italy. These
difficulties were in fact part of the general development of events after the proclamation of
the NDH in April of
1941.
During the first months of its existence its authorities initiated a
wave of terror and violence against the Serb population that lived within its borders. This
soon led to a Serb revolt against NDH. Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that rebellion
would have started anyway, if we take into consideration the political animosities between
Serbs and Croats that existed during Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the general wish of Serbs
to live in a Yugoslav state, together with Serbia proper. The Serb rebellion against NDH
gradually divided itself into two mutually opposing movements
—
the Partisans led by the
Communist party ofYugoslavia and the Chetnik movement, which presented the continuation
of the former royal Yugoslav army. Throughout the war the Chetniks remained an almost
completely Serb movement. The Partisans, by contrast, attracted into their movement many
more non-Serbs. Especially in
Dalmaţia,
many Croats joined the Partisans because of the
Italian annexation and, later, because of Italian atrocities against the civilian population.
The Chetniks in northern
Dalmaţia
soon established tactical cooperation with the Italian
army, and, later, with the German army as well, because they perceived the Communist-led
Partisans as their main adversary.
Despite all serious problems that the NDH authorities encountered in the former annexed
areas, there is no doubt that they made a serious effort to establish their presence in these
areas, as well as to win the hearts and minds of the local Croatian population after more
than two years of Italian rule. This shows that the NDH and Ustasha movement understood
the importance of
Dalmaţia
and other Croatian areas on the Adriatic, and that the Rome
Agreements from May of
1941
were imposed on the NDH leadership by Italian pressure.
Some conclusions can be made in connection with the violence and crimes that occurred
in
Dalmaţia
during World War II. First, we should mention the fate of the Jews. During
the Italian rule in the annexed areas and the presence of Italian army in the coastal areas
Summary
793
of NDH, many Jews from other parts of NDH fled to these areas. In a way, the Italian-held
areas were a kind of safe heaven for Jews who fled from persecution by NDH authorities
and Germans. After the capitulation of Italy and the arrival of German army in Split, one of
their first measures was to arrest most of the Jews in that town. These Jews were deported to
concentration camps where they were murdered. The NDH authorities in Split later arrested
most of the remaining Jews and deported them to the
Jasenovac
concentration camp. It can
be said that Jews were a very small community, but were also a group that suffered almost
complete destruction.
During its presence in
Dalmaţia
the German army swiftly and sharply responded to
Partisan attacks on its soldiers. In such cases, the German army used reprisals against civilians.
This was especially visible immediately after the capitulation of Italy when Germans troops
advanced to the Dalmatian coast. Where they encountered Partisan resistance, for example
in vicinity of Split, they exacted harsh reprisals on local population. But after the German
army took control of
Dalmaţia
it also tried to develop less violent approach towards the
local population in order to win hearts and minds. Ultimately, it was not possible to realize
this goal because the Partisans continued their attacks on the Germans and this in turn led
to further German reprisals. The most drastic case of such reprisals occurred in March of
1944
when German Waffen-SS troops executed between
1300
and
1400
Croatian civilians
in a number of villages in central
Dalmaţia,
mostly near town of
Sinj.
There is still no clear
reason why the Germans committed this atrocity, but it can be assumed that this massive
execution of Croatian civilians was committed because the Germans wanted to punish and
intimidate population of the area where the Partisans operated and inflicted losses on the
Germans. In order to secure the Dalmatian coast from the possibility of an American and
British invasion throughout
1944,
the German army also carried out the evacuation of parts
of population from Dalmatian islands and parts of coast. The Germans also made numerous
arrests of persons suspected of cooperating with Partisans, with many later deported to serve
as forced labour for the Germans.
Yet, in a way, the presence of German army in
Dalmaţia
also had the effect of lowering
the level of violence. This can be seen in German attempts not to allow violence between
the Ustashas and Serb Chetniks. For the Germans, the most important goal was to use
NDH troops and Chetniks in northern
Dalmaţia
to fight against the Partisans and they were
much less interested in animosities between the NDH and the Chetniks. The Germans had
operational command over NDH troops in
Dalmaţia
and they also controlled the Chetniks.
This enabled the Germans to order both Ustasha troops and Chetniks to stop fighting each
other. As a result, this meant more security for the Croat and Serb civilians living in ethnically
mixed areas of northern
Dalmaţia.
The violence committed by the NDH authorities in
Dalmaţia
reached its peak between
May and July of
1941.
This is the period after the signing of Rome Agreements. Until the
Agreements were signed, the whole of
Dalmaţia
was under the control of the Italian army.
After the new border was established between Italy and the NDH, the Italian army allowed
the NDH authorities to take control over those parts of
Dalmaţia
that remained within
Croatian state. After that, the Ustasha colonel
Juco
Rukavina,
with a group of Ustashas from
Lika
region, arrived to northern
Dalmaţia,
which was an area inhabited by a sizeable Serb
population.
Rukavina
and his men initiated a campaign of terror against the Serbs. Their
main target were the more prominent members of local Serb community, especially those
794
Ustaše na Jadranu
who were presumed to be enemies of NDH, and those who petitioned Italians to annex
whole
Dalmaţia
in order to avoid Croatian rule. The Ustashas executed several hundred
Serbs and the NDH authorities also planned to deport the local Serbs to Serbia. But all this
was stopped after the revolt of Serb population against NDH, which began in late July of
1941.
Soon after the Italian army declared it was taking over control of the whole coastal belt
of the NDH and ordered the Ustasha militia to withdraw from this area. Such a development
stopped instances of further Ustasha violence against the Serb population. The Italians could
rightly claim that Ustasha violence against Serbs caused their uprising and could justify
reoccupation
of the Croatian coastal belt as a measure necessary to achieve pacification.
But the Italian motive was also to weaken the NDH and neutralise its influence in the area
bordering the territory that Italians gained by Rome Agreements.
By September
1943,
when Italy capitulated and the NDH gained the opportunity to
regain former annexed areas in
Dalmaţia,
the NDH authorities articulated a new policy
toward Serb population. During
1942
a new Croatian Orthodox Church was established,
which replaced the Serb Orthodox Church that the NDH authorities had abolished in
1941.
The Serb population in the NDH was redefined as "Croatian Orthodox". The NDH
authorities also decreed that Serbs who did not join the Croatian Orthodox Church, but who
expressed loyalty to NDH, would be treated in the same way as all other citizens. The NDH
authorities also made agreements with some Chetniks detachments. These agreements were
based on the mutual need to fight the Partisans. By signing these agreements, the Chetniks,
at least formally, recognized NDH as their state. Even before this policy of appeasement and
pacification was articulated at the state level it was advocated and successfully conducted
by David
Sinčić,
who in late
1941
became head of Great County Bribir-Sidraga in
Knin
and
leader of the Ustasha movement for that Great County whose territory included northern
Dalmaţia.
It was very difficult for the NDH authorities to conduct this new policy toward the Serbs
because by that time Zagreb had already lost control over much of its territory, much of
which was now in the hands of the Partisans and Chetniks. Nevertheless, after September
1943,
the NDH authorities in
Dalmaţia
did not commit any planned atrocities against the
local Serb population. There were cases in which Ustasha militiamen killed some Serb
civilians or Chetniks. But these murders were often motivated not only by Ustasha hatred
toward Serbs, but also because the poorly disciplined Ustasha militiamen wanted to plunder
the property of their victims.
Regarding the violence of NDH authorities toward the Communists, Partisans, and their
supporters, the NDH had a range of legal acts that stipulated very harsh reprisals against
enemies of the state. Yet in
Dalmaţia,
and especially in its areas formally annexed by Italians,
local NDH authorities rarely applied such reprisals. There are two reasons for such leniency.
The first one is the military weakness of NDH in
Dalmaţia.
Its authorities did not possess the
necessary strength and this restricted them from carrying out reprisals. The second reason
was caused by the political position of NDH authorities in the formally annexed areas. The
Italian annexation of parts of
Dalmaţia
and the formal alliance between the Italians and the
NDH was an excellent propaganda opportunity for the Communists who could claim to
Dalmatian Croats that the NDH and Ustashas had betrayed them and "sold" them to Italians.
Because of this, the NDH, after it had regained control of former annexed parts of
Dalmaţia,
made a serious propaganda effort to win the hearts and minds of the local Croats, although
Summary
795
many of them supported and had members of their families in the Partisan ranks. Because
of this, the NDH authorities often restrained themselves in reprisals against the Partisan
supporters. Very often the NDH authorities in
Dalmaţia
found themselves in a difficult
position because they wished to protect their own citizens from the reprisals of German
army. The Germans rightly saw that the Communists and Partisans had supporters among the
Croatian population in
Dalmaţia
and did not restrain themselves in taking reprisals against
civilians. The NDH itself wanted to destroy the Partisans, and depended on German support
in order to achieve this goal; yet because of the above-mentioned political reasons the NDH
representatives often tried to protect the Croatian population in
Dalmaţia
from German
reprisals. The German army's reprisals in
Dalmaţia
soon led to numerous protests by NDH
representatives. The Minister for Liberated Areas,
Edo Bulat,
was particularly vociferous in
his condemnation of German reprisals. However, the NDH depended heavily on German
army and therefore was unable to exert control over its actions towards Croatian civilians.
Regarding the violence of the Serb Chetniks in northern
Dalmaţia,
they never again
engaged in mass violence after the capitulation of Italy. The Chetniks did have plans to take
revenge against the Ustashas after winning to war in order to make them pay for the violence
they had previously committed against Serbs. It can be assumed that this would have meant
revenge against other Croats as well. The Chetniks also had plans to establish a "Greater
Serbia" within Yugoslavia after the war, and this enlarged Serb entity would have included
a large part of
Dalmaţia.
However, these were plans that depended on wider military and
political developments. The Chetniks collaborated with the German army based on their
need to fight the Partisans. The Chetniks were well aware that the Germans, who were
allies of NDH, would not allow Chetnik terror against the Croatian population. Therefore,
Chetnik violence was limited to the killing of some soldiers of the Croatian armed forces
and Croatian civilians. Yet such murders were often motivated not only by hatred but also
as a means to plunder the victims. The Germans allowed the Chetniks to use violence on a
larger scale only against those Croats who were suspected of being Partisan supporters, such
as in some villages around the coastal town of
Šibenik.
For the Germans, such violence was
a reprisal against the Partisans, but the Chetniks who took part in the killings were obviously
also motivated by hatred toward Croats as such. Nevertheless, the number of Croat victims
of Chetnik violence was immeasurably smaller then the number of Croats who were killed
in "mechanically" conducted German reprisals.
The Partisans, which was the army of the revolutionary Communist party of Yugoslavia,
eventually won the final victory in the war. Winning the war allowed them to take complete
power in newly established Yugoslav state. This also meant that they could impose their
interpretation of World War II, which was impossible to question while the Communists were
in power. However, in early
1990s,
with break-up of the Communist regime and Yugoslavia
as a state, the Communist interpretation of World War II could finally be questioned and
reinterpreted. Due to various circumstances a new concept called "Croatian anti-fascism"
was created and legitimized in the Republic of Croatia after
1990,
although in reality it
had little to do with real Communist revolutionaries and Partisan soldiers from World War
II. "Croatian anti-fascism" was created by a rejection of the Yugoslav framework that was
established in
1945
and then reduced to Croatia, as a former federal unit of the Yugoslav
state, while the Communist revolutionary ideology was replaced by "anti-fascism", which
was understood as a universal positive value. All of these changes have been reflected on
796
Ustaše na Jadranu
current descriptions of World War Il-era events in
Dalmaţia
and along the Croatian Adriatic
coast. The Ustashas are seen as national traitors and lackeys of Italian fascism, while the
"Croatian antifascists" are seen as those who bravely struggled for the present-day Croatian
borders on the Adriatic.
The Partisan movement in
Dalmaţia
was distinct because, unlike in other parts of the
NDH, its ranks were composed of mostly Croats and not Serbs. Some Croatian historians, as
well as the wider public, are of the opinion that Dalmatian Croats, faced with Italian rule that
attempted to denationalize them, and fascist terror, immediately and in great numbers chose
tojóin
the Partisans. However, it is doubtful that imposition of Italian rule by itself led to the
development of the Partisan movement in
Dalmaţia.
It is true that the new Italian authorities
had a policy of attempting to denationalize the Croatian population. But it is also a fact that
Italians attempted to win the hearts and minds of the local population in the annexed areas.
The Italians did not mobilise locals into the Italian army and planned to carry out economic
development of annexed areas. It is also interesting to note one detail: after the capitulation
of Italy, when the NDH regained annexed territories, its authorities were faced with the
problem of securing food supplies for population of
Dalmaţia.
Regarding this problem, NDH
officials in their reports often mentioned that the population complained that they were better
supplied with food under Italian rule.
In my opinion the mere fact that the Italian authority was established, even with its
plan to denationalize Croat population, was not the key reason why Croats from
Dalmaţia
joined the Partisans. What was more important were Communist revolutionary tactics.
The Communists initiated attacks on the Italians who responded with reprisals against
civilian population. This led to a cycle of violence in which more and more Croats from
Dalmaţia
went to Partisans. In September
1943,
the Communists in
Dalmaţia
again used
the circumstances appearing after the capitulation of Italy and the dissolution of the Italian
army and authority. In such circumstances the Communists mobilised into their units a large
number of Dalmatian Croats. But many of those who joined Partisans in September
1943
did not do so because they had a clear political and ideological idea that they were joining
the "right" side. Instead, many of them joined the Partisans because they believed, in the
immediate aftermath of the Italian collapse, that the war would soon be over. But the war did
not end at this time nor did the Americans and British land on eastern Adriatic.
On one hand, there is no doubt that the Communists in
Dalmaţia
managed to draw
to the Partisans many people by promising them not only national liberation, but also the
establishment of a more just social order. On the other hand, the chaotic war situation
went hand in hand with the Communists' revolutionary goals. The Partisans destroyed
communications, which hampered the supply of the Dalmatian population with food, but
Communist propaganda could claim that NDH authorities were responsible for poor food
supplies. The Partisans ambushed German army units even though they knew this would
lead to German reprisals; then, once the reprisals took place, the Communists could say to
the people that the only way to protect themselves from Germans was to join the Partisans.
The NDH and German armies did not have enough forces at their disposal to destroy the
Partisans, who used guerrilla tactics, attacking the enemy at the time and place of their
choosing and withdrawing when faced with stronger enemy. Yet, at the same time, the
Partisans were not strong enough to defeat the German army in
Dalmaţia.
The Partisans
were able to take control of
Dalmaţia
in late
1944
only after the German army decided to
Summary
797
withdraw from that province, which was due to developments on other fronts. The same
happened several months later in other parts of NDH, after the retreat of Germans. After the
war was decided on other fronts, the Yugoslav Communists had an organized army, as well
as support of a part of the population from all Yugoslav national communities, which enabled
them to acquire complete power.
The Communist-led Partisan movement liquidated its military and political opponents
whom it accused of having been "quislings", "traitors of the people", and "war criminals".
Yet the Communists were in fact frequently liquidating real and perceived political enemies
who could endanger their grip on power. During the war the Partisans killed hundreds of
"quislings" in
Dalmaţia
and even after they took control over
Dalmaţia
in late
1944
many of
these executions were carried out without any trial or before Communist-run "show trials".
The NDH regarded both the Chetniks and Partisans as very dangerous enemies to its
own existence. But because of its own military weakness the NDH could not fight against
or disarm the Chetniks who established cooperation first with the Italians, and later with
the Germans. The NDH authorities wanted to dissolve the Chetniks detachments in order
to transform them into village guards that would eventually become part of the Croatian
armed forces. The NDH had formal German support for such an arrangement. The Germans
knew very well that the Chetniks were the continuation of the royal Yugoslav army and, as
such, were allies of Americans and British. But the German army nevertheless continued
its cooperation with Chetniks, because it could not count on the fighting efficiency of the
Croatian armed forces. For this reason Chetniks units were never dissolved or put under
NDH's command.
NDH saw the Partisans as a Communist and Serb dominated movement whose goal was
to re-establish Yugoslavia. The NDH officials saw the Partisans in
Dalmaţia
in a particular
light because they were aware that most of them were Croats who became Partisans after
Rome Agreements and subsequent Italian reprisals. Even before the capitulation of Italy
there was a widespread opinion among NDH officials that Dalmatian Partisans were Croatian
patriots who joined the Partisans only to escape Italian atrocities and that these men should
be drawn to the side of the Croatian state. Immediately after the Italian capitulation Ante
Pavelić
made a public speech in which he called upon all Croats who are "in the woods" to
return to regular life as NDH citizens because the areas lost by Rome Agreements have finally
been regained. The NDH authorities also made efforts to repatriate from Italy all Croats
who were previously arrested or interned by the Italians as Partisans and their supporters.
All these measures of the NDH authorities were aimed at winning of hearts and minds of
the population in the former annexed areas and, moreover, were an indirect admission of
responsibility for negative consequences of Rome Agreements.
Regarding the final goals of all the political movements that were active in
Dalmaţia
during World War II, it is obvious that only the Ustasha movement unconditionally aspired
toward an independent Croatian state. The other Croatian political representatives, including
a large part of the Croatian Peasant Party, which was the most dominant Croatian political
force before war, as well as the Communist party of Croatia, which was part of the Communist
party of Yugoslavia, considered Yugoslavia as a realistic and desirable framework for
the solution of "Croat question". In
Dalmaţia,
the Communists could call upon Croatian
patriotism by declaring that the Ustasha movement and
Pavelić
"sold" the historical Croatian
provinces to Italians. In some areas, for example in the
Šibenik
area, the Croatian population
798
Ustaše na Jadranu
joined the Partisans in order to protect themselves from Chetnik violence because the NDH
authorities were too weak to offer that protection themselves. But all this did not mean that
Partisans were fighting for an independent Croatian state. Instead they fought for a Croatia
that would be a federal unit within a newly established Yugoslav state. Yugoslav patriotism
was clearly visible in the attitude of many Dalmatian Communists and their fellow travellers.
I presume that this Yugoslav orientation was linked with the ideology of integral Yugoslav
nation. This ideology was rejected by majority of Croats already during the period of first
Yugoslav state, but its echoes were visible among many Croats from
Dalmaţia
who later
joined and led the Partisan movement. The regional Communist leadership for
Dalmaţia
kept close ties with the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, although it was
formally subordinated to the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia.
From the present-day perspective, the Communist-led Partisan movement is often judged
by how it solved the national question and whether Croatia, as a federal unit of Communist-
led Yugoslavia, heralded the present-day independent Republic of Croatia. Because of this,
researchers tend to neglect the social base of the Communist-led Partisan movement. The
fact is that poverty and difficult life conditions before and during the World War II motivated
many from lower social classes, as well as some from the higher and better educated circles,
to join the Communist-led Partisan movement, with high hopes that its victory would bring
about a more just and prosperous social system.
In this book I devoted sustained attention to analysing what can be called "attitude of the
people". I tried to present and explain why certain individuals and groups decided to join or
refused to join political and military movements that existed in
Dalmaţia
during World War
II. Although it is very difficult to give a definitive answer to how ordinary people reacted to
all the events that occurred during World War II, it is certain that their reactions can hardly
be explained if we retrospectively seek to "grade" them as "good" or "bad". It can also be
concluded that a sizeable number of people did not even have a clear opinion about who
should win the war, but were ready to accept anyone who would guarantee them life and
security. It can be concluded that World War II in
Dalmaţia,
as well as in other parts of
Croatia, should be interpreted with more attention to the details of these past events. Current
simplified interpretations cannot offer an adequate set of answers for the questions that
emerge from that period and these interpretations often are not based on historical research
but rather tend to reflect contemporary political fault lines in Croatian society. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Barić, Nikica 1975- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1048596478 |
| author_facet | Barić, Nikica 1975- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Barić, Nikica 1975- |
| author_variant | n b nb |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040687808 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)863065499 (DE-599)BVBBV040687808 |
| era | Geschichte 1941-1944 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1941-1944 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Dalmatien (DE-588)4070200-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Dalmatien |
| id | DE-604.BV040687808 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-10-10T18:00:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789537840112 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025668621 |
| oclc_num | 863065499 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 |
| physical | 864 S. Ill., Kt. |
| psigel | DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica |
| series2 | Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije |
| spelling | Barić, Nikica 1975- Verfasser (DE-588)1048596478 aut Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije Nikica Barić The Ustashas on the Adriatic Zagreb Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest 2012 864 S. Ill., Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica : Monografije i studije 56 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The Ustashas on the Adriatic Ustaša (DE-588)278317-4 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1941-1944 gnd rswk-swf Dalmatien (DE-588)4070200-5 gnd rswk-swf Dalmatien (DE-588)4070200-5 g Ustaša (DE-588)278317-4 b Geschichte 1941-1944 z DE-604 Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica Monografije i studije ; 56 (DE-604)BV010859037 56 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025668621&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025668621&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Barić, Nikica 1975- Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije Biblioteka Hrvatska povjesnica Ustaša (DE-588)278317-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)278317-4 (DE-588)4070200-5 |
| title | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije |
| title_alt | The Ustashas on the Adriatic |
| title_auth | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije |
| title_exact_search | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije |
| title_full | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije Nikica Barić |
| title_fullStr | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije Nikica Barić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ustaše na Jadranu uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije Nikica Barić |
| title_short | Ustaše na Jadranu |
| title_sort | ustase na jadranu uprava nezavisne drzave hrvatske u jadranskoj hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije kraljevine italije |
| title_sub | uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije |
| topic | Ustaša (DE-588)278317-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ustaša Dalmatien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025668621&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025668621&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV010859037 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT baricnikica ustasenajadranuupravanezavisnedrzavehrvatskeujadranskojhrvatskojnakonkapitulacijekraljevineitalije AT baricnikica theustashasontheadriatic |