Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935): analizy, projekty, działania
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Łódź
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
2011
|
| Ausgabe: | Wyd. 1. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: British diplomacy and the concept of the Eastern Pact (1933-1935) |
| Beschreibung: | 635, [4] s 24 cm. |
| ISBN: | 9788375256277 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804149024576503808 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | SPIS TREŚCI
Wstęp
...................................................................................................................................... 7
Rozdział
1.
Od obawy do częściowego uznania. Brytyjska polityka w sprawie bezpieczeń¬
stwa zbiorowego
(1919-1933).......................................................................................... 23
Rozdział
2.
Przesilenie na linii
Moskwa-Berlin
(styczeń 1933-styczeń
1934)
w ocenie
dyplomacji brytyjskiej
...................................................................................................... 51
2.1.
Foreign
Office a narastanie sporu sowiecko-niemieckiego w
1933
r
......................... 52
2.2.
W obliczu sowieckiej gry dyplomatycznej wobec państw bałtyckich na przełomie
1933/1934
r
............................................................................................................... 89
2.3.
Deklaracje Moskwy w sprawie polityki bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego (grudzień
1933-styczeń
1934) .................................................................................................. 114
Rozdział
3.
Reakcje Londynu na pojawienie się koncepcji „Locarna wschodniego
(marzec-lipiec
1934) ........................................................................................................ 133
3.1.
Międzynarodowy kontekst inicjatywy francusko-sowieckiej w ocenie
Foreign
Office
133
3.2.
Brytyjskie opinie na temat doniesień o zamiarze wejścia ZSRS do Ligi Narodów
.... 159
3.3.
Reakcje FO na francuską deklarację rozszerzenia systemu locarneńskiego w Euro¬
pie Środkowo-Wschodniej (maj-czerwiec
1934) ..................................................... 169
3.4.
Analiza projektu francuskiego z
27
czerwca
1934
r
................................................... 199
Rozdział
4.
Brytyjskie działania dyplomatyczne na rzecz włączenia Związku Sowieckiego
do systemu bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego (lipiec-wrzesień
1934)...................................... 209
4.1.
Wizyta
Louisa
Barthou w Londynie
(9-10
lipca
1934) ............................................. 209
4.2.
Aktywność
Foreign
Office na rzecz podpisania paktu wschodniego
......................... 214
4.3.
Wyhamowanie działań brytyjskiej dyplomacji
.......................................................... 246
4.4.
Wobec odrzucenia koncepcji paktu wschodniego o wzajemnej pomocy przez
III Rzeszę i Polskę
..................................................................................................... 267
4.5.
Wielka Brytania a wejście ZSRS do Ligi Narodów
18
września
1934
r
.................... 278
Rozdział
5.
Impas rokowań na temat paktu wschodniego po śmierci
Louisa Barthou
(październik 1934-luty
1935)............................................................................................ 297
5.1.
Międzynarodowe i wewnętrzne uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej rządu bry¬
tyjskiego na przełomie
1934/1935
r
.......................................................................... 299
5.2.
Foreign
Office a rozgrywka w trójkącie Paryż-Moskwa-Berlin (październik-
grudzień
1934) .......................................................................................................... 312
5.3.
Oceny aktywności politycznej ZSRS na przełomie
1934/1935
r
............................... 337
5.4.
FO a działania dyplomatyczne
Pierre a
Lavala
na arenie europejskiej (grudzień
1934-styczeń
1935).................................................................................................. 351
5.5.
Londyńska wizyta
Pierre-Etienne
a Flandina i
Pierre a
Lavala
(1-3
lutego
1935) .... 371
Rozdział
6.
Negocjacje wokół koncepcji paktu wschodniego o nieagresji i konsultacji
(luty-kwiecień
1935) ........................................................................................................ 399
6.1.
Sformułowanie nowej koncepcji paktu wschodniego
............................................... 400
6.2.
Nadzieje związane z wizytą brytyjskich ministrów w Berlinie
.................................. 421
6.3.
Rozmowy
Anthony ego
Edena
w Moskwie
............................................................... 446
6.4.
Sondaż wokół nowej koncepcji paktu wschodniego w Warszawie i Pradze
.............. 463
6.5.
Sprawa paktu wschodniego na konferencji w Stresie
(11-14
kwietnia
1935)............ 477
British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact
(1933-1935)
Analyses, Projects, Activities
SUMMARY
The subject of this thesis is an exploration of British diplomatic relations in
the years of
1933-1935.
The main aim was to research what was London s
attitude towards the Eastern Pact, which at the time was seen as a solution to
stability in European relations. This was made possible by examining govern¬
ment materials available in the National Archives in London, particularly by
monitoring the general correspondence of the British Foreign Office at this time.
Other documents were also of great importance. It is evident from this that
London was interested in the success of the Soviet-French proposal of an
Eastern Pact as it was seen as a way of constraining German expansionist
ambitions in Europe.
Prior to
1933
there would have been no possibility of an Eastern European
security agreement due to the German-Soviet cooperation which lasted till
1933.
The liquidation of the German Communist Party on
28*
February
1933
was
a very important moment in the history of the bilateral relations of both coun¬
tries. The so called Rapallo policy existed even before
16*
April
1922,
when
an official treaty was signed in the Italian town by the representatives of the
Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union. But in
1933
bilateral relations between
Moscow and Berlin deteriorated drastically and by the end of
1933
and the
beginning of
1934
a whole series of Soviet declarations took place. These all
announced changes in Moscow s foreign policy but it was not very clear what
was to happen. On 29th December
1933,
Maxim Livinov, the Peoples Commis¬
sar for Foreign Affairs gave his most famous speech. In this he emphasized the
Policy of collective security which should be undertaken by all peace-loving
countries to counteract against the aggressors and instigators of war . Over the
next months it appeared that the collective security policy meant two things:
the USSR agreed to join the League of Nations and it promoted the idea of an
Eastern Pact of mutual assistance.
_
This idea of an Eastern Pact had several versions. The earliest one, formu¬
lated in December
1933,
assumed that France, Belgium, Poland, Finland,
Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would
militarily help each other should any of these states be attacked by a country
outside this constellation. In the second version, proposed in April
1934
several
alterations were introduced. Paris proposed changing the composition at the
6
Rozdział
7
Epilog brytyjskich starań o zawarcie paktu wschodniego (kwiecień-grudzień
1935)................................................................................................................................. 499
7.1.
Foreign
Office a francusko-sowiecki pakt o pomocy wzajemnej z
2
maja
1935
r
..... 500
7.2.
Ostatnie starania na rzecz zawarcia paktu wschodniego o nieagresji i konsultacji
.... 521
7.3.
Rezygnacja Londynu z popierania koncepcji paktu wschodniego
............................. 563
Zakończenie
............................................................................................................................ 589
Bibliografia
............................................................................................................................. 599
British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact
(1933-1935).
Analyses, Projects,
Activities (Summary)
.............................................................................................................. 615
Aneks I. Słownik osób występujących w książce...................................................................
619
Aneks
2.
Struktura
Foreign
Office w latach
1933-1935 .........................................................
636
Aneks
3.
Wykaz stosowanych skrótów
................................................................................... 637
Od Redakcji
............................................................................................................................ 639
616
members of the Pact. France and Belgium were to be excluded and Nazi
Germany to be co-opted. France would be only a guarantor of the pact while the
USSR would become the third guarantor of the Locarno agreement signed in
1925.
In such circumstances a clause of mutual assistance was also included. But
a member of Eastern Pact was to be immediately helped if another member
attacked him. In both conceptions there was no doubt that the proposed treaty
was anti-German in character as at this time Berlin, under Adolf Hitler s regime
was regarded as a country with offensive designs. The third version of Eastern
Pact appeared in February
1935.
French diplomacy offered to sign the mutual
non-aggression pact between the countries planned earlier. But this was to be
ammended by facultative immediate mutual assistance obligations by member-
states willing to undertake them. Thus the Soviet Union, France and Czecho¬
slovakia would be able to count on each other s assistance in the case of aggres¬
sion by any other member of the Eastern Non-Aggression Pact. Thus the
underlying purpose of the pact was still anti-German. And such an idea mate¬
rialized in form of two mutual assistance pacts between the USSR and France
and Czechoslovakia. But there was a non-aggression understanding.
British diplomacy was not informed about the first version of Eastern Pact.
But on 15th May
1934
Louis Barthou, French minister for foreign affairs, ex¬
plained his plans of an Eastern Locarno to Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal.
After this London started to be involved in the whole diplomatic game which took
place in Europe in connection with Eastern Pact. The first British reaction was
rather hesitant but Barthou s visit to London
(9-10*
July
1934)
dispelled all the
Foreign Office s doubts, particularly after he accepted the British adjustments. Sir
John Simon, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, following the advice
of senior clerks in his ministry (Sir
Orme
Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary and
Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary) proposed that the plan of
a French-Soviet guarantee should be ammended by the participation of Germany
as a third member. The second of Simon s conditions was Paris agreement to
legalize German rearmament to the level achieved by the Third Reich in the
middle of
1934.
It would be an answer to German claim of
Gleichberechtigung ,
which meant equal treatment of Nazi Germany. This point was much more
difficult for the French minister to accept but finally Barthou agreed and received
British assurance of support. London also expressed readiness to promote the idea
of an Eastern Pact in Italy, Germany and Poland, namely countries where Paris
expected a lack of support towards the proposed project.
London was a strong supporter of the Eastern Pact during the whole summer
of
1934.
But after the German memorandum announced on
10*
September
1934
British diplomats regarded the whole idea as dead. Louis Bartou s tragic death
a month later seemed to determine the end of the mutual assistance pact for
Eastern Europe. The entrance of the USSR to League of Nations on 18th Sep¬
tember
1934
appeared to be the only success of French and British endeavors.
617
Such a conviction lasted in London till the beginning of
1935.
Then London, like
the French began to fear the renewal of the Rapallo line again in Moscow.
Soviet diplomacy was not very active in promoting the idea of Eastern Pact,
which was assumed to be a French-Soviet one. But at the turn of
1934/1935
Moscow started to spread rumors about the weak position of Maxim
Litvínov,
who was regarded as a main
promotor
of collective security in Moscow. His
dismissal because of lack of success was perceived as a sign of the Kremlin
coming back into cooperation with Berlin.
This was a reason for London s support for the changed version of Eastern
Pact. Such a vision was also accepted by the new French minister for foreign
affaires, Pierre Laval. He wanted to both encourage German-Soviet tension and be
on good terms with Berlin. He was even ready to accept German rearmament as
the price for such an understanding with Hitler s government. The Soviet factor
was not his priority. But he knew the renewal of cooperation between Moscow
and Berlin could only undermine the security of France as it meant that German
expansionism would turn Westward. London did not wish this either. This was
why British diplomacy promoted the Eastern Non-Aggression Pact which could
stop Hitler s expansionism towards Eastern Europe. Diplomats in Foreign Office
were convinced that this could alleviate Soviet fears of aggression from Germany,
which seemed likely given Hitler s anti-communist enunciations and his book
Mein Kampf. In
this way they assumed that if Moscow felt secure about Western
support she would be less likely to make an understanding with the German
regime and instead continue her cooperation with the Western powers in frame¬
work of the collective security system proposed in the Eastern Pact.
In the end nothing happened. His Majesty s Government remained the most
faithful
promotor
of the conception of the Eastern Pact almost till the end of
1935.
The series of memoranda by senior clerks of the Foreign Office (one by
Sir
Orme
Sargent and Ralph Wigram, one by Laurence Collier and one by Sir
Robert Vansittart) in November-December
1935
on policy towards the Third
Reich did not mention the Eastern Pact as a tool of restraining German territorial
ambitions. Berlin was unwilling to take up new obligations because of Hitler s
expansionist plans. Warsaw refused to sign the mutual assistance pact too. Polish
diplomacy was afraid of the possibility of opening doors under international law
for the Red Army to invade Polish territory in the case of German attack on
Czechoslovakia or Lithuania. This they felt was a necessity to avoid the danger
of making Poland the battlefield in European conflict. But
Józef
Beck, Polish
minister for foreign affairs raised no reservations towards the multilateral non-
aggression treaty. Finland, Esthonia and Latvia shared Polish fears for the
French-Soviet suggestion but only Helsinki were courageous enough to refuse it
openly. Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, feeling endangered by the German
aggression, were the main supporters of Eastern mutual assistance pact. But they
were also happy to have at least a non-aggression agreement with Berlin.
618
Moscow, however, was only satisfied with a mutual assistance treaty, which
could easily provoke a war in Western Europe and allow Soviet troops to move
in on neighbouring territories. The Eastern Pact clauses allowed this to be done
lawfully. France under the leadership of the foreign minister Louis Barthou has
supported such a solution as a way of containing Germany from the East but
Pierre Laval changed Paris priorities.
The British Foreign Office correctly estimated French and German aims in
this diplomatic game and tried in their traditional manner to moderate the
attitudes of both sides to encourage their understanding. They also rightly picked
up Polish reservations but gave them no positive support. However London
decided to take the Polish attitude into account and Anthony Eden s visit in
Warsaw in April
1935
was a sign
ofthat.
On the other hand the feelings of the
Baltic States and Czechoslovakia were disregarded. Prague was expected to
follow anything proposed by the French government, Esthonia and Latvia
because of their ambigous declarations were mistakenly supposed to support the
idea of Eastern Pact in its original version. Lithuania was quite clear as to her
acceptance of the whole project. Finally, Soviet aims remained obscure for
London. The USSR was regarded a peaceful state by the majority of Foreign
Office officials (Sir
Orme
Sargent was an exception among the senior clerks).
Soviet propaganda stated their fear of attack from the West and simultaneously
from the East (Japan) and this was seen as the main motivation for Moscow s
defensive steps. This gives credence to the Foreign Office s low level of
understanding of what was the Soviet Union policy. The fact that London was
much less interested in the politics of states to the east of Germany might in
some way excuse the diplomats. Wrong assumptions, however, as to the aims of
the Stalin s regime meant that British attempts to establish a Western security
system failed.
Checked by
Kristina
Cooper
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Jeziorny, Dariusz 1968- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1150884568 |
| author_facet | Jeziorny, Dariusz 1968- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Jeziorny, Dariusz 1968- |
| author_variant | d j dj |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040028740 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)796193159 (DE-599)BVBBV040028740 |
| edition | Wyd. 1. |
| era | Geschichte 1933-1935 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1933-1935 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic_facet | Osteuropa Großbritannien |
| id | DE-604.BV040028740 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:16:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788375256277 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024885677 |
| oclc_num | 796193159 |
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| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
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| physical | 635, [4] s 24 cm. |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateSearch | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Jeziorny, Dariusz 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)1150884568 aut Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania Dariusz Jeziorny Wyd. 1. Łódź Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2011 635, [4] s 24 cm. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: British diplomacy and the concept of the Eastern Pact (1933-1935) Geschichte 1933-1935 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 g Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Geschichte 1933-1935 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024885677&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Jeziorny, Dariusz 1968- Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4075739-0 (DE-588)4022153-2 |
| title | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania |
| title_auth | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania |
| title_exact_search | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania |
| title_full | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania Dariusz Jeziorny |
| title_fullStr | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania Dariusz Jeziorny |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) analizy, projekty, działania Dariusz Jeziorny |
| title_short | Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego (1933 - 1935) |
| title_sort | dyplomacja brytyjska wobec koncepcji paktu wschodniego 1933 1935 analizy projekty dzialania |
| title_sub | analizy, projekty, działania |
| topic | Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Osteuropa Großbritannien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024885677&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jeziornydariusz dyplomacjabrytyjskawobeckoncepcjipaktuwschodniego19331935analizyprojektydziałania |