Titova licna diplomatija:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Beograd
Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju
2010
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd |
| Schriftenreihe: | Biblioteka Studije i monografije
68 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Personal diplomacy of Josip Broz Tito |
| Beschreibung: | 350 S. Ill., Kt. 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9788674031421 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Petrović, Vladimir |d 1979- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)141298553 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Titova licna diplomatija |c Vladimir Petrovic |
| 250 | |a 1. izd | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Beograd |b Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju |c 2010 | |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Biblioteka Studije i monografije |v 68 | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Personal diplomacy of Josip Broz Tito | ||
| 600 | 1 | 4 | |a Tito, Josip Broz / 1892-1980 |
| 600 | 1 | 7 | |a Tito, Josip Broz |d 1892-1980 |0 (DE-588)118622935 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1945-1980 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nonalignment / Yugoslavia | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Außenpolitik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
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| 651 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia / Foreign relations / 1945-1980 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia / Politics and government / 1945-1980 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Jugoslawien | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804147979048714240 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | SADRŽAJ
Predgovor
..................................................................................................................7
Uvod
....................................................................................................................... 11
Kontekst i struktura
................................................................................................ 12
Ličnost i literatura
.................................................................................................. 19
Prva glava Gost
..................................................................................................... 27
Neúspešní
pregovori
о
savezu sa Velikom Britanijom
.......................................... 31
Staljinova smrt i njene implikacije
......................................................................... 34
Škola bontona
......................................................................................................... 39
Prilozi prvoj glavi
................................................................................................... 51
Druga glava Domaćin
........................................................................................... 69
Sovjetska
Kanosa?
.................................................................................................. 70
Beogradski rašomon
............................................................................................... 78
Kanosa
u kontekstu
................................................................................................ 83
Prilozi drugoj glavi
................................................................................................. 93
Treća glava Posrednik
........................................................................................ 121
Jugoslavija u potrazi za fleksibilnom spoljnom politikom
................................... 123
Posredovanje na
delu:
Jugoslavija i kriza na Bliskom istoku
.............................. 124
Od Briona
do Sueca:
vrhunac i pad politike posredovanja
.................................. 130
Prilozi trećoj glavi
................................................................................................ 143
Četvrta glava Globtroter
................................................................................... 165
Svetski putnik
....................................................................................................... 166
Beogradska konferencija
...................................................................................... 174
Utabavanje nesvrstavanja
..................................................................................... 180
Prilozi četvrtoj glavi
............................................................................................. 189
Peta glava Arbitar
.............................................................................................. 211
Prevladavanje tuđih kriza
..................................................................................... 212
Nesvrstani od Lusake do
Kolomba
...................................................................... 221
Intimus
u godinama
detanta
................................................................................. 226
Prilozi petoj glavi
................................................................................................. 237
Šesta glava Veteran
............................................................................................ 261
Pripreme za samit
................................................................................................. 263
Odmeravanje u Havani
......................................................................................... 268
Memento mori
...................................................................................................... 280
Prilozi šestoj glavi
................................................................................................ 283
Epilog: Titova posthumna diplomatija
................................................................ 307
Tito s
Personal
Diplomacy
................................................................................... 319
Registar ličnih imena
............................................................................................ 325
Izvori i literatura
................................................................................................... 331
Skraćenice
.............................................................................................................349
Beleška
о
autoru
................................................................................................... 351
PERSONAL
DIPLOMACY OF
JOSIP BROZ TITO
Josip Broz Tito
liked his job. Having in mind that he was the head of the
state for almost three decades and head of the party for nearly five, this statement
might sound odd if one would not be acquainted with less entertaining aspects of
such an occupation. Endless meetings, receptions, interviews, public occasions,
rallies, speeches and other occasions designed to entrench the power and
popularity of regime and at the same time to provide a substitute for a very
limited public sphere, were actually putting a substantial strain on the capacities
of leading figures of the system, not the least boredom. This, however, does not
apply to Tito, who not only understood the importance of these symbolical
manifestations of power, but actually authentically enjoyed them. No other aspect
of his governance substantiates this claim better than foreign policy. During the
decades of his reign, Tito spent endless days in diplomatic exchange, being an
equally keen guest and generous host. It is enough to say that he had spent more
than
1000
days abroad in nearly
160
delegations, visiting
70
countries. He knew
in person almost all the leading figures of his times (with exception of
De
Gaulle),
and knew well how to use this leverage in routinizing his charisma in internal
politics in Yugoslavia.
However, the splendor of Tito s diplomatic achievements was not only a
reflection of his personal habits, but also a complex process conditioned by the
course of events. A leader of wartime Communist resistant movement which came
to power in Yugoslavia in the course of
1945
was not intrinsically predetermined to
take part in the international diplomatic exchange. Under the heel of Stalin,
although enjoying more internal support than his fellow leaders of the countries of
the Eastern bloc, Tito s early activity in foreign policy remained dull. His trips
confined to visits to the USSR and the countries of people s democracies ,
Yugoslav policy closely aligned with the Soviets, if not more radical, as in the case
of the crises of Trieste or support for the communists in the civil war in Greece. It
was in fact the undesired breakup with the Soviet Union which forced certain
flexibility onto Yugoslav foreign policy and coined a new role for its principal
bearer. This collision of
1948-9,
which led Yugoslavia in all but open conflict with
the socialist countries, also called for urgent support from the West and tighter
control over foreign affairs, which were nominally in the hands of foreign ministers
and assembly, but in reality were conducted under the auspices of the Party
leadership. Tightening was emphasized through the gradual removal of the old
prewar cadres in diplomacy, under the supervision of high ranking Politburo official
Eduard Kardelj
and under the watchful eye of
Josip Broz
Tito himself, who
changed his position after the set of constitutional changes of
1952,
making him
both the head of the party and the head of the state, and making him both formally
and factually responsible for conducting foreign policy.
320____________________________________________________________________
What can be said about the beginnings of Tito s involvement into global
political affairs is that he learned quickly. As late as
1944,
he still had all the
manners of the leader of the clandestine movement. On his first meeting with
Winston Churchill in Italy he appeared in full field uniform, accompanied with a
number of heavily armed bodyguards, making a meaningful exchange hardly
possible. Suspicious and cautious, he almost immediately ran back to Moscow to
report to Stalin, as a gambler who did not pay his debt, Churchill put it.
However, less than a decade after things changed rapidly. Seeking Western
support, but not keen to make substantial concessions in internal politics, Tito
was forced into transformations, to which this study is ultimately dedicated. Its
first chapter deals with important segments of Tito s diplomatic exchange with
the West and the East in the first half of the 50 s. First Tito s trip to the West
came after the signing of the treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia, Greece
and Turkey, putting the country effectively under the protection umbrella of
NATO. The destination was Great Britain, to which he was unofficially invited
in
1952.
However, the changes in his official status also changed the character
of the visit, which became a fully fledged meeting of British leaders with the
first Communist leader ever to visit the West. This change came exactly at the
time when Winston Churchill was promoting the very word summit in order to
convene the leading world s figures in the aim of easing the Cold
Wartensions. In
the absence of such parley, virtually impossible due to the Stalin s suspicions and
the turmoil following his death in March
1953,
Churchill had to satisfy with this
modest breakthrough.
Stalin s death also influenced heavily Tito s view of the forthcoming
meeting. Upon hearing of this news, immediately on his disemabarkment on the
cadet ship
Galeb
which over the time grew to symbolize his overseas ventures,
Tito decided not to press tighter alignment with Great Britain through formal
arrangements. Much to the relief of his counterparts in London, the visit ended
more as a protoclar than substantive event, without a treaty which could jeopardize
the entirety of British politics. On the other hand, it did offer a possibility to Tito to
get firsthand experience of international summitry. The meeting was indeed a
school of good manners for Yugoslav diplomacy. Tito appeared in the Buckingham
palace, met the Queen, led political dialogues with Churchill and Eden and has
committed himself strongly with the West. Dressed in uniform, but without boots,
which were exchanged with elegant shoes, and occasionally even a tuxedo, this
visual change was inaugurating a new period, in which revolutionary spirit was
transformed through the newly emerging protocol of the Chancery of the President
of the Republic, which was growingly taking over much of the competencies of the
Ministry of Foreign affairs, held at that time by interwar poet and wartime general
Koča Popović.
Diplomatic exchange with the West, and particularly with the
countries of the Third World intensified immensely in
1954.
And
1955,
with Tito s
visit to Turkey and Greece, but the actual eye-opener was long journey to India and
Burma from December
1954
during January
1955,
in the course of which Tito met
Nehru, Nasser and
U
Nu,
discovering on the road a whole new emerging factor in
___________________________________________________________________
321_
international relations and setting the stage
for reinterpretation of Yugoslav socialist
system independent of the Eastern Block.
Such experiment, naturally, could not come true without substantial
changes in the Soviet Union. However, in the very same period, these changes were
at sight. The death of Stalin opened up a brief era of interregnum of collective
leadership, in which unofficial leader was Lavrentiy Beria, Stalin s henchman. In a
matter of months, his downfall was prompted by unrest in Eastern Germany, and his
colleagues in Presidium of the Party introduced certain power sharing. Under the
leadership of Georgy Malenkov, the new generation was entrenching its positions,
and gradually a reforming wing (Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan) found itself
confronted with the conservatives (Kaganovich,
Molotov).
This internal power
struggle was reflected in the foreign policy as well, and led to the gradual
improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Encouraged by Khrushchev, exactly
because they were resented by
Molotov,
they were gladly embraced in Belgrade as
Yugoslav Communists understood that rapprochement with Soviet Union is a
necessity for the long-term stability of the country. However, keen to capitalize as
much as possible on the internal Kremlin struggles, they were not willing to
concede, so the improvement had to be conducted in the manner favorable for the
Yugoslav side
-
on the basis of state-to-state, and not party-to-party relations, and
through the Soviet official visit to Belgrade. Announced in May
1955,
visit of
Khrushchev and Bulganin was immediately recognized in Western press as the
Soviet Canossa . In less
triumphalist
view from Belgrade, it opened up the
opportunity for Tito for another debut, this time in the role of the host to the
representatives of his former leaders.
This is not to say that the talks in Belgrade were easy for either side. Many
harsh words have been said from
1948
onwards, many people died in border
incidents, many were locked in jails and concentration camps in Yugoslavia. The
Soviet side expected warmer embrace in Belgrade, whereas Yugoslav side expected
more than simple informal apology, in which interlocutors were ready to claim
previous policies a mistake caused by misinformation produced by Beria. Therefore,
instead of an agreement among the parties on common policies, an interstate
agreement called Belgrade declaration was coined, which allowed for mutual
relations to develop without interference between two socialist countries. Therefore,
Yugoslavs succeeded in winning Soviet acceptance of their new position between
the two blocks, whereas Soviets hoped to use the Yugoslav example to ease the grip
over the Eastern bloc without the danger of its dismantling. Moreover, during the
talks in Belgrade, Tito was in the position to convey his recent experiences from the
trips to the West and visits to the Far East, which were of some significance for his
interlocutors, Khrushchev and Bulganin, which were getting ready to set off on
their own tour around the world in promotion of concept of coexistence. Tito was
under the impression that the Belgrade visit was for them a necessity in order to
embark on such a path, which further increased Yugoslav self-esteem and help them
sustain criticism from the West. However, what Yugoslav side did not observe in
this triumphal atmosphere was the importance of this Yugoslav detour for Soviet
322_________________________________________________________
internal affairs and for a showdown between Khrushchev and
Molotov,
who was
sidetracked soon after the return of his colleagues from Belgrade. Once firmly in
power, the new Soviet group would reconsider its relations towards Tito.
On the wings of this oversight, the Yugoslavs entered mid 50s with an
extreme confidence in their role between the two worlds, and were seeking new
ways to confirm their doctrines on the global level. Increased contacts with the
Third World, in the United Nations, as well as in bilateral contacts, was lending
itself for further exploration of the policy of active peaceful coexistence . Turning
its rhetoric against the policy of confronted military blocks, NATO as well as the
Warsaw pact, Yugoslavia was hoping to win further favors of the growing number
of evolving countries who won their independence in the process of decolonization.
Increasing contacts with the leaders of United States, Great Britain, France, USSR
and Egypt also had set Tito in a role of a middleman between the two worlds and
the emerging one. Global crises, particularly the one in the Middle East, draw
considerable attention of Yugoslav foreign policy. Tito was frequently consulted by
his interlocutors about the intentions of the other major players, and he was more
than willing to offer his advice and personal assistance. The peak of this role was to
come in summer
1956,
during which a summit between Tito, Nasser and Nehru was
organized at the island of Brioni, setting out some of the basic principles of
nonalignment of their countries. Strong anti-colonialist sentiments of the
interlocutors seemed to have a strong global appeal, to be endorsed both by United
States and USSR, at the expense of the waning colonial powers.
However, the decline of this policy was as quick as its rise. The abrupt
crisis over the nationalization of the Company of Suez Chanel, in which Tito failed
to perform his role of a middleman lowered his leverage in the West, which eroded
steadily in the second half of
1956
due to the protracted visits of Soviet leadership
and Tito s state visits to the USSR. Worse still, Khrushchev, by this time the
undisputed leader in Kremlin, showed another face. As his strategy of controlled
desalinization was growing in popularity in Soviet Union, it had also opened up a
chained reaction in Eastern Europe, predominantly in Poland and in Hungary. The
situation in Hungary spinned completely out of control by October
1956,
calling for
Soviet intervention. This crisis also coincided with the French and British assault on
Egypt in collusion with Israel. In the crisis over Suez Yugoslavia played a
prominent role in which cooperation between the nonaligned countries was
confirmed in practice. However, in the Hungarian uprising it failed to produce
favorable results. Soviet leadership bullied Tito into accepting the intervention the
only possible solution to the replacement of the
Nagy
regime. The crisis was further
exacerbated by
Nagy
taking refuge in Yugoslav embassy, Soviet kidnapping of him
despite the preset agreement and Tito s controversial speech in which he accused
first Soviet intervention in Hungary as unnecessary, but the second one as
unavoidable. Such a standpoint did not get him praise from the East, but was
labeled as preposterous in the West. It took some time for Yugoslavia to grasp that
its position in the global international exchange was overstretched, and that the
position of the middleman for Tito proved to be as precarious as tempting. Saving
___________________________________________________________________
323_
its face through the support towards anti-colonial policies in the Security Council,
Yugoslavia succeeded to come through the blunder in Hungary, but the illusions
about nurturing undisrupted relations with the Soviet Union were irretrievably lost.
The attempt to play a significant role in international relations proved dangerous.
The abrupt rise and fall of the policies of middlemanship discouraged both
Tito and Yugoslav diplomacy from searching new models for promotion of active
peaceful coexistence. Indeed, it ensured the leader that much larger effort is needed
to put together like-minded states into a framework which would prove strong
enough to resist pressures from both blocks. After a couple of years of relative
passivity, Tito embarked on yet another tour of trips, biggest so far and the first in
the round of what came to be known as peace travels . First of those, in
1959,
led
him through Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan and United Arabian
Republic. Closing the ranks between neutral countries was continued on the
multilateral level on the meeting of General Assembly of United Nations in summer
1960,
which came to be known as the initiative of five to renew the contact
between the hostile superpowers. For the leaders of noncomitted countries, the
stalemate between the superpowers was the chance to launch a joint appeal, which
Tito, Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah and Nasser did there. Upon return, in early
1961,
Tito organized yet another peace travel , this time through the Mediterranean and
black Africa, preparing the scene for the first summit of nonaligned leaders, to be
held in Belgrade. The middleman was transforming into a globetrotter.
After the preparatory meeting in Cairo in June
1961,
a number of countries
agreed on taking part in conference in Belgrade. Organized by Tito, Nasser, Nehru
and Sukarno, it was joint by representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia,
Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco,
Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt and Yemen, and the preliminary criteria for
participation in First Conference on Nonalignment were forged. Heads of the states
met in Belgrade and issued a joint declaration, institutionalizing henceforth the
movement of the nonaligned countries. Such move was not welcomed by neither of
the superpowers, yet in the years to come nonalignment survived despite the
pressures, and the next summit was organized in Cairo in
1964.
Yugoslavia, which
was considered to be in the forefront of radicals within the movement, soured
somewhat its relations with the United States of America, losing the trading
privileges. However, after yet another round of conflicts with the Soviet Union, and
China afterwards, balance was restored and Tito was able to visit United States and
meet with President John Kennedy, during yet another of his globetrotting tours
across America. What followed was a long readjustment of Yugoslav nonalignment
to suit the demands of the new age. Personal changes in Yugoslav ministry of
foreign affairs, which fall in the same period, underpinned even more the
importance of the role of the President as the sole guarantee of continuity of shifting
Yugoslav policies. Personal continuity and political longevity of
Josip Broz
became
an important asset, not only for Yugoslav foreign policy, but for the international
relations, torn with crises on the Middle East
(1967),
Czechoslovakia
(1968)
and
Vietnam. By the virtue of his position between the camps, Tito capitalized on his
324___________________________________________________________________
world tours and he was elevated in the position of intimacy with the leading world
figures, which enabled him to play a role of arbitrator in conflicts, as well as to
influence decisively the currents of nonalignment after the death of Nehru and
Nasser.
The end of the
1960s
and beginning of
1970s
is therefore a sort of an ampir
of Tito s personal diplomacy. The changes in the foreign policy after the departure
of the foreign secretary
Koča Popović
in
1965
and the removal of Alexander
Ranković
next year made Tito an undisputed arbiter of Yugoslav foreign policy.
Balancing between East and West, as well as North and South, became his
trademark, expressed best through the continuous support for nonalignment at
summits in Lusaka
(1970),
Algeria
(1973)
and Colombo
(1976).
In the years of
détente,
Tito showed much enthusiasm in reconceptualisation of collective security
through CESC meeting in Helsinki
1975,
and Yugoslavia was to hold a follow-up
meeting which lasted throughout
1978
and
1979.
However, he was still firmly
convinced that only nonalignment provides an adequate niche for Yugoslav foreign
policy. Therefore he showed stubborn resistance at the attempts of several
nonaligned countries to bring the movement closer to the policies of Soviet Union.
The most remarkable display of this attitude occurred at the Sixth conference of
nonaligned countries in Havana, September
1979,
where Fidel Castro attempted to
promote new, radicalized vision of the movement. Tito, on the contrary, achieved
massive support with his counter-idea of going back to the roots of nonalignment,
and has therefore secured both the unity of the movement and the Yugoslav
prominent role in it.
This role, however, lasted only until Tito was chairing and representing
Yugoslav foreign policy. As old age and fragile health pushed him to hospital in the
beginning of
1980,
where he died on May 4th the same year, the privileged position
of Yugoslavia was fading away quickly. Tito s funeral on May 8th was a spectacle
which assembled leaders from all around the world, making it his last, posthumous
summit. It was not long, however, until realization that Yugoslavia cannot maintain
the same prestige in international relations which it enjoyed during his lifetime,
especially during the dramatic change of global context in the second half of
80s.
Tito s successors were, however, persisted in conducting the international relations
in his footsteps, until the complete decay of the country a decade after his death.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Petrović, Vladimir 1979- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)141298553 |
| author_facet | Petrović, Vladimir 1979- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Petrović, Vladimir 1979- |
| author_variant | v p vp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV039139931 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)709890692 (DE-599)BVBBV039139931 |
| edition | 1. izd |
| era | Geschichte 1945-1980 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1945-1980 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Yugoslavia / Foreign relations / 1945-1980 Yugoslavia / Politics and government / 1945-1980 Jugoslawien Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Yugoslavia / Foreign relations / 1945-1980 Yugoslavia / Politics and government / 1945-1980 Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV039139931 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:59:50Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788674031421 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024158001 |
| oclc_num | 709890692 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 350 S. Ill., Kt. 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Biblioteka Studije i monografije |
| series2 | Biblioteka Studije i monografije |
| spelling | Petrović, Vladimir 1979- Verfasser (DE-588)141298553 aut Titova licna diplomatija Vladimir Petrovic 1. izd Beograd Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju 2010 350 S. Ill., Kt. 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka Studije i monografije 68 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Personal diplomacy of Josip Broz Tito Tito, Josip Broz / 1892-1980 Tito, Josip Broz 1892-1980 (DE-588)118622935 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1945-1980 gnd rswk-swf Nonalignment / Yugoslavia Außenpolitik Politik Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd rswk-swf Blockfreiheit (DE-588)4126732-1 gnd rswk-swf Yugoslavia / Foreign relations / 1945-1980 Yugoslavia / Politics and government / 1945-1980 Jugoslawien Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Tito, Josip Broz 1892-1980 (DE-588)118622935 p Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Blockfreiheit (DE-588)4126732-1 s Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 s Geschichte 1945-1980 z DE-604 Biblioteka Studije i monografije 68 (DE-604)BV022785730 68 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024158001&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024158001&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Petrović, Vladimir 1979- Titova licna diplomatija Biblioteka Studije i monografije Tito, Josip Broz / 1892-1980 Tito, Josip Broz 1892-1980 (DE-588)118622935 gnd Nonalignment / Yugoslavia Außenpolitik Politik Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Blockfreiheit (DE-588)4126732-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118622935 (DE-588)4012402-2 (DE-588)4126732-1 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Titova licna diplomatija |
| title_auth | Titova licna diplomatija |
| title_exact_search | Titova licna diplomatija |
| title_full | Titova licna diplomatija Vladimir Petrovic |
| title_fullStr | Titova licna diplomatija Vladimir Petrovic |
| title_full_unstemmed | Titova licna diplomatija Vladimir Petrovic |
| title_short | Titova licna diplomatija |
| title_sort | titova licna diplomatija |
| topic | Tito, Josip Broz / 1892-1980 Tito, Josip Broz 1892-1980 (DE-588)118622935 gnd Nonalignment / Yugoslavia Außenpolitik Politik Diplomatie (DE-588)4012402-2 gnd Blockfreiheit (DE-588)4126732-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Tito, Josip Broz / 1892-1980 Tito, Josip Broz 1892-1980 Nonalignment / Yugoslavia Außenpolitik Politik Diplomatie Blockfreiheit Yugoslavia / Foreign relations / 1945-1980 Yugoslavia / Politics and government / 1945-1980 Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024158001&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024158001&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV022785730 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT petrovicvladimir titovalicnadiplomatija |