Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny?: emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej
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| Format: | Book |
|---|---|
| Language: | Polish |
| Published: |
Lublin
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, Oddział
2010
|
| Series: | Konferencje IPN
40 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Item Description: | Zsfassung in dt. u. engl. Sprache |
| Physical Description: | 382 S. |
| ISBN: | 9788376291888 |
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Record in the Search Index
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Spis fresci
Przedmowa (Sławomir Łukasiewicz)
. 9
Wykaz skrótów
. 13
CZĘŚĆ I. EMIGRACJE ŚRODKOWOEUROPEJSKIE
-
WYBRANE PRZYKŁADY
Magdolna Baráth
Zwalczanie czy wspieranie? Stosunek Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej
i jej aparatu bezpieczeństwa do emigracji
. 19
Ferenc Cseresnyés
Powrót Węgrów z Europy Zachodniej do kraju
wiatach
1956-1959. 33
Christopher Adam
Węgierska prasa emigracyjna w Kanadzie, imigracja polityczna oraz konflikt
z komunistycznymi Węgrami w latach
1956—1989. 42
András Tamás Fejérdy
„Bezpaństwowcy". Węgierska emigracja katolicka, węgierski reżim komunistyczny
¡początek watykańskiej
Ostpolitik (1959-1965). 53
Wan
j
a Petkowa
Rola bułgarskiego aparatu bezpieczeństwa w polityce reżimu komunistycznego
wobec emigracji politycznej
. 62
Jiří Friedl, Zdeněk Jirásek
Polska i czeska emigracja antykomunistyczna po
H
wojnie światowej
. 79
Prokop
Tomek
Działania czechosłowackiego aparatu bezpieczeństwa
przeciwko Radiu Wolna Europa
. 85
Matej Medvecký
Wywiad czechosłowacki przeciw „słowackiej emigracji separatystycznej"
. 90
leva
Zake
Łotewski Komitet Współpracy i Kontaktów Kulturalnych z Rodakami za Granicą.
Przykład sowieckiej polityki „dziel i rządź"
. 102
Kristina
Burinskaitè
„Aktywne działania"
KGB
przeciwko emigracji litewskiej
. 117
Tobias Wunschik
Wewnątrzniemiecka migracja z Zachodu na Wschód. Inwigilacja przez Służbę
Bezpieczeństwa Państwowego i Policję Ludową
. 125
Krzysztof Okoński
Represyjność epoki Honeckera. Recepcja twórczości emigracji literackiej
z NRD do RFNw polskim „drugim obiegu"
. 138
CZĘŚĆ
II.
PRL I EMIGRANCI
Patryk
Pleskot
Szpiedzy na emigracji. „Szpiegowska" działalność polskiej emigracji
w oczach kontrwywiadu MBP
(1945-1954). 145
Sławomir Łukasiewicz
Wywiad cywilny PRL wobec polskiej emigracji
rta
Zachodzie ~przegląd struktur
i kierunków działania do początku lat sześćdziesiątych
. 154
Pawel
Ziętara
Mobilizacja struktur państwa komunistycznego do walki z emigracyjnym przeciwnikiem:
casus Władysława Andersa
.
1°2
Adam F. Baran
„
Emigracyjny ZHP "jako inspiracyjny ośrodek wrogich elementów w Polsce
w latach
1945-1957.
175
Aleksander Kozicki
Działalność organów bezpieczeństwa PRL przeciwko białoruskiej emigracji
politycznej w latach
1945-1956.
l87
Dariusz Węgrzyn
Operacja specjalna „Dziady"
(1946-1948).
Gra operacyjna górnośląskich struktur UB
z Ośrodkiem Dyspozycyjnym Organizacji Polskiej w Ratyzbonie
. 200
Sebastian
Rosenbaum
Služba
Bezpieczeństwa w województwie katowickim wobec emigracji Górnoślązaków
do Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach siedemdziesiątych
. 214
CZĘŚĆ III. Z PERSPEKTYWY ZACHODU
John Earl Haynes
Niespełnione nadzieje. Karta Atlantycka, Jałta, stosunki polsko-amerykańskie
i antykomunizm we wczesnym okresie zimnej wojny
. 224
Anna Mazurkiewicz
„Niejawna ingerencja rządu w swobodną wymianę poglądów"
-
Zgromadzenie Euro¬
pejskich Narodów Ujarzmionych w zimnowojennejpolityce Stanów Zjednoczonych
. 255
6
Jan Raška
Narodziny głosu sprzeciwu: czescy imigranci, komunistyczni szpiedzy
i kanadyjski aparat bezpieczeństwa
1945-1968. 264
Cecilia
Notini Buren
Zimnowojenny pościg: szwedzkie reakcje na sowieckie polowanie
na uchodźców politycznych
1945-1960. 277
Thomas Wegener
Friis
Bezpieczeństwo Danii a migracja z Europy Wschodniej
. 293
Idesbald Goddeeris
Trzy perspektywy: agenta, emigranta i historyka
. 301
José M.
Faraldo
Uchodźcy, antykomuniści, uczeni. Imigranci z Europy Wschodniej
w Hiszpanii
generala
Franco
. 311
Foreword
(Sławomir Łukasiewicz)
. 321
Abstracts
. 325
Vorwort
(Sławomir Łukasiewicz)
. 343
Zusammenfasungen
. 348
Indeks Osób
. 368
Abstracts
Magdolna Baráth
Undermining and/or supporting. The attitude of Hungarian state
and security organs towards the emigres
This paper examines how the attitude of Hungarian state and security organs towards
émigrés
changed. Hungarian refugees left the country in three great waves: the first one in
1944-45,
the
second one after the Communist takeover in
1947^8,
and the third one in
1956
during the revo¬
lution and immediately after its suppression.
Surveillance of Hungarian emigres in Western countries was one of the objectives that the
Hungarian state security pursued from its early days. The Hungarian state security organizations
considered preventing the formation of a well organized and unified hostile block as their main
task. Their strategy of demoralisation was to discredit certain leaders of
émigré
environments
and to breed hostility among their members. On the other hand, Hungarian political organs tried
to isolate the widest possible public from emigrant organizations which they considered hostile.
First, they tried to neutralise them so that they could be made loyal to the ruling Hungarian regi¬
me. The so-called "home luring" campaign and the programme on the Hungarian Radio called
'Our Fatherland' were the main instruments of official propaganda. Thus instigating political di¬
sintegration within the emigre circles still remained a task both in the Communist emigration
policy and in keeping up relationships with different groups and individuals who were part of
the Hungarian emigration.
The change in the attitude of Hungarian leaders towards the emigration began in
1988.
The
change of the official standpoint was displayed in the discourse used: the authorities no longer
spoke of Hungarians who lived abroad as members of a national minority, but as representatives
of one Hungarian nation. Thus in their political terminology they avoided the expression
"émi¬
grés,"
and used "Hungarians living abroad" instead.
Ferenc Cseresnyés
The return of Hungarians from western Europe to Hungary in the years
1956-1959
A first historically confirmed example of a wholehearted welcome given to emigrants was
mostly probably that of Hungarians being accepted in Austria in
1956.
The Austrian Minister of
Interior
Oskar Helmer
had made his forecast that in October
1956
Austria should be ready to ca¬
ter to about ten thousand emigres, while in fact this number reached almost
200
thousand at the
end of
1956!
Although Hungarians were cordially welcome everywhere in the West, and their social inte¬
gration was usually successful, there was a movement to convince them to move back to Hun¬
gary, and after a couple of months its size and significance were more and more problematic to
the West. Only
10
per cent of Hungarians explicitly declared their wish to come back to Hun-
325
gary,
but it was disturbing that the people who had had a chance to enjoy freedom of the West
acknowledged after no more than a couple of months that they regretted having left their Com¬
munist-governed homeland. This was the birth of the competition of the two political doctrines
for the souls of the Hungarian
émigrés.
The research conducted by
Europäischen Bildungsgemeinschaft - das Eiserne Vorhang
(Eu¬
ropean Educational Association „Iron Curtain") helped determine that mere social and material
aid given to the
émigrés
was not enough. The host societies should also help Hungarians in the
domain of culture and politics, as these two spheres seemed decisive in Hungarians' choices to
stay or to leave the free world.
The Hungarian Communist regime tried its best to reach these Hungarians who experienced
problems socially integrating into the country of exile. They were dissatisfied with the kinds of
jobs they had, their incomes, state bureaucracy they had to struggle with, etc. The list of factors
that directly influenced people's decision to return to Hungary included the following:
-
direct or indirect pressure wielded by the Hungarian government;
-
activities of Hungarian embassies and missions;
-
activities of secret agents and of Western communists
-
terrorist acts undertaken against the emigrants' family members staying in Hungary, or so¬
metimes also directly against the emigres themselves abroad.
Most emigrants from Hungary who did not participate in or were not strictly involved with
the
1956
revolution tended to regard themselves as victims of the Cold War. Active participants,
including Hungarian anti-communist leaders, undertook their anti-communist activities after
their emigration to the West.
Christopher Adam
The Hungarian-Canadian emigre press, the political immigration
and conflict with Hungary,
1956-1989
Hungary's
János Kádár
regime maintained a keen interest in Canada's Hungarian communi¬
ties and used its embassy in Ottawa, the Foreign Ministry and state security agents to influence
emigre organizations. Canada's Hungarian communist community
-
which dated back to the late
1
920's
-
seemed the most obvious partner for Hungary's regime. Yet what was meant to serve as
a working relationship between socialist Hungary and Hungarian communists not only proved
ineffective, but was also a liability. In-fighting, sectarianism and suspicion characterized the Ca¬
nadian "progressive" movement that Budapest depended upon when seeking to gain a foothold
in the country's large Hungarian community.
András Tamás Fejérdy
"Stateless people." The Hungarian Catholic Emigration, the Hungarian Communist
Regime and the Beginning of the Vatican's New
"Ostpolitik" (1959-1965)
From the very beginning the Hungarian Communist government regarded the Roman Catho¬
lic priests living in Rome as one of the most influential and dangerous emigrant groups. Due to
326
their secret communication channels with the Hungarian Catholic Church, they provided the Va¬
tican Secretariat of State with the best possible information about Hungary. In addition, the cle¬
rical emigration played an intermediary role between the Holy See and the Hungarian Catholic
Church. In order to restrain the "clerical reaction" and to control the
'Ostpolitik"
of the Holy
See, the Hungarian government was continuously attempting to oust the clerical emigration from
decision-making in the Holy See. The Vatican Council offered a unique opportunity of appro¬
aching the emigration and isolating them from the Holy See.
The paper first summarizes the foundation and role of the Hungarian catholic emigration and
the Hungarian Communist regime's countermeasures between
1945
and
1962.
Then it analyses
the plans against the so-called "stateless" and examines the various operations of the Hungarian
intelligence service. It shows that despite great expectations and remarkable efforts, penetration
into the clerical emigration failed. The informants sent from Hungary, the surveillance opera¬
tions against the Hungarian Pontifical Institute and the Hungarian "rezidentura" in Rome, howe¬
ver, provided valuable intelligence on the clerical emigration and on the Holy See's Hungarian
policy. Therefore, in possession of the newly obtained information, during the bilateral negotia¬
tions which started in May
1963
between the Holy See and Hungary, the Hungarian party could
carry out most of the set objectives of their ecclesiastical policy.
The
1964
agreement marked the end of the emigration's influence on the Vatican Secretariat
of State and enabled the regime to exercise influence over the Holy See's
"Ostpolitik."
Accor¬
ding to the agreement, the authority on Pontifical Hungarian Institute in Rome returned to the
Hungarian Catholic Church, which enabled the service to create an important intelligence centre
at the heart of the Holy See. It was during the Second Vatican Council that the Hungarian politi¬
cal direction and intelligence
-
learning from their errors
-
laid the foundations for further ope¬
rational activities and the policy against the Vatican, which were successful from the point of
view of the Hungarian regime.
Vanya Petkova
The role of Bulgarian State Security Service in the policy
of the communist regime against political emigration
The history of Bulgarian state security services during the Cold War is probably the most di¬
scussed topic in Bulgaria after the fall of the totalitarian regimes in the Communist Bloc in
1989.
It is of crucial importance for Bulgarian society as it relates to the evaluation of the Communist
past as well as to the fate of two generations of Bulgarians and affects the post-Communist pe¬
riod with its implications for Bulgaria's democratic development. The lack of sufficient historic
evidence and enough scientific research, as state security archives remained closed for almost
20
years, lead to partial answers to the questions about the legacy of Bulgarian secret services.
Despite this and contrary to the deliberately imposed view that the Communist secret services'
priority focused on protecting Bulgaria's national security interests, it can be said that Bulga¬
rian state security was a defender of the interests and existence of the Communist party and the
regime. It was the darkest and most repressive institution of the totalitarian state, performing
functions of political policing and keeping the political status-quo. More importantly, Bulgarian
state security maintained an intermediary position between the ruling Communist party, on the
one hand, and Bulgarian institutions and citizens, on the other, and guaranteed the political legi¬
timacy of the Communist rule by manipulating public opinion in the country and abroad. It was
327
an instrument for providing information about political decisions taken by the Communist party
and directed their implementation using tools from political violence to propaganda campaigns.
By conducting the so-called "active measures," Bulgarian state security controlled groups of
considerable social recognition, created conspiracy theories and conducted large-scale propa¬
ganda campaigns. With respect to political
émigrés,
secret services spread their repressive func¬
tions outside the borders of Bulgaria in an attempt to overpower the Bulgarian emigre community
for fear that it could doubt, oppose and even abolish the Communist party rule. The intermediary
position of the secret services also refutes another wide-spread opinion that, during the Commu¬
nist period, the country was ruled solely by state security services. Rather, it was the Bulgarian
Communist Party (BCP) Politburo and its leadership, as well as state security high-ranking offi¬
cers, that sanctioned and secured Bulgaria's 45-year totalitarian rule.
Jiří Friedl, Zdeněk Jirásek
Polish and Czechoslovak Anticommunist emigration after the World War II
When the relationships between the Czech and the Polish governments in exile were bro¬
ken, the latter showed its interest in the activities of a group led by the Czechoslovak general
Lev
Prchala.
He addressed the Polish authorities in London with a request that a Czech army be
organized within the structures of the Polish Army in exile
-
a scheme that was never realized.
Prchala
often expressed his criticism about the Czechoslovak President
Beneš
and his policy. He
was convinced that Czechoslovakia under
Beneš
was not an independent state, and thus he laun¬
ched the Czech National Committee
(Národní Výbor),
which was to represent in the West tho¬
se Czechs who opposed
Beneš. Prchala
frequently contacted the Polish government in exile. He
won considerable popularity at a very early stage of the war: he commanded a Czech and Slovak
Legion, which was to engage in the conflict with Germany in September
1939,
though this ne¬
ver happened. All these actions also aroused the interest of the Czechoslovak secret services in
Prchala.
After the events of February
1948
in Czechoslovakia a number of Czechs emigre groups
grew considerably. The most important body in the Czech environment was the Council of Free
Czechoslovakia
(Rada Svobodného Československa),
established in early
1949.
For a long time
Poles did not develop any relationship with the Council and called its members "Beneszowcy"
(enthusiasts of
Beneš).
The Polish government also criticised the council for its limited activity
in the realization of the scheme of the Central European federation. Even in the
1950s
the Poles
did not regard the Council as important
-
quite incorrectly. The relationships between the Polish
and the Czechoslovak emigration were marred by conflicts, accusations, and repeated allusions
to the past. A new opening in Polish-Czechoslovak relationships would come with the new emi¬
gration waves of the
1970s
and
1980s.
Prokop Tomek
Czechoslovak Security Services against Radio Free Europe
In February
1948
the Communist party took power in Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, Czech
and Slovak democratic politicians escaped from the totalitarian regime to the West. They wanted
328
to break the isolation of people behind the Iron Curtain. In
1949
the National Committee for Free
Europe was established in the USA. Its most well-known activity was Radio Free Europe (RFE).
After RFE began broadcasting to Czechoslovakia in
1951,
it became the symbol of exile and the
most effective tool for breaking communistic censorship.
In response, the communist regime and its security apparatus have put much effort into shut¬
ting down broadcasting of RFE.
Using now-accessible documents from the archives of the former Czechoslovak State Securi¬
ty Service (StB), it is possible to describe and analyze the Security apparatus' plans against RFE,
as well as the details of particular operations.
At first the Communist security apparatus fought against RFE through passive forms. In
between
1951
and
1956
RFE also provided information to captive nations through millions of
leaflets carried by balloons. Communist bodies reacted by shooting down these balloons. At the
beginning of
1956,
a collision with an RFE balloon was falsely cited as the cause of a Czecho¬
slovak civil aircraft crash in the
Tatry
Mountains.
Since the beginning of fifties Czechoslovakia started jamming foreign broadcasting, espe¬
cially RFE. In Czechoslovakia RFE broadcasts were jammed until the end of
1988.
The Communistic regime very carefully controlled and penalized RFE contacts and listeners
by mail and telephone.
But the Security apparatus also used active approaches. Since the mid-fifties State security at¬
tempted to infiltrate RFE with secret collaborators who fed information and exercised so called
„active measures." attacks and disinformation. This period came to a close on Christmas
1959
through an attempt to pass a gift to the RFE canteen through a secret StB collaborator. The six¬
ties were a bad period for StB, because after this attack nobody from StB could penetrate RFE.
The communist regime only achieved some success through diplomatic means. After the ar¬
mies of the Warsaw treaty members entered Czechoslovakia in August
1968,
a large wave of
Czechoslovak refugees came to the West. Amongst them was speaker Pavel Minan'k, who after
his return in
1976
became the most known StB spy in RFE. One of the results of
propagandistic
campaigns against RFE after return of Minan'k to Czechoslovakia was the total stop of possibi¬
lities to penetrate the RFE again.
A famous bombing attack against RFE in
1981
damaged the Czechoslovak offices in
the RFE building in Munich. Three employees were seriously wounded. This attack was com¬
mitted by the far-left terrorist group „Carlos" employed for this task by the Rumanian State se¬
curity service.
Research of various documents from the archives of the former Czechoslovak State securi¬
ty service allows us to conclude that the Czechoslovak communist regime, in spite of making an
enormous effort and using a variety of tools, failed to reach any considerable success in its fight
against Radio Free Europe.
Matej Medvecký
State Security against „Slovak separatist emigration"
At the beginning of the year
1945
a great wave of emigrants left Slovakia. These people were
mainly high officials of the former Slovak republic
(1939-1945)
that was an ally of Nazi Ger¬
many. Motives for their departure varied; many of them were afraid of the Red Army or Com¬
munists, but many were to be put to trial by the courts for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
329
etc. Some of them (for example members of former Slovak government) were extradited to Cze¬
choslovakia, but the majority were not, despite their having committed serious crimes during the
Second World War.
The state security apparatus started its activities against Slovak nationalists (called "separa¬
tists" by the state security) immediately after the establishment of the National Security Corps
in
1945.
Activities of state security varied
-
from rather violent (e.g. kidnapping) to more so¬
phisticated (e.g. infiltration of co-opted workers into the emigrant organisations). The "Slovak
separatist emigration" was considered an important topic for nearly the whole period of Com¬
munist rule in Czechoslovakia.
In this study, I focus on several of the most important cases of state security activities against
nationalist emigration or people with similar ideological backgrounds. Slovak emigrants foun¬
ded several organisations in order to achieve their goals or just to promote their activity as such
and to make contacts with Western governments. Later they even tried to unify all emigrant or¬
ganisations. However, this goal was never fully achieved, again due to state security activities.
The study deals with several co-opted workers of state security, for example
Jozef
Bobek,
who infiltrated the Slovak National Council in Exile in Austria at the beginning of
1950s,
and
Ernest
Mašat,
who infiltrated the Institute of
Matúš
Cérnák
at the end of the
1
950s and later be¬
came a member of the governing body of this Institute. From his position he was also able to act
against the unification of emigrant organisations during
1960s.
The activities of the state securi¬
ty against Slovak nationalists lost its intensity in the late
1970s
and
1
980s as the majority of emi¬
grants were already old or even dead at this point.
leva
Zake
Latvian SSR's Liaison Committee for Cultural Relations with Countrymen Abroad:
An Example of the Soviet Politics of Divide and Rule
This article explores the actions and impact of the controversial Liaison Committee with Cul¬
tural Relations with Countrymen Abroad of Latvian
SSR (LCCR),
which was controlled by the
Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party and the Latvian branch of the KGB. First,
the article discusses the LCCR's intentions and methods. It provides convincing evidence that
the LCCR pursued a destructive campaign aimed at fragmenting the emigre community, parti¬
cularly its outspokenly anti-soviet political organizations. In particular, the article demonstrates
that the Soviets used Latvian intellectuals both in Latvia and in the West as their propaganda in¬
struments. This helped the LCCR to achieve its goal of undermining and compromising Latvian
national identity and its main advocate
-
Latvian intelligentsia. Second, the article analyses the
ambiguous reception of the Committee among Latvian
émigrés
in the US and the LCCR's im¬
pact on
émigré
society. As explained in the article, while the perception of the cultural con¬
tacts with the USSR was predominately positive among Americans, the Baltic emigres were
negatively affected by it. This was due to the calculated strategies of the LCCR, which caused the
Latvian
émigré
community to become highly polarized. Some
émigrés
were concerned that the
intentions of the LCCR were not honest, yet they had a hard time finding evidence for this claim
or defending their position against it. Others were willing to pay the price of being involved with
the Soviet authorities as long as it gave them access to Latvian
SSR
and its people. Yet another
group were aware of the intentions of the Committee, yet they were loyal to the Soviet state and
engaged in not-always wholesome activities. Overall, the article presents the complete story of
330
the Soviet authorities' attitudes toward the Latvian emigre community and discusses the failu¬
res and successes of the Soviet strategy. The article utilizes data gathered in cross-Atlantic archi¬
val research involving materials from the Latvian emigre community in the US and the Central
Committee of the Latvian Communist Party.
Kristina
Burinskaitè
Usage of "active measures" by KGB against Lithuanian emigres
The Soviet regime and the KGB treated the main Lithuanian emigrant organisations as col¬
laborators with Western countries and their secret services in an ideological struggle against
the Soviet Union. The Communist party gave special powers to the KGB enabling them to use
specific methods against emigrants, such as propaganda, discrediting, etc. By creating a negative
opinion about emigre organisations, the KGB and soviet propagandists tried to discredit their po¬
litical, anti-soviet activity. The targets of KGB actions were not only the international community
but also emigre organisations, especially these representing the younger generations of
émigrés.
Propaganda about achievements of Soviet Lithuania, their ideology and politics, was also used
as a form of discrediting. Propaganda had to show that the information spread by the emigrants
contradicted the facts. In this way Soviets tried to arouse distrust in emigration and in emigre
activity. Also by leaking negative information and distorting true information they tried to de¬
epen disagreements among emigration organisations, sow discord and distrust, and disunite an¬
ti-soviet powers. The main themes of discrediting actions were: accusations of the emigrants of
war crimes, of being anti-Semites, of collaboration with the Nazi in
1941-1944,
of collaboration
with Western intelligence services, and of being their instruments against the Soviet Union. Li¬
thuanian anti-soviet organizations and unarmed
anti-nazi
resistance were treated by the Soviets
as being in collaboration with the Nazis and gave Soviet propaganda a pretext to accuse them of
pro-nazi views. In this case, history was ideologically evaluated and distorted. Personal informa¬
tion for discrediting actions was used on a less radical scale. It is important to notice that infor¬
mation for discrediting actions was not always completely untrue. Sometimes true information
was used, sometimes facts were distorted or tendentiously interpreted, and some facts were taken
out of context. Such propaganda and discrediting actions were used not only to discredit emigre
organisations, but to undermine to their efforts to liberate Lithuania, because international sup¬
port and the pressure of Western countries on the Soviet Union was vital to the emigre organisa¬
tions. However there actions were not as successful as the KGB expected.
Tobias Wunschik
Internal migration of Western Germans to Eastern Germany and their surveillance
by GDR state security apparatus and police
In the years
1949-1988 3.3
million Germans migrated from the GDR to the Federal Repu¬
blic, most of them by
1961.
But one of out ten migrants returned to the GDR, most of them on
personal grounds, others
-
especially in the early period of the migration process
-
on economic
ones. Adding the number
ornative
citizens of the German Federal Republic who migrated to the
331
GDR, we arrive at the approximate total of
675
thousand people who moved from West to East
Germany. This migration was not forced displacement (in contrast to the prevalent tendency in
Europe after World War
11)
but a voluntary reemigration. The reemigrants were aware of ente¬
ring the sphere of the imperial reign of the Communist Soviet Union and had prior experience
of what political and social practices to expect. Another characteristic of the process in question
involves the question of why these few reemigrants were hindered by the Communists. As the
image of the West as a lethal enemy was widespread, and the fear of infiltration by Western spies
was common, the emigrants to the GDR were under scrupulous surveillance by Communist se¬
cret police. In the
1970s
a considerable number of the citizens of the GDR
-
despite the risk of
becoming regarded as criminals by the state
-
applied for
pennits
to migrate to Western Europe,
or they used the opportunity of a tourist visit to the West to leave the GDR permanently. At the
same time, the number of those declaring the wish potentially to return to the GDR
-
whether for
the short or long-term
-
grew constantly. This growing trend led to the launching of the Central
House for the Reception of Emigrants
(Zentrale Aufnahmeheim, ZAH) in
April
1979
in
Rönt¬
gental
near East Berlin. The migrants were under the supervision of
51
criminal police officers,
32
functionaries of the Ministry of Interior,
29
members of the guard services and
19
full-time
employees of the security apparatus. This latter group managed to coax one fourth of the func¬
tionaries in the former three groups into collaborating as informants.
Röntgental
could host up to
117
migrants. They were continuously interrogated for weeks, which was a strategy to prevent
any infiltration of the GDR by Western spies. Migrants were also converted into informants. Se¬
lected GDR agents tested the efficiency of the system when they reported to the House as people
applying for GDR citizenship. When the application for citizenship was submitted by a person
staying in the Federal Republic, they were forced to become Eastern agents in the West in return
for a positive decision concerning their case.
Krzysztof Okoński
Repression under Honecker's reign and literary emigration from the GDR to the FRG.
Reactions and publications in the Polish publishing „underground"
What was known as Honecker's era began at the turn of the
1970s.
It was full of proclama¬
tions of „socialism with a human face," which was to succeed the previous period of steadfast
Stalinist Walter Ulbricht's brutal reign. The Honecker era witnessed an amelioration of living
conditions for East Germans, a more liberal approach to culture, sports (giving rise to numero¬
us achievements, often at the cost of the athletes' lives and health, as they were forced to dope).
All these facts were to testify to high living standards in the country regarded as the flagship of
the Communist bloc. In
1976,
the popular bard Wolf
Biermann was
deprived of his East-German
citizenship, which led to serious conflicts between the politicians and the artists in the GDR.
As a result, a number of opposition groups formed, and the artistic circles that had so far been
tolerated by the state (sometimes even eagerly supported), now were to be banned
-
writers, ac¬
tors and rock musicians. Reports, analyses and publications available in the Polish publishing
"underground"
were the only window through which one could familiarize oneself with literary
achievements of the East-German emigrants to the FRG.
332
Patryk Pleskot
Spy activity of Polish emigrants as assessed by the counterintelligence
of the Ministry of Public Security,
1945-1954
Among the main objectives that the counterintelligence department of the Ministry of Public
Security pursued was "detecting and counteracting" the espionage of the "reactionary centres of
Polish emigration," operating mostly from West Germany and the United Kingdom. Working in
close collaboration with the intelligence forces of other imperialist states, they kept sending to
Poland their spies and saboteurs, whose task was to promote "hostile propaganda," "intelligen¬
ce surveys," and even to establish a fifth column in case of a new military conflict in Europe.
What was the actual knowledge of the Communist counterintelligence agents about the espio¬
nage activities of the London emigration? That the issue was of utmost importance to the secu¬
rity apparatus is borne out by their action against
152
people, sentenced for espionage in
1948.
110
out of these
152
were accused of spying for "reactionary centres in the West." In
1952,
Sec¬
tion VI of the
1st
Department of the Ministry of Public Security had compiled a list of about
200
names of alleged agents representing western Polish emigrants. The list also contained the
names of the intelligence centres in which these agents were to have worked since the end of the
war. These centres, including their branches, were located in West Berlin and in about
20
other
cities, most often in close vicinity to camps for displaced people.
It is virtually impossible to determine today how many of the accused and sentenced were
actual spies. From the Communist point of view, every
"londyńczyk"
("Londoner"
-
supporter
of the London government in exile),
"dwójkarz"
("Seconder"
-
supporter of the Second Polish
Corps), or "andersowiec" ("Andersian"
-
supporter of general Anders) was automatically accu¬
sed of espionage. One thing is beyond doubt: to consider any activity undertaken by represen¬
tatives of the same nation and of the same state was absurd in purely counterintelligence terms.
Sławomir Łukasiewicz
Civil secret services in the People's Republic of Poland and the Polish emigration
in the West: structures and operational directions from the early
1960s
Since political emigrants led their activities in the environments and centres that were located
outside Poland, they inevitably became of interest to the Polish foreign intelligence service. This
kind of intelligence organization, built as a copy of Soviet institutions, was beginning to emerge
in the early days of communist rule in Poland, that is between
1944
and
1945.
Documents reveal
that one of the reasons behinds the launching of a foreign intelligence institution was the need to
undertake action against Polish emigration in the West. The activities of the foreign civil intelli¬
gence corroborated with the work of military intelligence, which may be borne out by a "personal
union" between the two institutions: in the years
1947-50
both intelligence services were headed
by General
Wacław Komar.
The emigration issue was dealt with by the so-called territorial de¬
partments. Gradually, it became subject to analyses undertaken by a newly established Research
Office. In
1949
a special department was created (Department V) to deal exclusively with the emi¬
gration-related problems. In the years
1953-54
the activities of Department V were distributed
over two territorial departments: Department HI for European capitalist countries, and Department
333
IV for countries outside Europe). It was no sooner than
1962
that Department V became Depart¬
ment
VIII
within the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This change also resulted in
an organizational reshuffling of the service. Apart from the discussion on the structural develop¬
ment of the institution in question, along with the presentation of its key figures, I try to illustrate
the methods the institution used in recruiting and using agents, as well as strategic operational di¬
rections. I also consider the extent to which the
émigrés
were aware of being subject to the acti¬
vities of Polish communist secret services and how they attempted to neutralize the latter.
Paweł Zięłara
Coordinated efforts of the communist state structures to fight the emigration enemy:
the case of
Władysław
Anders
General
Władysław
Anders was undoubtedly one of the most outstanding figure of Polish po¬
litical emigration after WWII. His reputation among and recognition by all the emigre communi¬
ties, his contacts in Western military circles and his being regarded as a living legend in Poland
posed a serious threat to the leaders of new Communist Poland; a threat that should be neutrali¬
sed by all means. The article presents the vast spectrum of methods used by the Warsaw admi¬
nistration against Anders. The methods included institutional actions (like depriving Anders of
Polish citizenship); intelligence infiltration
—
with the use of domestic and emigre agents, inspi¬
ring and disinformation of the
émigré
press, Western „progressive" (anti-reactionist) press, leftist
and Jewish organizations. They also launched anti-Anders propaganda campaigns, including
financing libelling publications and, finally, on a domestic scale, preventive censorship was em¬
ployed. Numerous institutions of the Communist state were involved in the struggle against An¬
ders: the Ministry of Public Security and its subsequent emanations, the Council of Ministers, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military and diplomatic missions, embassies and consulates, the Lia-
son Society with Poles Abroad
"Polonia,"
and the censorship office. Civil and military special
service personnel, diplomats, party activists and propaganda specialists all collaborated in order
to eliminate the enemy. The pre-war materials that were supposed to compromise Anders were
in vast use: from pamphlets, through Communist „diplomacy," up to the authors of fully politi¬
cally correct publications after the general's death. The Foreign Branch of the Central Commit¬
tee of the Polish United Workers' Party
(PZPR)
prepared materials for use in a campaign against
Anders in America. The information gathered by the London attache office about the contents of
public speeches given by Anders were used as basis for protest and interventions of Polish Com¬
munist diplomats in the British Foreign Office. The Liason Society was also deeply involved in
the anti-Anders campaign, under the umbrella of Departaments I and III of the Ministry of In¬
terior and of the Foreign Branch of the Central Commitee of the Polish United Workers' Party
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A lot of Communist diplomats and consular personnel were
intelligence officers. A legal case that Anders had against the
"Narodowiec"
daily was of consi¬
derable interest to the Ministries of Interior and of Foreign Affairs, and also to the Ministry of
Defence. They all collaborated on a common strategy in this case. Fighting Anders, as an icon
of a victorious leader and an anti-Communist patriot, did not stop after his death in
1970.
The
suspension of the decision to deprive him of Polish citizenship, which can be interpreted as his
public and formal rehabilitation, took place as late as March
1989,
only three months before the
"contract" elections that marked the end of the People's Republic of Poland.
334
Adam F. Baran
Polish Scouting Association in Exile as a source of inspiration for enemies of Poland. The
period of
1945-57
Polish Scouting Association in Exile was formally launched by a convention of the pre-war
Polish Scouting Association leaders in Enghien near Paris on
2
February
1946.
In May,
Dr Mi¬
chał Grażyński
was elected President of the organization.
Grażyński
had formerly been Head of
Silesia Province and President of the pre-war Polish Scouting Association until
1939.
Adopting
the legalist perspective, the exile organization declared that it was part of the Polish Scouting
Association as a whole, and that it acted as a legally sound structure in a time when the fate of
a future post-war Poland was mostly indefinable. Scouting
-
in its limited and state-controlled
form
-
was active in communist Poland, whether in a legal, or a clandestine form. When in
1950
the Communists realized that they would not be able to use the post-war Scouting Association
in Poland
-
already reinstated in the "Lublin Poland" period
-
for their political needs, they put
a ban on it. From that time on the Scouting Association in Exile was the only legal continuation
of the pre-war Polish Scouting Association. Struggling to gain control over control youth sco¬
uting, Communists regarded the Scouting Association in Exile as hostile, dangerous and antide¬
mocratic. They took measures (also diplomatic) and succeeded in withdrawing the support of the
International Scouting Office for the Scouting Association in Exile. At the same time, Commu¬
nists questioned the rules of scouting adopted by the domestic scouting organization. As a result,
Polish scouts lost contact and a relationship with their international counterparts for a long time.
The liquidation of this scouting organization in
1951
did not prevent the regime from fighting
against any hints and traces of "reactionist scouting." The situation did not improve in Decem¬
ber
1956,
when scouting was brought back to life in Poland in the form of a Communist-control¬
led Polish Scouting Association. Irrespective of the history of the Polish Scouting Association in
Exile, we have to acknowledge the fact that advocates of authentic scouting in communist Po¬
land did their best to restore the scouting movement based on traditional patterns and ideals. At¬
tempts
ofthat
kind were made in vain in
1956
and in
1980,
but then Polish scouting was formally
restored successfully in
1989.
In each of these attempts Polish scouts asked for support of the Po¬
lish Scouting Association in Exile. The main aim of this paper is to show the role that Communi¬
sts in Poland attributed to the exile scouting organization and its structures. Document research
and analysis reveals examples of activities meant to undermine the organization and its structu¬
res. The research leads presented by the author may inspire other researchers to undertake fur¬
ther study of the subject matter.
Aleksander Kozicki
Activities of the security apparatus in the Polish People's Republic targeted against
the Belarusan political emigration in the years
1945-56
In
1951
the Polish Ministry of Public Security launched an objective infiltration of- what is
called in the ministry's documentation
-
"the nationalist Belarusan circles." This action was na¬
med "Dywersant" (Saboteur). The name reflected the judgement that was made of the Belarusan
minority by the security services. This particularly pertained to these representatives of the mi-
335
nority who fought against Soviets in the years
1941-1945,
often relying on German support. The
Belarusan problem had been subject to investigation by the security apparatus even before
1951,
but there had been no centralized operational activities in that domain. At first, the Polish appa¬
ratus lacked any kind of knowledge about the living conditions of the Belarusan emigration. This
knowledge was obtained from Soviets, along with a selection of agents.
A practical example of objective infiltration by the ministry in the domain of Belarusan mi¬
nority was the case of Jan Kuszel. He was infiltrated for his potential contacts with his brother
Franciszek,
a leader of Belarusan armed formations during the war.
The Belarusan community in exile underwent serious political disintegration. In December
1947,
in Osterhofen (American zone) the
Rada
of the Belarusan Democratic Republic (RBDR)
was established, with
Mikołaj Abramczyk
elected its first president. Apart from this new politi¬
cal centre, there existed an older organization, headed by the president of the former Belorusan
Central Council, R.
Ostrowski.
The establishment of these two organizations was responsible for
the evident polarization within the Belarusan emigration into two main camps. The supporters
of RBDR, also widely known as "Krywicze," were in favour of cooperation with Western demo¬
cracies and the Polish government in exile. The other group, often referred to as
"Zarubieżnicy,"
remained strongly influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church in exile. They focused mostly on
cooperation with the Russian emigration and the West. In time the RDBR won considerable acc¬
laim and authority over the emigres from the USSR. A key date was
15
February
1953 -
that day
a treaty in Karlsruhe was signed between the governments in exile of Belarus (RDBR), Georgia,
Ukraine and the united national environments of the Caucasus. Another key moment was March
1953,
when representatives of all these ethnic groups met in Paris. At the meeting many declara¬
tions were issued concerning goodwill and the wish to cooperate in bringing freedom and inde¬
pendence to Belarus. In this way the so-called Paris Bloc was established, headed by M. Abram¬
czyk. The years that followed witnessed a reduced intensity of political activities of the particular
emigration environments, including the Belarusans. This was mainly due to the global political
changes and the local political status quo in Belarus
—
a new generation of Belarusans was edu¬
cated in the spirit of complete isolation from the West.
Dariusz Węgrzyn
The Special Operation
"Dziady"
(1946-48).
Operational games of the Higher Silesian
security service with the Headquarters of the Polish Organization in
Regensburg
The paper concentrates on the operational activities of the Higher Silesian security service
targeted at the national emigration groups in Germany. In autumn
1945
the commander of the
Vllth Silesian District of the National Armed Forces (NSZ),
Kazimierz Zaborski "Łamigłowa,"
turned traitor to the organization and started to collaborate with the Communists. This led to
a wave of repression in the NSZ in Higher Silesia, but also in other parts of Poland. In consequ¬
ence the growth of NSZ was thwarted. Acting as a secret agent, Zaborski (nicknamed RR) laun¬
ched a provocation organization in Higher Silesia named Silesian Armed Forces
(Śląskie Siły
Zbrojne),
which was fully under the control of the security service. Silesian Armed Forces under¬
took a number of operational activities, of which the most tragic was Operation
"Lawina"
(Ava¬
lanche). In mid-
1946
it was announced that a formation of NSZ, under the command of
Henryk
Flame,
pseudo "Bartek,"
was to be relocated from the
Podbeskidzie
region. In fact, the whole
action was to enable the extermination of NSZ members.
200
partisans lost their lives. An active
336
participant
in the operation was
Henryk Wendrowski,
a representative of the Ministry of Public-
Security. Later he was in charge of security operation
"Cezary,"
in which a fake Vth Board of the
Society "Freedom and independence" (WiN) was elected. In the years
1946-1948
he initiated co¬
urier activities with the Headquarters of the Polish Organization in
Regensburg,
whose task was
to ensure communication between NSZ in Poland and in exile, as well as to promote intelligen¬
ce activities. This activity was titled
"Dziady."
The present paper describes the process of how
the courier network was being built between Katowice and
Regensburg.
It also shows how the
Communist security apparatus was trying to obtain money, specialists and all other forms of sup¬
port from the emigre environments. Of equal importance were activities in the field of offensive
counterintelligence, which were meant to allow intelligence infiltration of the emigre environ¬
ments, performed by fake couriers, who in fact were agents. Despite a lot of financial and orga¬
nizational effort invested into the operational activities in Higher Silesia, the operational effects
fell far below of what was expected. This was mostly owing to the weak position of the natio¬
nal emigration groups, who failed to send the resources to Poland. The greatest advantage from
the operation for the security apparatus in Poland was the experience they gained, used creative¬
ly in a series of subsequent operational activities, e.g. operation
"Cezary"
-
as mentioned above,
or the so-called Berg affair. Operation
"Dziady,"
despite its limited scale, is worth researching
as it gives insight into the methodology, resources and operational activities used by the securi¬
ty apparatus.
Sebastian Rosenbaum
The Attitude of the Security Service in the Province of Katowice towards the Higher
Sitesian emigration to West Germany in the
1970s
December
1970
marked the beginning of a new
-
normalized
-
era in Polish-West German
relationships, accompanied by a more liberal approach of Polish authorities to the question of
emigration. As a result, the Higher Silesian population was granted a chance to migrate to West
Germany. In the
1970s
and
1980s
over
110
thousand people left Poland. These emigrants were
under constant, meticulous surveillance by the Polish security apparatus. This emigration group
was treated by the apparatus as representative of the so called "West-German revisionism." Fi¬
ghting against this phenomenon was a major operational activity of state security services in the
Province of Katowice. At the same time, the growing Higher Silesian emigration offered a chan¬
ce to the Communists to launch intelligence and counterintelligence activities in West Germany.
Agents were sent in disguise, well concealed among all those who left for West Germany. Worth
describing are three interrelated operations undertaken by security services in the Province of
Katowice, targeted at the Higher Silesians: these were
„Ośrodek," „Wezera"
and „Ren." Ope¬
ration
„Ośrodek"
was launched in order to infiltrate the environments of „the displaced" from
Higher Silesia and of Higher Silesian fraternities, regarded by Polish Communists as „seeds of
West-German revisionism" and as supporters of pro-German sympathies of Higher Silesians li¬
ving in Poland. Operation
„Wezera"
targeted scholarly centres in West Germany, with special
focus on the so-called
„Ostforschung"
(research on former German eastern territories). Security
services believed that German Higher Silesians, organized in fraternities and emigration organi¬
zations, were inspired in their attacks against the People's Republic of Poland and the geopolitical
status quo of the time by these research institutes. What is more, it was believed that the findings of
these research institutions were also used by West-German intelligence forces. Other institutions
337
also fell within the scope of operational interest of Polish security services. These included In¬
ter Nationes,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
and Goethe-lnstitut. Operation „Ren" was initiated at the
level of the Ministry of Interior (Section III, Department II) in March
1971.
It was also realized
locally in the Province of Katowice through agents and pseudo-agents
(disinformers)
whose task
was to thwart the activities of the West-German intelligence and counter-intelligence. Operation
"Ren" was formally terminated in July
1975,
but the actual operational activities were held in
the years
1971-1973.
Drawing upon an in-depth analysis of personal files of several thousands
of people, the security officers selected a group of a hundred
disinformers
who were sent to West
Germany. Other operational activities of the Katowice branch of security services also related to
matters concerning the Higher Silesian emigration, for example operation
„Tama,"
whose aim
was to thwart the rising wave of
émigrés.
The operation turned out to be unsuccessful, as in the
1980s
the emigration escalated.
John Earl Haynes
Frustrated Expectations: The Atlantic Charter, Yalta, Polish-Americans,
and Early Cold War Anticommunism
In
1941
U.S. President Roosevelt and U.K. Prime Minister Churchill pledged in the "Atlantic
Charter" that the peace at the end of the war in Europe would "respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them" and also stated
the "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned." The Atlantic Charter was affirmed in
1942
by the joint American, British,
and Soviet "Declaration of United Nations." Roosevelt further articulated these democratic war
aims in his famous "Four Freedoms" speech that became a central theme of the Roosevelt admi¬
nistration's justification to the American public for participation in World War II. First and se¬
cond generation Americans of recent Eastern European descent embraced these Atlantic Charter
and Four Freedom's war aims as promising post-war independence and internal self-government
to their ancestral homelands after their liberation from Nazi occupation. During the war the
Roosevelt administration believed it could reconcile those promises with its alliance with the
USSR. But at the war's end, Soviet establishment of its suzerainty and imposition of Communist
political control in Eastern Europe produced significant domestic frustration and feelings among
Americans of recent immigrant origin that the White House had misled and manipulated them.
Polish-Americans in particular felt that the Roosevelt administration and prominent Democratic
Party political figures had promised to undo the
1939
Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland and were
gravely disappointed by FDR's acceptance of the partition at the
1945
Yalta conference and the
subsequent establishment of Communist political dominance in Poland. The resulting political
backlash allowed the Republican Party to make inroads into a hitherto largely Democratic Par¬
ty voting bloc and was one of the factors that encouraged President Truman's administration and
the post-war Democratic Party to shift toward a Cold War foreign policy stance and a clear em¬
brace of anticommunism.
338
Anna Mazurkiewicz
„Covert infringement by the federal government on the free market of ideas"
-
Assembly of Captive European Nations in the American politics of the Cold War period
The wave of East European exiles which reached American shores after the Second World
War posed a significant challenge to the American administration. Not only did the arriving
expatriates bring along a staunchly anti-communist outlook but also an array of political views,
ethnic and personal divisions, and antagonisms. For the Americans they represented a valuable
source of information, possible intelligence contacts, and an opportunity fordeveloping anti-
communist propaganda but also a likely source of trouble if they were left alone to organize and
possibly openly criticize the U.S. foreign policy.
One of the tools introduced to assist and coordinate the exile activities was the National Com¬
mittee for a Free Europe which had been established in
1949.
Under its aegis, beginning in Sep¬
tember 20th,
1954,
East European emigre communities in the U.S. acknowledged new, powerful
means of advancing their common goal: the restoration of independence to their homelands
-
the
Assembly of Captive European Nations.
From its inception ACEN represented Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. However, the membership in ACEN was not confined
to national representations (councils or committees in exile). The Assembly included Associative
Member Organizations such as the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, International
Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, International Peasant Union, Liberal Democratic Union
of Centra] Eastern Europe, and Socialist Union of Central Eastern Europe.
Officially sponsored by the FEC this new organization repeatedly called for free elections
and immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, which would provide for a "peaceful liberation" of
Eastern Europe. ACEN addressed its appeals to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and
both American and foreign governments.
Based on a detailed examination of the ACEN's archival collection (principally at the Immi¬
gration History Research Center), as well as on the U.S. government's records and a series of inte¬
rviews, this article examines the reasons for American support for East European exile activities.
Although the role of ACEN was far from decisive and its suggestions were not crucial in
shaping American foreign policy, this organization ran a series
ofinformation
campaigns direc¬
ted both at the Americans and foreigners and supported by American taxpayers' money. As such
the U.S. government found it a useful element for anti-communist propaganda both at home and
abroad.
Jan Raška
Forging states of dissent: Czech emigres, communist spies,
and Canadian State Security,
1945-68
The immediate postwar period re-established lingering social, political, and ethnic divisions
between Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Magyars and other ethnic groups that had existed since the
First Czechoslovak Republic. The Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February
1948
forced
many supporters of democracy to flee the country. In Canada, the Czech and Slovak communities
339
vehemently opposed the Communist takeover and welcomed countless 'Czechoslovak' refu¬
gees.
Pre-
1945
immigration to Canada had been predominantly Slovak, whereas following the
war Czechs accounted for the majority of the refugees fleeing Communist rale. Amongst the
1948
emigres were political dissidents, intellectuals, artists, skilled professionals, Communist spies,
and Nazi sympathizers. The Canadian government permitted entry to hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons of war, and political and humanitarian refugees to resettle in their new coun¬
try. Czech and Slovak political emigres sought to stifle the Communist spies and Nazi sympathi¬
zers hiding within their communities, while actively promoting and working to free Czechoslo¬
vakia from Communist oppression. The Hungarian Revolution of
1956
profoundly shaped the
relations that the emigres possessed with their „home governments." Prior to the
1956
Revolu¬
tion, Czechs in Canada were split in their political outlook in regard to their relations with the
(Communist-led) homeland.
Such a division resulted in one faction focused on freeing Czechoslovakia from Communist
oppression, while the other concentrated on ameliorating the socio-economic position of fellow
compatriots already in Canada. This article examines the nature of the social and political disco¬
urse between Czech and Slovak political refugees in Canada from the end of the Second World
War through to the Hungarian Revolution of
1956,
and the Prague Spring invasion of
1968.
Inte¬
gral to our understanding of this period are such questions as: to what extent did the federal go¬
vernment and other institutional "gatekeepers" subvert the social integration of immigrants from
Eastern Europe to achieve strategic objectives of state security? How did Ottawa bridge the di¬
vide between immigrant acculturation, which led to the promotion of western democratic ide¬
als, and its consistent use of security tactics, which often compromised sociopolitical harmony
among new immigrants?
Cecilia Notini Burch
A Cold War pursuit: Swedish responses to the Soviet hunt
for political refugees,
1945-60
This chapter examines the close relationship between refugee handling and foreign policy in
Sweden during the Cold War. The empirical focus of the article is on the various ways in which
Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to official appeals made by the Soviet embassy
in Stockholm regarding Soviet and Baltic refugees in Sweden between the years
1945
and
1960.
The Embassy's entreaties ranged from requests for personal information about an individual to
open demands for repatriation.
How Sweden was to deal with these demands was a far from uncomplicated matter. In ide¬
ological and cultural terms, post-War Sweden identified itself as a Western country. It had also
begun to participate actively in the construction of the international (Western) refugee regime.
However, due to the country's non-allied status, officially neutral position and sensitive geopoli¬
tical location, its concomitant dealings with the Soviet Union were dictated to a greater or lesser
extent by concerns for national security.
The study reveals that Sweden's responses to Soviet demands changed considerably between
1945
and
1960.
Sweden's willingness to protect refugees from the Soviet Union increased si¬
gnificantly from the early
1950s
onwards. Nevertheless, the article also demonstrates that the
actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it came to Soviet and Baltic refugees were, in
varying degrees, contingent on Soviet demands during the whole of the period under considera-
340
tion.
This is proven by the fact that the Ministry at no time ceased to provide the Embassy with
limited information about the refugees, and that it did so even though its head of staff was ful¬
ly cognisant of the troublesome consequences this behaviour could
-
and sometimes did
-
cau¬
se the refugees.
At the close of the article, the author argues that this state of affairs needs to be understood as
a direct consequence of Sweden's balancing ambitions in foreign policy during these years, and
its wish to 'smooth' a sometimes rather tense relationship with the Soviet Union.
Thomas Wegener Friis
Danish security and the East European migration
Intelligence services from all of the communist countries operated in Denmark during the
Cold War. One of their main targets was the emigrants living in the country. The attitude of the
services toward their former countrymen was ambiguous. On one hand they could be used as an
intelligence asset. On the other hand they were often a political liability because of their oppo¬
sition to the communist government. Both possibilities can be observed in Denmark during the
Cold War. Spy networks with their roots in German
émigré
society in the 1930's can
-
for instan¬
ce
-
be observed as late as the
1
990s. The arm of the communist security apparatus also reached
Scandinavia in the attempt of keeping
émigrés
under political control. Cases show that at least
the Bulgarians and the Rumanians went as far as to try to terminate politically active
émigrés.
The Danish authorities were unable to provide the emigres with sufficient security. Coun¬
ter-intelligence files also clearly show that the Danish services were overwhelmed with the task
of hindering the Eastern services from recruiting emigres as agents. Even though the Danish Po¬
lice Intelligence (PET) was aware of some case, it was not in a position to infiltrate large mino¬
rities like the
20,000
Poles or the thousand Hungarians. Furthermore, these new citizens were
easily integrated. This was a benefit for the Danish society, but a security hazard in the eyes of
security officers. A claim like „all GDR citizens resident here must be considered a potential MfS
agent
-
either active or passive" seems an outburst of frustration rather than fact a based on re¬
liable intelligence. This shows that Western countries also had an ambiguous attitude to the
émi¬
grés.
They were a valuable political weapon in the fight against communism, but could also be
perceived as a security problem.
Idesbald Goddeeris
Three perspectives: agent, emigrant and historian
The article elaborates on the case of a Polish exile,
Eryk,
who had settled in Belgium in
1945
and was four times, in
1955, 1962, 1968-72,
and
1979-81,
the object of operations held by
Polish intelligence, which aimed to recruit him as an informant. Comparing his file at the Polish
secret services' archives with information from an interview with
Eryk
himself, the article reve¬
als that intelligence reports were very inaccurate in several areas. Biographical details, concrete
facts on operations, and the general image that was set up of
Eryk
were all incorrect. Consequen¬
tly, the article raises questions about Polish intelligence's efficiency and its archives' reliability.
341
Moreover, it discusses the place of secret services in migrants' life, both during the Cold War
and nowadays, suggesting that present-day historians overstate the impact of the intelligence ac¬
tivities and, in consequence, even unnecessarily spoil victims' last years of life.
José M.
Faraldo
Refugees, anticommunists, acholars. Eastern European emigres in Franco's Spain
After the fall of the Axis powers in
1945,
refugees from Slovakia, Croatia, Romania and Hun¬
gary and even from Nazi Germany escaped to Spain. They joined the little community of Eastern
and Central European emigrants (Polish, Russian, Ukrainians, etc.) that had came to Spain at
different times after
1936.
Their impact on Spanish society was in some aspects very impor¬
tant. They helped to build a special image of East and Central Europe in Spanish public opinion,
which was quite alive until the
1970s.
Disciplines like Slavic, Romanian and Magyar studies and
Communism research developed in Spain with the help of these emigrants. All national groups
were given the opportunity to conduct radio broadcasts in their own languages, for their coun¬
tries ("Radio Madrid"). Some of these broadcasts were only ended after Franco's death. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1154400840 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV037473257 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)734078282 (DE-599)BVBBV037473257 |
| era | Geschichte 1945-1989 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1945-1989 |
| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)1071861417 Konferenzschrift 2008 Lublin gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Konferenzschrift 2008 Lublin |
| geographic | Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd Ostmitteleuropa (DE-588)4075753-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Osteuropa Ostmitteleuropa |
| id | DE-604.BV037473257 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-31T19:03:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788376291888 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022624961 |
| oclc_num | 734078282 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 382 S. |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, Oddział |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Konferencje IPN |
| series2 | Konferencje IPN |
| spelling | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Pod red. Sławomira Łukasiewicza Lublin Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, Oddział 2010 382 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Konferencje IPN 40 Zsfassung in dt. u. engl. Sprache Geschichte 1945-1989 gnd rswk-swf Politischer Flüchtling (DE-588)4175042-1 gnd rswk-swf Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd rswk-swf Ostmitteleuropa (DE-588)4075753-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)1071861417 Konferenzschrift 2008 Lublin gnd-content Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 g Ostmitteleuropa (DE-588)4075753-5 g Politischer Flüchtling (DE-588)4175042-1 s Geschichte 1945-1989 z DE-604 Łukasiewicz, Sławomir 1972- Sonstige (DE-588)1154400840 oth Konferencje IPN 40 (DE-604)BV016982224 40 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022624961&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022624961&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej Konferencje IPN Politischer Flüchtling (DE-588)4175042-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4175042-1 (DE-588)4075739-0 (DE-588)4075753-5 (DE-588)1071861417 |
| title | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej |
| title_auth | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej |
| title_exact_search | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej |
| title_full | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Pod red. Sławomira Łukasiewicza |
| title_fullStr | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Pod red. Sławomira Łukasiewicza |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Pod red. Sławomira Łukasiewicza |
| title_short | Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? |
| title_sort | tajny orez czy ofiary zimnej wojny emigracje polityczne z europy srodkowej i wschodniej |
| title_sub | emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej |
| topic | Politischer Flüchtling (DE-588)4175042-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politischer Flüchtling Osteuropa Ostmitteleuropa Konferenzschrift 2008 Lublin |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022624961&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022624961&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV016982224 |
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