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1. Verfasser:	Sagers, Christopher L. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	New York, NY Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2011
Schriftenreihe:	Examples & explanations
Schlagworte:	Antitrust law / United States Antitrustrecht USA
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis
Beschreibung:	XXIX, 463 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:	9781454800002 1454800003

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MARC


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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	Summary of Contents Contents xiii Preface xxvii PART I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LAW Chapter 1 The History, Nature, and Theory of Federal Competition Policy PART II. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY ANTITRUST Chapter 2 A Two-Part Strategy for Understanding Antitrust Economics 19 Chapter 3 Part Two of the Two-Part Strategy: Economic Generalizations That Pervade Modern Antitrust 51 Chapter 4 The All-Important Concept of Market Power 65 PART III. CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE Chapter 5 An Introduction to Sherman Act § 1 81 Chapter б Per se Offenses 95 Chapter 7 The Rule of Reason and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints 107 Chapter 8 Intermediate Analysis: The Long Struggle to Define an Abbreviated Rule of Reason 113 Chapter 9 One Further Problem in Horizontal Cooperation: Exchanges of Information 125 IX Summary of Contents PART IV. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS Chapter 10 Antitrust and the Distribution of Goods: A Whole New World 133 Chapter 11 Tying and Exclusive Contracting 145 PART V. PROOF OF CONSPIRACY Chapter 12 Proof of Conspiracy Under Sherman Act § 1 157 PART VI. CONFRONTING MR. BIG: THE LAW OF MONOPOLY Chapter 13 The Offense of Monopolization 177 Chapter 14 Attempted Monopolization and Conspiracy to Monopolize 217 PART VII. ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Chapter 15 Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property 227 PART VIII. PRICE DISCRIMINATION Chapter 1 6 Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act 243 PART IX. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Chapter 17 Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions 261 Chapter 18 Merger Review Under Hart-Scott-Rodino 301 Summary of Contents PART X. INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES IN ANTITRUST Chapter 19 Institutions and Procedures in Antitrust 323 PART Xl. THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST Chapter 20 The Scope of Antitrust Generally 353 Chapter 21 Antitrust and Politics 367 Chapter 22 Antitrust and the Regulated Industries 397 Chapter 23 The Labor Exemption 417 Appendix Further Topics in Antitrust Economics: The Problem of Industrial Organization 431 Qlossary 445 Table of Cases 453 Index 459 Xl Contents Preface xxvii PART I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LAW Chapter і The History, Nature, and Theory of Federal Competition Policy 3 §1.1 What Is Antitrust ? 3 §1.2 Contemporary Antitrust in the Bigger Picture 9 §1.3 Using This Book 13 §1.4 A One-Page Crib Sheet to the Entire Law of Antitrust 15 PART II. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY ANTITRUST Chapter 2 A Two-Part Strategy for Understanding Antitrust Economics 19 §2.1 The Role of Economics in Antitrust 19 §2.2 Economic Theory Explained Intuitively: The Ground Rules of Antitrust Economics 22 §2.2.1 The Ground Rules 23 §2.2.2 Getting Our Feet Wet with the Ground Rules 26 §2.3 Basic Price Theory, More Traditionally Explained: Using Graphs and Mathematics to Capture Economic Concepts 30 §2.3.1 Functions, Curves, and Graphs 31 §2.3.2 How Competitive Markets Reach Equilibrium 32 §2.3.2 (a) How Firms Make Decisions, Part 1: Costs 33 §2.3.2(b) How Firms Make Decisions, Part 2: Demand, Elasticity, and the Firm-Specific Demand Curve 3 7 xiii Contents §2.3.2 (с) How Firms Make Decisions, Part 3: Maximizing Profit 40 §2.3.2(d) How Firms Make Decisions, Part 4: The Short Run, the Long Rim, and the Different Kinds of Fixed Costs 41 §2.3.2(e) How Firms Make Decisions, Part 5: Minimizing Loss 43 §2.3.3 Equilibrium in Monopoly 44 §2.3.4 Price Theory as a Normative Argument: Calculating the Areas of Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus, and Deadweight Loss 47 Chapter 3 Part Two of the Two-Part Strategy: Economic Generalizations That Pervade Modern Antitrust 51 §3.1 The Basic Purpose of Antitrust: The Rise of the Consumer Protection Standard 52 §3.2 What Antitrust Really Cares About Now: Protecting Optimal Conditions for Competition to Encourage Competition on the Merits 54 §3.2.1 Antitrust Protects Competition, Not Competitors 54 §3.2.2 Social Justifications Are Never Relevant in Antitrust: The Cognizability Issue 56 §3.2.3 Antitrust Is (Almost) Always Agnostic About Prices 58 §3.3 The Harvard School Contribution: Formulation of Antitrust Rules to Balance False Negatives and False Positives 60 §3.4 Unilateral Versus Multilateral and the Copperweld Gap: Antitrust Cares More About Conspiracy Than About Individual Action 62 Chapter 4 The All-Important Concept of Market Power 65 §4.1 The Omnipresence of Market Power in Antitrust Law 65 §4.1.1 Market Power: What It Is 65 §4.1.2 Why and When Market Power Matters in Antitrust Law 66 §4.2 The Traditional Doctrinal Tests for Market Power: The Market Share Proxy 69 §4.2.1 The Test and Its Origins 69 xiv Contents §4.2.2 Defining the Product Market: The Cellophane Test 70 §4.2.3 Defining the Geographic Market 74 §4.2.4 Measuring Share Once the Market Is Defined 75 §4.2.5 Assessing Other Indices of Market Power 75 §4.3 Measures of Concentration: The Merger Guidelines and the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index 77 PART III. CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE Chapter 5 An Introduction to Sherman Act §1 81 §5.1 An Introduction to Business Collaboration and a Few Preliminary Ideas: Horizontal and Vertical Restraints, and Per se Illegality Versus the Rule of Reason 81 §5.1.1 Limitation of the § 1 Prohibition to Unreasonable Conspiracies and the Difference Between Per se and Rule-of-Reason Analysis 83 §5.1.2 Horizontal Versus Vertical Arrangements: The Significance of Product Distribution in the Law of §1 86 §5.2 Why the Per-se-Versus-Rule-of-Reason Distinction Isn t Actually Easy: The Changing Perspective Since 1975 and the Trade-Off Between False Positive and False Negative 86 §5.3 A Summary of the Law of Multilateral Restraints 91 Chapter 6 Per se Offenses 95 §6.1 The Structure of a Per se Cause of Action 95 §6.2 Categories of Conduct That Remain Per se Illegal 97 §6.2.1 Horizontal Price Fixing 97 §6.2.1 (a) In General 97 § 6.2.1 (b) Kinds of Conduct Commonly Found to Constitute Per se Price Fixing 98 §6.2.1 (c) The Sui Generis Rule of BMI: Price Fixing Agreements That Are Themselves the Product 99 §6.2.2 Horizontal Market Allocations 10 0 XV Contents §6.2.3 Concerted Refusals to Deal (a.k.a. Boycotts ) 101 §6.2.3 (a) Distinguishing Per se and Non- Perse Boycotts 102 §6.2.3 (b) The First Amendment Issue 104 Chapter 7 The Rule of Reason and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints 107 §7.1 What the Rule of Reason Is Really About and the Elements of a Rule-of-Reason Cause of Action 107 §7.2 The Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints 110 Chapter 8 Intermediate Analysis: The Long Struggle to Define an Abbreviated Rule of Reason 11 3 §8.1 Introduction 113 §8.2 The Quick-Look Rule in Operation 114 §8.2.1 When Is a Case a Quick-Look Case? 114 §8.2.1 (a) The Case Law 114 §8.2.1 (b) So When Is a Case a Quick-Look Case? 117 §8.2.2 The Current Structure of a Quick-Look Case 121 §8.2.2(a) The Burden-Shifting Framework 121 § 8.2.2 (b) The Defendant s Justifications 12 3 Chapter 9 One Further Problem in Horizontal Cooperation: Exchanges of Information 125 §9.1 The Traditional Bookends Approach 125 §9.2 The Structural Approach of United States v. Container Corp. and the Law as It Stands 128 PART IV. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS Chapter 10 Antitrust and the Distribution of Goods: A Whole New World 133 §10.1 Vertical Relationships in General 133 §10.2 The Law of Vertical Restraints in General 134 §10.2.1 Varieties of Vertical Restraint 13 4 §10.2.2 Vertical Restraints in Historical Perspective: The Long Road from Dr. Miles to Continental T.V. to Leegin 135 XVI Contents §10.2.3 Doctrinal Elaborations Following Leegin s Universalization of Rule-of-Reason Treatment 140 §10.3 Distinguishing Horizontal and Vertical Conspiracies 142 Chapter 11 Tying and Exclusive Contracting 145 §11.1 Introduction 145 §11.1.1 A Special Problem in Distribution 145 §11.1.2 The Limitations and Peculiarities of Clayton Act §3 146 §11.2 Tying 147 §11.2.1 What Tying Is 147 §11.2.2 The So-Called Per se Tying Test 148 §11.2.2 (a) Separate Products 148 §11.2.2(b) Coerced Purchase of Both Products 149 § 11.2.2 (c) Power in the Tying Product 149 §11.2.2(d) Substantial Amount of Commerce Affected 150 § 11.2.3 (e) Business Justifications 15 0 §11.3 Exclusive Contracts 152 PART V. PROOF OF CONSPIRACY Chapter 12 Proof of Conspiracy Under Sherman Act § I 157 §12.1 Why Conspiracy Is Hard to Prove 157 §12.2 The Single Entity Problem: Cottemela, Dagher, and .American Needle 158 §12.3 Proving Conspiracy 163 §12.3.1 The Basic Framework and the Law as It Once Was 163 §12.3.2 Proving Conspiracy Under Twombly, Monsanto, and Matsushita: The Pretrial Requirement of Economic Sense 166 §12.3.2 (a) The Economic Sense Test 166 §12.3.2(b) When and How the Test Is Applied 167 §12.3.3 The Significance of Oligopoly Theory 169 §12.3.4 The Continuing Framework for Proof of Conspiracy with Circumstantial Evidence: The Plus-Factors Test as It Is Now Applied 171 §12.4 Special Problems in Proof of Vertical Conspiracy 174 XVII Contents PART VI. CONFRONTING MR. BIG: THE LAW OF MONOPOLY Chapter 1 3 The Offense of Monopolization 1 77 §13.1 Early Case Law and Its Current Significance: Alcoa, United Shoe, and the Many Forms the Law Could Have Taken 179 §13.2 The Basic Cause of Action as It Exists: Monopolize Is a Verb 182 §13.3 Proving Exclusionary Conduct Under §2 183 §13.3.1 The (So Far) Unsuccessful Search for a General Theory of Exclusion 183 §13.3.1 (a) Background 183 §13.3.1 (b) The Ambiguous Reception of Profit Sacrifice and No Economic Sense Tests 185 § 13.3.1 (c) The Current State of Play : Analyzing Exclusion Through the Category Approach 187 §13.3.2 The Role of Intent 188 §13.3.3 Exclusionary Pricing: Price Prédation and Its Variations 190 § 13.3.3 (a) The Present Standard Under Brooke Group 192 § 13.3.3 (b) Evolving Trends in Prédation Law 193 §13.3.4 Exclusionary Refusals to Cooperate 195 § 13.3.4 (a) Refusals to Deal in General 19 5 §13.3.4(b) The Essential Facilities Rule 197 §13.3.5 Exclusionary Distribution: Exclusive Contracts, Tying, Bundling, Full-Line Forcing, Loyalty Discounts, and the Many Other Faces of Vertical Foreclosure 201 §13.3.6 Exclusionary Misuse of Institutions: Exclusion Through Public and Quasi-Public Instrumentalities 204 § 13.3.6 (a) Standard Setting and Government Rule Making 205 §13.3.6(b) Exclusionary Litigation and Administrative Complaints 207 §13.3.6(c) Enforcement of Bogus Patents: The Walker Process Cause of Action 209 §13.3.7 Exclusionary Innovation 210 XVIII Contents §13.3.7 (a) Refusals to License Intellectual Property 210 § 13.3.7 (b) Product Design 211 § 13.3.7 (c) Failure to Predisclose 212 §13.3.8 The Unlimited Range of Other Conduct That Can Be Exclusionary and Judicial Reluctance to Consider It 213 §13.4 The Legitimate Business Justification 214 Chapter 14 Attempted Monopolization and Conspiracy to Monopolize 217 §14.1 The §2 Attempt Cause of Action 217 §14.1.1 Predatory Conduct 218 §14.1.2 Specific Intent 219 §14.1.3 Dangerous Likelihood of Success 220 §14.2 The §2 Conspiracy Cause of Action 221 §14.3 Evidence of Business Justification 222 § 14.4 The Practical Importance of the Attempt and Conspiracy Theories: Pleading Strategy 222 PART VII. ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Chapter 15 Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property 227 §15.1 The Rationalization of Two Policies 227 §15.2 Specific Antitrust Applications 228 §15.2.1 Acquisition of Legitimate Intellectual Property as an Antitrust Violation 229 §15.2.2 Improper Extension or Abuse of Otherwise Legitimate Intellectual Property 230 §15.2.2(a) Nonuse 230 §15.2.2(b) Objectively Baseless Infringement Claims 231 §15.2.2(c) Standard Setting and the Patent Hold-Up Problem 231 §15.2.3 Licensing Issues as to Legitimate Intellectual Property 233 §15.2.3 (a) Licensing or Refusal to License 233 §15.2.3(b) Trade-Restraining License Terms 233 xix Contents §15.2.3(c) Blocking Patents, Cross-Licensing, and Patent Pools 236 §15.2.3 (d) The First Sale Doctrine and the Tying Rule 237 §15.2.4 Enforcement of Wrongfully Acquired Intellectual Property 238 PART VIII. PRICE DISCRIMINATION Chapter 16 Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act 243 §16.1 The Phenomenon and Its Competitive Significance 243 §16.2 Theoretical Perspectives 245 §16.2.1 Price Discrimination in Economic Theory 245 §16.2.1 (a) What It Is 245 §16.2.1(b) The Prerequisites for Price Discrimination and the Incidence of It in the Real World 245 §16.2.2 Its Peculiarity in a System of Competition 247 §16.3 The Statute, Its Origins, and Its Peculiarities 248 §16.4 Prerequisites to Recovery 250 §16.4.1 Narrowed Jurisdictional Reach 250 § 16.4.1 (a) In Commerce : Physical Transfer of Goods Across State Lines in All RPA Actions (Probably) 250 §16.4.1(b) Section 2 (a) Cases Only (Probably): Domestic Consumption or Resale 251 §16.4.2 Scope of the RPA 251 §16.4.2 (a) Legal Persons Exempted from RPA Coverage 251 §16.4.2(b) Commodities 252 §16.5 The Four RPA Causes of Action 252 §16.5.1 The Primary Offense: Ordinary Price Discrimination Under RPA §2 (a) 253 § 16.5.1 (a) The Factual Predicates of the §2 (a) Cause of Action 253 §16.5.1 (b) Causing Competitive Injury 254 §16.5.2 The §2(a) Defenses (Which Also Apply in One Other Case) 256 §16.5.2 (a) Meeting Competition 256 XX Contents §16.5.2(b) Cost Justification 257 § 16.5.2 (с) Changing Conditions 257 §16.6 The Subsidiary RPA Causes of Action 257 §16.6.1 Brokerage Payments Under RPA § 2 (с) 257 §16.6.2 Promotional Materials Under RPA §§2 (d) and2(e) 258 §16.6.3 Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Benefits Under RPA §2 (f) 258 PART IX. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Chapter 1 7 Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions 261 §17.1 Some Brief Background 263 §17.1.1 The Many Ways One Firm Can Acquire All or Part of Another: A Primer on Acquisition Transactions 263 §17.1.2 The Competitive Relation Between the Merging Firms: Horizontal, Vertical, and Conglomerate Mergers and the Significance of These Distinctions 265 §17.2 Sources of the Law of Merger and Acquisition: Whence §7, Hart-Scott-Rodino, and the Guidelines, as Well as the Peculiar Quasi-Irrelevance of the Supreme Court 267 §17.2.1 The Long Legislative History of §7 and the Coming of HSR 268 §17.2.1 (a) Statutory Origins 268 §17.2.1 (b) The Creation of Modern Merger Law by the Warren Court 268 §17.2. Цс) The Sea Change of the 1970s and the Coming of HSR 270 §17.2.2 The Merger Guidelines 272 §17.3 The Substantive Law of Clayton Act §7: Scope and Applicability 275 §17.4 The §7 Substantive Cause of Action 279 §17.5 The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 1: Market Definition, Structural Presumptions, and the Defendant s Initial Rebuttal 282 §17.5.1 Horizontal Cases 283 §17.5.2 Vertical Cases and Conglomerate Cases 284 xxi Contents §17.6 The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 2: Theories of Harm 285 §17.6.1 Theories of Harm from Horizontal Merger 285 §17.6.2 Theories of Harm from Vertical Merger 289 §17.6.3 Theories of Harm from Conglomerate Merger 293 §17.7 The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 3: Defenses 296 §17.7.1 The Failing Firm Defense 296 §17.7.2 Efficiencies as a Defense 296 Chapter 18 Merger Review Under Hart-Scott-Rodino 301 §18.1 1976: HSR and the Revolution of Bureaucratic Merger Review 301 §18.1.1 Introduction 301 §18.1.2 Unpacking HSR 303 §18.2 Covered Transactions 305 §18.3 What Happens on Merger Review 310 §18.3.1 The Initial Filing and the HSR Clock 311 §18.3.2 The Second Request and Further Extensions of Time 312 §18.3.3 Disputes Within the HSR Process ЗІЗ §18.3.4 The Problem of Gun Jumping 315 §18.3.5 What Happens at the End 316 §18.3.6 Special Treatment for Cash Tender Offers and Bankrupt Entities 317 PART X. INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES IN ANTITRUST Chapter 1 9 Institutions and Procedures in Antitrust 323 §19.1 Limitations on Private Recovery. The Antitrust Injury Rule, the Standing Requirement, and Illinois Brick 324 §19.1.1 Antitrust Injury 325 §19.1.2 Standing or Remoteness 328 §19.1.3 The Direct Purchaser Rule 330 §19.2 The Unusual Variety of Enforcers 332 §19.2.1 Federal Enforcers 332 § 19.2.1 (a) The Justice Department, Antitrust Division: Civil Enforcement Powers 333 §19.2.1(b) The U.S. Attorneys and Criminal Enforcement 334 XXII Contents §19.2.1 (с) The Federal Trade Commission, Its Special Functions, and Its Complicated Jurisdiction 335 §19.2.2 Private Plaintiffs and the Rule of Treble Damages 338 §19.2.3 State Governments: As Private Plaintiffs and in Parens Patriae 339 §19.3 Technical Procedural Peculiarities 340 §19.3.1 Follow-On Litigation and Collateral Estoppel 340 §19.3.2 The Antitrust Statute of Limitations 3 41 §19.3.3 Government Settlements and the Tunney Act 343 §19.4 Remedies in Antitrust 344 §19.4.1 Recovery ofMoney 344 §19.4.1 (a) Money Damages: Private Plaintiffs, States in Parens Patriae, and the Federal Government 344 §19.4.2(b) FTC: Disgorgement, Restitution, and Forfeiture 345 §19.4.1(c) Money Penalties for Contempt 346 §19.4.2 Structural Relief — Divestiture or Dissolution 347 §19.4.3 Other Injunctions 348 §19.4.4 Remedies in Merger Preclearance Review 348 PART XI. THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST Chapter 20 The Scope of Antitrust Generally 353 §20.1 Antitrust Is the Great Swiss Cheese 353 §20.2 The Basic Scope of Antitrust: The Commerce Requirement, the Interstate Requirement, and the Reach of the Clayton and FTC Acts 355 §20.2.1 Trade or Commerce in General; Its Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity; and That Awkward Orphan of Antitrust, Professional Baseball 355 §20.2.2 Clayton Act §3 and the Robinson-Patman Act 359 §20.2.3 The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission 360 §20.3 International Antitrust: The Reach of U.S. Law Overseas 362 §20.3.1 The International Reach of the Sherman Act 362 §20.3.2 The Extraterritorial Reach of the FTC and Clayton Acts 364 §20.3.3 Extraterritorial Antitrust in Summary 365 §20.4 The Basic Scope of Antitrust in Summary 366 XXIII Contents Chapter 21 Antitrust and Politics 367 §21.1 The Interface of Antitrust and Politics 367 §21.1.1 Why Political or Government Action Could (Theoretically) Violate Antitrust 367 §21.1.2 The Constitutional Character of Political Immunities Cases 369 §21.1.2 (a) The Immunities Are Not Themselves Constitutional Rules (Apparently) 369 §21.1.2(b) State Action Cases Are Definitely Constitutional in Some Sense: They Implicate Sovereign Immunity and Seek Federal Preemption 370 §21.1.2(c) Cases Involving Both Immunities Doctrines Implicate Other Constitutional Issues 3 71 §21.1.3 The Political Immunities in Summary 372 §21.2 The State Itself as Defendant: Parker or State Action Immunity 373 §21.2.1 The Basic Rule; Genuine State Action Is Ipso Facto Immune 373 §21.2.2 The Several Failed, Would-Be Exceptions and the Lingering Uncertainty of the Market Participant Exception 375 §21.3 The Problem of Private Persons as Trade-Restraining Deputies: Midcal Immunity 376 §21.3.1 Clear Articulation 379 §21.3.2 Active Supervision 3 81 §21.3.3 State Agencies and Local Government Subdivisions: The Town of Hallie Rule 382 §21.3.3(a) Municipalities 382 §21.3.3(b) State Administrative Agencies 382 §21.3.3(c) Money Damages Against Local Governments: The Local Government Antitrust Act 383 §21.4 Noerr-Pennington or Petitioning Immunity 384 §21.4.1 Basic Rule: Petitioning That Is Not a Sham Is Immune from Antitrust 386 §21.4.1 (a) General Rule 386 §21.4.1 (b) What Is a Sham ? And Is Sham Petitioning in Itself an Antitrust Violation? 387 XXIV Contents §21.4.1 (с) The Special Case of Petitioning in the Adjudicatory Context and the Lingering Uncertainty over Adjudicatory Frauds 388 §21.4.2 Allied Tube and the Source, Context and Nature of the Restraint 390 §21.4.3 Conduct That in Itself Violates Antitrust Is Not Petitioning 391 §21.4.4 Purported Exceptions 393 §21.4.5 The Distinct Constitutional Protection of the First Amendment: The Rule of Claibome Hardware 395 §21.5 A Note on Antitrust and Federal Action: The Doctrine of Implied Repeal 395 Chapter 22 Antitrust and the Regulated Industries 397 §22.1 The Range of Regulated Industries and Their Relation to Antitrust 397 §22.1.1 Introduction 397 §22.1.2 A History of Economic Regulation: Changing Faith in Competition 400 §22.1.2 (a) The Rate-and-Entry Regulation of the Destructive Competition Era 400 §22.1.2(b) The Health-and-Safety Regulation of the Contemporary Era 402 §22.1.2 (c) The Ambiguous Term Deregulation 402 §22.1.3 A Few Useful Ideas From Administrative Law 403 §22.2 The Once-and-Continuing Prevalence of Statutory Exemptions 405 §22.3 The Doctrine of Implied Repeal 407 §22.4 Rules of Judicial Deference: The Filed Rate and Primary Jurisdiction Doctrines 410 §22.4.1 The Keooh or Filed Rate Doctrine 411 §22.4.2 The Rule of Primary Jurisdiction 413 Chapter 23 The Labor Exemption 417 §23.1 The Problem of Labor in Antitrust 417 §23.1.1 Introduction 417 §23.1.1 (a) Background 417 §23.1.1 (b) Summary of the Law 419 XXV Contents §23.1.2 A (Very) Brief History: The Early Judicial Hostility and the Rise of the Modern Statutory Regime 421 §23.2 The Modern Doctrinal Framework: The Statutory Exemption, the Nonstatutory Exemption, and the Allen Bradley Rule 423 §23.2.1 The Statutory Exemption 424 §23.2.2 The Nonstatutory Exemption 426 §23.2.3 The Allen Bradley Rule: Union-Employer Conspiracy 429 Appendix Further Topics in Antitrust Economics: The Problem of Industrial Organization 431 ŞApp.l The Economics of Distribution: Vertical Relationships and Their Antitrust Significance 432 ŞApp.1.1 The Horizontal-Vertical Distinction 432 § App. 1.2 Some Basic Features: The Fundamental Problem of Product Distribution and the Goal of Product Differentiation 433 § App. 1.2 (a) The Problem of Distribution 433 §App.l.2(b) Branding or Product Differentiation 435 § App. 1.3 Traditional Theories of Vertical Harm and the Neoclassical Criticism 436 § App. 1.4 Recent Reexamination of the Neoclassical Critique 439 §App.2 Modeling Imperfect Competition: Theories of Oligopoly 441 § App .2.1 Oligopoly Interdependence 441 § App. 2.2 Further Variations on Small-Numbers Competition: Limit Pricing and Contestable Markets 443 Qlossary 445 Table of Cases 453 Index 459 XXVI
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geographic	USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd
geographic_facet	USA
id	DE-604.BV037430048
illustrated	Illustrated
indexdate	2024-07-09T23:24:11Z
institution	BVB
isbn	9781454800002 1454800003
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022582132
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open_access_boolean
owner	DE-M382 DE-739
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physical	XXIX, 463 S. graph. Darst.
publishDate	2011
publishDateSearch	2011
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publisher	Wolters Kluwer Law & Business
record_format	marc
series2	Examples & explanations
spelling	Sagers, Christopher L. Verfasser aut Antitrust Christopher L. Sagers New York, NY Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2011 XXIX, 463 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Examples & explanations Antitrust law / United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022582132&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis
spellingShingle	Sagers, Christopher L. Antitrust Antitrust law / United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4140732-5 (DE-588)4078704-7
title	Antitrust
title_auth	Antitrust
title_exact_search	Antitrust
title_full	Antitrust Christopher L. Sagers
title_fullStr	Antitrust Christopher L. Sagers
title_full_unstemmed	Antitrust Christopher L. Sagers
title_short	Antitrust
title_sort	antitrust
topic	Antitrust law / United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd
topic_facet	Antitrust law / United States Antitrustrecht USA
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022582132&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
work_keys_str_mv	AT sagerschristopherl antitrust

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