Too much information sharing?: welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ganuza, Juan José (Author), Jansen, Jos 1969- (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Bonn Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods 2010
Series:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,40
Online Access:http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2520
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Summary:By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms’ incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms’ information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect. -- Oligopoly ; information acquisition ; information sharing ; Information structures ; Consumer surplus
Physical Description:37 S.
Format:. - Acrobat Reader

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