Handbook of social choice and welfare: 2
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| Language: | English |
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Amsterdam [u.a.]
Elsevier
2011
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| Edition: | 1. publ. |
| Series: | Handbooks in economics
19,[2] |
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| adam_text | CONTENTS
Preface
xvii
List of Contributors
xix
Part Five Foundations
1
13
Kenneth Arrow on Social Choice Theory
3
Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and
Kotaro Suzumura
Part I: An Editorial Note
3
Part II: An Interview with Kenneth J. Arrow
4
References
23
Part III: The Classification of Social Choice Propositions
24
14
The Informational Basis of Social Choice
29
Amartya Sen
1.
Introduction
29
2.
Democratic Priorities and Informational Inclusiveness
32
3.
Informational Exclusions and Social Choice Framework
34
4.
Axiomatic Exclusions and Arrow s Impossibility Theorem
37
4.1.
Arrow s Theorem
37
4.2.
Proof of Arrow s Theorem
38
4.3.
Interpretation of the Proof
39
5.
Enriching Information for the Possibility of Social Choice
40
6.
On Combining Utility and Nonutility Information
41
References
43
15
Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
47
Peter J. Hammond
1.
Introduction and Outline
50
1.1.
Markets and Social Choice
50
1.2.
Finite Economies
50
1.3.
Continuum Economies
51
1.4.
Public Goods and Externalities
52
2.
Agent Types
52
2.1.
Commodity Space
52
2.2.
Notation
52
2.3.
Consumption and Production Sets
53
2.4.
Preferences for Consumption
53
2.5.
Regular Smooth Preferences
55
2.6.
Preferences for Net Trades
56
vi
Contents
2.7.
A
Compact
Polish Space of Agents Types
57
2.8.
Smooth Type Domains
58
3.
Walrasian Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency
59
3.1.
Finite Set of Agents
59
3.2.
Feasible and Pareto Efficient Allocations
60
3.3.
Wealth Distribution and Walrasian Equilibrium
60
3.4.
Compensated Walrasian Equilibrium
61
3.5.
Properties of Compensated and Walrasian Equilibria
63
3.6.
Walrasian Equilibrium with Equal Budgets
64
3.7.
The Cheaper Point Lemma
66
3.8.
The Unique Cheapest Point Case
67
3.9.
Aggregate Interiority
67
4.
Characterizing Pareto Efficient Allocations
68
4.1.
First Efficiency Theorem
68
4.2.
Second Efficiency Theorem
68
4.3.
Identical Agents
69
4.4.
Nonoligarchic Allocations
70
4.5.
Exact Characterization of Nonoligarchic Allocations
72
4.6.
Oligarchic Allocations and Hierarchical Prices
72
5.
Walrasian Equilibrium in Finite Economies
74
5.1.
Autarky
75
5.2.
Gains from Trade
75
5.3.
Existence of Compensated Walrasian Equilibrium
76
5.4.
Directional Irreducibility and Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
79
5.5.
Extended
Irreducibility
82
6.
Characterizations of WE with a Fixed Profile of Agents Types
84
6.1.
Walrasian Acceptability
84
6.2.
Equal Rights to Multiple Proportional Trade
85
6.3.
Interactive Opportunity Sets
87
7.
Characterizations of WE with a Variable Profile of Agents Types
89
7.1.
Minimal Message Spaces
89
7.2.
Gevers
Theorem
91
7.3.
A Maximally Selective Social Choice Rule
93
7.4.
Local Independence in Smooth Economies
94
7.5.
Strategyproofness with Exogenous Prices
95
8.
Characterizations of WE with a Varying Number of Agents
97
8.1.
The Core and Edgeworth Equilibrium
97
8.2.
Another Limit Theorem
99
8.3.
Stability
99
8.4.
Consistency and Converse Consistency
103
8.5.
Consistency and Converse Consistency with Interactive Opportunity Sets
104
8.6.
Minimal Message Spaces
105
Contents_____________________________________________________________________________________________
vil
9.
Statistical Continuum Economies
105
9.1.
Continuum Economies
105
9.2.
Statistical Economies
106
9.3.
Statistical Continuum Economies
106
9.4.
Allocation Mechanisms
107
9.5.
Pareto Efficiency
108
9.6.
Walrasian and Compensated Equilibria
108
9.7.
Lump-Sum Wealth Redistribution
109
9.8.
Walrasian Equilibrium with Equal Budgets
109
10.
Efficiency Theorems in Continuum Economies
109
10.1.
First Efficiency Theorem
109
10.2.
Second Efficiency Theorem
110
10.3.
Nonoligarchic Allocations
111
10.4.
Individual Nonconvexities
112
11.
Statistical Continuum Economies: Existence Theorems
114
11.1.
Integrably Bounded Gains from Trade Sets
114
11.2.
Continuity of the Budget and Demand Correspondences
115
11.3.
Integrably Bounded Restricted Budget and Demand Correspondences
116
11.4.
Existence of Compensated Equilibrium with Free Disposal
117
11.5.
Monotone Preferences and Existence of Compensated Equilibrium
120
11.6.
Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
120
11.7.
Indivisible Goods and Constrained Monotone Preferences
121
11.8.
Dispersion and Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
122
12.
Equivalence Theorems for the Core and/-Core
123
12.1.
The Core and/-Core
123
12.2.
Walrasian Equilibria Belong to the Core
124
12.3.
/-Core Allocations are Compensated Equilibria
124
12.4.
Coalitional Fairness
126
12.5.
A Bargaining Set
127
13.
Envy-Free Mechanisms
129
13.1.
Full/-Pareto Efficiency
129
13.2.
Self-Selective Allocations
129
13.3.
Counterexample
132
13.4.
Fully Fair Allocations
132
14.
Strategyproof Mechanisms in a Continuum Economy
133
14.1.
Individual Strategyproofness
133
14.2.
Decentralization Theorem
134
14.3.
Limits to Redistribution
136
14.4.
Anonymity
136
14.5.
Weak Gains from Trade with an Inclusive Type Domain
137
14.6.
Strategyproof Mechanisms of Maximal Dimension
138
15.
Manipulation by Finite Coalitions
139
15.1.
Multilateral Strategyproofness
139
15.2.
Arbitrage-Free Allocations
140
v¡¡¡
Contents
16.
Other Environments
142
16.1.
Public Goods
142
16.2.
Externalities
143
Acknowledgments
144
References
144
16
Functionings and Capabilities
153
Kaushik
Basu
and Luis F.
Lopez-Calva
1.
The Capabilities Approach: An Introduction
154
2.
The Ideas in History
156
3.
Sen s Critique and Formulation
159
4.
Further Formalizations
164
5.
Capability, Preference, and Choice
169
6.
Applications of the Capabilities Approach to Poverty Measurement and Gender
Issues
1^5
7.
Capability and Exclusion
177
8.
The Human Development Index
179
9.
Concluding Remarks
182
Acknowledgments
182
References
183
Part Six Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes
189
17
Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains
191
Michel
Le
Breton and John A. Weymark
1.
Introduction
192
Part I: Social Welfare Functions
195
2.
Arrow s Theorem
195
3.
Single-Peaked Preferences
198
4.
Saturating Preference Domains
203
4.1.
Preliminaries
203
4.2.
The Kalai-Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem
206
4.3.
Further Properties of Saturating Preference Domains
208
5.
Examples of Saturating Preference Domains
209
6.
Topological Domain Restrictions for Public Goods
224
7.
Supersaturating Preference Domains
233
8.
Hypersaturating Preference Domains
239
9.
Topological Domain Restrictions for Private Goods
243
10.
Non-Cartesian Sets of Alternatives
245
10.1.
Assignments of Indivisible Objects
245
10.2.
Exchange Economies
250
11.
Effective Social Welfare Functions
255
Contents
¡x
Part II: Social Choice Correspondences
257
12.
A Choice-Theoretic Version of Arrow s Theorem
257
12.1.
The Arrow Choice Axioms
257
12.2.
Arrow s Theorem
262
13.
Unrestricted Preference Domains
262
13.1.
The Grether-Plott Theorem
263
13.2.
Strategic Candidacy
265
13.3.
Fixed Feasible Alternatives
267
14.
Single-Peaked Preferences and Interval Agenda Domains
271
15.
Analytic Preference Domains
274
15.1.
Euclidean Spatial Preferences
275
15.2.
Monotone Analytic Preferences
276
16.
Classical Domains of Spatial and Economic Preferences
277
16.1.
Exchange Economies
278
16.2.
Production Economies
281
16.3.
General Spatial Preferences
283
17.
Independence of Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives
286
17.1.
Nonconvex Agendas
286
17.2.
Convex Agendas
288
18.
Concluding Remarks
292
Acknowledgments
296
References
296
18
Topological Theories of Social Choice
301
Nicholas Baigent
1.
Introduction
302
2.
Chichilnisky s Theorem: An Elementary Introduction
302
2.1.
Linear Preferences
302
2.2.
Chichilnisky s Impossibility Theorem
304
2.3.
Loops
306
2.4.
Fundamental Equation of Topological Social Choice Theory
310
2.5.
Proof of Theorem
1
313
3.
Domain Restriction
315
3.1.
Domain Restriction
316
3.2.
Contractibility
316
4.
Weak Pareto and No Veto
317
4.1.
The Cone Property and the No Veto Property
317
5.
Strategic Manipulators and Homotopic Dictators
316
5.1.
Dropping the No Veto Property
320
6.
Continuity
323
6.1.
Justification
323
6.2.
Limitations of Continuity
325
7.
Topological Proof of Arrow s Theorem
326
7.1.
Nerves
326
Contents
7.2.
Loops in
Nerves 329
7.3.
Arrow s
Theorem 331
8.
Conclusion
332
Acknowledgments
333
References
333
19
Nonbinary Social Choice
335
Rajat Deb
1.
Introduction
335
2.
Choice Functions and Domain Restrictions
337
3.
Consistency and Rationalizability
339
4.
Nonbinary Social Choice: A Definition
342
5.
Social Choice: Some Standard Concepts
343
6.
Dictatorship and Oligarchy: The Fixed Agenda Case
345
6.1.
Social Choice with a Fixed Agenda: Hansson s Independence Condition
346
6.2.
Social Choice with a Fixed Agenda: Sen s Approach to the Independence
Condition
349
7.
Dictatorship and Oligarchy: With Multiple Agendas
355
8.
Conclusion
364
Acknowledgments
365
References
365
20
Social Choice with Fuzzy Preferences
367
Richard Barrett and Maurice
Salles
1.
Introduction
367
2.
Fuzzy Preferences
369
2.1.
Fuzzy Preferences: Numerical Values
370
2.2.
Fuzzy Preferences: Qualitative Values
372
3.
Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences: Arrovian Theorems
374
3.1.
The Case of Numerical Values
374
3.2.
The Case of Qualitative Values
378
4.
Other Aspects
380
4.1.
Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences and Sen s Impossibility Theorem
381
4.2.
Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences and Economic Environments
382
5.
Concluding Remarks
386
Acknowledgments
387
References
387
Part Seven Fairness and Rights
391
21
Fair Allocation Rules
393
William Thomson
1.
Introduction
395
2.
A Note on the Approach Followed
397
Contents xi
399
401
401
402
402
407
409
411
413
415
417
419
423
423
426
428
429
430
431
432
433
436
438
441
443
444
444
449
450
451
451
455
455
455
456
456
456
458
458
458
460
464
466
466
3.
The Classical Problem of Fair Division
4.
Equitable Allocations
4.1.
Comparisons to Equal Division
4.2.
No-Domination
4.3.
No-Envy
4.4.
Concepts Related to No-Envy
4.5.
Selections and Rankings
4.6.
Economies with a Large Number of Agents
4.7.
Equity Criteria for Groups
4.8.
Egalitarian-Equivalence
4.9.
Equitable Trades
4.10.
Towards a Complete Theory of Equity
5.
Economies with Production
5.1.
Adapting the Basic Concepts
5.2.
Agent-by-Agent Lower and Upper Bounds
6.
Equal
Opportunities as Equal, or Equivalent, Choice Sets
6.1.
Equal Opportunities
6.2.
Equal-Opportunity-Equivalence
6.3.
No Envy of Opportunities
7.
Monotonicity
7.1.
Resource-Monotonicity
7.2.
Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement
7.3.
Technology-Monotonicity
7.4.
Population-Monotonicity
7.5.
Monotonicity
in Economies with Individual Endowments
8.
Consistency and Related Properties
8.1.
Consistency and converse consistency
8.2.
Minimal Consistent Enlargements
8.3.
Consistency in Economies with Individual Endowments
9.
Public
:
Goods
9.1.
Basic Solutions
9.2.
Notions of Equal, or Equivalent, Opportunities
9.3.
Social Endowment
Monotonicity
9.4.
Technology-Monotonicity
9.5.
Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement
9.6.
Monotonicity
in Economies with Individual Endowments
9.7.
Population-Monotonicity
9.8.
Consistency
10.
Indivisible Goods
10.1.
The Model
10.2.
Basic Solutions
10.3.
Resource-Monotonicity
10.4.
Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement
10.5.
Population-Monotonicity
x¡¡
Contents
10.6.
Consistency
468
10.7.
Related Models
470
11.
Single-Peaked Preferences
476
11.1.
The Model
477
11.2.
Basic Solutions
477
11.3.
Resource-Monotonicity
479
11.4.
Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement
480
11.5.
Separability
481
11.6.
Population-Monotonicity
481
11.7.
Consistency
482
11.8.
Extensions and Related Models
483
12.
Nonhomogeneous Continuum
485
13.
Other Domains and Issues
489
14.
Conclusion
489
Acknowledgments
492
References
492
22
Compensation and Responsibility
507
Marc Fleurbaey and
François Maniquet
1.
Introduction
508
2.
Fair Monetary Compensation
517
2.1.
The Model
517
2.2.
Fairness as No-Envy, and Related Solutions
519
2.3.
Axioms and Ethical Principles
526
2.4.
The Quasi-Linear Case
536
3.
Unequal Productive Skills
546
3.1.
The Model
547
3.2.
Fairness in Compensation and Reward
549
3.3.
Bundle Equality and Welfare Lower Bounds
561
3.4.
Limited Self-Ownership
566
4.
The Utilitarian Approach to Responsibility
568
4.1.
Framework
568
4.2.
Social Welfare Functions
571
4.3.
Mln-of-Means or Mean-of-Mins?
573
5.
Related Literature
582
5.1.
Ranking Distributions of Opportunity Sets
582
5.2.
Extended Insurance
584
5.3.
Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
585
5.4.
Bargaining
587
5.5.
Surplus-Sharing and Cost-Sharing Approach
588
5.6.
Opinions
590
5.7.
Applications
591
Contents xiii
6.
Conclusion
595
Acknowledgments
597
References
598
23
Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness
605
Kotaro Suzumura
1.
Introduction
606
2.
Informational Bases of Normative Welfare Judgments
607
3.
Social Welfare, Individual Rights, and Liberal Paradox
611
4.
Proposed Resolution Schemes for
Paretian
Liberal Paradox
618
4.1.
Voluntary Alienation of Conferred Libertarian Rights
620
4.2.
Voluntary Exchange of Conferred Libertarian Rights
625
4.3.
Liberal Individual as the Base of the Liberal Society
628
4.4.
Ethical Constraints on the Exercise of Conferred Libertarian Rights
633
5.
Critiques on Sen s Formulation of Individual Rights
642
6.
Formulation, Realization, and Initial Conferment of Rights
646
7.
Liberal Paradoxes with Game Form Rights
653
7.1.
Power Structure Generated by Game Form Rights
653
7.2.
Gibbard Paradox with Game Form Rights
658
7.3.
Pareto Libertarian Paradox with Game Form Rights
660
8.
Initial Conferment of Game Form Rights
666
9.
Some Further Remarks on Paretianlsm
670
9.1.
The Paretlan Epidemic and Its Implications
670
9.2.
Nonwelfaristic Policy Assessment and the Pareto Principle
674
10.
Concluding Remarks
675
Acknowledgments
677
References
677
24
Freedom, Opportunity, and Weil-Being
687
James E. Foster
1.
Introduction
688
2.
Notation
693
3.
Freedom counts
693
3.1.
Rankings and Axioms
694
3.2.
Additive Representations and Cardinality Freedom
699
3.3.
Reflections on Counting as a Measure of Freedom
701
4.
Preference and Indirect Utility
702
4.1.
Rankings and Axioms
702
4.2.
Representations of Indirect Utility Freedom
705
4.3.
Combining Cardinality and Indirect Utility
706
4.4.
Other Views of Quality
709
4.5.
Reflections on Indirect Utility as a Measure of Freedom
711
5.
Plural Preferences and Effective Freedom
711
5.1.
Rankings and Axioms
712
xiv Contents
5.2.
Representations and Measures
716
5.3.
Sen s
Subrelation
and Arrow s Extension
718
5.4.
Reflections on Plural Preferences and Effective Freedom
723
6.
Conclusions
724
Acknowledgments
725
References
725
Part Eight Voting and Manipulation
729
25
Strategy proof Social Choice
731
Salvador
Barbera
1.
The Purpose and Limitations of This Survey
732
2.
Introduction: A Few Historical Notes
733
3.
Strategyproof Social Choice Functions for Unrestricted Domains:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
738
3.1.
Statement
738
3.2.
The Impact of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
741
3.3.
Proofs of the Theorem
743
4.
Game Forms and the Question of Implementation
748
4.1.
Strategyproofness in a Larger Picture
748
4.2.
Strengthenings, Weakenings, and Related Definitions
750
4.3.
Other Forms of Strategic Behavior in Voting
752
4.4.
The Analysis of Specific Social Choice Rules
753
5.
The Search for Strategyproofness: An Outline
754
6.
Common Domains: Strategyproof Rules for the Choice of Multi-attribute
Alternatives
758
6.1.
Two Alternatives
759
6.2.
Linearly Ordered Sets of Alternatives
759
6.3.
n-Dimensional
Grids
765
6.4.
Constraints: A First Approach
772
6.5.
The Structure of Strategyproof Rules
774
6.6.
Constraints Revisited
779
7.
Common Domains: Probabilistic Voting Schemes
780
8.
Common Domains: Social Choice Correspondences
787
9.
Strategyproofness in Personalized Domains
794
9.1.
Strategyproof Rationing
794
9.2.
Strategyproof Exchange
798
9.3.
Strategyproof Matching and Assignment
807
9.4.
Strategyproof Cost Sharing
811
10.
Further Comments on Preference Domains
815
10.1.
Some Special Domains
815
10.2.
Maximal Domains
817
11.
Some Final Remarks
817
Acknowledgments
818
References
819
Contents
XV
26
Probabilistic and Spatial Models of Voting
833
Peter Coughlin
1.
Black s Analysis of Committees and Related Results about Majority Rule
834
1.1.
Voters, Alternatives, and Preferences
835
1.2.
Simple Majority Rule
835
1.3.
Single-Peakedness and Median Alternatives
836
1.4.
Results for Committees and for the General Model
837
2.
Hotelling, Downs, and Electoral Competition
840
2.1.
Hotelling s Model for Duopolists
841
2.2.
Interpretation as a Model of Electoral Competition
842
3.
A Framework for Models of Electoral Competition
844
3.1.
Basic Assumptions and Notation
844
3.2.
Possible Objectives
848
4.
Deterministic Voting and Simple Majority Rule
852
4.1.
Definitions
852
4.2.
Pure-Strategy Equilibria and Condorcet Winners
853
5.
Unidimensional
Models with Deterministic Voting
854
6.
Finite-Dimensional Models with Deterministic Voting
858
6.1.
Plott s Analysis
859
6.2.
Sufficient Conditions
860
6.3.
McKelvey s Theorem
865
6.4.
Summing Up
867
7.
Probabilistic Voting Models
867
7.1.
An Overview
867
7.2.
Reasons for Analyzing Probabilistic Voting Models
867
8.
Unidimensional
Models with Probabilistic Voting
869
9.
Finite-Dimensional Models with Probabilistic Voting
871
9.1.
Hinich s Model
871
9.2.
Expectations Based on a Binary Luce Model
874
9.3.
Lindbeck
and Weibull s Model
879
10.
Probabilistic Voting Models with Fixed Candidate Characteristics and Voter
Predictions
881
10.1.
Fixed Candidate Characteristics
881
10.2.
Predictive Maps
883
10.3.
Summing Up
886
11.
Alternative Solution Concepts
886
11.1.
A Dynamical Approach
887
11.2.
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
888
11.3.
Some Other Solutions That Have Been Proposed
891
12.
Conclusion
892
Acknowledgments
892
References
892
xvi
Contents
27
Geometry of Voting
897
Donald G. Saari
1.
Introduction
898
2.
From Simple Geometry to Profile Coordinates
899
2.1.
Using Geometry to Represent Profiles
899
2.2.
Different Information, Different Voting Outcomes
901
2.3.
Profile Coordinates
903
2.4.
Resolving Classical Problems and Paradoxes
911
3.
Geometry of the Likelihoods of Voting Problems
913
3.1.
Central Limit Theorem
913
3.2.
Geometry of Paired Comparisons
914
3.3.
Geometric Likelihood Estimates
917
3.4.
Explaining and Interpreting Pairwise Voting Outcomes
918
3.5.
Geometry of All Three-Candidate Pairwise and Positional Outcomes
920
4.
Other Geometric Voting Results
924
4.1.
Paired Comparisons: Extending McGarey s Theorem
925
4.2.
Geometry of Strategic Behavior
927
4.3.
Could My Candidate Have Won with a Different Voting Rule?
930
5.
Exporting Lessons Learned From Social Choice
936
5.1.
From Voting to
Non
parametric Statistics
937
5.2.
Divide and Conquer : A Generalized Arrow s Theorem
938
5.3.
Dysfunctional Societies: Lessons from Sen s Theorem
940
5.4.
Applying Chichilnisky s Topological Dictator to Psychology
941
6.
Summary
942
Acknowledgments
943
References
943
Index
947
|
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| id | DE-604.BV036740274 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:47:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780444508942 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020657752 |
| oclc_num | 705930742 |
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| physical | XX, 962 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2011 |
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| series | Handbooks in economics |
| series2 | Handbooks in economics |
| spelling | Handbook of social choice and welfare 2 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... 1. publ. Amsterdam [u.a.] Elsevier 2011 XX, 962 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Handbooks in economics 19,[2] Handbooks in economics ... Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 s DE-604 Arrow, Kenneth Joseph 1921-2017 Sonstige (DE-588)118986856 oth (DE-604)BV014527301 2 Handbooks in economics 19,[2] (DE-604)BV000009734 19,2 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020657752&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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| title | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_auth | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_exact_search | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_full | Handbook of social choice and welfare 2 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_fullStr | Handbook of social choice and welfare 2 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Handbook of social choice and welfare 2 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_short | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_sort | handbook of social choice and welfare |
| topic | Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wohlfahrtstheorie Kollektiventscheidung Wahlverhalten Aufsatzsammlung |
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