Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War: disentangling deception and distraction
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Brighton [u.a.]
Sussex Academic Press
2010
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
Beschreibung: | XXIII, 297 S. |
ISBN: | 9781845193706 |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War |b disentangling deception and distraction |c Aryeh Shalev |
264 | 1 | |a Brighton [u.a.] |b Sussex Academic Press |c 2010 | |
300 | |a XXIII, 297 S. | ||
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500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
505 | 0 | |a pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept -- Israel's security concept and its limitations -- The intelligence concept -- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism -- Basic intelligence -- Formulating the intelligence picture -- The essence of warning -- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers -- Is Egypt starting a war? -- Warning from a particular high placed source -- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions -- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff -- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures -- Intelligence's mistaken assessment -- The reasons for the intelligence failure -- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work -- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch -- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War -- pt. 6. Proposed lessons -- Responsibility for assessment of intentions: the role of the leadership -- Organizational lessons | |
648 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1900-2000 | |
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650 | 4 | |a National security |z Israel |x History |y 20th century | |
650 | 4 | |a Deception |x Political aspects |z Israel |x History |y 20th century | |
650 | 4 | |a Distraction (Psychology) |x Political aspects |z Israel |x History |y 20th century | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | ISRAEL S
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
REFORE THE
YOM KIPPUR WAR
Disentangling Deception and Distraction
ARYEH SHALEV
Sussex
ACADEMIC
PRESS
Brighton • Portland • Toronto
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xxii
Introduction 1
Part I Israel s Security Concept and the Intelligence Concept
1 Israel s Security Concept and its Limitations 25
2 The Intelligence Concept 34
Part II Arab Military Preparations for War through
the Intelligence Prism
Part
Part
Part
Part
III
IV
V
VI
Basic Intelligence
Formulating the Intelligence Picture
The Essence of Warning
Intelligence Assessments and the Decision Makers
Is Egypt Starting a War?
Warning from a Particular High Placed Source
Assessment of Readiness and Assessment of Intentions
Meetings with the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister,
and the Chief of the General Staff
The Mistakes and the Failures
Intelligence s Mistaken Assessment
The Reasons for the Intelligence Failure
The Difficulties of Intelligence Work
Basic Issues in the Intelligence Branch
Problems with the Intelligence Assessment before
the Yom Kippur War
Proposed Lessons
Responsibility for Assessment of Intentions: The Role
of the Leadership
Organizational Lessons
CONTENTS
16 Lessons on Working Methods 221
Conclusion 227
Appendix A Israel and the Arab States: Important Dates 233
between the Six Day War and the Yom
Kippur War
Appendix B Intelligence Products in the Period before 238
the Yom Kippur War
Appendix C Emerging Lessons in a Meeting with the 244
Intelligence Branch Director One Month
after the Outbreak of the War
Appendix D Personal Letter from Intelligence Branch 248
Director Major General Aharon Yariv to
the Author, 27 September 1972
Appendix E Letter in Praise of this Book by Lieutenant 250
General (ret ) Moshe Yaalon, while Serving
as Chief of General Staff
Notes 251
Select Bibliography 284
Index 286
V I
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Shaleṿ, Aryeh |
author_facet | Shaleṿ, Aryeh |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Shaleṿ, Aryeh |
author_variant | a s as |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV036546510 |
callnumber-first | D - World History |
callnumber-label | DS128 |
callnumber-raw | DS128.1 |
callnumber-search | DS128.1 |
callnumber-sort | DS 3128.1 |
callnumber-subject | DS - Asia |
contents | pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept -- Israel's security concept and its limitations -- The intelligence concept -- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism -- Basic intelligence -- Formulating the intelligence picture -- The essence of warning -- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers -- Is Egypt starting a war? -- Warning from a particular high placed source -- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions -- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff -- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures -- Intelligence's mistaken assessment -- The reasons for the intelligence failure -- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work -- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch -- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War -- pt. 6. Proposed lessons -- Responsibility for assessment of intentions: the role of the leadership -- Organizational lessons |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)705646361 (DE-599)BVBBV036546510 |
dewey-full | 956.04/8 |
dewey-hundreds | 900 - History & geography |
dewey-ones | 956 - Middle East (Near East) |
dewey-raw | 956.04/8 |
dewey-search | 956.04/8 |
dewey-sort | 3956.04 18 |
dewey-tens | 950 - History of Asia |
discipline | Geschichte |
era | Geschichte 1900-2000 |
era_facet | Geschichte 1900-2000 |
format | Book |
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geographic | Israel Military policy Decision making Israel (DE-588)4027808-6 gnd |
geographic_facet | Israel Military policy Decision making Israel |
id | DE-604.BV036546510 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:42:33Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781845193706 |
language | English |
lccn | 2010005582 |
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physical | XXIII, 297 S. |
publishDate | 2010 |
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spelling | Shaleṿ, Aryeh Verfasser aut Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction Aryeh Shalev Brighton [u.a.] Sussex Academic Press 2010 XXIII, 297 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept -- Israel's security concept and its limitations -- The intelligence concept -- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism -- Basic intelligence -- Formulating the intelligence picture -- The essence of warning -- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers -- Is Egypt starting a war? -- Warning from a particular high placed source -- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions -- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff -- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures -- Intelligence's mistaken assessment -- The reasons for the intelligence failure -- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work -- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch -- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War -- pt. 6. Proposed lessons -- Responsibility for assessment of intentions: the role of the leadership -- Organizational lessons Geschichte 1900-2000 Geschichte Politik Israel-Arab War, 1973 Military intelligence Israel Military intelligence Israel History 20th century Intelligence service Israel History 20th century National security Israel History 20th century Deception Political aspects Israel History 20th century Distraction (Psychology) Political aspects Israel History 20th century Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd rswk-swf Jom-Kippur-Krieg (DE-588)4190425-4 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf Israel Military policy Decision making Israel (DE-588)4027808-6 gnd rswk-swf Israel (DE-588)4027808-6 g Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 s Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Jom-Kippur-Krieg (DE-588)4190425-4 s DE-604 HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020468181&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Shaleṿ, Aryeh Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept -- Israel's security concept and its limitations -- The intelligence concept -- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism -- Basic intelligence -- Formulating the intelligence picture -- The essence of warning -- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers -- Is Egypt starting a war? -- Warning from a particular high placed source -- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions -- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff -- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures -- Intelligence's mistaken assessment -- The reasons for the intelligence failure -- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work -- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch -- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War -- pt. 6. Proposed lessons -- Responsibility for assessment of intentions: the role of the leadership -- Organizational lessons Geschichte Politik Israel-Arab War, 1973 Military intelligence Israel Military intelligence Israel History 20th century Intelligence service Israel History 20th century National security Israel History 20th century Deception Political aspects Israel History 20th century Distraction (Psychology) Political aspects Israel History 20th century Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd Jom-Kippur-Krieg (DE-588)4190425-4 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4039305-7 (DE-588)4190425-4 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4027808-6 |
title | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction |
title_auth | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction |
title_exact_search | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction |
title_full | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction Aryeh Shalev |
title_fullStr | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction Aryeh Shalev |
title_full_unstemmed | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War disentangling deception and distraction Aryeh Shalev |
title_short | Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War |
title_sort | israel s intelligence assessment before the yom kippur war disentangling deception and distraction |
title_sub | disentangling deception and distraction |
topic | Geschichte Politik Israel-Arab War, 1973 Military intelligence Israel Military intelligence Israel History 20th century Intelligence service Israel History 20th century National security Israel History 20th century Deception Political aspects Israel History 20th century Distraction (Psychology) Political aspects Israel History 20th century Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd Jom-Kippur-Krieg (DE-588)4190425-4 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Geschichte Politik Israel-Arab War, 1973 Military intelligence Israel Military intelligence Israel History 20th century Intelligence service Israel History 20th century National security Israel History 20th century Deception Political aspects Israel History 20th century Distraction (Psychology) Political aspects Israel History 20th century Militär Jom-Kippur-Krieg Geheimdienst Israel Military policy Decision making Israel |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020468181&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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