Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958: organizare, metode, obiective
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | Romanian |
| Published: |
Iaşi
Ed. Junimea
2009
|
| Series: | Historia magistra vitae
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Item Description: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Physical Description: | 537 S. |
| ISBN: | 9789733712343 |
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Record in the Search Index
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|---|---|
| adam_text | CUPRINS
INTRODUCERE
................................................................5-23
CAPITOLUL
I
ORGANIZAREA SECURITĂŢII.
PREMISE ŞI REALIZĂRI
.......................................24-130
1.1.
Serviciul de informaţii al P.C.R
...................24-33
1.2.
Acţiuni de infiltrare şi epurare a Ministerului de
Interne
.........................................................................33
l^.l.Direcţia Generală a Siguranţei Statului.-^-Sl
1.2.2.
Corpul Detectivilor
.....................................51-56
O.Atribuţiile, rolul şi modul de organizare a
aparatului de securitate
........................................56-74
lACadrele Securităţii
..........................................74-90
l.S.Locul şi rolul consilierilor sovietici în activitatea
Securităţii
............................................................90-104
1.6.Alte instituţii cu atribuţii de poliţie politică....l04
l.o.l.Miliţia......
..................................................104-117
і.б.г.Тгиреіе
de Securitate
..............................117-130
CAPITOLUL
II
METODE DE OBŢINERE ŞI STOCARE
A INFORMAŢIILOR
..................................................131-318
2.1.
Reţeaua informativă
...................................134-168
2.2.Arestările şi percheziţiile operate de către poliţia
politică
................................................................168-202
2.3.Anchetele
.....................................................202-236
2.4.
Cenzura corespondenţei
.............................236-253
2.5.Tehnica operativă
.......................................253-264
2.6.Supravegherea operativă (filajul) şi investigaţiile
............................................................................264-285
2.7.Evidenţele Securităţii. Constituirea Arhivei
.................. ..................... .....................................285-318
CAPITOLUL III OBIECTIVELE SECURITĂŢII ÎN
PERIOADA
1948-1958.................................................319-481
S.l.Conţinutul şi formele represiunii
..............319-339
3.2-Rolul Securităţii în procesul de colectivizare a
agriculturii
.........................................................339-364
3.3.Poliţia politică şi lucrările de la Canalul Dunăre-
Marea Neagră
...................................................364-389
3.4.Securitatea şi cultele
...................................389-440
3.5.Acţiunile Securităţii împotriva „bandelor
contrarevoluţionare înarmate
.......................440-481
ABSTRACT
..................................................482-500
BIBLIOGRAFIE
..........................................................501-526
INDICE ONOMASTIC
................................................527-537
ABSTRACT
It was the Information Service of the Romanian
Communist Party that dealt with the communists penetration
and surveillance of the political enemy up to the moment when
the communists managed to control the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the official information structures. Founded in
early
1944
by
Emil Bodnăraş,
the Information Service was lead
by an old underground communist, Mirel
Costea.
The Service
carried out its activity both by setting up its own agency and by
penetrating and recruiting informers among the staff members
of the legal information services of the State and political
parties. The Service found links in the state apparatus, S.S.I.
(Secret Information Service), the Security and Major Great
State by selecting underground communists with skills in
collecting information as well as members of the Romanian
Communist Party that had been trained as agents by the
N.K.V.D. in the Soviet Union and who were sent in missions to
Romania during the war.
Until taking full control over the Interior Ministry and
secret services, the Romanian Communist Party had been
closely following their moves due to moles with important
functions that provided besides current information also
characterizations of some leaders, the communists being able
to spot people likely to be blackmailed.
Due to the Support Service which was grouping agents
on field, delicate missions were solved, for instance the
unlawful detention and interrogation of some people. Some of
the well-known cases are those of
Ştefan Floriş
and Dafinescu,
the former director at the prison Doftana during the 40s, shot
in the winter of
1946-1947,
after having been staged an attempt
of escort escaping . From that moment on, a way of action
482
was drawn up and it would become a common practice for
Securitate:
the use of special services in order to eliminate
uncomfortable opponents. The informing activity carried out
by that service enabled communist leaders to get acquainted in
time with the intentions of the traditional parties and main state
institutions. The early forms of the future political police of the
communist state are now set up due to the selection of the
Safety and S.S.I, leaders after March 6th,
1945,
especially
among former members of the Romanian Communist Party s
Intelligence Service.
Through men named in leading positions within the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Police Directorate and
the General Military Force Inspectorate, Dr.
Petru
Groza s
Government began politicizing these institutions, preventing
them from fulfilling their ordinary tasks in order to transform
Romania into a communist country.
The steps taken by the communists aimed to reorganize
the security institutions by infiltrations of special delegates of
N.K.V.D. such as
Emil Bodnăraş,
Piotr
Goncearuk, Pantelimon
Bodnarenco (Gheorghe Pintilie),
Alexandru Nicolschi,
Vladimir Mazuru, Ana
Toma or
Nina Nikonova, all Moscow s
agents, designated executives within certain Romanian
informative structures
-
purification of the elements faithful to
the ex-form of government and politicization of the
informative-operative work.
For a better coordination of informative and repressive
actions, the communist party, a determined supporter of
centralism, decided in
1947
to create the General Directorate
for State Security, direct predecessor of
Securitate.
The
management of the institution was assigned to a team which
had proved its fidelity and lack of scruples in eliminating
political enemies.
One of the first structures within the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, infiltrated and then controlled by communists,
483
was the Detective Service, directly subject to the Directorate
for Security Police. Besides the direct involvement in
organizing the repression of political opponents, the Detective
Service intensified its attributions in what concerned the
prosecution and infiltration in the environments hostile to
communism.
If between
1945
and
1947
the repressive actions had
been carried out by persons from the old police or informative
structures, being used for the fight against political opponents
by the persons from those structures believing in communists,
on August 28th,
1948,
the political police became the explicit
attribute of a state institution, General Directorate for the
Security of the People (GDSP). GDSP was nothing else but the
synthesis of the communist party s efforts during the period
after March 6th,
1945
in view of the creation of a supervision
and repression apparatus as intimidating as possible. The new
institution had to correspond to the stage in which Romania
entered at the same time with the king s dethronement and the
proclamation of the Popular Republic on December 30th,
1947.
In organizing the
Securitate,
great attention was paid to
operative, and informative supervision functions and direct
actions against the ones identified as enemies of the people ,
who could have been taken and investigated in the political
police s detention places consequently to the information
gathered by the investigation departments. At the same time,
they paid great attention to decision centralization and labour
division, the General Directorate coordinating all the actions in
the country of the
Securitate
Services and Offices which had a
double subordination: first, towards the central Directorate
from the activity segment, from which they received
indications and orders and then towards the Regional
Administration which was responsible for the coordination of
all the activities from its competence area and the enforcement
of the orders received from the subordinated Services. The fact
484
that the new institution was totally militarized increased the
command, coordination and control efficiency regarding the
way the political police act was managed, which is explicitly
mentioned in Decree
221.
The period between
1945
and the beginning of the
60
s
represented an acute crisis period for the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, an acute staff crisis, as the crossover from the
democratic form of government to the one installed after
March 6th,
1945
supposed the purification and replacement of
old employees with new ones, loyal to the new government. In
the 50 s, the security officers had to observe certain conditions:
to have had proved their devotion in the ardour of the class
fights from
1945-1947
and the belief in the triumph of the
communist cause. The sound social origin adds to all these,
in other words the workers were preferred, many times the
unqualified ones, or poor peasants, who did not sympathize
with the bourgeois and landlords and executed the most
strange orders. Most of the time, the security officers were
young persons, at most
30
years old, with poor education, but
obeying the bosses and fully trusting the protection the
institution and party offered them even for the most serious
infringements of the law. Most of the officers were or were
about to become party members and that made them more
invulnerable and, at the same time, represented a launching
platform in their careers. Another element was the attachment
to great country of the U.S.S.R. socialism , considered a real
test for every good security officer.
The security organs had been supervised since the
beginning by the soviet counsellors who were K.G.B. officers
and played an important role both as organisers and instructors,
their role exceeding by far the administrative level. Having as
main objective to test the activity line of each security unit, set
up tasks and operative missions, define the working
methodology, introduce the soviet operative technique, as well
485
as to direct the important actions (the investigation of certain
people took place only after they had been informed, in many
cases it was them to set the tasks that were to be carried on),
the soviet counsellors exceeded their attributions, exercising a
great influence not only on the Romanian informative organs,
but even on the Romanian Labour Party. Based on the
information provided by the counsellors and the orders
received from Moscow after that, the appointment or dismissal
of persons from the Romanian structures was influenced.
At the moment, the number of the soviet counsellors is
still unknown, but what it is known is that they occupied all the
important positions from the central and regional Directorates,
even those from the security offices in small towns. Although
they were Soviet citizens, it seems that they were registered as
officers of the Romanian
Securitate,
and they arrived in the
country consequently to an interstate agreement between
Popular Romania and Soviet Union, being requested by the
Romanian party.
In its actions, the communist political police was helped
by another two repression institutions, Militia (Police) and
Security Troops.
Ever since its foundation, the Militia represented an
instrument faithful to communism and it collaborated with
Securitate.
The Police staff members, chosen among the poor
social classes, with a less than modest education, was
indoctrinated by the Political Directorate, founding a group of
faithful members of the regime. What it is important is the fact
that the Police did not only try to prevent certain anti-social
deeds, but for certain actions, even they could have been
accused of political police, such as the delivery of the
informative notes collected by its own network agents (most of
the times, simple denouncements) towards the
Securitate,
the
participation to the fight against the resistance groups or the
ungrounded arrests in the frontier area.
486
Another help received by the political police came from
the Security Troops. Created on the soviet model, they were
necessary for far-reaching actions such as the dislocation of
certain categories of persons, operations against the armed
resistance organizations, interventions in case of popular
rebellion or the guard of labour camps. The Security Troops
started to work from January
23 , 1949,
with members
recruited on ideological criteria, and not professional ones, due
to clean files and sound social origin and lack of anti¬
democratic political antecedents, representing the fundamental
standard for the maintenance, promotion or dismissal within
those structures.
Consequently to the actions against the resistance members, the
leaders of the Troops tried to set up norms regarding this
army s activity, but the very strong ideological print acted
against the specialization criteria, the professional lack being
noticed in the fights against the armed
anti
-communist
resistance groups, in the capture or elimination of the persons
parachuted on the Romanian territory etc.
The methods used by
Securitate
to reach its goals were
strictly connected to the general instruction level and
professional training of the institution s employees. Thus,
despites
using methods apparently common to all information
services in the world, the
Securitate
s
activity came to be
marked by violence as never seen before in the practice of
Romanian secrete services, abuses and important infringement
of the legislation in force at that moment.
The secret agents (informative network) were the
Securitate
s
main mean of gathering and checking the
information pieces they were interested in. Ever since the
political police was founded, internal orders had been issued,
regulating the way of working with informers, both for getting
to know better the situation in the country and for preventing
and discouraging any hostile action against the communist
487
form of government. The Agents/Agency represented the
Securitate
s
main tool of population control, its expansion
degree and the directing way evolving and reflecting the
ideological line drawn by the party. Each member of the
informative network acted within the limits set up by the
connection officer. The agency, by the role it had been
conferred, as the eyes and years of the
Securitate
s
organs,
according to Alexandra
Draghici,
favoured the maintenance of
an abnormality atmosphere concerning the entire Romanian
society, every person suspecting the other of collaboration, and
this neurotic phenomenon lead
ín
time to passivism and lack
of attitude in relation with any form of power.
One of the important attributions of the security organs
was to arrest the persons suspected of acting against the
popular democratic form of government. The arrests were
done by officers of the Operative Service and the way they
were carried out was based on the instructions issued by the
Securitate
s
leadership. In many cases, these orders were not
observed, the system of the arrests without a warn functioning
for all the
60
s
period. It is hard to tell the number of those
arrested and imprisoned during the leadership of Gheorghiu-
Dej as the
Securitate ?,
statistics are contradictory. Moreover,
assessing the numbers of the repression based on the political
police s documents contrasts with the evaluations done by the
ex-political prisoners.
By means of the investigation, the Romanian citizens
got to know one of the toughest faces of the
Securitate
and the
traumas caused could only be matched by the nightmare of the
concentration camps environment. The inquest s aim in the
communist totalitarian system was not to obtain true
information from the interrogated person any more, as in the
case of classical interrogations from the democratic states,
but to make a solid file, upon a prescribed receipt, which was
supposed to lead to the conviction of the arrested persons,
488
whether they were guilty or not. The political inquests and
processes spread terror and confusion both among the victims
who caused them and free people, the entire arsenal used by
Securitate
playing an essential role in sickening the
Romanian society as the reflex of the terror imprinted during
that period in the collective consciousness remained vivid
throughout the entire communist period.
In the
Securitate
s
activity, a commonly used method to
obtain information consisted in censoring the mail. The system
also worked during the interwar period, being significantly
improved, while later the communist political police did
nothing but availing the instructions of censorship into an
unmistakable ideological cover where the target was the inside
and outside class enemy. The secret censorship of the mail and
parcels was done by the
Securitate^
F
Service. It had among
its attributions the thorough control of the external and internal
mail deliveries (letters, telegrams, press and stamped materials)
with the declared purpose of preventing any possibility to use
this way of connection by part of the elements hostile to the
popular democracy form of government . The censorship s
mission was to provide the operative units with materials
concerning the activity of spies and anti-revolutionary
elements which the censors obtained by reading the mail, to
intercept the letters of the persons already prosecuted, but also
to find out, in certain moments, the state of mind of different
categories of citizens regarding certain events or decisions
taken by the party, government etc., even if this way the
Romanians constitutional rights were infringed.
Another way the political police used to obtain
information was the spinning, which was the task of VIIth
Operative Directorate. It consisted in the secret supervision of
the persons who were prosecuted by
Securitate
and was meant
to discover their connections (entourage) and visited addresses,
to observe their way of living, customs and behaviour, while
489
the moments considered as important were secretly
photographed.
The
Securitate
also obtained certain data using the
operative technique by intercepting the discussions of the
prosecuted persons. Based on the requests of the operative
Directorates and the approval of the Ministry leadership, the
T Service within the Operative Technique Directorate
secretly installed equipments meant to control the activity of
the persons prosecuted by the operative structures. We do not
question the technical means and procedures used by
Securitate,
but the purpose and the way in which they were
used, by abuse and infringement of legal and methodological
norms. Moreover, the
Securitate
used the operative technique
in an extreme manner in order to substitute the insufficient
informational contribution of the humane resources. The
interceptions, in most of the cases carried out without
observing the legal procedures, became common practices, the
citizens intimacy and rights being infringed in a flagrant
manner.
All those data obtained by the
Securitate
were stored in
archive files kept in the political police Archives. The
registration and archiving system changed considerably after
1945.
when they renounced the logistics that ensured full
conspiracy regarding both agents and operative employees of
the secret service, and also people considered targets under
tracking or monitoring surveillance. It was for that reason that
the records of the
Securitate
can be more easily traced than
those belonging to interwar secret service intelligence.
From
1948
until
1971,
recording, folding and keeping
documents became the responsibility of the Service C , which
coordinated the activities of central registration and archive of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the corresponding sections
of the regional directorates. The archives and the central
records of the
Securitate
were founded in the first years of the
490
5th decade, once with the classification of the first files. The
archives were organized based on funds system: operative
system (later renamed information system, it comprised
tracking and surveillance records), network (filling the ex-
agents files, and of those who refused to cooperate or those
who did not receive the approval to be recruited, being
considered improper), inquest (comprising the prosecution and
criminal investigation files, those of military tribunals, the
prison portfolios and labour colonies), mail (comprising letters
between the units of
Securitate
or between them and other
institutions outside the Ministry of Internal Affairs),
inoperative (here filling the personnel records of officers,
NCOs, military supervisors and civil personnel after they were
put in reserve or retired, as well as the documents drawn up by
the administrative services and secretariats), documentary
(comprising the materials provided by processing the records
from the former informative organs and security police in
which they were not interested from the operative point of
view).
The repressive measures, which caused a terror climate
in Popular Romania, represented the act of political wish of the
party s superior leaders by providing the frame, setting the
objectives, while
Securitate
was dealing with their fulfilment.
The details concerning the various oppressive actions
represented the object of the debates within the party s
leadership forums who ordered directly repressive measures
against certain social-professional categories (rich people,
priests, intellectuals etc.) or members of the historic parties.
During the periods characterized by a reduced repression, the
thousands of victims of the system were considered to be due
to the mistakes and lacks of the
Securitate.
Their disclosure, in
different stages, will become an arm of fight and political
blackmail used both by Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae
Ceauşescu
every time they considered necessary to eliminate their
491
possible
enemies. The years
Securitatea
was directly involved
into the control taking fights among the leaders of the Party,
there were periods in which its autonomy increased, due to the
fact that either it obeyed the decisions of the collective
leaderships or it acted according to the orders of a single
person, it always fulfilled the requests regarding the repression
of the government s enemies, whoever they might have been in
the leaders opinion. It was never the case that
Securitate
was
outside the
„
line
drawn by the party.
The new laws created the so-called legal frame for the
Securitate
s
actions, transforming the opposition towards the
government into a crime. On February 27th,
1948,
the Penal
code was republished and the amendments brought under the
coordination of the ex-Minister of justice,
Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu,
represented the legal basis that facilitated the
Securitate
s
actions materialized in the repression of the enemies the
people . Consequently, depending on the priorities set up by
the party for the political police, the Penal Code was modified
in order to leave to the
Securitate
a large sphere of action.
Between
1948
and
1958,
among the objectives of
Securitate,
characterized by the number of victims and special
attention paid to the working plans, were the enforcement of
the party s economic police in the whole country
(collectivization, enforcement of the quota system etc.), the
works at Danube-Black Sea Channel, the elimination of the
armed resistance groups, the surveillance and annihilation of
the anti-communist leaders from the country, and the
prevention of the occurrence and elimination of any anti-
communist idea among the hierarchy of various cults.
Due to the fact that in Romania the peasants
represented the majority of the population, the agricultural
problem represented an important preoccupation of the
governors even after the communists came to power. The
existence of the peasantry not included into the socialist system
492
was
inacceptable
for the authorities, due to both the Marxist-
Leninist judgement and the fact that, by possessing land, the
rural population controlled the resources necessary to the
payment of war debts, ensured the town supply and the
country s economic development.
The collectivization issue represented a highly
important objective in the
Securitate ?,
activity. The officers of
the repressive apparatus drew up reports based on the
informative notes provided by the agents where they mentioned
the instigation, diversion and sabotage actions. For each parish
the
Securitate
officers drew up objective files, which, besides
the general data, contained the records of those categories of
persons who might have opposed to the collectivization or
shares system. An important attribution of the operative officer
was to create, in the countryside, a strong informative network
meant to supervise the population. Helped by the informative
network,
Securitatea
had to make an analysis of the rural
environment and provide the party s structures with all the
necessary data, but this kind of activity was much attenuated
by its repressive side, as the peasants provided the largest
number of arrests between
1848
and
1958.
The steps taken by the authorities in the countryside,
helped by the political police, caused protests of the peasants,
including rebellions, as their most radical form. Throughout the
analysed period, various rebellions took place in many
Romanian regions and lead to confrontations with the
Securitate
troops and Militia, consequently to which many
peasants were immediately executed, while others were
arrested,
trialled
and sentenced or deported to Dobrogea and
Bărăgan.
Another very important objective in the
Securitate
s
activity consisted in the supervision of the works performed at
the Danube
-
Black Sea channel. It was still the mission of the
political police to investigate certain persons fictively accused
493
either belonging to the leadership or pastoral-missionary ones.
The political activity of the Orthodox priests before August
23rd,
1944,
as well as their social status represented an
important argument in their prosecution. At the end of
1949,
many of them were qualified as kulaks who did not want to
adhere to the kolkhoz (collective farm), becoming thus
suspected of sabotage in what concerned the socialization of
agriculture . The pastoral-missionary activity of an important
number of Orthodox priests carried out in the Romanian
provinces,
Basarabia
and Bucovina, under the leadership pf Ion
Antonescu, added to all these. This activity was considered as a
campaign of calumnies addressed to the Soviet Union .
An unexpected problem which confused the proper
course of the political police s activity was the change of
direction of patriarch Iustinian who will become an enemy of
the repressive authorities due to his wish to administrate the
church according to his evangelic principles and canonical
provisions, in view of its conservation in the new political
environment from Romania.
In what concerns the Catholic Church, given that its
centre of decision was in Vatican, outside the socialist camp,
the
Securitate
s
efforts focused on determining its
representatives from the country to separate from the Pope by
creating
dissidence, a
national Catholic Church. The most
powerful
Securitate
s
attack against the Romanian Catholic
Church, after the Decree no.
358
from December 1st,
1948,
was
the frame up of a trial in which the Nunciature was accused,
this legal joke carefully set up by the political police, copying,
as in the case of deviationists , the Stalinist scenario of the
time, already put into practice in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The
Securitate
s
repression against the Catholicism
promoted by the Vatican increased when the party started the
fight against saboteurs and all conspirators from the Popular
Republic of Romania, after the resolution of the plenary
496
meeting
of Romanian Labour Party s Central Committee from
June
IO111
- 11*, 1948.
On this occasion, the Catholic Church
and the members of Jehovah s witnesses sect were convicted
as supporters of fascist-Iron Guard elements . This party
document represented the
Securitate
s
directing line in terms of
religions/cults, while the two churches benefited from a special
attention in the informative prosecution. This way one can
explain the tough repression to which were subject the
Catholics and Jehovists and a certain caution towards the other
religions.
Among the methods the Romanians used to fight
against the system, the toughest and most tragic at the same
time was the armed resistance. The oppression unleashed by
the communists after March 6th,
1945,
against the political
enemies, together with the financial problems, created a
climate of general uncertainty and discontent. Many population
categories were deeply discontent with the new form of
government, while the number of those who wanted to fight
against it was continuously increasing. In this context, a strong
motivation in taking the decision to hide in the mountains and
take part to armed resistance groups was determined by the
imminence of the arrest and by the belief that the form of
government imposed by the Soviets, due to its brutality and
unpopular measures, would not resist for long. This belief was
strongly fed by the hope that Western Europe and U.S.A.
would not abandon Central and Eastern Europe in favour of the
Soviets, a war against U.S.S.R. being considered inevitable.
Due to the lack of a national leadership nucleus, the partisans
control over an important geographical area where to restrain
or interrupt the communists authority could not be put into
practice. Except for the intimidation of members from the
Romanian Communist Party or of those from the order and
administration organs, some anti-soviet and anticommunist
instigations, the ways of imposing the control were reduced.
497
Moreover, the lack of a leading nucleus allowed the
Securitate
and its regular troops to gather the forces in view of the
destruction of each group, which would have been impossible
in a contrary case, when a unique commandment would have
forced the repressive organs to disperse its means on areas
exceeding their possibilities. Thus, before dense forces, in
order to survive, the members of the resistance were forced to
divide themselves into small groups or to abandon their
actions.
The proportion of the resistance is proved by the
numbers provided by
Securitate:
in
1949, 200
subversive
organisations and
33
terrorist groups had been tracked down,
while for
1945-1959
their number amounted
1196
persons. The
liquidation of this resistance form finished, according to a
synthesis draw up in May
1959
by the
Securitate
s
organs,
with
13.297
persons sentenced to prison and
463
with forced
domicile. Among them, over
5000
had bee part of
organizations and gangs lead by Iron Guard members . The
exact number of those killed consequently to military actions
or in investigations carried on after the arrest.
The action areas of these groups were the regions with
road inequalities in the mountains or hardly accessible, forests
or Danube s moors. The actions took place near small villages,
which provided the resistance s members with supplies and
informative support. The endowment with military material
consisting in light fire guns, in general, and grenades, and the
very small number of members from these groups determined
the typology of the actions. Most of them were sabotage-
diversion and intimidation-terror acts focused especially on the
party and state local representatives, as well as their
collaborators.
Even since its foundation in August
1948,
the General
Directorate for the Security of the People had had among its
attributions the repression of the armed resistance movements.
498
The repeated failures in capturing certain groups determine the
Securitate
s
leadership to found single commandments meant
to coordinate on a certain geographical area the capture and
elimination actions. In its fight against partisans,
Securitate
benefited from huge funds, but also from the contribution of
soviet counsellors who introduced organisational and labour
methods inspired from the Russian civil war.
The first operation against the armed groups was
gathering information on them, the possibility of catching the
resistance s members being initially postponed. The
fundamental element in the elimination of the armed resistance
by part of the
Securitate
consisted in the expansion and
qualitative improvement of the informative network in areas
where the partisans acted, preoccupations regarding its
improvement and expansion seeming a recurrent subject in the
epoch s documents drawn up by the repression organs.
In order to destroy the groups, they also used
undercover informers and officers who recommended
themselves as being refugees prosecuted by the
Securitate.
The
political police also got information consequently to the
captures and further interrogations of the resistance members,
as their interrogation took place in such a manner so that they
could ascertain who their accomplices were, where they had
taken the weapons from and where these were stored, who the
persons were who helped them, if there were any connections
between the various partisans groups or between them and the
ex-political parties, priests and Romanians who had left the
country etc. Another method used by
Securitate
consisted in
discrediting the members of the groups from the mountains in
front of the population and the supporting elements in order to
reduce the partisans information and supply possibilities. The
main way of capturing and destroying the armed anti-
revolutionary gangs was the massive use of the Security
Troops.
499
The Securitate
succeed to inoculate and later on to
administrate the feeling of fear which this institution generated.
Fear created the perception of a supernatural power of the
Securitate,
causing most of the population a self-censoring
mechanism which restrained the occurrence of conflicts with
the system. Thus, although those who had a direct contact with
Securitate,
compared to the population s number, were not so
many, most Romanians showed a deep fear of the political
police, first of all caused by its actions, and further on only by
its simple existence and image management.
500
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Ivănescu, Sorin D. 1967- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1183953526 |
| author_facet | Ivănescu, Sorin D. 1967- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Ivănescu, Sorin D. 1967- |
| author_variant | s d i sd sdi |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV036464124 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)643727823 (DE-599)BVBBV036464124 |
| era | Geschichte 1948-1958 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1948-1958 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV036464124 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:40:01Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789733712343 |
| language | Romanian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020335950 |
| oclc_num | 643727823 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 537 S. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Ed. Junimea |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Historia magistra vitae |
| spelling | Ivănescu, Sorin D. 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)1183953526 aut Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective Sorin D. Ivănescu Iaşi Ed. Junimea 2009 537 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Historia magistra vitae Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Rumänien Ministerul de Interne (DE-588)2120896-7 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1948-1958 gnd rswk-swf Rumänien Ministerul de Interne (DE-588)2120896-7 b Geschichte 1948-1958 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020335950&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020335950&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Ivănescu, Sorin D. 1967- Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective Rumänien Ministerul de Interne (DE-588)2120896-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)2120896-7 |
| title | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective |
| title_auth | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective |
| title_exact_search | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective |
| title_full | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective Sorin D. Ivănescu |
| title_fullStr | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective Sorin D. Ivănescu |
| title_full_unstemmed | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 organizare, metode, obiective Sorin D. Ivănescu |
| title_short | Securitatea în perioada 1948 - 1958 |
| title_sort | securitatea in perioada 1948 1958 organizare metode obiective |
| title_sub | organizare, metode, obiective |
| topic | Rumänien Ministerul de Interne (DE-588)2120896-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rumänien Ministerul de Interne |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020335950&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020335950&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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