Competition against peer-to-peer networks:
In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading-incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of in...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Maastricht
METEOR, Maastricht research school of Economics of Technology and organizations
2008
|
| Series: | Research memorandum
|
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading-incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights-we find that the firm may employ pricing strategies to either deter the entry of a network or to accommodate it. In the latter case, we find that the equilibrium price moves in the opposite direction of the generic cost factor of downloading. This counter-intuitive result corresponds to a very subtle form of platform competition between the firm and the network. Furthermore, profits for the firm ambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines, whereas total welfare unambiguously increases. This implies that it may well be welfare enhancing to relax the legal enforcements of intellectual property rights |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 S.) |
Staff View
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| 520 | |a In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading-incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights-we find that the firm may employ pricing strategies to either deter the entry of a network or to accommodate it. In the latter case, we find that the equilibrium price moves in the opposite direction of the generic cost factor of downloading. This counter-intuitive result corresponds to a very subtle form of platform competition between the firm and the network. Furthermore, profits for the firm ambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines, whereas total welfare unambiguously increases. This implies that it may well be welfare enhancing to relax the legal enforcements of intellectual property rights | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Peeters, Ronald |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Yang, Michael |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
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| spelling | Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)124502709 aut Competition against peer-to-peer networks P. Jean-Jacques Herings ; Ronald Peeters ; Michael Yang Maastricht METEOR, Maastricht research school of Economics of Technology and organizations 2008 1 Online-Ressource (35 S.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Research memorandum In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading-incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights-we find that the firm may employ pricing strategies to either deter the entry of a network or to accommodate it. In the latter case, we find that the equilibrium price moves in the opposite direction of the generic cost factor of downloading. This counter-intuitive result corresponds to a very subtle form of platform competition between the firm and the network. Furthermore, profits for the firm ambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines, whereas total welfare unambiguously increases. This implies that it may well be welfare enhancing to relax the legal enforcements of intellectual property rights Peeters, Ronald Verfasser aut Yang, Michael Verfasser aut http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1319 kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques 1969- Peeters, Ronald Yang, Michael Competition against peer-to-peer networks |
| title | Competition against peer-to-peer networks |
| title_auth | Competition against peer-to-peer networks |
| title_exact_search | Competition against peer-to-peer networks |
| title_full | Competition against peer-to-peer networks P. Jean-Jacques Herings ; Ronald Peeters ; Michael Yang |
| title_fullStr | Competition against peer-to-peer networks P. Jean-Jacques Herings ; Ronald Peeters ; Michael Yang |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition against peer-to-peer networks P. Jean-Jacques Herings ; Ronald Peeters ; Michael Yang |
| title_short | Competition against peer-to-peer networks |
| title_sort | competition against peer to peer networks |
| url | http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1319 |
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