A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes: transferring OPEC monopoly rent
This paper highlights the potential for joint OECD (or non-OPEC) carbon taxes to reduce OPEC's monopoly rent and provide benefit to non-OPEC countries provided jointly agreed trigger strategies are adhered to. In traditional economic theory, the primary purpose of a carbon tax is to internalize...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CESifo
2009
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
2741 : Category 8, Trade policy |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper highlights the potential for joint OECD (or non-OPEC) carbon taxes to reduce OPEC's monopoly rent and provide benefit to non-OPEC countries provided jointly agreed trigger strategies are adhered to. In traditional economic theory, the primary purpose of a carbon tax is to internalize a global negative externality. A second benefit for individual countries is that the revenue raised by carbon tax can be used to reduce other tax rates and so lower the deadweight loss of tax system. In this paper, we discuss a third benefit of carbon taxes: transferring rents from OPEC to the oil importing countries. We develop a multi-region general equilibrium structure with endogenously determined oil supply for the purpose in which emissions are endogenously determined. We calibrate our model to 2006 data. Our analytics and numerical simulation results highlight how a uniform carbon tax used by all non-OPEC countries will increase the buyer’s price of oil but decrease the supplier's price of oil, thus decreasing non-OPEC countrie's oil demand, and transferring OPEC monopoly rent to non-OPEC countries. Carbon taxes reduce the welfare of OPEC and increase the welfare of non-OPEC countries. Results also show how carbon taxes reduce global emissions, but the effect is small. -- carbon taxes ; OECD ; monopoly rent |
| Beschreibung: | 20 S. |
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| id | DE-604.BV035816149 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:05:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-018674987 |
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| physical | 20 S. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
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| publisher | CESifo |
| record_format | marc |
| series | CESifo working papers |
| series2 | CESifo working papers |
| spelling | Dong, Yan Verfasser (DE-588)136765599 aut A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent Yan Dong ; John Whalley Munich CESifo 2009 20 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 2741 : Category 8, Trade policy This paper highlights the potential for joint OECD (or non-OPEC) carbon taxes to reduce OPEC's monopoly rent and provide benefit to non-OPEC countries provided jointly agreed trigger strategies are adhered to. In traditional economic theory, the primary purpose of a carbon tax is to internalize a global negative externality. A second benefit for individual countries is that the revenue raised by carbon tax can be used to reduce other tax rates and so lower the deadweight loss of tax system. In this paper, we discuss a third benefit of carbon taxes: transferring rents from OPEC to the oil importing countries. We develop a multi-region general equilibrium structure with endogenously determined oil supply for the purpose in which emissions are endogenously determined. We calibrate our model to 2006 data. Our analytics and numerical simulation results highlight how a uniform carbon tax used by all non-OPEC countries will increase the buyer’s price of oil but decrease the supplier's price of oil, thus decreasing non-OPEC countrie's oil demand, and transferring OPEC monopoly rent to non-OPEC countries. Carbon taxes reduce the welfare of OPEC and increase the welfare of non-OPEC countries. Results also show how carbon taxes reduce global emissions, but the effect is small. -- carbon taxes ; OECD ; monopoly rent Steuererhebung (DE-588)4057425-8 gnd rswk-swf Kohlenversorgung (DE-588)4164575-3 gnd rswk-swf Kohlenversorgung (DE-588)4164575-3 s Steuererhebung (DE-588)4057425-8 s DE-604 Whalley, John 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)128956879 aut CESifo working papers 2741 : Category 8, Trade policy (DE-604)BV013978326 2741 |
| spellingShingle | Dong, Yan Whalley, John 1947- A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent CESifo working papers Steuererhebung (DE-588)4057425-8 gnd Kohlenversorgung (DE-588)4164575-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4057425-8 (DE-588)4164575-3 |
| title | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent |
| title_auth | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent |
| title_exact_search | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent |
| title_full | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent Yan Dong ; John Whalley |
| title_fullStr | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent Yan Dong ; John Whalley |
| title_full_unstemmed | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes transferring OPEC monopoly rent Yan Dong ; John Whalley |
| title_short | A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes |
| title_sort | a third benefit of joint non opec carbon taxes transferring opec monopoly rent |
| title_sub | transferring OPEC monopoly rent |
| topic | Steuererhebung (DE-588)4057425-8 gnd Kohlenversorgung (DE-588)4164575-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Steuererhebung Kohlenversorgung |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dongyan athirdbenefitofjointnonopeccarbontaxestransferringopecmonopolyrent AT whalleyjohn athirdbenefitofjointnonopeccarbontaxestransferringopecmonopolyrent |